A History Of Eclecticism In Greek Philosophy

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TRANSDBLATOR’S PREFACHEK.

es
᾿Ὁς.» 0...

THIS is a translation of the second section of Dr.
Zeller’s ‘Philosophie der Griechen, Dritter Theil,
Erste Abtheilung.’ The first section of the volume,
concerning the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, has
already been translated by Dr. Reichel. The present
translation has been made from the third and latest

edition of the German work.

S. F. ALLEYNE.

CLIFTON: Sevtember 1, 1883.

Errata.

Page 83, line 15: for belonged read belongs

33

95, ., 36: forfundamental impulse read impulse

116, ,, 2: for their read its

162, ,, 19: for I read we

205, ,, 21: for effects read affect

206, ,, 6: for enquires read asks

207, ,, 2: substitute a semicolon for a comma after ‘doctrine,’

210, ,, 13: substitute a note of interrogation for a comma after

‘ourselves.’

294, 3: for under read in

357, lines land 2: for that universal, which he claims for all men as
their inborn conviction read that universal con-
viction which he claims for all men as innate

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER 1.

ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF ECLECTICISM .

Gradual blending of the schools of philosophy: internal
causes of this, 1 sg. External causes: diffusion of Greek
philosophy among the Romans, 5. Reaction of that
diffusion upon philosophy, 14. Principle and character
of eclectic philosophy, 17. Contained the germs of the
later scepticism, 21; and of Neo-Platonism, 22

CHAPTER It.

ECLECTICISM IN THE SECOND AND FIRST CENTURIES
BEFORE CHRIST-——-THE EPICUREANS—ASCLEPIADES

Relation of the later Epicureans to Epicurus, 24. Asclepi-
ades of Bithynia, 29 sq.

CHAPTER IIT.
THE STOICS: BOETHUS, PANZ:TIUS, POSIDONIUS .

Successors of Chrysippus, 34. Boéthus, 35. Panztius, 39.
Character of his philosophy, 42. Deviations from Stoic-
ism, 43 sg. Ethics, 47. Contemporaries and disciples of
Panztius, 52. Posidonius, 56. His philosophic ten-
dencies, 59. His anthropology, 64. Other Stoics of the
first century before Christ, 70

PAGE

24

34

vi CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHERS IN THE FIRST
CENTURY BEFORE CHRIST . . 178

PAGE

Philo of Larissa, 75. His practical bias, 77. Modification
of the scepticism of the Academy, 79. His theory of
knowledge, 81. Antiochus of Ascalon, 85. Polemic
against scepticism, 87. Hclecticism: essential agree-
ment of the various systems, 91; theory of knowledge, 93.
Physics and metaphysics, 94. Ethics, 95. School of
Antiochus, 99. Eudorus, 103. Arius Didymus, 106.
Potamo, 109

CHAPTER V.

THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL IN THE FIRST CENTURY
BEFORE CHRIST . . . 112

The Commentators: Andronicus of Rhodes, 113. Boéthus
of Sidon, 117. Aristo, Staseas, Cratippus, Nicolaus,
Xenarchus, and others, 121 sg. The treatise περὶ κόσμον ;
various theories as to its origin, 125. Nature of the
treatise, 132. Origin and date of composition, 138.
Treatise on virtues and vices, 145

CHAPTER VI.

CICERO——-VARRO : . . 146

Cicero, 146. His scepticism, 149. Its limits, 151. Practical
view of philosophy, 156. Eclecticism : doctrine of innate
knowledge, 159. Ethics, 162. Theology, 167. Anthro-
pology, 169. Varro, 171. His view of philosophy and
the various schools, 172. Ethics, 173. Anthropology
and philosophy, 176

CHAPTER VII.

THE SCHOOL OF THE SEXTII . . 180

History of the school, 80. Iis philosophic character and
standpoint, 183

CONTENTS. vil

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST CENTURIES AFTER CHRIST — THE
SCHOOL OF THE STOICS—SENECGA . . 189

PAGE

Philosophy in the Imperial period: study of the ancient
philosophers, 189. HEndowment of public chairs of
philosophy, 190. The school of the Stoics from the first
to the third century, 194 sg. Cornutus, 199. Seneca,
202. His conception of the problem of philosophy, 205.
Uselessness of merely theoretic inquiries, 206. Opinion
of dialectic, 207. Physics, 209. Metaphysical and
theological views, 212. The world and nature, 217.
Man, 219. Uncertainty of Seneca’s speculative theories,
225. His ethics essentially Stoic in principle, 226.
Modification of Stoic dogmas, 227. Application of par-
ticular moral doctrines, 235. Independence of things
external, 236. Love of mankind, 239. Religious tem-
perament, 242

CHAPTER IX,

THE STOICS CONTINUED: MUSONIUS, EPICTETUS,
MARCUS AURELIUS . . . 246

Musonius, 246. His-practical standpoint, 248. His ethics,
255. Epictetus and Arrian, 256. Practical end of
philosophy, 258. Inferior value of knowledge, 260.
Religious view of the world, 263. Man, 266. Ethics,
268. Independence of things external; resignation to
destiny and the course of the universe, 270 sy. In-
clination to Cynicism, 272. Gentleness and love of
mankind, 274, 275. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, 276.
His practical view of philosophy, 277. His theoretic
opinions; flux of all things, 279; the Deity, Providence,
order of the world, 280 sy. Kinship of man to God, 283.
Ethics, 284. Withdrawal into self, 284. Resignation
to the will of God, 285. Love of mankind, 286

Vill CONTENTS.

CHAPTER X.
PAGE

THE CYNICS OF THE IMPERIAL ERA. . 288

Revival of Cynicism, 289. Its adherents, 290 sg. De-
metrius, 291. Cinomaus, 294. Demonax, 296. Pere-
grinus, 299. Later Cynics, 301

CHAPTER XI.

THE PERIPATETICS OF THE FIRST CENTURIES
AFTER CHRIST . . . 304

The Peripatetic school of the first and second century, 304.
Commentators of Aristotle’s works: Aspasius, Adrastus,
Herminus, Achaicus, Sosigenes, 306. Aristocles of
Messene, 314. Alexander of Aphrodisias, 318. Apologies
for Aristotle’s writings and commentaries on them, 322.
The Particular and the Universal, Form and Matter,
324. The soul and νοῦς, 324. God and the world, 329.
Extinction of the Peripatetic School, 332

CHAPTER XII.

THE PLATONIC SCHOOL IN THE FIRST CENTURIES
AFTER THE CHRISTIAN ERA . . . 334

Platonists of this period, 334. Commentators of Platonic

writings, 337.. Introduction of alien doctrines opposed

by Taurus and Atticus, 340. Eclecticism exemplified. in
Theo, Nigrinus, Severus, Albinus, 344

CHAPTER XIII.
ECLECTICS WHO BELONG TO NO DEFINITE scHOOL 351

Dio Chrysostom, 353. Lucian, 357. Galen, 360. Character
of his philosophy, 362. Theory of knowledge, 362 sq.
Logic, 363. Physics and metaphysics, 365. Contempt
for theoretic enquiry, 369. Ethics, 370

INDEX . . . . . . . . 373

EKCLECTICISM.

CHAPTER 1.

ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF ECLECTICISM.

TuatT form of philosophy which appeared about the
beginning of the post-Aristotelian period had, in
the course of the third and second centuries, per-
fected itself in its three principal branches. These
three schools had hitherto existed side by side,
each striving to maintain itself in its purity, and
merely adopting towards the others, and towards
the previous philosophy, an aggressive or defensive
attitude. But it lies in the nature of things that
mental tendencies, which have sprung from a kin-
dred soil, cannot very long continue in this mutu-
ally exclusive position. The first founders of a
school and their immediate successors, in the fervour
of original enquiry, usually lay excessive weight upon
that which is peculiar to their mode of thought ; in
their opponents they see only deviations from this
their truth: later members, on the contrary, who
have not sought this peculiar element with the
same zeal, and therefore have not grasped it with
B

CHAP.
I.

ated

A. Gra-
dual
blending
of the
three
post-Aris-
totelia ir
schools

of phito-
sophy.

i. Internal
CAUSES
of this.

bo

CHAP,

ECLECTICISM.

the same rigidity and one-sidedness, more easily
perceive, even in adverse statements, that which is
common and akin, and are more ready to sacrifice
subordinate peculiarities of their own standpoint ;
the strife of schools will itself oblige them to repel
exaggerated accusations and unqualifed condem-
nations, by the stronger enforcement of that in
which they coincide with others, to give up or put
aside untenable assertions, to soften offensive propo-
sitions, and to break off from their systems the
sharpest angles ; many an objection of the adversary
maintains its ground, and in seeking to elude it by
another interpretation, it is found that the presup-
positions of the objection have been partially con-
ceded, together with the objection itself. It is,
therefore, a natural and universal experience that
in the conflict of parties and schools their opposi-
tions gradually become blunted, that the common
principle which underlies them all is in time more
clearly recognised, and a mediation and fusion is
attempted. Now, so long as philosophic productivity
is still living and active in a people, the case will
either never arise or arise only temporarily, that
its whole science is infected by this eclecticism,
because already in its youthful course, new direc-
tions are attempted before those immediately pre-
ceding them have decidedly begun to grow old. As
soon, on the contrary, as the scientific spirit is
exhausted, and a long space of time, devoid of new
creations, is merely filled with discussions among
the existing schools, the natural result of these

ITS ORIGIN.

discussions, the partial blending of the hostile
parties, will appear to a greater extent, and the
whole philosophy will assume that eclectie character
which, in its universal diffusion, is always the pre~
monitory sign either of a deeply seated revolution,
or of scientific decay. This was precisely the posi-
tion in which Greek philosophy found itself in the
last centuries before Christ. All the causes which
led, generally speaking, to the dissolution of classi-
cal culture, had also bad a paralysing imfluence on
the philosophic spirit; for centuries after the
transformation of philosophy, which marks the
end of the fourth and the beginning of the third
century no new system arose; and if the post-
Aristotelian systems in and for themselves had
already lost the purely theoretic interest in the
contemplation of things, and by their restriction
to the life and aims of men, had announced the
discontinuance of scientific endeavour, the - long
cessation of philosophic production could only serve
to dull the scientific sense still more, and to call in
question the possibility of scientific knowledge im
general. This. state of things found its proper ex-
pression in scepticism, which opposed the dogmatic
systems with more and more signal success. The
eclecticism which since the beginning of the first
century before Christ had repressed scepticism
and united together the previously separate ten-
dencies of thought, was, however, merely the re-
verse side of scepticism itself. Scepticism had

Β ἃ

CHAP.

cM

a
ah ty

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.

placed all dogmatic theories on an equality in such
a manner as to deny scientific truth to all alike.
This ‘ neither one nor another’ ( Weder-noch) became
in eclecticism ‘One as well as the other’ (Sowohl-
als-awuch); but for that very transition scepticism
had paved the way; for it had not been able to
rest in pure negation, and had therefore, in its
doctrine of probability, set up once more a positive
conviction as a practical postulate. This conviction
was not indeed to come forward with a claim to full
certainty ; but we cannot fail to perceive in the de-
velopment of the sceptical theory, from Pyrrho to
Arcesilaus, and from Arcesilaus to Carneades, a grow-
ing estimation of the value ef the knowledge of prob-
ability: it was only necessary to advance one step
further, to bring forward practical necessity more
decidedly as against the sceptical theory, and the
probable would receive the significance of the true
—seepticism would be transformed into a dogmatic
acceptance of truth (Furwahrhalten). In this dog-
matism, however, doubt would inevitably continue
to exercise such an influence that no individual
system as such would be recognised as true, but
the true out of all systems would be separated
according to the measure of subjective necessity
and opinion. This had been exactly the pro-
cedure of the sceptics in the ascertainment of
the probable; as they develop their doubt in the
criticism of existing theories, so do they seek the
probable primarily in the existing systems, among
which they have reserved to themselves the right to

ITS ORIGIN.

decide. Carneades, as we know,' had so treated

the ethical questions to which, we are told, aban- ~

doning his former predilection for combating hostile
opinions, he more and more restricted himself with
advancing years.? Similarly Clitomachus, while
contending with the dogmatic schools, seems to
have sought a positive relation to them; and we
learn that /Eschines, another disciple of Carneades,
adhered to that side only of his master’s teach-
ing. Thus scepticism forms the bridge from the
one-sided dogmatism of the Stoic and Epicurean
philosophy to eclecticism ; and in this respect we
cannot regard it as a mere accident that from the
followers of Carneades this mode of thought chiefly
emanated, and that in them it was immediately
connected with the point on which the Stoics and
Epicureans had sustained their dogmatism, and
even the Platonists, in the last resort, their doctrine
of probability, viz. the necessity of definite theories
for practical life. It was, however, generally speak-
ing, the condition of philosophy at that time, and
the strife of the philosophic schools, which first
caused the rise and spread of scepticism, and in the
sequel, the eclectic tendency in philosophy.

The most important external impulse to this

1 Zeller, Philosophie der Grie-
chen, 3% Theil, 1* Abtheilung,
Ὁ. 517 sq.

μαθητής" ἀλλὰ τότε γε, εἶπεν, ἐγὼ
Kapveddou διήκουον ὅτε τὴν
ῥαχίαν καὶ τὸν ψόφον ἀφεικὼς ὃ

2 Plut. An sent 8, ger. resp.
13, 1. p. 791: 6 μὲν οὖν ᾿Ακαδη-
μαϊκὸς Αἰσχίνης, σοφιστῶν τινων
λεγόντων, ὅτι προσποιεῖται γεγο-
γέναι Καρνεάδον, μὴ γεγονὼς,

λόγος αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ γῆρας εἰς τὸ
χρήσιμον συνῆκτο καὶ κοινωνικόν,
8 Phil. der Griechen, TIT. i.
p. 524, note 2,
4 Vide note 2.

ut

ii. Hter-
Ra CUUSES.
a

6

CHAP.

Diffusion
of Greek
philosophy
among the
Romans.

ECLECTICISM.

change was given by the relation in which Greek
science and culture stood to the Roman world.!
The first knowledge of Greek philosophy doubtless
came to the Romans from Lower Italy: the founder
of the Italian School (Pythagoras) is the first philo-
sopher whose name is mentioned in Rome.? But
the doctrines of the Greek philosophers can only
have been heard of there in an entirely superficial
and fragmentary manner before the beginning of the
second century before Christ. This state of things
must have changed, however, when, after the second
Punic War, the Roman policy and Roman arms pressed
forward farther and farther towards the east; when
the wars ‘with Macedonia and Syria brought dis-
tinguished Romans in great numbers to Greece,
while, on the other hand, Greek ambassadors and
state prisoners,? and soon also slaves, appeared more
and more commonly in Rome; when men of the
importance of the elder Scipio Africanus, T. Quinctius
Flamininus, and Aimilius Paulus, applied themselves

1 For what follows, cf. Ritter,
iv. 79 sq.

2 The arguments for this are
given in Phil. der Goiech. Part
I. pp. 287, 3; 450, 1; cf. ibed.
313, 2; and Part III. ii. p. 77
sq. A still earlier date (if this
statement is historical) must be
fixed for the presence in Rome
of Hermodorus the Ephesian,
who assisted the decemviri in
the drawing up of the twelve
tables (Part I. 566, 2): but
even if he were indeed the
celebrated friend of Heraclei-
tus, we have no ground for the

supposition that he discoursed
to the Romans on the physics of
that philosopher.

3 Such as the thousand Achz-
ans who, 168 B.C., were carried
away into Italy, and kept there
for seventeen years, all of them
men of repute and culture
(among them we know was
Polybius}, whose long residence
in the country could not have
been without influence on Rome
if even the least considerable
of them had their actual abode
in that city.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ROME.

with delight to Greek literature; when, from the
beginning of the second century, Greek poetry was
transplanted to Roman soil in the more or less free
imitations of Ennius, Pacuvius, Statius, Plautus,
and their successors ; and Roman history was related
in the Greek language by Fabius Pictor and other
annalists. The philosophic literature of Greece
stood in far too close a connection with the other
branches—philosophy occupied far too important a
place in the whole Hellenic sphere of culture, asa
means of instruction and object of universal interest
—to make it possible for such as had once found
pleasure in Greek intellectual life to shut themselves
up from it very long, however small the need for
scientific enquiry might be in them. We find, then,
even before the middle of the second century, many
and various traces of the commencement of a know-
ledge of Greek philosophy among the Romans.
Ennius shows that he was acquainted with it, and
adopts from it isolated propositions. In the year
181 B.C. an attempt was made, in the so-called Books
of Numa,! to introduce dogmas of Greek philosophy
into the Roman religion.2. Twenty-six years later
(according to others only eight) the activity of the
Epicurean philosophers in. teaching caused their
banishment from Rome.*? In 161 B.c., by a decree
of the senate, residence in Rome was forbidden to
the philosophers and rhetoricians ;* and this always

1 Cf. Phil. der. Griech, 111. 4 This decree of the senate is
ii. p. 83. to be found in Suetonius, De

* Cf. ἃ 6. 171. 11. Ὁ. 85. Cl. Rietor.1; Gell. WA. xv. 11
3 Of. 2. 84. TI. i. p. 372, 1. (cf. also Clinton, Fasti Hellen.

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.

proves that there was reason for anxiety in regar¢
to their influence upon the education of youth.
fimilius Paulus, the conqueror of Macedonia, gave
his sons Greek instructors, and for that purpose took
with him on his expeditions the philosopher Metro-
dorus.! His companion in the Macedonian cam-
paign, Sulpicius Gallus, besides the astronomical
knowledge for which he was distinguished, may, per-
haps, have also adopted certain philosophic theories of
the Greeks.? But all these are merely isolated signs
of the movement which from the middle of the
second century manifested itself to a much greater
extent. Hitherto comparatively few had occupied
themselves with Greek philosophy ; now the interest
in that philosophy was more universally diffused.
Greek philosophers come to Rome in order to try

161 B.c.). These authors tell
us of another similar enact-
ment: an edict of the censor
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and
L. Licinius Crassus, in which
they express their serious dis-
pleasure with the teachers and
frequenters of the newly-arisen
Latin schools of rhetoricians on
account of this departure from
the consuetudo majorum. But,
not to mention that the rhetores
Latini, who were alone affected
by this decree, according also
to Cicero, De Orat. iil. 24, 93 sy.,
were only indirectly connected
with Greek philosophy, the
decree was not promulgated
until the year 95 B.c., as we
see from a comparison of Cicero,

log. ett. with i. 7,24. Clinton,

Fasti Hellen., dates itin 92 B.c.,

1 Plin. Hist. Nat. xxxv. 135;

cf. Plut. 4m. P. 6. The latter
mentions among the Greeks
with whom Aimilius surrounded
his sons, grammarians, sophists,
and rhetoricians. Pliny gives
the more definite information,
that after the victory over
Perseus (168 B.c.) he requested
from the Athenians a good
painter and an able philosopher.
They sent him Metrodorus,
who was both in one person.
Of. Phil. d. Gr. TIT. i. Ὁ. 525.

2 Cicero praises his know-
ledge of astronomy, Cic. Off. 1.
6,19. According to Livy, xliv.
87; and Plin. Hist. Nat. ii. 12,
53, he foretold an eclipse of the
sun before the battle of Pydna.
A more detailed account of the
authorities in regard to this
event is given by Martin, Revue
Archéolog. 1864, No. 3.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ROME.

their fortune, or are sent for thither by distinguished
men. Young Romans, desirous of playing a part in
the state, or of gaining distinetion in cultivated
society, think that they cannot do without the
instruction of a philosopher, and it soon became
usual to seek this not only in Rome, but in Athens
itself, the chief school of Greek science. Already
the famous deputation of philosophers in the year
156 3.c.! showed, by the extraordinary influence
which Carneades especially obtained, how favourably
Greek philosophy was regarded in Rome; and
though we should not overrate the effect of this
passing event, we may, nevertheless, suppose that
it gave a considerable impetus to the previously
awakened interest in philosophy, and spread it abroad
in wider circles. More permanent, no doubt, was the
influence of the Stoic Panetius during his residence,
prolonged as it would seem to have been for many
years, in the capital of the Roman empire, he being
a man peculiarly fitted by the character of his
philosophy to effect an entrance for Stoicism among
his Roman auditors.2, Soon after him Caius Blossius
of Cums, a disciple of Antipater the Stoic, was
in Rome, the friend and counsellor of Tiberius

Gracchus,? who through him must likewise have
1 The authorities for this are of Gracchus (133 B.c.) Blossius

cited PAil. ἃ. Gr. ΤΙ. ii. p. 928, was also in danger. He left
1; cf, Ὁ. 498, 1; cf. Part III. i. Rome, and went into Asia

p. 498, 1. Minor to Andronicus, after
2 Further details infra, chap- whose fall (130 B.c.) he killed
ter ili. himself. A thorough examina-

3 Plut. Tib. Gracch. 8, 17, tion of him is to be found in
20; Val. Max. iv. 7,1; Cicero, Ῥενιερῇ περὶ Βλοσσίου καὶ Διοφά-
Lel. 11,37. After the murder ρους (Leipzig, 1873). Mean-

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.,

become acquainted with Stoicism.! And now that
immigration of Greek learned men begins, which,
in time, assumed greater and greater proportions.”
Among the Romans themselves, men who by
their intellect and position were so decidedly
pre-eminent as the younger Scipio Africanus, his
friend the wise Lelius, L. Furius Philus and
Tiberius Gracchus, took philosophic studies under
their protection. With them are connected Scipio’s
nephew Tubero,* a disciple of Panzetius, who,

while he himself calls his work
ἔρευναι καὶ εἰκασίαι, and the lat-
ter so decidedly preponderate,
that our historical knowledge
of the man is scarcely extended
by the treatise.

1 That Gracchus, through the
care of his mother, had distin-
guished Greeks for his instruc-
tors (Cic. Brut. 27, 104; cf.
Plat. Tib. Gracch. 20) is well
known.

3 Polybius (xxxii.10), however,
relates that much earlier, when
Scipio was only eighteen (166
B.C.), he said to him and his
brother: περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθήματα,
περὶ ἃ νῦν δρῶ σπουδάζοντας ὑμᾶς
καὶ φιλοτιμουμένους, οὐκ ἀπορήσετε
τῶν συνεργησόντων ὑμῖν ἑτοίμως,
καὶ σοὶ κἀκείνῳ' πολὺ γὰρ δῆ τι
φῦλον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπιρρέον
ὁρῶ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τῶν τοιούτων
ἀνθρώπων, which agrees with
what is quoted supra, Ὁ. 7,
note 4.

3 Cicero, De Orat. ii. 37, 154:
Et certe non tulit ullos hee
civitas aut gloria clariores, aut
auctoritate graviores, aut hu-
manitate politiores P. Africano,
CG, Letho, 1, Furio, qui secum

eruditissinos homines ex Gracia
palam semper habuerunt. De
Rep. 1.3, 5: Quid P. Scipione,
guid C. Lelio, quid LL. Philo
perfeerius cogitart potest ? gua
.. . a& domesticum majorumaque
morem etiam hance a Socrate ad-
veenticiam doctrinam adhibue-
runt. Cicero there puts the sub-
stance of Carneades’ discourse
against justice, which he him-
self had heard, into the mouth
of Furius Philus, while he
makes him at the same time
follow the Academic philoso-
pher in the consuetudo contra-
rias in partes disserendi; loa.
cit. c. 5, 8 sg.; Lact. Znst. v.
14. Concerning the connection
of Scipio and Leelius with
Panetius we shall have to
speak later on. Leelius, ac-
cording to Cic. Fin. ii. 8, 24,
had also attended the lectures
of Diogenes, which we must,
no doubt, connect with his
presence in Rome in the year
156 B.C.

* Q. Ailius Tubero, through
his mother a grandson of
Emilius Paulus, was a very
zealous Stoic, who carried out

GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ROME.

with the sons-in-law of Leelius, Quintus Mucius
Scavola,! and Caius Fannius,? P. Rutilius Rufus?
Lucius Aflius Stilo,* and others,> open the long

his principles in his life, not
without exaggeration. Cf. con-
cerning him Cic. Brut. 31, 117 ;
De Orat. iii. 23, 87; Pro Mur.
36, 75 sq.; Acad. ii. 44, 135;
Tuse. iv. 2,4; Sen. Ep. 95, 72 sq. ;
98,13; 104, 21; 120,19; Plut.
Lucull. 39; Pompon. De Orig.
Juris, i. 40; Gell. M.A. 1, 22,
τ: xiv. 2, 20; Val. Mas. vil.
5,1. Cic. Off. 111. 15, 63, men-
tions a treatise of Hecato ad-
dressed to him, and another of
Paneetius, ibid. Aead. il. 44,
185; Zuse. iv. 2, 1; against
which the pseudo-Plutarch, De
Nobilit. 18, 3, is not any his-
torical testimony; cf. Bernays,
Dial. ad. Arist. 140.

* One of the most celebrated
of the ancient jurists and
founders of scientitic jurispru-
dence among tne Romains ( Bern-
hardy, Grundr. d. Rom. Lit.
676, &c.), son-in-law of Leelius
(Cic. De Orat.i.9, 35). Accord-
ing to Cicero, he had heard
Panetinus lecture, and (ὦ. 6. 10,
43) he calls the Stoics Stoter
nostrl.

2 CG. Fannius, son of Marcus,
son-in-law of Lelius, was
brought by Lelius to hear
Panetius (Cic. Brut. 26, 101),
and is designated by Cicero
(Brut. 31, 18) as a Stoic.
Cicero often mentions an his-
torical work composed by him.
Similarly Plut. Zib. Graech. 4.
With regard to his consulate,
cf. id. C. Gracch. 8, 11, 12.

3 This is the Rutilius who
was famous for his services in

war (Val. Max. ii. 3,2; Sallust,
Jug. 54, 56 sq.), but princi-
pally for the purity of his
character. On account of the
impartiality with which, as
proconsul, he defended the in-
habitants of Asia Minor against
the extortions of the Roman
equites, one of the most shame-

_less sentences of banishment

was passed upon him, which he
bore with the cheerfulness of a
sage. He went to Smyrna,
where he died, having refused
to return, which was offered him
by Sulla. Cf. on this subject
Cic. Brut. 30, 115; N. 2. ii.
32, 80; tn Pison. 39, 95;
Rabir. Post. 10, 27 ; Pre Balbo,
11, 28 (cf. Tacit. Ann. iv. 43);
Sen. Hp. 24,4; 79, 14; 82, 11;
Benef. vi. 37, 2, κοι; Val.
Max. li. 10, 5, &c. Cicero
(Brut. 30, 114) calls him doctus
vir et Grecis literis eruditus,
Panetii auditor, prope perfec-
tus in Stoicis. Concerning his
admiration of his teacher
Panetius and his acquain-
tance with Posidonius, ct. Cic.
OF. iii. 2,10. He left behind
him memorials and historical
works: vide Bernhardy, loc. cit.
203, 506; also Cicero, fin. i.
3, 7.

4 Wide concerning this phi-
losopher, the predecessor and
teacher of Varro, Cie. Brut. 56,
205 sq.3 also Acad.i. 2,8; Ad
Herenn. iv. 12; Bernhardy,
loc. cit. 857.

5 Such as Marcus Vigellius
(Cie. Orat. iii, 21, 78) and Sp,

CHAP,

ECLECTICISM.

series of Roman Stoics. Epicureanism, at the
same time, obtained a still wider diffusion, having,
through books written in Latin, gained entrance
at an earlier period than the other systems, even
among those who had not received a Greek edu-
cation.! Somewhat later the Academic and Peri-
patetic schools, whose principles could not have
remained unknown to the hearers of Paneetius, were
represented by celebrated teachers in Rome. Among
the Platonists Philo is the first whose presence in
Rome is known to us (irrespective of the deputation
of philosophers) ; of the Peripatetics, Staseas.2 But
already, at a much earlier period, Clitomachus had
dedicated works to two Romans ;? and Carneades
himself, we are told, was sought out in Athens by
Roman travellers. Soon after the beginning of
the first century before Christ, Posidonius (vide
infra) visited the metropolis of the world; before
the middle of the same century we encounter there

Mummius, brother of the con-
queror of Corinth, who, to judge
by the date (Cic. Brut. 25, 94),
must also have owed his Stoicism
to Paneetius.

1 Vide Cic. Tuse, iv. 3, 6:
Ttaque illius vere elegantisque
philosophia (the Stoic, Peripa-
tetic, and Academic)... nulla
Sere sunt aut pauca admodum
Latina monumenta .. . cum in-
terim tllis silentibus CO. Ama-
finius extitit dicens, &c,

* Further details, infra.
Philo came to Rome in 88 Β.6.
Staseas, as we find from Cic.
De Orat. i. 22, 104, appeared
there in 92 B.c.

8 To the poet Lucilius (148.
102 B.c), and previously to
L. Censorinus, who was consul
in 149 B.c.; Cic. Acad, ii. 32,
102.

* So much truth may un-
derlie the statement of Cicero
(De Orat. iii. 18, 68) even
supposing the statement itself
to be untrue that Q. Metellus
(Numidicus) as a young man
listened to the aged Carneades
for several days in Athens,
Respecting Catulus’ relation to
Carneades, cf. the last pages of
the chapter on Carneades, Phil.
ὦ. Gr. Part TIT. i,

GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ROME.

the Epicureans Philodemus and Syro.! Mean-
-“while, it was already at this time very common for
“Roman youths to seek Greek science at its fountain-
Σ ,head, and for the sake of their studies to betake
Δ themselves to the principal seats of that science,
and especially to Athens.2 At the commencement
of the imperial era, at any rate, Rome swarmed
with Greek savants of every kind,? and among these
were many who were not merely turning to account
a superficial knowledge in a mechanical manner; ‘
while contemporaneously in various places of the west
the philosophy of Greece became naturalised together
with other sciences, and from these centres spread
itself still further. With the knowledge of Greek
philosophy, that of Greek literature went naturally

hand in hand, and from the time of Lucretius and
Cicero a Roman literature sprang up at its side,®

1 Phil. d. Gr. Part JI. i. 374.
ys 2 The best known examples
are those of Cicero and Atticus,
= but we shall meet with many
εἶ Jothers later on. For the gene-
* ral practice, cf. Cic. #%n. v. 1,
, 4 where Cicero describes his own
IN. life in Athens with companions
in study (77 B.c.); and in re-
gard to a somewhat later time,
Acad. i. 2, 8, where he says to
Varro: Sed meos amicos, in
quibus est studium, in Greciam
mitto, ut ea a fontibus potius
hauriant, quam rivulos consec-
tentur.

3 The fact is notorious; for
examples cf. Strabo, xiv. 5, 15,
p. 675. Ταρσέων γὰρ καὶ ᾿Αλεξαν-
δρέων μεστή ἐστι [ἢ Ῥώμη] .

4 Several Greek philosophers

of the time of Augustus and
Tiberius, residing in “Rome, will
come before us further on.

5 The most important of
these was the ancient Greek
city Massilia, of which Strabo
(iv. 1, 5, p. 181) says: πάντες
γὰρ οἱ χαρίεντες πρὸς τὸ λέγειν
τρέπονται καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. ΔῊ
early colony of Greek culture
in Gaul, this city had now
made such advances that noble
Romans pursued their studies
here instead of in Athens.

5 That these two were the
first noteworthy writers on
philosophy in the Latin tongue
is certain; the few earlier at-
tempts (cf. LT. i. 372, 2) seem
to have been very unsatisfac-
tory. Both, moreover, expressly

CHAP.

Lnevitabile
PEACLION
of that
diffusion
UPON
philose-
phy.

ECLECTICISM.

which was scarcely inferior to the contemporary
Greek, though not to be compared with the earlier,
either in scientific acumen or creative individuality.

At the beginning of this movement, the Romans
were related to the Greeks merely as disciples who
adopted and imitated the science of their teachers ;
and, to a certain degree, this relation continued
throughout its whole course ; for in Rome the scien-
tific genius and spirit never attained even to so
much force and self-dependence as in Greece it had.
still preserved in the latter period. But in the end
this influence of Greek philosophy could not remain
without a reaction on itself. Though Romans by
birth, like Cicero and Lucretius, might rehabilitate
Greek science for their countrymen; and Greek
philosophers, like Paneetius and Antiochus, might
lecture to the Romans, in both cases it was unavoid-
able that the character of their presentations should
be more or less determined by regard to the spirit
and requirements of their Roman hearers and readers.
Even the purely Greek schools of philosophy in
Athens, Rhodes, and other places, could not free them-
selves from this determining influence, on account
of the great number of young Romans of position

who visited them; for it

claim for themselves this
honour, cf. Luer. v. 336: Hane
(the Epicurean doctrine) pri-
mus cum primis tipse repertus
mune ego sum in putrias qui
possim vertere voces. Cic. Tuse.
Ἰ, 8, ὅ : Philosophia jacuit usque
ad hane etatem nee ullum

was naturally from these

habuit lumen literarum Lati-
narum...%m guo eo mugis
nobis est elaborandum, quod
multi jam esse libri. Latini di-
cuntur scripti inconsiderate ab
optimis iblis quidem vivris, sed
non satis eruditis,

GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ROME.

scholars that honour and profit mostly accrued to
the teachers. Of still higher importance, however,
than these considerations must be rated the uncon-
scious influence of the Roman spirit; not merely
upon the Romans who pursued philosophy, but also
upon the Greek philosophers in the Roman empire ;
for, however great the superiority of Greek culture
over Roman, however complete the literary depen-
dence of the conquerors upon the conquered, it was
inevitable that Greece, too, should receive spiritual
influence from her proud scholars, and that the
astuteness and force of will to which, in spite of
science, she had succumbed, should necessarily
acquire considerable value as compared with that
science in the eyes of the subjugated nations. It
was consistent. with the Roman spirit, however, to
estimate the worth of philosophy, as of all other
things, primarily according to the standard of prac-
tical utility; and, on the contrary, to ascribe no
importance to scientific opinions as such, when no
great influence on human life was perceptible in
them. From this source sprang those prejudices
against philosophy, which at first led even to magis-
terial interposition.! The same point of view was

1 Cf. on this subject what
Plutarch (Cato Maj. 22) relates
of Cato’s behaviour to the em-
bassy of philosophers as to
whom he feared from the outset
μὴ τὸ φιλότιμον ἐνταῦθα τρέψαν-
τες of νέοι τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ λέγειν
δόξαν ἀγαπήσωσι μᾶλλον τῆς ἀπὸ
τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν στρατειῶν, and

whom, after he had heard the

contents of their lectures, he
advised should be sent away as
quickly as possible. Also id.
ap. Gell. xvill. 7, 3; Nepos ap.
Lactant. 1. 15, 10; and the
edict of the censors quoted
supra, Ὁ 7, note 4, which cen-
sures the rhetorical schools: ἐδὲ
homines adolescentulos totos dies
desidere. To the Roman states-

ECLECTICISM.

also, however, maintained even in the pursuit and
study of philosophy. So far as philosophy was con-
cerned merely with scientific questions, it could
scarcely be regarded as anything more than a re-
spectable recreation; it only attained to more
serious value in the eyes of the Roman, inasmuch
as it proved itself an instrument of practical educa-
tion. The strengthening of moral principles and
the training for the calling of orator and statesman,
these are the aspects which primarily and principally
recommended philosophic studies to his attention.
But on this very account he was necessarily inclined
to treat them with reference to these points of view.
He cared little for the scientific establishment and
logical development of a philosophic system ; that
which alone, or almost alone, concerned him was its
practical utility; the strife of schools, he thought,
turned mostly on non-essential things, and he him~
self could not therefore hesitate to select from the
various systems, careless of the deeper interconnec-
tion of particular definitions, that which seemed to him
serviceable. The proconsul Gellius, who made the
well-meaning proposal to the philosophers in Athens
that they should amicably settle their points of
difference, and offered himself as mediator,! expressed
the truly Roman conception of philosophy, though
somewhat too candidly. Though the influence of
this standpoint would doubtless have affected Greek
man and soldier philosophy 1 Cie. Legg. i. 20, 53. Gellius
must naturally have appeared was consul in 682 A.U.c.=72 ᾿

even greater waste of time B.0. Vide Clinton, Fastt Hellen.
than rhetoric. for that year.

iTS PRINCIPLE AND CHARACTER.

philosophy very little had it been exerted at an
earlier period, it was quite otherwise when philo-
sophy had itself taken the direction which especi-
ally corresponded with the Roman nature. When
the internal condition of the philosophic schools,
and especially the last important phenomenon in this
sphere—the doctrine of Carneades—already led to
eclecticism, it must necessarily have developed itself
only the more speedily and successfully through the
concurrence of internal motives with external in-
fluences.

But although this eclecticism primarily appears
merely as the product of historical relations, which
rather conduced to the external connection than to
the internal harmonising of different standpoints, it
is not wholly without a characteristic principle,
which till then had not existed in this form. If we
enquire according to what point of view the doctrines
of the different systems were chosen, we find it was
not sufficient to maintain those doctrines in which
all were agreed; for the eclectics would then have
been limited to a very few propositions of indefinite
universality. But even the practical utility of
theories could not be considered as the final mark
of their truth; for the practical problem of mankind,
and the way of its solution was itself a main object
of the strife; the question was therefore, by what
standard practical aims and relations should them-
selves be determined? This standard could only
be ultimately sought in immediate consciousness.
If it be required that the individual shall choose

C

Β. £rin-
ciple and
character
of eclectic
philo-
siphy.

CHAP,

ECLECTICISM.

out of the various systems that which is true for his
own use, this presupposes that each man carries in
himself the standard for decision between true and
false, and that truth is directly given to man in his
self-consciousness; and it is precisely in this pre-
supposition, that the individuality and importance
of the eclectic philosophy seem chiefly to lie.
Plato had indeed assumed that the soul brought
with it from a previous life into its present existence
the consciousness of ideas; and similarly the Stoies
had spoken of conceptions which are implanted in
man by nature; but neither Plato nor the Stoics
had thereby intended to teach an immediate know-
ledge in the strict sense of the term; for the re-
miniscence of ideas coincides in Plato with the dialec-
tic forming of conceptions, and arises, according to
him, by means of the moral and scientific activities
which he regards as preliminary stages of philosophy;
and the natural conceptions of the Stoics are not, as
has already been shown, innate ideas; but, like scien-
tific thoughts, are derived merely in a natural manner
from experience. Knowledge here also has to de-
velop itself from experience, and is attained and
conditioned by intercourse with things. This attain-
ment of knowledge was first denied by scepticism,
which declared the relation of our conceptions to
the things conceived to be unknowable, and made
all our convictions exclusively dependent upon sub-
jective bases. But if in this way, not a knowledge
of the truth, but only belief in probability can be
established, this belief takes the place of knowledge

ITS PRINCIPLE AND CHARACTER.

in him who has despaired of knowledge: and so
there results, as the natural product of scepticism,
reliance on that which is given to man directly in his
self- consciousness, and is certain before all scientific
enquiry ; and this, as we shall find in Cicero and
others, is the last foot-hold in the eclectic fluctua-
tion among the various theories.! Now, we can
ascribe, it is true, to this principle of immediate
knowledge only a very limited value. What it main-
tains is at bottom merely this: that the final decision
concerning the questions of philosophy belongs to
unphilosophic consciousness; and though the uni-
versal thought that every truth has to approve itself
to human self-consciousness is entirely established,
yet this thought is here introduced under a per-
verted and one-sided aspect, and the whole pre-
supposition of an immediate knowledge is untrue;
closer observation shows that these supposed im-
mediate and mnate ideas have likewise been formed
by manifold intermediate processes, and that it is only
a deficiency of clear scientific consciousness, which
makes them appear as immediately given. This
return to the directly certain is sofar to be regarded
primarily as a sign of scientific decay, an involuntary
evidence of the exhaustion of thought. But at the
same time it presents one aspect which is not with-

1 The eclecticism of the last
century B.c. stands in this
respect to the preceding scepti-
cism in a similar relation to
that which in modern times
the philosophy of the Scottish
school bore to Hume; it can-

not be regarded, any more than
the Scottish philosophy, as a
mere reaction of dogmatism
against doubt, but it is, like
the Scottish philosophy, itselt
a product of doubt.

c 2

CH

I

10.

AP.

20

CAP,
T.

ECLECTICISM.

out importance for the further course of philosophic
development. As the interior of man is regarded as
the place where the knowledge of the most essential
truth originally has its seat, it is herein maintained
in opposition to the Stoic and Epicurean sensualism,
that in self-consciousness a specific source of know-
ledge is given: and though this higher knowledge
is something actual, a fact of inner experience—
though this rationalism, so far, again resolves itself
into the empiricism of direct consciousness, yet it is
no longer the mere perception from which all truth is
derived. This appeal to the immediately certain may,
therefore, be regarded as a reaction against the sen-
sualistic empiricism of the preceding systems. But
because it does not go beyond the internally given,
as such, and is nevertheless wanting in any deeper
scientific establishment and development, philosophic
convictions are not recognised actually in their origin
from the hnman mind, but appear as something be-
stowed on man by a power standing above him ; and
thus innate knowledge forms the transition to that
form of philosophy which only goes back to self-con-~
sciousness, in order to receive in it the revelation of
God. How the belief in external revelations and the
leaning of philosophy to positive religion are allied
to this, will be shown later on; at present it is
enough to remark that, as a matter of fact, in a
Plutarch, an Apuleius, a Maximus, a Numenius, and
generally among the Platonists of the first two
centuries after Christ, eclecticism and the philosophy
of revelation went hand in hand.

ITS PRINCIPLE AND CHARACTER.

But as eclecticism in this aspect bore within it
the germ of the mode of thought which so powerfully
developed itself subsequently in Neo-Platonism ;
from another point of view it also contained the
scepticism, to which in great part it owed its own
origin. For that dissatisfaction which will not allow
thought to be at peace in any definite system, has
its ultimate basis in this: that it has not fully over-
come doubt in the truth of dogmatic systems, that
it cannot refuse to recognise doubt as to certain
particulars, even though it does not approve of it
in principle. Scepticism is consequently not merely
one of the causes which have conditioned the
development of eclecticism; eclecticism has it
continually within itself as a phase of its own exis-
tence; and its own behaviour tends to keep it
awake; the eclectic vacillation between different
systems is nothing else than the unrest of sceptical
thought, a little moderated by belief in the original
consciousness of truth, the utterances of which are
to be brought together out of the many and various
scientific theories. The more superficially, however,
doubt was stilled by.a mode of philosophising so
devoid of principle, the less was it to be expected that
it should be for ever silenced. If the truth which
could be found in no individual system was to be
gleaned out of all systems, it required only moderate
attention to perceive that the fragments of various
systems would not allow themselves to be so directly
united—that each philosophical proposition has its
definite meaning only in its interconnection with

21

CHAP.
I.

i, Eelec-
Ticisn, Cuh-
tained the
germs of
the later
scepti-
cism,

li. And of
wVvo- Plu-
EORISM.

ECLECTICISM.

some definite system; while, on the other hand,

_ propositions from different systems, like the systems

themselves, mutually exclude one another: that
the contradiction of opposite theories annuls their
authority, and that the attempt to make a basis out
of the harmonising propositions of the philosophers,
as recognised truth, is wrecked on the fact of their
disagreement. Therefore after the scepticism of the
Academy had been extinguished in the eclecticism
of the first century before Christ, doubt arose anew
in the school of nesidemus to lose itself only in the
third century, simultaneously with all other theories,
in Neo-Platonism; and no argument has greater
weight with these new sceptics than that which the
precedent of eclecticism readily furnished to them:
the impossibility of knowledge is shown by the
contradiction of the systems of philosophy; the
pretended harmony of these systems has resolved
itself into the perception of their mutual incom-
patibility.

Justifiable, however, as the renewal of scepticism
appears in relation to the uncritical eclectic treat-
ment of philosophy, it could no longer attain the
importance which it had had in the school of the
new academy. The exhaustion of thought which
can be shown even in this later scepticism, made a
positive conviction too necessary, to allow many to
return to pure doubt. If, therefore, the belief in
the truth of the systems hitherto in vogue was
shaken, and if even their eclectic combination could
not entirely satisfy, while strength was wantiag for

ITS PRINCIPLE AND CHARACTER.

the independent production of a new system; the
general result was only that thought began to long
more and more for a source of knowledge lying
outside itself and science as hitherto existing ;
which was sought partly in the inner revelation of
the Deity and partly in religious tradition, Thus
the way was entered upon, which Neo-Platonism
in the next period more definitely pursued, and so
opened the last epoch of Greek philosophy.

CHAP.
ΤΙ.

I. £clee-
Ticism in
the tra
CONT ULIES
B.C.
A. The
Epieu-
ΥΩ ἃ.

Ficlation
of the
later Epi-
CUTEANS tO
νέφη.

ECLECTICISM.

CHAPTER Ii.

ECLECTICISM IN THE SECOND AND FIRST CENTURIES
BEFORE CHRIST. THE EPICUREANS. ASCLEPIADES.

Or the schools of philosophy which had still main-
tained themselves on the theatre of history up to
the middle of the second century before Christ, that
of the Epicureans was, to all appearance, least affected
by the scientific movement of the time. Though
its juxtaposition with other intellectual tendencies
had left upon it some traces, it does not seem to
have been influenced by any of these tendencies in
a deeper and more permanent,manner. We must,
no doubt, suppose that even the refutation of the
objections which encountered the Epicurean doctrine
on all sides, gave occasion to some new phases in
the conception and establishment of it; that the
system perhaps was further developed or modified in
certain subordinate points by one and another of its
adherents, and that alien doctrines may have been
more thoroughly investigated by them than by
Epicurus himself. But when we have followed up
all the traces which might seem to indicate that
individual disciples of Epicurus had departed, either
formally or materially, from their master,! the sum

1 A collection and examina- which we cannot but acknow-
tion of these—the value of ledge, though we may not

THE EPICUREANS.

total of such departures which can be historically
proved is so inconsiderable that the well-known
judgments of Seneca and Numenius concerning the
orthodoxy of the Epicureans! scarcely suffers any
limitation from them. We learn from Cicero? that
the theory of Epicurus was not seldom conceived by
his Roman compatriots as if he had ascribed an
independent value to intellectual culture and to
virtue ; but Cicero himself adds, that this opinion is
to be found in no scientific representative of the
Epicurean philosophy.2 He tells us of some Epi-
cureans of his time who separated themselves from
Epicurus* by their theory of a disinterested love to
friends. It is doubtful, however, whether this
should be regarded as a radical deviation from the
Eudemonism of Epicurus; the statement in ques-
tion only asserts that friends may be loved for their
own sake, even when they bring us no advantage ; ὃ
but this does not exclude the idea that love to them
is based upon the pleasure secured by intercourse

agree with all the inferences
and conjectures deduced from
them—has been undertaken by
Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cie.
i. 165-190, in connection with
Diining, De Metrodort vita et
seriptis, Ὁ. 18 sqq.

1 Phil. dey Gr. III. i. Ὁ. 379, 4.

2 Fin. i. 7, 25; 17, 555 cf.
Phil. der Gr. JIT. i. 445, 2.

8 Quos quidem (he makes
Torquatus, i. 17, 55, observe
respecting them) video esse
multos sed imperitos.

4 Phil. der Go, 111. 1. 460, 2.
Hirzel, Zoe. cit. 170 sg., supposes

these ‘later philosophers’ to
be Siro and Philodemus; but
though this idea is not improb-
able in itself, it cannot be ascer-
tained whether it has any foun-
dation.

5 Cic. Fin. i. 20, 69, thus ex-
presses it: Primos congressus
(and so forth) jfiert propter
voluptatem, cum autem usus
progrediens familiaritatem effe-
cerit, tum amorem efflorescere
tantum, ut, etiam si nulla sit
utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ips
amici propter 886 ipsos amentur.

ECLECTICISM.

with them.! Sucha difference cannot be considered
of much importance. Nor are we justified in
ascribing an alteration of the Epicurean theology
to Philodemus, though he may, perhaps, have carried
it further in certain particulars than Epicurus him-
self:? and though many deviations from pure
Epicureanism are perceptible? in Lucretius, on
closer inspection they will be found to refer to traits
which merely concern the form of the poetic pre-
sentation, but do not affect the scientific theories.*

1 In the amare propter 86
ipses, aS opposed to the love
because of utility, there lies
nothing more than the con-
ception of an affection based
upon delight in the person of a
friend, and not merely on 8
calculation of benetits. But
such an affection can also be
based on the motive of plea-
sure. To this only the further
argument can be applied:
Hienim si loca, st fana, si wrbes,
δὲ gymnasia, si campum, δὲ
canes, St eqwuos ludicra exercende
aut venandi consuetudine ad-
amare solemus, quanto id in
hominum consuetudine fJacilius
jiert potuerit et justius !

* Phil. der Gr. 111. i. 435, 1.

3 Ritter, iv. 89-106.

* Ritter thinks (p. 94) that
Nature and her component
parts are described by Lucre-
tius at times in ἃ much more
vivid, and at times in a much
more detailed manner, vhan
the lifeless and uniform physics
of the Epicureans would seem
to have permitted. Nature is
conceived by Lucretius as a
Unity, which rules absolutely

over all. The sun is described
as an essence which generates
the births of the world; the
earth, In animated language, as
the mother of living creatures ;
even the conjecture that the
stars are living beings he does
not cast aside (v. 523 sqq.).
This last, however, according
to v. 122 sqq., cannot be his
own opinion. What he really
says is only the same that
Epicurus (ap. Diog. x. 112) also
expresses in one of his hypo-
thetical explanations of Nature
with reference to earlier theories
(Phil. der Gr. J. 245). Concern-
ing’the remaining points, Ritter
himself remarks that the de-
scriptions of the poet can only
be intended figuratively; and
this is the case with the pas-
sages which perhaps would be
most surprising toan Hpicurean
(v. 534 sgq.), where Lucretius
defends the Epicurean theory
that the earth is borne up by
the air (Diog. x. 74) with the
observation that the air is not
oppressed by the earth, because
the earth was originally of one
piece with it, just as the weight

THE EPICUREANS.

The same may be said of other philosophers among
the later Epicureans concerning whom tradition has
told us something. It may be that Zeno of Sidon
appropriated to himself in the school of Carneades !
a more dialectic method, a mode of argument going
more acutely and thoroughly into details than we
find in Epicurus ;? or that Apollodorus* was superior
to Epicurus in historical knowledge and interest ; ὁ

of our limbs is no burden to
us. Though this strongly re-
minds us of the Stoic sympathy
of the universe, Lucretius will
have nothing to do with that
theory, and consequently desig-
nates the parts of the world
only as quasi membra. In any
case this thought is without
result for the rest of his doc-
trine of Nature. He rather
maintains, as his own opinion,
the unity of Nature in the
same sense as Epicurus—?.e. in
the sense of an interdependence
brought about by the identity
of physical and mechanical
laws. Moreover, the doctrine
of the spontaneous movement
of the atoms (Luer. ii. 133, 251
824.) is Epicurean; and if, on
the other hand, Lucretius is
distinguished from Epicurus by
maintaining more firmly the
conformity to law of natural
phenomena (Ritter, 97), we
have already heard (Phil. der
Gr. 111. i. 397, 1) the explana-
tion of Epicurus, which is con-
firmed by his whole system,
that unconditional necessity
rules in universal causes, if
even individual phenomena
admit of various constructions.
That Lucretius (ii, 333 sqq.),

departing from Epicurus, as-
sumes aS many original figures
of the atoms as there are atoms
(Ritter, p. 101) is decidedly a
misapprehension, expressly con-
tradicted by the passage ii.
478 sqq. Cwhich Ritter mis-
understands). How little the
ethics also of the Roman Epi-
curean differed from those of
the ancient Epicurean it would
be easy to show from the points
adduced by Ritter, Ὁ. 104 sq.
The agreement of Lucretius
with Epicurus has now been
expounded in the most thorough
manner by Woltjer in the trea-
tise quoted, Phil. der Gr. 111.
i. 363, 1.

1 Cf. ὦ. 6. IIL. i. 373, 2.

* As Hirzel conjectures, Joc.
cit. 176 sqq., appealing to
Cicero, Fin. i. 9, 31; Duse. iii.
17, 38; V.D.1.18, 46 sg.

8 The κηποτύραννος discussed
in Phil. der Gr. TIL. i. 378.

4 Hirzel, 183 s¢., who asserts,
in support of this, that Apol-
lodorus (according to Diog. vii.
181; x. 13) had composed a
συναγωγὴ δογμάτων, and perhaps
had justified in it the judg-
ment of Epicurus on Leucippus
(Phil. der Gr. I, 842, 6).

ECLECTICISM.

we also find Demetrius meeting an objection of
Carneades with an answer which leads us to suppose
that this Epicurean had gained in logical training
through the dialectic of the Academy.' But that
either of these philosophers in any definition of
doctrine materially diverged from the doctrine of
their master is not maintained in any quarter.
When Diogenes in his catalogue mentions certain
men who were called Sophists by the genuine Epi-
cureans, we have no reason to consider these Sophists
as more than isolated offshoots of the school, or to
argue from their appearance any deeply seated dis-
agreements within it, or any change in its general

character.?

1 Yn the exposition (men-
tioned in Part 111. i. 371, 4) ap.
Sext. Vath. viii. 348, where he
maintains, in opposition to the
statement about argumentation
discussed at p. 504, and in har-
mony with the distinction of
γενικὴ and εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις, that
whenever a valid separate proof
is adduced, the admissibility of
the argument is at once shown.
To him also, perhaps, belongs
what is quoted by Sextus, viii.
330; in any case it shows what
influence the objections of Car-
neades had made even upon the
Epicureans.

2 The wordsin Diog. x. 25 pro-
ceed thus: (after theenumeration
of several immediate disciples
of Epicurus) καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ἐλλόγι-
μοι, ὧν ἦν καὶ WoAverparos ... ὃν
διεδέξατο Διονύσιος, ὃν Βασιλείδης.
καὶ ᾿Απολλόδωρος δ᾽ ὃ κηποτύραν-
vos γέγονεν ἐλλόγιμος, ὃς ὑπὲρ τὰ
τετρακόσια σννέγραψε βιβλία: δύο

τε Ἡτολεμαῖοι ᾿Αλεξανδρεῖς, ὅ τε
μέλας καὶ 6 λευκός. Ζήνων θ᾽ ὃ
Σιδώνιος ἀκροατὴς ᾿Απολλοδώρου,
πολυγράφος ἀνήρ' καὶ Δημήτριος
ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Λάκων, Διογένης θ᾽ ὃ
Ταρσεὺς ὃ τὰς ἐπιλέκτους σχολὰς
συγγράψας, καὶ ᾿Ωρίων καὶ ἄλλοι
obs οἱ γνήσιοι ᾿Επικούρειοι σοφισ-
τὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν. Hirzel (doe.
cit. 180 925.) believes that
those named Sophists by the
true Epicureans must include
all the men here men-
tioned, from Apollodorus on-
wards, and therefore Apol-
lodorus himself, the two Ptole-
mei, Zeno of Sidon, ὅζο. But
this is very improbable, even
from the mode of expression.
Had such been the meaning of
the writer, he must at least
have said: πάντας δὲ τούτους of
γνήσιοι Ἐπικούρειοι σοφιστὰς ἂἄπο-
καλοῦσιν; and if he wished to
express himself clearly even
this would have been insuffi-

ASCLEPIA DES.

The famous physician, Asclepiades of Bithynia,!
stands in another relation to the Epicurean school.
He is not expressly enumerated among its members
by any of the authors who mention him, but his
theories would certainly lead us to suppose that he

had some connection with the school.

cient. He must have written:
τὸν δὲ ᾿Απολλόδωρον καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽
αὐτὸν οἱ γνήσιοι ᾿Ἐπικούρειοι
σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν. As it is,
we can only refer the words
ovs ἀποκαλοῦσιν either to the
ἄλλοι alone, or to the ἄλλοι and
the names immediately pre-
ceding them, Orion and Dio-
genes. Diogenes may in this
case be the same person men-
tioned by Strabo, xiv. 5, 15;
but this is not necessarily the
case, as Strabo does not de-
scribe Diogenes as an Hpicu-
rean, and in the enumera-
tion of the philosophers of
Tarsus, the Epicurean Diogenes
may have been passed over, as
well as the far more celebrated
Stoic Zeno. But the positive
arguments against the suppo-
sition of Hirzel are still more
decisive. According to this,
the Epicurean with whom the
mention of Diogenes originates
must have pointed out a whole
series of Hpicurean philoso-
phers, whom he himself calls
ἐλλόγιμοι aS men who were
named Sophists by the genuine
Epicureans, and consequently
members of the school who had
become unfaithful to its true
spirit. How is this conceivable?
As ἐλλόγιμοι, he had previously
mentioned Metrodorus, Her-
marchus, Polyenus, &c.—in a
word, the most loyal disciples

He is at one

of Epicurus; and is it likely
that he would immediately
after apply the same predicate
to those who were not acknow-
ledged by the genuine Epicu-
reans as belonging to their
number? This is in itself very
improbable, but the improb-
ability becomes greater still
when we find that among these
Sophists are two of the most
distinguished leaders, Apol-
lodorus and Zeno. Hirzel has
just before (p. 170) shown that
only HEpicureans of the purest
type were selected as overseers
of the school; and we can all
the less concede to him that an
Apollodorus anda Zeno—the for-
mer, as his designation proves,
a highly-esteemed head of the
schuol; the latter regarded by
Cicero and Philodemus as one
of the first Epicurean authori-
ties—could have been, in the
judgement of the γνήσιοι only
pseuclo-Hpicurean Sophists.

1 This physician, whose theo-
ries are constantly mentioned
in the Placitu ascribed to Plu-
tarch, and in the writings of
Galen, is counted by the psendo-
Galen, Zsag. c. 4, vol. xiv. 683 K,
as one of the leaders of the
logical school of physicians.
According to Sext. Math. vii.
20 sq., he was a contemporary
of Antiochus of Ascalon. Tide
Ὁ. 30, note 1.

CHAP.
11.

Ascle-
piades the
physician
NIE (ἢ
Hpicu-
TOUR,

but shons
affinities
qith. the
sehvol.,

ECLECTICISM.

with the Epicurean sensualism! in his statement
that the sensible perception gives a true image of
the thing perceived, but that reason, on the con-
trary, is not an independent source of knowledge,
borrows all its content from perception, and has
to be verified by perception.” In connection with
this he found reason superfluous,’ as an integral part
of the soul, herein going beyond Epicurus: the
soul, he said, was only the whole compounded of
all the senses collectively ;* to which he gave as

1 Sext. Math. vii. 201. That
there were also some who de-
clared sensations to be the
criterion of truth, Antiochus
shows in these words: ἄλλος δέ
τις ἐν τῇ ἰατρικῇ μὲν οὐδενὸς
δεύτερος, ἁπτόμενος δὲ καὶ φιλο-
σοφίας, ἐπείθετο τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις
ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι,
λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως ἡμᾶς κατα-
λαμβάνειν. Here Asclepiades the
contemporary of Antiochus can
alone be referred to.

2 This and nothing else can
be the real opinion of Ascle-
piades, on which the statement,
λόγῳ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς καταλαμβάνειν,
is based, for he, like Epicurus,
denominated his atoms vonrol,
λόγῳ θεωρητοὶ (infra, p.31n. 5),
and also believed in an intellec-
tual knowledge of the hidden
by means of inferences from the
perceived. Vide infra, note 4.

3 Sext. Math. vii. 202: ’Acran-
πιάδην τὸν ἰατρὸν. . . ἀναιροῦντα
μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Ibid. 380,
he says: οὐδὲ ὅλως ὑπάρχειν τι
ἡγεμονικόν. Tert. De an. 15:
Messenius atiquis Dicearchus,
ex medicis autem Andreas et
aAsclepiades ita «ubdstulerunt

principale, dum in animo ipso
rolunt esse sensus, quorum vin-
dicatur principale, in favour of
which Asclepiades argues that
many animals live for a time
without head or heart (the two
parts regarded as seats of the
ἡγεμονικόν). See next note.

4 This conception results
from the passage in Tertullian,
which therefore compares Ascle-
piades with Dicwarchus; and
still more distinctly from Cvl.
Aurel. De Morb. acut. i. 14
(quoted by Fabric. on Sext.
Math. vii. 380): Aselepiades
regnum anime aliqua parte con-
stitutum (a ἡγεμονικόν dwelling
in a definite part of the body)
negat. Htenim nihil alivad esse
dicitt animam quam sensuum
omnium catum: intellectium
autem occuttarum vel tatentinum
rerum per solubilen fiert motum
sensuum, gui ab accidentibus
sensibilibus atque antecedenti
perspectione perficiturmemorian
vero alterno eorum exercitio dicit.
Plut. Place. iv. 2,8 (Stob. £el. i.
496) expresses the same in the
following words: ’AckA. 6 ἰατρὸς
[ἀπεφήνατο τὴν ψυχὴν] συγγυμ-

ASCLEPIADES.,

substratum the πνεῦμα consisting of light and
round particles! He also traced the activities of
memory and intellect to movements in the organs
of sense.” If lastly the atomistic theory of Ascle-
piades *is primarily allied to that of Heraclides of
Pontus,* it is not to be supposed that he arrived at
this theory without the tradition of the atomistic
system which was still living in the Epicurean school.
The primary constituents of all things he held to be
small bodies which were distinguished from the
atoms of Democritus and Epicurus in that they
were divisible. From all eternity they strike to-
gether in constant motion and split up into num-
berless parts, of which sensibly perceptible things

consist.®

vaciay τῶν αἰσθήσεων, whether
the ovyyvuvacia may mean
‘practice,’ or ‘common practice,
work done together,’ or whether
in a sense otherwise not de-
monstrable, corresponding with
cetus, it may denote a society
of συγγυμναζόμενοι.

1 Chalcid. in Zim. 213: Aut
enim moles (ὄγκοι, vide infra)
quedam sunt leves et globose
c@demque admodum delicate ex
guibus anima subsistit, quod
totum spiritus est, ut Ascle-
piades putat, ὅσ. On the
analogous, though somewhat
different definitions of Epicu-
rus and Democritus, cf. Phil. der
Gr, III. i. 418; also I. 808.

2 His exact conception of
this is not clear from the pass-
age of Celius Aurelius quoted
in note 4, Ὁ. 30. The soludilis
motus points to the idea that

But even in compound bodies their cease-

from acomplex of motions, cer-
tain motions detach themselves,
and that through these arise
abstract presentations.

$ On this subject cf. Lass-
witz, who discusses it in his
treatise on Daniel Sennert,
p. 425 8. (Vierteliahrschr. fiir
wissensch. Philos. ili. 408 sqq.),
for this German restorer of the
atomistic philosophy (he died
in 1637) allied himself chiefly
with Asclepiades.

4 Phil. d. Gr. li. i. 886 sq.

5 The most complete account
of this theory is given by Cel.
Aurel. lec. cit.: Primordia cor-
poris primo constituerat atemus
(this is inaccurate; he did not
call them so for the reason that
they are not indivisible) cor-
puscula intellectu sensa, sine
ulla quatitate solita (without
colour, and so forth) atgue ex

ol

CHAP,
11.

ECLECTICISM.

less motion continues, so that nothing in any section
of time, even the smallest, remains unchanged.’ Τῇ

initio comitata (2) eternum se
moventia que suo ineursu offensa
mutuis ictibus in infinita par-
tium fragmenta solvantur mag-
nitudine atque schemate differ-
entia, que rursum eundo sibi
adjecta vel conjuncta omnia
Faciant sensibilia, vim in semet
mutationis habentia aut per mag-
nitudinem sui aut per multitu-
dinem aut per schema aut per
ordinem. Nec, inguit, ratione ca-
rere videtur quod nultius factant
quulitatis corpora (that being
without quality, generate bodies
of definite quality); silver is
white, whereas that which is
rubbed off from it is black;
the goat's horn is black, the
sawdust of it white. These
primeval bodies Asclepiades, like
Heracleitus, called ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι
(cf. the passages quoted, Phi.
der Gr. 11. 1. 886, 3; where, how-
ever, in Hus. Par. ev. xiv. 23, 3,
instead of μὲν ὀνομάσαντες, μετο-
νομάσαντες is to be read, accord-
ing to Diels, Dowvogr. 252, 2).
I previously understood the ex-
pression as applying to bodies
not joined together—z.e., not
divisible ; but I must concede
to Lasswitz that the primitive
atoms of Asclepiades are not
this. Theinterpretations locker,
‘loose’ (therefore capable of
separation), and ungeordnet,
‘unordered,’ seem to me, how-
ever, in point of language, ques-
tionable. I should, therefore,
prefer to give to ἄναρμος the
signification, ‘not combined
with one another’ (so that each
ὄγκος is separated from the
other and moves itself for

itself). That these ὄγκοι (as
Epicurus had said of the atoms)
are λόγῳ θεωρητοὶ and δὲ αἰῶνος
ἀνηρέμητοι, we are told by Sext.
Math. iii. 5. He also speaks
(viii. 220) of vonrol ὄγκοι and
νοητὰ ἀραιώματα. What Ceelius
Aurel. says of the shattering of
the atoms receives confirmation
from the words quoted by Lass-
witz (p. 426) from the pseudo-
Galen, Zntrod. c. 9, vol. xiv.
698 &: κατὰ δὲ τὸν ᾿Ασκληπιάδην
στοιχεῖα ἀνθρώπου ὄγκοι θραυστοὶ
καὶ πόροι; and from Stob. £ei. i.
350, according to which the pre-
decessor of Asclepiades (Hera-
clides) declared θραύσματα to be
the smallest bodies (the theories
also ascribed to Heracleitus
in the foregoing, and in the
Placita, 1. 18, 2—cf. ψηγμάτιά
τινα ἐλάχιστα καὶ &uep7—seem,
however, originally to belong
to Heraclides). This divisibility
of the ὄγκοι is referred to when
Sextus (ath. x. 318) observes
that Democritus and Epicurus
represent things as arising ἐξ
ἀνομοίων (4.6. τοῖς γεννωμένοις)
τε καὶ ἀπαθῶν. Heraclides and
Asclepiades, on the contrary,
ἐξ ἀνομοίων μὲν παθητῶν δὲ καθά-
wep τῶν ἀνάρμων ὄγκων. The
πόροι, Which are side by side
with the ὄγκοι, and have the
same significance as the void
beside the atoms, are also men-
tioned by Galen, Zheriac. ad.
Pis. c. 11, vol. xiv. 250 x.

1 Sext. dfath. vill. 7. Plato
ascribes true Being to the not-
sensible alone, because sensible
things are always in a state of
Becoming : ποταμοῦ δίκην ρεούσης

ASCLEPLADES,.

these theories had been attributed to an acknow-
ledged member of the Epicurean school, they would
no doubt contain a noteworthy departure from the
doctrine of the master, but as Asclepiades is not
described as an Epicurean, they only show in one
individual case what seems in itself natural and
probable, viz., that the influence of Epicureanism, as
of other systems, was not strictly confined within
the limits of the school.

τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε ταὐτὸ μὴ δύο τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς pons (on account
Tous ἐλαχίστους χρόνους ὑπομένειν of the swiftness of the flow
μηδὲ ἐπιδέχεσθαι, καθάπερ ἔλεγε nothing can show itself twice).
καὶ Arranmains, ϑύο ἐπιδείξεις διὰ

CHAP,
II.

34

Supposed
vacibla-
tion of the
SUCCESSOVE
of Chrys-
appus
concerning
the finat
conflagra-
tion of the
vorld.

ECLECTICISM.

CHAPTER III.

THE STOICS: BOETHUS, PANATIUS, POSIDONIUS.

AmonG the remaining schools of philosophy, that of
the Stoics was the first which, in partial divergence
from its older teachers, admitted foreign elements.
This occurred, however, subsequently to a still more
considerable extent in the Academy, which, from the
first century before Christ, was the chief seat of
eclecticism. The Peripatetics seem, on the whole,
to have preserved the tradition of their school in
greater purity ; but we shall find that some, even
among them, were inclined towards an eclectic com-
bination of that school with other standpoints.

In the school of the Stoies, the rise of eclecticism
is connected with the names of Boéthus, Pansetius,
and Posidonius.

Already at the beginning of the second century
the successor of Chrysippus, Zeno of Tarsus, is said
to have been perplexed as to one of the distinctive
doctrines of his school—the doctrine of the destruc-
tion of the world—so that he left the question of
its truth undecided:! and similarly, after him,

+ Numen. ap. Eus. Pr.ev.xv. of the conflagration of the

18, 2. Zeno, Cleanthes, and world: τὸν μὲν γὰρ τούτου μαθη-
Chrysippus taught the doctrine τὴν καὶ διάδοχον τῆς σχολῆς

BOETHUS.

Diogenes of Seleucia in his later years became
doubtful about this dogma, which he had previously
defended.! Neither of these statements, however,
is satisfactorily attested ;? though the thing is pos-
sible in itself, and we can easily explain it, especially
in the ease of Diogenes, if the objections of his
disciples against the conflagration of the world had
embarrassed him and caused him to refrain from
expressing any decided opinion on the subject. As
to Boéthus,? we know that he not only openly re-
nounced the Stoic tradition on this point, but on
other and more important questions approximated
to the Peripatetic doctrine, so as to imperil the
purity of his Stoicism.

An example of this has already come before us
in his doctrines concerning the theory of knowledge:
for if he described Reason (νοῦς) and Desire as
criteria ὁ side by side with Perception and Science,
he not only set up the Aristotelian ἐπιστήμη in the
place of the Stoic πρόληψις, but added to it and to
Perception two other independent sources of know-
ledge, the recognition of which was not consistent

Ζήνωνά φασιν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ Tis
ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων.

1 Ps.-Philo. tern. m.c. 15,
p. 248 Bern.: λέγεται δὲ καὶ
Διογένης ἡνίκα νέος ἦν συνεπι-
γραψάμενος τῷ δόγματι τῆς ἐκπυρ-
σεως ὄψὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐνδοιάσας
ἐπισχεῖν.

2 Neither of the witnesses
speaks from his own knowledge,
as they themselves tell us. We
know not, therefore, on what
their assertions are based. In

regard to Zeno of Tarsus, the
otherwise well-instructed au-
thor of the Philonic treatise can-
not have been acquainted with
any divergence of his from the
school, or he would not have
omitted to appeal to him.

8 Concerning whom cf. Pxil.
ad. Gr, 111. i. 46, 1.

4 Thid. TIT. i. 71, 1; 84, 1.

5. Tbid. TIT. 1. 74; 84 sg.; and
concerning ἐπιστήμη, ibid. ΤΙ. ii.
650.

p ὦ

ogee

ope

CHAP.

Boetth us.

Flis devia-
tions from.
pure
Stoicism.

ECLECTICISM.

with the Stoic empiricism, though it perfectly
harmonised with the Peripatetic doctrine."

But the attitude of Boéthus to the Stoic theology
is still more antagonistic. For although he held,
with others, that God was an ethereal substance,”
he would not admit that He dwelt in the world as
its sonl; and he consequently refused to describe
the world as a living being ;? he rather assigned the
abode‘of the Deity to the highest sphere, and re-
presented Him as working from thence upon the

universe.

1 In respect to γοῦς this is
shown in Phil. d. Gr. II. ii. 190
sqq. Aristotle nowhere, indeed,
describes the ὄρεξις asa Source of
presentations or cognitions;
but he traces practical ends
and aims partly to natural
desires, and partly to the con-
stitution of the will, on which
must depend what we consider
to be good (7.0. 582, 3; 586, 2;
631, 2; 653; cf. Ath. NL 1.7;
1098, ὁ, 8).

5 Stob. £cl. 1.60: Βόηθος τὸν
αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο. In his
opinion of the soul also he
remained faithful to the Stoic
materialism.

3 Diog. vii. 143. The Stoics
declare the world to be
living and animate: Βόηζος δέ
φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον.
Philo, AWtern. m. c. 16, Ὁ. 251,
Bern.: ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου
κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας
ὃ @eds—if these words belong to
the excerpt from Boéthus, which
how appears to me most pro-
bable, at least according to the
sense.

As to the reasons which determined the

4 Diog. vii. 148: Βόηθος δὲ ἂν
Τῇ περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν
τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν, Which isto
be understood in the same way
as the corresponding definitions
of other Stoics (PAil. d, Gr. TI.
i.137, 1, 2), the ἡγεμονικὸν of the
world is said to have its seat in
the purest part of the ether.
This would not necessarily ex-
clude the ancient Stoic doctrine
that it spreads itself from
thence through all the parts of
the world. But in that case
the world would be a living
creature and the Deity its soul,
which Boéthus did not allow.
But if this conception be re-
jected, there remains only a
motion of the world from with-
out, and so far the extract
given by Philo (Jc.) corre-
sponds with the view of out
Stoic: ἕκαστα ἐφορᾷ [ὁ θεὸς καὶ
πάντων οἷα γνήσιος πατὴρ ἐπιτρο-
πεύει, καὶ, εἰ δε; τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν,
ἡνιόχου καὶ κυβερνήτου τρόπον
ἡνιουχεῖ καὶ πηδαλιουχεῖ τὰ σύμ-
παντα, ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ, ὅζο.
παριστάμενος καὶ συνδρῶν ὅσα

BOETHUS.

philosopher to this rejection of Stoic pantheism,
tradition tells us nothing: the decisive cause must
no doubt have lain in the fear of imperilling the
sublimity and unchangeableness of God, if He were,
according to His substance, connected with the
world. In these theories Boéthus, in opposition to
his school, agreed with Aristotle, but he essentially
differs from him both in his materialism, and in the

opinion that God not only directs and guides the ~

universe from the ruling point, but stands beside
every part of it, ready to help; whereas Aristotle
denies to the Deity every activity directed to the
world.) Boéthus is therefore seeking a middle course
between the pantheism of the Staics and the theism
οἵ Aristotle; like that which was subsequently
attempted from the Peripatetic side in the ‘ Book of
the Universe.’?

With this is connected Boéthus’ contradiction of
the doctrine of the conflagration of the world. Of
the four arguments by which he opposes this doc-
trine,? the first shows that the destruction of the
world must result without a cause, for outside the
world there is nothing but the void, and in the world
there is nothing which could bring destruction to it.
The second seeks to prove, not altogether conclusively,
that of all the different kinds of destruction * none

πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλον διαμονὴν καὶ 8. According to Ps.-Philo, 2.6.
τὴν κατ᾽ ὀρθὺν λόγον ayunairioy c.16 sq., Ὁ. 249~253, Bern. (952,
διοίκησιν. C. sg. H., 503 sg. M.).

1 ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ τοῖς 4 κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ ἄναίρεσιν
ἄλλοις πλάνησι καὶ ἀπλανέσιν, ἔτε τῆς ἐπεχούσης ποιότητος (as in
δ᾽ ἀέρι καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ κόσμον the destruction of a figure),
παριστάμενος καὶ συνδρῶν (Philo, κατὰ σύγχυσιν (chemical mix-
Zoe. δἰ1.). ture, cf. PRiL d. Gr. TIL i 127,

2 bide injra, chapter v. 1).

4"
of

CHAP.
“THT.

ECLECTICISM.

could be applicable to the world! The third main-
tains that after the destruction of the world the Deity
would have no object for his activity, and must con-
sequently sink into inaction; nay, if the Deity be
the world-soul, he must himself be destroyed.
Lastly, the fourth contends that, after the complete
annihilation of the world, this tire must itself be
extinguished for want of nourishment; 5 and then the
new formation of the world would be impossible.
But Boéthus had doubtless concluded from this not
only that the world was imperishable, but also that
it had no beginning ;*? he exchanged the Stoic cos-
mology not for the Platonic but for the Aristotelian

‘theory, the doctrine of the eternity of the world:

his departure from the Stoic dogma is here also a
transition to that of the Peripatetics.

That Boéthus likewise opposed the Stoic belief in
prophecy is not asserted;* his own utterances on
this subject are confined to an enquiry concerning
the prognostics of weather and similar things, the

1 For that only is capable of
division which is é« διεστώτων,
or ἐκ συναπτομένων, or only
weakly united—not that which
is superior to all else in force.
An entire annibilation of the
quality of the world is not
maintained by the other view, for
this is still to subsist in the form
of fire. If finally all elements
were simultaneously abolished
through σύγχυσις, there would
be a transition of the ovinto the
μὴ ὅν.

2 Because as pure fire it could
be neither ἄνθραξ nor φλὸξ, but
only αὐγὴ (on which cf, Phil. ὦ.

Gr, TIT. 1.153, 2),and this would
presuppose a luminous body.

3This appears especially from
the thirdargument ; the pseudo-
Philo also (Ὁ. 349, 4) represents
him as attacking the presuppo-
sition εἰ γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτὸς ὃ
κόσμος.

+ The contrary would rather
seem to result from Cic. Divin.
ii. 42, 88, according to which
Panzxtius unus 6 Stoicis astrolo-
gorum predicta rejecit; but
this only implies that Boéthus
did not expressly oppose the
belief, not that he himself
shared it.

PANATIUS.

connection of which with the phenomena portended
he sought to discover."

With Boéthus is associated his celebrated co-
disciple Panzetius,? not only in his opposition to the
doctrine of the destruction of the world, but also in
the independent attitude he assumed to the tradi-
tion of his school, and in his readiness to allow
entrance to other views. This distinguished and
influential philosopher, the chief founder of Roman
Stoicism, was born, it would seem, about 180 B.c., in
Rhodes, 8 and was introduced to the Stoic philosophy

39

CHAP,
TTI.

by Diogenes and Antipater.*

1 Cic. Divin. i. 8, 18: Quis
igitur elicere causas presen-
sionwm potest ? Etsi video Boé-
thum Stotcum essé conatwm, gut
hactenus (only so far) aliquid
egit, ut earum rationem rerum
explicaret, que in mari caelove
jierent. Ubid. i. 21, £7: Nam
et prog nosticorum C&USas perse-
cuté sunt et Botthus Stoicus .
et... Posidonius. In both
passages the emphasis falls on
the cause prognosticorum, the
natural connection between
prognostic and result.

2 Van Lynden, De Panetio
Rhodio, Leiden, 1802.

8 Concerning his native place
there is no doubt (vide Strabo,
xiv. 2, 18, Ὁ. 655). On the
other hand, we are told nothing
of the year either of his birth
or death, and they can only be
approximately determined from
the facts that he attended the
discourses of Diogenes of Seleu-
cia; in 143 B.c. as an openly-
recognised philosopher, accom-
panied Scipio to Alexandria,

He afterwards went to

and was no longer living after
110 B.c. Van Lynden places
his life between 185-112 B.c.
The Ind. Herc. Comp. Col. 51
(ci. Phil. d. Gr. IIL i. 33, 2
names Nicagoras as his father,
and in Col. 55 mentions his
two younger brothers. That
he was of good family, we know
from Strabo, @.c. When Suidas,
sub voce, distinguishes from the
celebrated Panastius a second
and younger Pansetius, the
friend of Scipio, this is merely
a proof of his ignorance, as is
abundantly shown by Van
Lynden, p. 5 sqq.

4 Diogenes is mentioned as
his teacher in the Ind. Here.
Col. 51, 2; and by Suidas,
Tlavair.; Antipater, by Cicero,
Divin. i. 3, 6. His piety to-
wards the latter is praised by
the Ind. Here. Col. 60. Besides
these, according to his own
statement (ap. Strab. xiv. 5, 16,
p. 676), he heard Crates of
Mallos in Pergamus. Polemo
also, the Periegete, is, on chrono-

Panetius:
born in
Riodes,
180 B.C. |

40

CHAP,
iil,
His resi-
ence Fir
Hone.

Appointed
head οὗ
the Stvie
school

in Athens.

ECLECTICISM.

Rome,' where he long remained an inmate of the
household of Scipio Africanus, the younger.” Scipio
and Lelius were his friends? and hearers, and he won

over many zealous youths to Stoicism.*

Scipio also

chose him for his companion when in 143 8.0. he
was sent at the head of a deputation to the East,

and particularly to Alexandria.®

After the death of

Antipater, Panstius undertook the leadership of the
school in Athens,® of which apparently he was the

logical grounds, regarded as

is teacher rather than his
disciple. The text of Suidas
which asserts the latter (Πολέμ.
Evny.) seems corrupt. Cf. Bern-
hardy iz loe., Van Lynden, 36 sq.

1 Whether this occurred after
the Alexandrian journey, and
whether Panzetius visited Rome
of his own accord, or was invited
there by others, tradition does
not inform us. Plutarch (Οἱ
Prine. Philosoph, i. 12, Ὁ. 777)
presupposes that Pansetius was
not in Rome when Scipio in-
vited him to accompany him.
But Scipio must have been
already well acquainted with
him to have given such an
invitation.

* Vide the following note,
and Cic. Pro Mur. 31, 66;
Vell. Patere. i. 13, 3. How
long Panztius was in Rome we
do not know; but as he came
thither at latest after the
Alexandrian journey, therefore
in 142 B.c., and probably before
that journey, and as, on the
other hand, Rutilius Rufus,
who died after 81 B.c., seems
to have heard him in Rome
(supra, p. 11, 3), which can
scarcely have happened before

135-130 B.Cc., we must suppose
that he worked here for a con-
siderable number of years.
Vellejus says that Scipio had
him with him domi militieque,
and the Ind. Here. Col. 56, 2,
seems to speak as if he accom-
panied Scipio to the army.

3 Cic. Fin. iv. 9, 28 ; 11. 8, 24.
Off. i. 26, 90; 1. 22,76. Gell,
NV. A. xvii. 21, 1. Suidas
Παναίτ. Ἰτολύβιος.

4 Vide supra, Ὁ. 10 sq.

5 Cic. Acad. ii. 2, 5; Posidon.
ap. Plut. 1. ¢., and Apophthegur.
reg. et wimp. Serip. Min. 13 sq.
Ῥ. 200; Athen. xi. 549, ἃ.
(where Ποσειδώνιος is in any
case 4 slip of the memory for
Παναίτιος, which, however, is
repeated xiv. 657 sg.) Of.
Justin. fist. xxxviii. 8.

§ Ind. Here. Col. 53 : διάδοχος
ἐγένετο τῆς Avrimdrpov σχολῆς.
Cf. these further statements ;
that he died in Athens (Suid.) ;
that he did not again return to
Rhodes (Cie. Zuse. v. 37, 107);
that he was offered the right
of citizenship in Athens, but
did not accept it (Procl. in
Hesiod. Ἔ. κα ‘Hu. 707,
no doubt after Plutarch);
that there was in Athens a

PANZETIUS.

head until about 110 B.c.!

That he had previously

been active in a similar capacity in his native city is

not likely.2 As teacher
society for common meals
called Panetiasts (Athen. v.
186, a). The attempt of Schep-
pig, De Posidon. Apam. (Son-
dersh. 1869), p. 3 sg. to make
Panetins the head of the
Rhodian, and not of the Athe-
nian school is settled by the
foregoing, and by the proofs
given wfra, Ὁ. 42,1, and Ὁ. 52,3
(Mnesarchus and Dardanus).

1 We cannot place his death
mouch earlier, as, according to
Cic Off. 111. 2, 8, he lived after
the composition of his work on
Duty (which he cannot have
written when he was very
young), for 30 years; but espe-
cially because Posidonius could
otherwise scarcely have been
his disciple; nor can it have
occurred much later, for Crassus,
who came as questor to Athens
found Mnesarchus there, and
not Paneetius (Cic. De Orat. i.
11, £5); and Crassus, born,
according to Cicero, Brut. 43,
161, under the Consuls Q. Czepio
and C. Leelius (140 B.c.) could
not have become queestor be-
fore 110 B.c., but also not very
long after that date. Vide
Zumpt, Abh. d. Berl. Acad. 1842;
fist. Phil. Ki. 8. 104 (80).

* Suidas (Ποσειδών ᾿Απαμ.)
presupposes this when he says
o£ Posidonius: σχολὴν δ᾽ ἔσχεν
ἐν Ῥόδῳ, διάδοχος γεγονὼς καὶ
μαθητὴς Ἰαμαιτίου.ι: But Cicero,
Luse. v. 87, 107, reckons him
among those gui semel egresst
nunguam domum reverterunt ;
and on the other hand Suidas
manifestly presupposes that

and author,? scholar and

Posidonius had been the im-
mediate successor of Pansetius
in Rhodes, which according to
the dates would only be pos-
sible if Panztius had been at
the head of the Rhodian, and
not the Athenian school, and
had filled this post towards the
end of the second century.

3 Concerning his writings vide

. Van Lynden, Ὁ. 78-117, 62 sqq.

The best known of these are
the books περὶ rai καθήκοντος (cf.
Phii. @. Gr. TI. i. 273, 3, 276 sq.),
acknowledged, according to
Cicero, to be the most profound
work on that subject, the model
of Cicero’s own. There are
also quoted a work on the
schools of philosophy (7. aipé-
σέων), π. εὐθυμίας, π. προνοίας,
a political treatise (Cic. Legg.
ili. 6, 14) and a letter to Tubero.
From the .treatise 7. προνοίας
Cicero seems to have taken his
criticism of astrology, De
Divin. ti. 42, 87—46, 97.
ὦ, ὁ. § 88, 97; Schiche, Ὁ. 37
sgq; Hartfelder, Ὁ. 20 sgg. of
his treatise Die Quellen von
Cic.; Bich, De Divin. Freiburg,
1878). Hirzel supposes that
treatise to be also the souree
of Cicero’s De Nat. De. ii, 30,
75-61, 154,and he is probably
right, while Schwenke (Jahrb.
Sir Philol. 1879, Ὁ. 185 s¢.),
derives this section, with the
rest of the book, from Posi-
donius π. θεῶν, The letter ta
Tubero way have been used by
Cicero for the second book of
the Tusculane Disputationes
(cf. Zietzschmann, De Tuse. Dis-

a
μα

CRAP,
111.
fils leita
ang and

re puta~
tLON.

ffis cha-
acter

as ᾧ philo-
sopher.

ECLECTICISM.

philosopher, he enjoyed great reputation,’ and it is
probable that no one since Chrysippus had worked
with greater success for the spread of Stoicism.

The Stoic system, however, had undergone con-
siderable alteration in his hands. Though Paneetius
agreed with its principles and found no part of it
superflucus,? yet bis own interest, consistently with
the spirit of the period, was chiefly directed to the
practical side of philosophy ;3 and he therefore en-
deavoured (herein departing from the usage of his
school) to bring that aspect nearer to the general
comprehension by presenting it ina more intelligible
and attractive form. But this practical interest,
when the scientific objects are subordinated to it,
always involves an attempt to harmonise and com-

put. Font. Halle, 1868); on the
other hand the chief source of
the first book of the Tuseulan.
Disp. is not, as Heine thinks
(De Font. Tuse. Disp. Ὁ. 8 sq.),
to be sought in a treatise of
Pansetius, whose view is di-
rectly opposed to that of Cicero;
but, as Corssen says (De Posid.
Riod. Bonn, 1878), in a trea-
tise of Posidonius.

1 This, after what has been
said, scarcely requires a special
proof. Cicero, eg., calls him
(Divin. i. ὃ, 6) vel princeps
ejus [sce. Stoice] discipline ;
(Legg. 1. 4.) magnus homo et
imprimis eruditus ; (Fin. iv. 9,
23 )inmpriméis ingenuus et gruris ;
(Of. i. 14, 51) gravissimus
Stoicorum ; the Ind. Here.
Comp. Col. 66, praises his many-
sided knowledge, and mentions
(Col. 68) the esteem in which

he was held in Athens; in Col.
7] we are told of his honourable
burial ; Seneca, Hp. 33, 4, com-
pares him and Posidonius with
Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus.

3 Which is evident from his
title of wrinceps Stoicorwm,
and is contirmed by the quota-
tions in Part ITI. i. 61, 3.

8 A few physical propositions
of Paneetius have been handed
down to us; but the greater
number and the most charac-
teristic of the quotations from
him that we possess relate to
anthropology, theology, and
morality. Such of his writings
as we know are either historical,
ethical, or theological in their
contents ; whereas not a single
dialectic definition has ever
been quoted from him.

4 Cic, Fin. iv. 28,79; Off. i.
2,7; ii. 10, 35.

PANATIUS.

bine differing points of view. Panetius, therefore,
assumed « freer attitude towards the doctrine of his
predecessors: he would not withhold from other
philosophers the recognition due to them: he highly
esteemed Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and
Diczearchus; and his admiration of Plato was so
great that it might seem he would have preferred to
follow him, rather than Zeno.! It cannot be ex-
pected of one who appreciated the merits of the
earlier philosophers so impartially that he should
adhere very scrupulously to the traditional doc-
trines of a single school: and, in fact, the many
deviations of Panzetius from the Stoic dogmas show
that he treated the authority of his school, in re-
spect to philosophy, with the same independence of
judgment that he displayed in regard to questions

of literary and historical

1 Cic, A%2. iv. 28, 79: sem-
perque habuit in ore Platonem,
Avistotelem, Xenocratem, Theo-
phrastum, Dicwarchum, ut ip-
sius sevipta declarant. Tuse. 1.
32,79 (vide p.44,1,). Ind. Here.
Col. 61: ἦν yap ἰσχυρῶς φιλο-
πλάτων Kal φιλοαριστοτέλης,
ἀλλὰ] καὶ παρε[ νέδ Ἰω[ κ]ε τῶν
Ζηνων εἰωὴῆν {τι διὰ τὴ]ν ᾽ἸΑΆκα-
δημίαν [καὶ τὸν Περίπατον. Of
Crantor’s treatise on Affliction
he said (Cic. sicad. ii, 44, 135)
it should be learned by heart,
word for word. According to
Proclus in Zim. 50 B, he seems
to have written a commentary
on Plato’s Zimeus; the words
of Proclus, however, Παναΐτ.
καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν Πλατωνικῶν,
do not necessarily imply that

criticism.? He disputed,
Proclus reckoned himself
among the Platonists; they
may also be translated: ‘ Panz-
tius and some others belonging
to the Platonicschool.’ Whether
he or Posidonius is meant by
the philosopher from Rhodes,
whose remarks on Parmenides
are mentioned by Proclus in
Parm. vi. T. vi. 25, cannot be
ascertained.

2 Panzetius is in this respect
a remarkable exception to the
careless manner in which the
majority of the ancients are
accustomed to deal with learned
tradition. His opinion con-
cerning the genuineness of the
dialogues passing under the
name of Socrates, and his
judgment concerning the writ-

CHAP.
111.

elation
to the
Stvie doc-
triues.

ECLECTICISM.

like Boéthus, the doctrine of the conflagration of
the world;! and though he only said that the

ings of Ariston of Chios are
discussed in Phil. d. Gr.
11. 1, 206, 1, and IIT. i. 35, 1.
We see from Plutarch, Arvst.
27, and Athen. xiii 556, ὁ,
that he was the first, as it
seems, to dispute the story of
the bigamy cf Socrates, and
from Plut. Avist. 1, that he
corrected a wrong statement of
Demetrius Phalerius concern-
ing a χορηγία of Aristides
through closer investigation.
It is possible that he went too
far in the matter of Ariston’s
writings, and his conjecture
respecting Archelaus (cf. Phil.
d. Gr. I. 869) may have been
unfounded, as in his opinion
(Sehol. in Aristoph. Ran. 14938
sqq.3 οἵ, Hirzel, Unters. cu Cie.
i, 234) that Aristophanes, ὦ. ¢.,
is speaking of another Socrates;
but the fact that Paneetius felt
the necessity of critical exami-
nation, rarely felt in his time,
is not aifected by this, On the
other hand it is in the highest
degree improbable that the as-
sertion of his having denied
Plato’s authorship of the Phedo
rests upon any other ground
than a misunderstanding, as I
have shown concisely in Part
II. a, 384,1, and more at length
in the Commentationes Momm-
seniane, p. 407 sq.; ef. 405.

1 Diog. vii. 142: Παναίτιος δ᾽
ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον,
Philo, Atern. m. ὁ. 15, p. 248,
Bern. (947, C. H.497 M,): Bondos
γοῦν 6 Σιδώνιος καὶ Wavairios...
τὰς ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας
καταλιπόντες πρὸς θειότερον δόγ-
μα τὸ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμον

παντὸς ηὐτομόλησαν. Epiph.
Her. iii. 2, 9,Ὁ. 1090, Ὁ : Παναΐίτ.
.. . τὸν κόσμον ἔλεγεν ἀθάνατον
καὶ ἀγήρω. With this agrees
in substance βίον, #el. i. 414
(lay, πιθανωτέραν εἶναι νομίζει
καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρέσκουσαν αὐτῷ ΤῊΡ
ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμον ἢ τὴν τῶν
ὅλων εἰς πῦρ μεταβολὴν), though
we learn from it that Paneetius
after his manner had expressed
himself guardedly upon the
point; and it is also quite con-
sistent therewith that in a dis-
sertation on the universe pro-.
bably emanating from Paneetius
fap. Cic. WD. ii. 45, 115, 46,
119), it is emphatically asserted
that the whole universe is
framed with a view to the én-
columitas mundi, and that there
is nothing in it so admirable
quam quod ita stabilis est mun-
dus atque ita coheret ad per-
manendum, ut nihil ne excogi-
tari quidem possit aptius, for a
philosopher who assumed the
destruction of the world would
have had no oceasion to lay the
chief stress on its durability.
Nor does Cic. WW. D. ii. 33, 85,
offer any contradiction: if the
Stoic does not here come toa
decision whether the world will
last for ever or only for an in-
detinitely long period, this does
not prove that he had no opinion
about it, but only that it is not
necessary for his immediate
purpose, the proof of a world-
forming intelligence to bring
this question into discussion.
It is true that the burning of
the world is mentioned, 2. ὁ,
46, 118, with the comment: de

HIS RELATION TO STOICISM.

eternity of the world was, in his opinion, more prob-
able, we can see that he decidedly preferred the
Platenic or Aristotelian theory to that of the Stoics.!
In eonnection with this, he not only limited the
soul’s existence after death to a certain space of

time, but denied it entirely

quo Panetium addubitare di-
cebant, but this mode of ex-
pression can neither be taken
from Paneetius nor from Cicero's
Greek original, the author of
which cannot have learned
merely by hearsay that Panee-
tius was sceptical concerning
the world’s conflagration. The
words are to be laid to Cicero’s
account; nor can we infer from
them that even he was uncer-
tain about Parnetius’s real
meaning, for he may have em-
ployed this form of language
to represent Balbus as speaking
from his recollection of oral
communications (cf. Comment.
Momnsen. p. 403 sq. That
Arnob. Adv. Nat. ii. 9, names
Panestius among the defenders
o£ the conflagration theory is
only a proof of his superficiality
(cf. Diels, Dowogr. 172 sq.).

1 For which of these two theo-
ries he had decided—whether he
repudiated a beginning of the
world as well as an ending—we
are not told. The words, ἀθά-
varov Καὶ ἀγήρω in Epiphanius,
if they really emanate from
Panztius, remind us of Plato’s
ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον (Tim. 33, A);
and even the further statements
do not carry us with certainty
beyond the question of the end
of the world, since the notion
of having no beginning is not
so completely included in the

It is also stated that

word aid:érys (nor in épbapola)
as having no end. But as the
former was as a rule admitted
by the Platonic school (ef. Phil.
ad. Gr. 11. i. 876 sq.), and as the
chief opponents of the Stoicdoc-
trine since Zeno were the Peripa-
teties (Phil. d. Gr. ἘΠ. ii. 836,
929), it seems tome probable that
Paneetius, when he had once
given up the Stoic dogma, did
not remain half way, but went
over to the Peripatetic, which
ai that pericd was generally
the next alternative.

5. This is clear from Cic.
Tuse.i, 32, 78. After the Stoic
doctrine of a limited duration
of the soul has been repudiated,
Cicero continued : WL. Vumquid
igitur est cause, quin amicos
nostros Stoices dimittumus, eos
dico, gui ajunt animos manere,
6 corpore cum excesserint, sed
non semper ? A. Istos vero, &e.
M. Bene reprehendis ... cre-
damus igitur Panetio a Platone
suo dissentientt ? quem enim
omnibus locis divinum, quem
saprentissimum, quem sanctis-
stmum, quem Homerum pivilo-
sophorum appellat, hujus hane
unam sententian de immortali-
tate animorum non probat.
Vult enim, quod nemo negat,
gquivquid natum sit interive :
naser autem animos... alteran
autem adfert rattonem: nihil
6886, quod doleat, quin id egrum

é
fp

CHAP.

»

Y

a

”

46

CHAP.
11}.

ECLECTICISM.

he reckoned only six divisions in the soul instead of
the traditional eight; for he included speech under
the voluntary motions, and ascribed sexual propaga~
tion, not to the soul, but to the vegetable nature.'

esse quoque possit ; quod autem
in morbum cadat, id etiam in-
teriturum: dolere autem ani-
mos, ergo etiam interire. Now,
as I must concede to Heine (De
Fontibus Tusewl. Disput. Wei-
mar, 1863, Ὁ. 8 sq.), even an
orthodox Stoic would neces-
sarily oppose the doctrine of
immortality so far as this main-
tains not merely continuance
after death, but an eternal con-
tinuance. But that the objec-
tions of Panztius had not this
meaning merely, we can see
from the manner in which
Cicero introduces them. He
distinguishes Paneetius, indeed,
quite clearly from those Stoics
qui ajunt animos manere. These
are previously disposed of, and
there then remain only two
possible views, that of Plato
and that of Panztius—that
which maintains an endless
duration of life after death,
and that which altogether dle-
nies it. The same is evident
even from the objections which
Cicero quotes from Pansetius,
especially the second: he who
represents souls as lasting till
the contlagration of the world,
must not base his denial of
their unlimited existence on
the argument that they become
diseased, and therefore may
also die, but on the view that
they are not able to withdraw
themselves from the fate of
the whole; for they would suc-
cumb, according to his theory,

not to internal disease and dis-
solution but to external force.
When, at last, Panetius aban-
doned the conflagration of the
world, he had no motive for
attributing to the soul a limited
existence; he had only the
choice between absolute denial
and unlimited acceptance of
its immortality. From Tuse.
i. 18, 42, it would appear that
Panzetius believed in the disso-
lution of the soul immediately
after death. Js autem animus,
it is here said, qui, st est horam
quatuor generum, ex quibus om-
nia constare dicuntur, ex tn-
flammata anima constat, ut
potissimum videri video Panatio,
superiora capessat necesse est.
Nihil enim habent hee du
Genera PTONI, et supera semper
petunt. Ita, sive dissipantur,
procul aterris id evenit ; sive
permanent et conservant habi-
tum suum, hoe etiam magis ne-
cesse est ferantur im calum.
When Cicero here remarks that
‘the view of Panetius con-
cerning the nature of the soul
being presupposed, we must
admit that it is exalted to
Heaven even in the event of
its being annihilated after
death,’ the inference is that
it was Panstius himself with
whom he had found the doc-
trine of such a dissolution of
the soul.

1 Nemes. De Nat. Hom. α. 15,
p. 96: Παναίτιος δὲ 6 φιλόσοφος
τὸ μὲν φωνητικὸν τῆς Kal? ὁρμὴν

HIS RELATION TO STOICISM.

The first of these theories is not of much impor-
tance;! but the second, in the discrimination of
ψυχὴ from φύσις, presupposes a psychological dual-
ism, which is originally foreign to Stoicism.? Pane-
tius here follows the Peripatetic doctrine, as in his
theory of immortality. Weare again reminded of
it in his ethics, by the division of the virtues into
theoretical and practical. That he also departed
from the severity of the Stoics and approximated to
the view of the Academy and the. Peripatetics, in his
definition of the highest good, is not probable ; Ὁ

κινήσεως μέρος εἶναι βυύλεται,
λέγων ὀρθότατα, τὸ δὲ σπερματι-
κὸν οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος ἀλλὰ
τῆς φύσεως. Tertull. De An.
14: Dividitur autem [anima]
in partes nune in aduas...
mune im guingue (to which
Diels, Dovogr. 205, from the
parallel passage in Theodoret,
Cur. Gr. Aff. v. 20, adds: ad
Aristotele) et in sex a Panetio,
Through Diel’s luminous re-
storation of the text, those
conjectures are’ set at rest
which Zietzschmann (De Tuse.
Disp. Font. 20 sqg.) connects
with the reading of the manu-
scripts: Mune in quingue et in
sex a Pan. When this author
infers from Cic. Zuse. 11, 21,
47 (est enim animus in partes
tributus duas, quarum altera
rationis est particeps, altera
expers) that Panztius in his
ethics followed the Platonic
and Aristotelian distinction of
a rational and irrational part
of the soul, I cannot agree
with him. Even if Cicero in
this section holds to Panztius
throughout, it is still question-

able how far this dependence
extends to details, and it is
perfectly conceivable that here
and in what follows he himself
may first have given this un-
Stoical meaning to the truly
Stoic notion of the dominion
of the λόγος (ratio) over the
ὁρμὴ (temeritas).

1 Ritter (ili. 698) undoubtedly
seeks too much in it.

2 The old Stoic psychology
derives all practical activities
from the ἡγεμονικὸν, and in its
materialism has no occasion
for the distinction of ψυχὴ and
φύσις ἴῃ latter is rather sup-
posed to be changed into the
former after birth ¢ Pail. d. Gr.
111. i. 197, 1).

3 Diog. vii. 92.

4 Diogenes indeed maintains
(vii. 128): 6 μέντοι Ἰϊαναίτιος
καὶ Tloveddvios οὐκ αὐτάρκη
λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ χρείαν
εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ ἰσχύος
καὶ χορηγίας. But as this state-
ment in regard to Posidonius
(vide proofs it Phil. d. Gr. ITI.
i. p. 214,2; 216, 1) is decidedly
false, Tennemann (Geschichte

FYis
Ethies.

43

CHAP.
IIL.

ne er eee re ay

ECLECTICISM.

though he perhaps emphasised more strongly the
distinction between desirable things and things to be
rejected; and similarly the statement that he denied
the ἀπάθεια of the wise,! may be traceable to the
fact that he brought out more clearly the difference
between the Stoic superiority over pain and the
Cynic insensibility to it. But we may, nevertheless,
gather from these statements that he tried to soften
the asperities of the Stoic ethics, and among the
many possible views of their propositions, gave the
preference to those which brought him least into
collision with the ordinary theory.2 The same en-
deavour is also evinced by the tendency of his cele-
brated work on Duty, the prototype of that of Cicero ;
for this is expressly designed, not for the perfected

d. Phil. iv. 382) is right in
saying that we cannot trust to it
in regard to Panztius. Accord-
ing to Plutarch (Demosth. 13),
he tried to prove that Demos-
thenes held the καλὸ: alone to
be a 82 αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν : all the
less would he himself have
doubted it; and Cicero says ex~-
pressly (infra, p. 49, 2) that he
did not. When Ritter (iil. 699)
finds in the proposition (ap.
Sext. Math. xi. 73) that ‘there
is not only a pleasure contrary
to nature, but a pleasure accord-
ing to nature,’a manifest devia-
tion from the older Stoicism,
this seems questionable, both
from the passage itself and
the quotation in Phil. ὦ. Gr.
TIL. i. p. 219 sg. The Stoic
doctrine is only that pleasure
isa thing indifferent (ad:dpopor>,
with which the theory of a

pleasure according to nature is
not inconsistent; but when we
understand by pleasure in the
narrower sense the emotion of
ἡδονὴ. it is like every emotion
contrary to nature. Cf. ἐδώ. II].
218, 3.

1A. Gell. xii. δ, 10: ἀναλ-
ynola enim atque ἀπάθεια non
meo tantun, tuguit, sed quorun-
dam etiam ew eadem porticu
prudentiorum hominum sicuti
judicio Panativ .. . improbateu
abjectaque est.

2 This is seen from the cir-
cumstance that, according to
Cicero, in. iv. 9, 28, In the
letter to Tubero de dolore
patiendo, he did not expressly
declare that pain is not an
evil, but only enquired: Quid
esset et quale, quantumgue vn en
esset alieni, deinde que ratio
esset perferendr.

“PANZETIUS’ RELATION ΤῸ STOICISM.

wise man, but only for those who are making pro-
gress in wisdom; and for this reason it does not
treat of the κατόρθωμα, but only of the καθῆκον."
Meanwhile, however, all this contains no real devia-
tion from the Stoic ethics, and what we are otherwise
told concerning the moral doctrines of Panetius is
in harmony with them.? His divergences from the
traditional theology of his school were more consider-
able. It can only be the doctrine of Paneetius
which his scholar, Mucius Sceevola, puts forward (like
Varro? at a later period), when he says* that there
are three classes of gods, those spoxen of by the
poets, by the philosophers, and by the statesmen.
The narratives of the poets concerning the gods are
full of absurd and unworthy fables: they represent
the gods as stealing, committing adultery, changing
themselves into beasts, swallowing their own chil-
dren, ὅθ. On the other hand, philosophic theology
is valueless to states (it does not adopt itself to a
1 This at least results from sets forth the claim of life
Cicero’s exposition, O/f. ili. 3, according to nature; ap. Cic.
13 sg.; also ap. Sen. #p.116,5, Off. lil. ὃ, 11 sg.; 7, 34, he de-
Pantius would firstof all give claresid solum bonum, quod esset
precepts for those who are not honestum; ap. Stob. Eel. ii. 112,
yet wise. In reply to the ques- he compares particular duties
tion ofa youth astowhetherthe with marksmen aiming from
wise man will fallin love, he different standpoints at the
says that they will both do same mark. What Cicero quotes
better to keep themselvesfrom (Off. ii. 14, 51) has also an
such an agitation of the mind, analogy (Pail. d. Gr. 111.1. 263)
as they are not yet wise men. with the ancient Stoics. The
For further details concerning utterance in Of. ii. 17, 60, is
the treatise of Pantius see truly Zenonian.
Phil. ἃ. Gr, THT, i. p. 273, 276 3 Cf. infra, chapter vii. Varro,
Sq 4 According to Augustine,

3 Ap. Glem. Alex. Strom. ii. Οἵα. D.iv. 27, whose authority
416, B; Stob. Hel. ii. 114, he was doubtless Varro.

E

49

CHAP.
. JIT,

4Tis
theology.

BO

CHAP.
Ii.

ECLECTICISM.

public religion), for it contains many things the
knowledge of which is either superfluous or preju-
dicial to the people; under the latter category,
Sceevola places the two propositions that many of
the personages honoured as gods—as Heracles,
ARsculapius, the Dioscuri—were merely human
beings, and the gods are not in appearance as they
are represented, for the true God has no sex, no age,
and no members.! From this it naturally resulted ?
that the existing religion could only be regarded as
a convenient public institution in the service of
order, and that the authors of it must regulate them-
selves in their doctrine of the gods according to the
power of comprehension in the masses. Though we
do not know whether Panzetius was the first to bring
forward this discrimination of a threefold doctrine
of the gods,3 we must at any rate assume that
in his theology, as in that of the men who for
the most part adopted it—Scevola, Varro, and
Seneca—a thoroughly free attitude to the popular
religion found expression and was justified: though
it is not known that either of them, in the
allegorical interpretation of myths, which was so
much in favour with the Stoics and from which

1 Among those portions of Gz. III. i. 317, 8) this is

philosophical theology which treated as belonging to the
are unnecessary for the people,
concerning which Augustine is
silent, we must reckon the
purely philosophic doctrines,
incomprehensible to him.

3 Varro says this more defi-
nitely.

3 In the Placita (cf. Phil, ὦ.

Stoics universally; but the
Stoic from whom the author
of the Plucita here takes his
excerpt can only have belonged
to the later period, which is
also indicated by the appeal to
Plato, i. 6, 3.

PANHTIUS RELATION ΤῸ STOICISM.

no Stoic could ever entirely escape,! went beyond
the most general determinations. Pansetius placed
himself in open opposition to the Stoic tradition, on
a point which the school was accustomed to con-
sider of the highest importance—namely, in his dis-
belief of sootbsaying, mentioned above:? herein,
he seems to have accepted the criticism of Carne-
ades.2 We cannot, however, on this account convict
him of desertion from the Stoic principles, since the
Stoa of that time acknowledged him as one of its
members.> His relation to his school is, neverthe-
less, of quite another kind from that of Antiochus
to the later Academy: he remained true in the
main to its doctrine; yet in his theories, and his
attitude towards the earlier philosophers he un-
mistakably tends to an understanding with points of
view regarding which Stoicism had hitherto been
accustomed to maintain a purely hostile position.®

1 Vide Phil. d. Gr. ΤΙ,
Ῥ. 825, with which cf. the
.quotations from Varro, infra
chap. vi. end.

2 Even on this point the
testimonies are not quite unani-
mous. Diogenes (vii. 149)
says simply: ἀνυπόστατον αὐτήν
[τὴν μαντικὴν) φησι. HKpiphan.
8. Her. 111. 2,9: τῆς μαντείας
κατ᾽ οὐδὲν ἐπεστρέφετο. On the
other hand, Cicero says, Divin.
i. 8,, δ: Nee tumen ausus est
megare vim esse adivinandi, sed
_dubitare se αἰαὶ. Similarly
Acad. ii. 33, 107. Meanwhile
we see from Dirin. i. 7, 12,
that he propounded his doubts
pretty decidedly, and from
Divin. ii. 42,88; 47, 97 (of. Phil.

d. Gr. TIT. 1. 340, 1, and supra,
p. £2, 1) that he alone among
the Stoics positively discarded,
at any rate, astrological sooth-
saying.

3 Of. Cic. Divin. i.
QOuare omittat urgere Car-
neades, quod faciebat etiam
Panetius requirens, Juppiterne
cornicem ὦ leva, eorcum ab
dextera canere jussisset.

4 Epiphanius is entirely in
the wrong when he adds, after
the words quoted in the pre-
vious note: καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν
λεγόμενα ἀνήρει, ἔλεγε γὰρ φλήν-
αφον εἶναι τὸν περὶ θεοῦ λόγον.

5 Supra, Ὁ. +2, 2.

§ Some other opinions quoted
from Pansetius are unimportant

7, 12:

E 2

δ]

CHAP,
111.

52

CHAP.
Til.

Contem-
porarres
and disci-
ples of
Pune-
tius.

tlera-
clides.
Sosigenes.

ECLECTICISM.

That Paneetius, in adopting this mode of thought,
did not stand alone among the Stoics of that time,
is proved, not only by what we have seen above of
the deviations of Boéthus from the Stoic doctrine,
but also by what we are told of his fellow disciples,
Heraclides and Sosigenes. The former opposed the
Stoic proposition concerning the equality of all
faults;! the latter, like others, is said to have
attempted, not without inconsistencies, to combine
the Aristotelian theory of the mingling of substances
with that of Chrysippus.2 But we know nothing
further of either of these contemporaries of Panzetius.
In his own school we may suppose that the con-
ception and treatment of the Stoical doctrine,
which he himself favoured, was predominant. But
here, again, we have to regret the meagreness
of the historical tradition. Though we are ac-
quainted with the names of many of his numerous
disciples? Posidonius is the only one concerning

so far as his character as a
philosopher is concerned. Van
Lynden (72 sq.) mentions
among these his opinion re-
specting comets (Sen. Nat. Qu.
vii. 80, 2); his theory that At-
tica, on account of its healthy
climate, produced gifted men
CProcl. ἐν Tim. 50 ¢., following
Plato, Zim. 24, ¢.); the state-
ment that the torrid zone is
inhabited (Ach. Tat. Zsag. in
Petar. Doctr. Temp. 111. 96).

1 Diog. vii. 121.

2 Alex. Aphr. w. μίξεως 142,
a m.: Of the Stoics after
Chrysippus, of μὲν Χρυσίππῳ
συμφέρονται (especially in re-

gard to the mixture, for which
cf. Phil. d. Gy. TIT.126 sqq.) of δέ
τινες αὐτῶν, τῆς ᾿Αριστοτέλους
δόξης ὕστερον ἀκοῦσαι δυνηθέντες,
πολλὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου
περὶ κράσεως καὶ αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν.
ὧν εἷς ἐστι καὶ Ξωσιγένης, ἑταῖρος
᾿Αντιπάτρου (cf, δια. 111.1. Ὁ. 48).
Because they could not, on
account of-their other presup-
positions follow Aristotle en-
tirely (this seems the sense of
the imperfect text), they fell
into contradictions.

5 Among these the following
names should be mentioned :
(1) Greeks: Mnesarchus, of
Athens, who had also heard

SCHOOL OF PANATIUS,

whose opinions we possess any details.

Of the suc-

cessor of Panztius, Mnesarchus, we can only con-

Diogenes and Antipater, the
successor of Pansetius (Cic.
De Orat. i. 11, 45; cf. 18, 83;
Ind. Here. Comp. Col. 51, 4;
78,5; Hpit. Diog.ct. Phil. d. Gr.
IIT. i. 38, 2), who likewise heard
Antiochus in Athens (Cic. Acad.
i. 22,69; Numen.ap. Eus. Pr.
Ee. xiv. 9,2; quoting from him
Augustin. c. Aead. 111. 18, 40).
Cicero (4, cf. #%n. 1. 2, 6) calls
him and Dardanus tum prin-
cipes Stotcorum. From Ind.
Here. Col. 51, 58, 78, cf. ptt.
Diog., it follows that Darda-
nus was likewise an Athenian
and a disciple of Diogenes,
Antipater,and Panetius. Ashe
was at the same time called the
successor of Panzetius, he would
seem to have conducted the
school in common with Mnes-
archus. Their successor was
probably (as Zumpt supposes,
Abdh. ἃ. Berl. Acad. Hist. Phit.
At. 1842, p. 105) Apollodo-
rus of Athens, whom Cicero
describes as a contemporary of
Zeno the Epicurean (iV. D. 1.
34, 93) and the Znd. Here. Col.
53, names among the disciples
of Panzetius, but who is to be
distinguished from the Seleu-
cian before mentioned, with
whom Zumpt confuses him. His
leadership of the school must
have fallen in the beginning
of the first century, and perhaps
even began before the end of
the second. Apollonius of
Nysa, in Phrygia, τῶν Παναιτίου
γνωρίμων ἄριστος (Strabo, xiv. 1,
48, p. 650), of whom nothing
further is known. Asclepio-
dotus, of Nicwa (Lnd. Here. Col.

73). Damocles of Messene
(ibid. 76,4). Demetriusthe Bi-
thynian (Diog. v.84; Ind. Here.
Col. 75), with whom his father
Diphilusis also mentioned as
a Stoic. To him belong, asit ap-
pears, the two epigrams in An-
thol. Gr. ii. 64, Jue. Dionysius
of Cyrene, a great geometrician
(Ind. Herc. 52). Georgius
of Lacedemon (fxd. Here. 76,
5). Hecato of Rhodes, whose
treatise on Duties, dedicated
to Tubero, is quoted by Cicero,
Off. 111.15, 63 : 23, 89 «7. From
the same treatise, if not from a
separate work of his own on
Benevolence, Seneca seems t

have taken the greater part οἱ
what he quotes from him (Sen.
Benef. 1. 3,9; ii. 18, 2, 21, 4;
11, 18, 1; vi. 87, 1; Hy. 5,7;
6,7; 9,6. Several other works,
some of them comprehensive,
are quoted by Diogenes (see
his Index), who, according to
the epitome (in which Rose
rightly substitutes ‘Exar. for
Κάτων), had dedicated to him
his own biography. The Bi-
thynians Nicander and
Lyco(lnd. Here. 75.5; 76, 1).
Munasagoras (pit. Ὁ). Pa-
ramonus of Tarsus (nd.
Here. 74,77). Pausanias of
Pontus (ibid. 76,1). Plato
of Rhodes (Diog. 11. 109).
Posidonius (vide infra).
Sosus of Ascalon (Ind. Here.
75, 1; Steph. Byz. De Urb.
ἌἊσκ.), doubtless the same after
whom Antiochus of Ascalon,
the Academician, had named a
treatise (infra, p. 86,2). Perhaps
after the death of Panztius he

ECLECTICISM.

jecture that the Stoicism which his pupil Antiochus
(vide infra) found it so easy to combine with the

had still belonged to the school
of Mnesarchus and Dardanus,
(which Antiochus also visited),
as an older member. Sotas
of Paphos (ind. Here. 75, 1).
Stratocles of Rhodes, de-
scribed by Strabo (xiv. 2, 13,
p. 655) as a Stoic, and by the
Ind. Here. 17, 8, cf. 79, as a
disciple of Panstius and author
of a work on the Stoic school.
Timocles of Knosos or Cni-
dus (Ind. Here. 76,2). Anti-
dotus also appears to have
belonged to the school of
Panetius or Mnesarchus, as,
according to Ind. Here. Col. 79,
Antipater of Tyre, seems at first
to have been his disciple and
afterwards the disciple of
Stratocles, Also the poet An-
tipater of Sidon (Diog. ii.
39), of whom the Anthology
contains many epigrams (ride
Jacob. sLnthol. Gr. xiii. 846),
belongs to the generation after
Panestins According to Cicero
(De Orat. iii. 50, 194) he was
already known about 92 B.c.,
and still living; and the same
author refers to an event in
his life (De Pato, 8, 5), which
Posidonius would seem to have
quoted. Diotimus, or Theo-
timus, must have been a con-
temporary, or a little later; the
same who, according to Déog.
x. 8, forged immoral letters
with the name of Epicurus
(perhaps also the same person
thatis quoted by Sext. Math. vii.
140); for, according to Athen.
ΧΙ. 611, ὃ, he was executed for
this at the instance of Zeno the
Epicurean (Phil. ἃ. Gr. TIT. 1.

402). Concerning Scylax of
Halicarnassus, celebrated as an
astronomer and politician, we
learn from Cic. Divin. ii. 42, 88,
that he was a friend of Pane-
tius, and, like him, an opponent
of astrology. That he belonged
to the school of the Stoics, is
not, however, said. In regard
to Nestor of Tarsus, it is not
quite clear whether he was a
fellow dclisciple or a disciple of
Panectius, or lived at a later
time. Strabo (xiv. 514, p. 674)
mentions him after Antipater
and Archedemus and before
the two Athenodori (discussed
infra, Ὁ. 71); the Hpitome or
Diogenes, side ‘by side with
Dardanus and other disciples
of Diogenes of Seleucia, before
Antipater. On the other hand,
according to Lucian, JJacrob.
21, the Stoic Nestor of Tarsus,
had been the teacher of Ti-
berius, which, as a contempo-
rary of Pansetius, in spite of
the ninety-two years life here
attributed to him, he could not
possibly have been. We might
conjecture that the so-called
Lucian had mistaken the Stoic
Nestor for the philosopher of
the Academy of the same name
(mentioned infra, p. 102, 1), the
teacher of Marcellus (who
may also have instructed Tibe-
rius), and that the Stoic was
a contemporary of Pansetius,
Between Nestor and Dardanus
the Mpitome introduces a Ba-
silides. This, however, was
probably not the teacher of
Marcus Aurelius (infra, ch.
vill.) butan otherwise unknown

SCHOOL OF PANATIUVS.

doctrine of the Academy already approximated to
that doctrine in his own exposition of it;! and that
his views resembled those of his master on other
points besides psychology, of which this is expressly

stated.

Of Hecato, we know that he considerably

departed from the strict ethical doctrine of the Stoics

member of the school of Dio-
genes; for the former could
not have been placed here, and
was no doubt earlier than the
source of the Stoic biographies
of the Laertian.—Besides the
Greeks, there were the Romans
whom Panztius had for dis-
ciples in Rome, and some of
them also perhaps afterwards
in Athens. The most important
of these, Q. Alius Tubero,
Q. Mucius Scevola,
C. Fannius, P. Rutilius
Rufus, L. Mlius, Δ. Vi-
gellius, Sp. Mummius,
have been already named
(supra, p.10 sqg.). Further we
may mention: A certain Piso, of
whom we know nothing more
(7nd. Here. Col.74, 6), butaccord-
ing tothe theory of Comparetti
he was the L. Calpurnius
Piso Frugi, who was consul in
188 B.c.; Sextus Pompejus
(Cic. De Orat. t.c.and 1.15, 67;
Brut. 47, 175; Off. i. 6, 19;
Philipp. 12, 11, 27), a distin-
guished authority on civil law,
geometry, and the Stoic philo-
sophy; and L. Lucilius Bal-
bus (De Orat. iii. 21,78: Brut.
49,154); for that the two last
owed their Stoicism to Panz-
tius is most probable. On the
other hand, Q. Lucilius Bal-
bus (Cic. WV. D.6, 15) seems to
be too young for this. When,

therefore, we hear in De Orat.
iii. 21, 78 (supposed date 91
B.c.), of two Balbi who
were Stoics, one of these must
be meant together with a third
of the same name, Besides
these the Ζῶ. Here. Col. T4
names the Samnites Marcius
and Nysius; which latter
introduced the σπουδαιότατοι
(in distinction from the σπουδ-
ator) as a separate class.

1 Nothing else has ever been
quoted from him except an
utterance against unphilosophi-
cal rhetoric (ap. Cic. De Orat.
i, 18, 83), a logical observation
(ap. Stob. «μοὶ. i. 436), and a
detinition of God (bid. 60).
These passages contain nothing
divergent from the general
Stoic doctrine.

2 Galen, H. Phil. 20 (Diels,
Doxogr. 615) : Μνήσαρχος δὲ τὴν
Στωικῶν ὑπόληψιν ἐπικρίνων τὸ
φωητικὸν (καὶ add. D.) τὸ σπερ-
ματικὸν περιεῖλεν οἰηθεὶς τῆς
αἰσθητικῆς δυνάμεως ταῦτα (μὴ
add. Ὁ. p. 206) μετέχειν (Panse-
tius did not reckon it accord-
ing to p. 46, 1, supra, as be-
longing to the φυχὴ), μέρη δὲ τῆς
ψυχῆς φήθη μόνον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ
τὸ αἰσθητικόν, the latter being
naturally again divided into
the five senses, with which we
come back to Panetius’ six
faculties of the soul.

55

CHAP,
111.

56

CHAP,

IIT.

Posido-

NLS.

ECLECTICISM.

in its application to individual details;' in this
respect he was certainly anticipated by Diogenes ;
but tradition tells us nothing further of these philo-

sophers.

Rather more has been communicated to us re-
specting Posidonius,? a Syrian of Apamea,* whose
long activity seems to have extended over, or nearly

over, the first half of the first century.‘

1 Phil. d. Gr. 111. i. 263, 2.

2 Bake, Posidunti Rhodit Re-
liguie Doctrine : Leiden, 1810;
Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gree. iii.
245 sqq.; Scheppig, De Posid.
Apam. Rerum Gentium Terra-
pum Scriptore: Sondersh. 1869.

3 Strabo, xiv. 2, 18, Ὁ. 655;
xvi. 2, 10, p. 753; Athen. Vi.
252, 6.; Lucian, Aacrob. 20;
Suidas, sub voce.

1 More precise information
we do not possess. Three data
may be made the basis of an
approximate ealculation: (1)
that Posidonius was the dis-
ciple of Panzetius; (2) that he
lived to be eighty-four years
old (Lucian, 1. 6.) ; and (3) that,
according to Suidas, he came
to Rome under the consulate
of M. Marcellus (51 B.c.). Ac-
cordingly Bake, and subse-
quently almost all the authori-
ties, believe that he was born in
135 B.c. and died in 51 Bc.
But the statement of Suidas
(notwithstanding Scheppig, p.
10) seems to me suspicious ;
partly because it is not probable
that Posidonius as an old man
of more than eighty years
journeyed a second time to
Rome; partly because Suidas
speaks as if this visit of Posi-
donius to ‘Rome were the only

A disciple

one, or the most known (ἦλθε
δὲ καὶ eis Ῥώμην, ἐπὶ Μάρκου
Μαρκέλλου), and thus shows
himself (as in the statement
discussed supra, p. 41, 2) to
be imperfectly informed as to
Posidonius: and partly because
we should necessarily expect to
find some trace of his presence
in Rome in Cicero, all of whose
philosophical writings, and a
great part of his letters, were
written at a later time. Per-
haps the circumstance that
under M. Marcellus the league
of the Rhodians with Rome
was renewed (Lentulus, in Cie.
ad Hamil. xii. 15)—possibly,
however, a merely clerical
error—may have caused the
journey which occurred in the
last consulate of Marius (tn/fra,
p. 57, 2) to be placed under
that of Marcellus. Miiller (2. 6.
p. 245) believes Posidonius to
have been ten years younger
than he is represented accord-
ing to the ordinary theory. He
bases this partly on the asser-
tion of Athen. xiv. 657, 7, that
Strabo, B. vii, said that he
had known Posidonius; partly
on Strabo, xvi. 2, 10, p. 753
(Ποσειδ. τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς φιλο-
σόφων πολυμαθέστατος); partly
on Plut. #rat. i, where some-

POSIDONITS,

of Paneetius,' he also visited the countries of the
West, as far as Gades,? but not to seek a sphere for his

thing is quoted from Posidonius
which seems to have been
written after Ceesar’s death.
But the last is not correct;
the quotation from Posidonius
contains no allusion to Ceesar’s
murder. From the καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς we
ean only infer at most that
the lifetime of Posidonius had
touched that of Strabo, which
would also have been the case
if Posidonius had died in 50
B.c. Meantime Wyttenbach in
Bake, Ὁ. 263 sqg., shows that the
expression is not seldom used,
even by Strabo in a wider
sense. The acjuaintance of
Strabo with Posidonius may
still be held without placing
the death of Posidonius much
beyond 50 B.c. For as Strabo
(vide infra, p. Τῷ, ἢ.) went to
Rome as a boy before the year
44, perhaps (as Scheppig, p. 11
sq¢, thinks, agreeing with Ha-
sen-Miiller, De Strab. Vita, 18)
in 46-7, or even in 48 B.c., he
might possibly have seen the
Rhodian philosopher in his
later days. Scheppig there-
fore places his birth 1 130 Bo.
and his death in 46 B.c. Even
on this assumption sufficient
time would not be found for
the instruction which Posido-
nius received from Pansetius.
It is therefore questionable
whether we can depend upon
the statement of Athenseus.
This statement occurs at the
same place where Athenzeus
also maintains that Posidonius
had been with Scipio in Egypt
(supra, p. 40, 5), and may
be founded upon a mistake as

well as the latter statemert.
It relates, perhaps, not to a
passage in the last part of
Strabo’s seventh hook, but to
c. ὃ, 4, p. 297 (ἔκ τε ὧν εἶπε
Ποσειδώνιος). or c. 5, 8, p.
316, where a report of Posi-
donius is quoted concerning an
event that occurred in his period
of office, which an inaccurate
recollection might have repre-
sented to Athenzeus as an oral
communieation. But if the
two statements which occa-
sioned the death of Posidonius
to be placed in or before 51 B.¢.,
concerning his visit to Rome
under Marcellus and his meet-
ing with Stiabo, are both
uncertain. the possibility is not
excluded that he may have been
born some years before 135 B.c.
and may havedied before 51 B.c.
1 Cic. OFF. ili. 2, 8; Davin.
1.8, 6; Suid. veide supra, Ὁ. 41,
3)
3 The traces of this journey
are preserved in Strabo’s quo-
tations from Posidonius. We
here see that Posidonius re-
mained a long time in Spain,
especially at Gades (ili. 1, 5,
p. 188; ¢. 5, 7-9, p. 172, 174;
xiii. 1, 66, Ὁ. 614); from thence
he coasted along the African
shores to Italy (iii. 2, 63 xvii.
3, 4, p. 144, 827); that he
visited Gaul (iv. 4, 5, p. 198),
Liguria (ili. 3, 18, p. 165),
Sicily (vi. 2, 7, p. 273), the
Lipari islands (vi. 2, 11, p. 277),
the east coast of the Adriatic
Sea (vii. 5, 9, Ὁ. 816). That he
did not neglect this opportunity
of visiting Rome may be taken

δ8

ECLECTICISM.

CHAP. teaching : 1 this he found in Rhodes,? where he was
so completely naturalised that he is frequently called

ΠῚ.

a Rhodian.®

His name attracted numerous scholars,

and especially Romans; therefore, although he never
himself taught in Rome, he must certainly be
reckoned among the men who did most for the
spread of the Stoic philosophy among the Romans ;*

for granted. He came a second
time from Rhodes under the last
consulate of Marius (86 B.C.)
on business to Rome (Plut.
Mar. 45), while, on the other
hand, the supposed visit in the
year 51 seems to me, as I have
shown, improbable.

1 At any rate, we have not
the slightest intimation of such
a design. The chief purpose
of this journey rather con-
sisted, as far as we can gather,
in geographical and historical
investigation. The date seems
to be the beginning of the first
century, soon after the war
with the Cimbri; cf. Strabo,
vil. 2, 2,293. For further con-
jectures, vide Scheppig, Ὁ. 4 sqq.

5 At what time he went to
Rhodes and what induced him
to settle there, we are not told;
but as the journey in the west
must have consumed several
years, it is to be supposed that
he only commenced his activity
as a teacher subsequently.

3 Athen, vi. 252, δ: Lue.
Macrob. 20; Suid. From Lue.
lL. ὁ.; Strabo, xiv. 2,13, p. 655;
vil. 5, 8, Ὁ. 316; Plut. Alar. 45;
we find that he received the
Bhodian citizenship, and filled
public offices—even that of a
Prytanis.

* We can at once perceive

this from the manner in which
Cicero mentions him, treating
him throughout as a man well
known to his Roman readers;
cf., for example, WV. D. i. 44,
198: Laniliaris omnium nos-
trim Posidenius. He himself
had heard him in Rhodes (Plut.
Cic. 4; Cic. VW. .22.1. 8, 6; Tuse.
11, 25, 61; De Fato,3,5; Brut.
91, 316), and kept up a con-
stant connection with him
(Hin. 1. 2, 6: Legimus tamen
Diogenem, &C., ὦν primisque
Jamiliarem nostrum Posido-
nium). Inthe year 59 B.c. he
sent Posidonius the memorial
of his consulate to revise, but
Posidonius cleclined the propo-
sition, as the memorial could
gain nothing by it (4p. ad Att.
1.1). This is the last definite
date in the life of Posidonius.
Previously Pompey had made
the acquaintance of the philo-
sopher, and given him repeated
proofs of his estrem (Strabo,
xi. 1, 6, p. 492; Plut. Pomp.
42; Cie. Tuse. ὦ. ¢.; Plin. AN.
vii. 112). Thestory of Pompey’s
visit to him, which Cicero
(Tuse. t. 6.) cites as a proof
of Stoic fortitude under
sufferings, is well known. He
was also acquainted with the
older disciple of Panzetius, Ru-
tilius Rufus (Cic. Off. 111. 2,10).

POSIDONTTS.

even at a later period he was regarded as one of
the first Stoic authorities! and his numerous writ-
ings were among the scientific works most read.

In his conception of Stoicism, Posidonius follows
in the main the tendency of his teacher Panetius.
In critical acuteness and freedom of spirit he stands
indeed as far behind Panetius? as he excelled him
in erudition ;* and he consequently did not oppose

1 Seneca repeatedly names
him as such (2p. 33, 4; 104,
21; 108, 38), together with
Zeno, Chrysippus, and Panz-
tius ; and in Zp. 90, 20, he says
of him: SPosidonius, ut mea
fert opinio, ex his, qui pluri-
mum philosophie contulerunt.

2 Concerning the writings
known to us, cf. Bake, 235 sqq¢. ;
Muller, 248 s¢g.; on the geo-
graphical and historical writ-
ings, Scheppig, 15 sg¢¢. There
are more than fifty of them,
some of them extensive works.
What a mine of knowledge and
learning the later authors pos-
sessed in them, we see from the
numerous quotations in Cicero,
Strabo, Seneca, Plutarch, Athe-
neus, Galen (De Hippocratis
οὐ Platonis Placitis), Diogenes,
Stobeus, &e. But, no doubt,
much besides has been trans-
ferred without acknowledg-
ment to other expositions.

3 Posidoninus shows himself,
as we shall find, very credulous,
not merely in his defence of
soothsaying, but in other cases
where he accepts fabulous
statements too easily, for which
Strabo oceasionally censures
him (ii. 8, 5, p. 100, 102; iii. 2,
9, 147; iil. 5, 8, 178; ef. alsa

xvi. 2,17, Ὁ. 755). What Schep-
pig (Ὁ. 42 sq.) observes in his
detence is not convincing to
me, and when he says that the
facility with which Posidonius
appropriates the most fabulous
narratives about fulfilled pro-
phecies does not signify much,
he forgets that a person who
accepts the most improbable
stories without competent au-
thority cannot possibly be a
critical investigator of history.

4 There is but one voice
among the ancient authorities
concerning the comprehensive
learning of Posidonius. Strabo
(xvi. 2, 10, p. 758) calls him:
avinp τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς φιλοσόφων
πολυμαθέστατος:; and Galen
says (De Hippoer. et Plat. viii.
1; vol. v. 6522): Ποσειδώνιος ὃ
ἐπιστημονικώτατος τῶν Ξτωϊκῶν
διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι κατὰ γεω-
μετρίαν. His knowledge of
geometry is also praised by
Galen (iv. 4,p.390). Stray por-
tions of his geometrical works
are to be found in Proclus
(Bake, Ὁ. 178 sgq.; Friedlein’s
Indes). A proof of his as-
tronomical knowledge is the
globe of the heavens, which
Cicero describes, δὴ D. ii. 34, 88.
Of his geographical enquiries

59

CHAP.
111.

Lis philo-
sophie ten-
dencies.

60

CHAP.
III.

ECLECTICISM.

the tradition of his school with the same indepen-

dence as his master did.

In regard to several im-

portant points in which Panzetius deserted the old

Stoic doctrine, Posidonius returned to it.

He held

to the dogma of destruction of the world by fire ;’
and he added some further arguments and theories
to the ingenious devices invented by his predecessors
for the defence of soothsaying:? for he ascribed a

(Bake, 87 sqg.; Scheppig, 15
872.) we have evidence in
Strabo’s numerous quotations.
Concerning the enquiries into
natural history which he com-
bined with his geographical
descriptions, vide infra, Ῥ.
62, 8. A mass of historical
knowledge must have lain in
the great historical work, the
49th book of which is quoted
by Athenaus, iv. 168 ὦ, This
work treated in fifty-two books
of the period from the con-
clusion of Polybius’s history
(146 B.c.) to 88 Bc. For
further details, vide Bake, p.
133 sgq., 248 sqq.; Miiller, 219
sqq-; Scheppig, 24 s¢q.

1 Diog. vil. 142: περὶ δὴ οὖν
τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ
κόσμον φησὶ Ζήνων μὲν ἐν τῷ
περὶ ὅλου, Χρύσιππος δ ἐν τῷ
πρώτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ἰοσειδώ-
yios ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ κόσμον, &C.
Τίαναίτιος δ᾽ ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο
τὸν κόσμον. Τ δὶ ΤῺ these words
not merely the discussion, but
the assertion, of the beginning
and destruction of the world is
ascribed to Posidonius, is self-
evident. In confirmation of
this statement we have the
remark (Plat. Plae.u.9, 3 par.)
that Posidonius, deviating from
his predecessors, would only

allow so much space external
to the world, as would be neces-
sary for the world’s éxripwots.
The contrary statement in
Philo, avtern. Mundi, where,
in the passage quoted svpra,
p. 44, 1, was read (previously
to Bernays’ correction), instead
of Bondds ὃ Σιδώνιος, Bond. καὶ
Ποσιδώνιος, is nullitied by this
restoration of the true text,
which also does away with
Hirzel’s objections (Unters. su
Cie. 1. 225 522.) to my exposi-
tion of the theory of Posido-
nius.

? Further details will be
found in the passages quoted,
Phil. d. Gr. WT. 1. 337, 1. We
there learn that Posidonius had
treated of prophecy not only
in the 2nd book of his φυσικὸς
λόγος, but also in a separate
and comprehensive book; that
he sought to establish belief in
it, and to explain its possibility
more particularly by other
arguments (ibid. ITI. i. 339,
1; 841, 3; 343, 5); that his
acceptance of fulfilled pro-
phecies and dreams was just
as uncritical as his predeces-
sors Antipater and Chrysippus
(ibid. TIT. i. 339, 5). To him,
indeed, is to be referred (cf.
ibid. 11. i. 337, 1) the en-

DOCTRINES OF POSIDONIUS.

value to this belief that might incline us to consider
him not merely a Stoic but a Syrian Hellenist. The
belief in demons was also taken under his protec-
tion and utilised in support of a belief in pro-
phecy ;' likewise the immortality of the soul,? which
Paneetius had opposed. But on the whole he is, in
his mode of thought, unmistakably the disciple of
Panetius. The chief problem of philosophy for him
also avowedly lies in ethics: it is the soul of the
whole system; a point of view which in and for

tire representation of the Stoic
doctrine of prophecy in the
1st book of Cicero's treatise De
Divinatione.

1 Of. Phil. ἃ. Gr. ITI. 319, 2;
320,38; Cic. Divin.i. 80, 64: Tribus
modis censet (Posid.) Deorum
udpulsu homines somniare : uno
quod provideat animus ipse per
8686, quippe gui Deorum cog-
natione teneatur, altero quod
plenus aér sit immortalium ani-
morum, in giuibus tamguam
insignite note veritatis ad-
pareant, tertio, quod ἐμοὶ Di
cum dormientibus conloguantur.

2 Hirzel (Unters. su Cie.i. 231

$g.) indeed thinks that as Posi-
donius like Paneetius disbelieved
in the conflagration of the world,
so like him he must have entirely
denied the doctrine of immor-
tality. But even if this were
not in itself unnecessary, the
conjecture is wholly excluded
when it has been shown that
Posidonius entertained no doubt
of the conflagration of the
world. Posidonius’ belief in
demons would already pre-
dispose him to believe in a
future life (untilthe end of the
world) ; for he who allows the

existence of immortal souls
generally has no ground for
denying human souls te be
immortal. But we also learn
from Cicero (ὦ. δ. ὁ. 31, 68 sq.)
that Posidonius maintained that
dying persons had the gift of
prophecy because (for there
is no doubt that this argu-
ment also belongs to him) the
soul which even in sleep de-
taches itself from the body,
and thus is rendered capable
of looking into futurity, mu/to
magis faciet post mortem, cum
omnino eorpore excesserit. Ita-
que adpropinguante morte muito
est divinior. As, moreover, it has
never been said in any quarter
that Posiclonius doubted the
life of the soul after death,
though Cicero especially had
every opportunity of asserting
it, we have not the slightest
ground for the assumption.
But whether we are justified
in going still farther, and as-
cribing to him the Platonic
doctrine of the eternity of the
soul will be discussed infra,
p. 67, 4.
3 Phil. ὦ. Gr. 111,1, 62, 1,

CHAP.
III.

His love of
rhetoric.

Brudition.

Natural
scence.

ECLECTICISM.

itself was already likely to cause a certain indiffer-
ence to dogmatic controversies. The adornment of
speech and the general intelligibility of dis-
course had also for Posidonius a value which they
had not for the older Stoics; he is not merely a
philosopher but a rhetorician, and even in his scien-
tific exposition he does not belie thischaracter.' If,
lastly, he excelled most philosophers in learning,
there lay therein an attempt te work, even in philo-
sophy, rather on the surface than in the depths;
and it cannot be gainsaid that he was inclined to
ignore the difference between philosophic enquiry
and erudite knowledge. If the interest in natural
science was stronger in him than was usual in the
Stoic school, this circumstance might also contribute
to tarnish the purity of his Stoicism, and to bring
him nearer to the Peripatetics.2 His admiration

1 Cf. Strabo, ili. 2, 9, Ὁ. 147:
Ποσειδώνιος δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
μετάλλων (in Spain) ἐπαινῶν καὶ
τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀπέχεται τῆς συν-
ἤθους ῥητορείας, ἀλλὰ συνενθου-
σιᾷ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς. Even the
frugments we possess are some-
times ornate in style, but
always well written, and show
no trace of the tasteless mode
of exposition delighting mostly
in the form of scholastic in-
ference employed by Zeno and
Chrysippus.

2 According to Seneca, fp.
88, 21, 24, he reckoned mathe-
matics and all liberal arts
under philosophy. Seneca,
Hip. 90, 7 sqq., combats the
statement which Posidonius
had tried to establish—that

even the mechanical arts were
invented by the philosophers of
the Golden age. Perhaps he is
responsible also for what Strabo
says, i. 1, that as philosophy is
the knowledge of things human
and divine (Phil.d. G». IIT. i.238,
3), SO πολυμάθεια can belong to
no one except to a philosopher ;
geography is consequently a
part of philosophy.

3 Strabo, ii. 8, 8, p. 104:
πολὺ γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἰτιολογικὸν
map’ αὐτῷ (Strabo is speaking
primarily of his geographical
work) καὶ τὸ ἀριστοτελίζον, ὅπερ
ἐμκλίνουσιν οἱ ἡμέτεροι (the
Stoies) διὰ τὴν ἐπίκρυψιν τῶν
αἰτίων. Some particulars bor
rowed by Posidonius from Aris
stotle are given by Simplicius

DOCTRINES OF POSIDONITS.

for Plato’ was just as great (after the example
of Panetius); and in his commentary on the
Timeus,? we may well suppose that he tried to
combine the Stoic doctrine with the Platonic. Even
his agreement with Pythagoras is of consequence in
his eyes;* and Democritus himself is reckoned by
him among the philosophers ;4 to which the earlier
Stoies would have demurred on account of the re-

lation of Democritus to Epicurus.

Phys. 64, Ὁ. m. (from Geminius’
abstract of his Meteorology.)
De cele, 309, 6,2 BK; Scehol. tn
Arist. 517, a, 81; Alex. Aphr.
Meteorol. 116, a, ὁ.

1 Galen, Hippy. et Plat. iv. T,
491: καίτοι καὶ τοῦ TaAdravos
θαυμαστῶς γράψαντος, ὡς καὶ 6
Ποσειδώνιος ἐπισημαίνεται θαυ-
ἐμάζων τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ θεῖον ἄπο-
καλεῖ, ὧς καὶ πρεσβεύων αὐτοῦ τά
τε περὶ τῶν παθῶν δόγματα καὶ τὰ
περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων, ΧΟ.
Posid. ¢bid. ν. 6,p. 472 : ὥσπερ ὃ
πλάτων ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξε.

2 Sext. Math. vii. 938; Plut.
Procr, An. 22, Ὁ. 1023; Theo
Smyrn. Le jJfus. c. £6, Ὁ. 162,
Bull.; Hermias in Phedr. p.
114,Ast.,ifa commentary onthe
Pheedrus of his own is not here
referred to. That he perhaps
wrote a commentary on the
Parmenides has already been
observed, supra, p. 43, 1.

3 Galen, ὦ. δ. iv. 7, Ὁ. £25; v.
6, p. 478. What Plutarch, J. 6.»
quotes from Posidonius (vide
Phit. ἃ Gr, ΤΙ... 659, 1) belongs
to the exposition of the Timzus,
not directly to his own theory ;
and the Pythagorean opinion
ap. Sext. d.¢., as the comparison

Hence it is mani-

of the passage in Vath. iv. 2 87.
shows, does not belong to the
citation from Posidonius. Also
the remark in Theo Smyrn. 1. c.,
that day and night correspond
with the even and uneven,
manifestly taken from the com-
mentary on the Timeus, can
only serve to give a physical
sense to the Platonicutterances,
and therefore can prove nothing
in regard to Posidonius’ own
adhesion to the Pythagorean
numbersystem. Ritter iii. 701.

4 Sen. Ap. 90. 82.

5 His eclecticism would have
gone still further if Posidonius
really, as Ritter, ili. 702, says,
had derived Greek philosophy
from Oriental tradition. This,
however, is not correct in so
universal a sense; he merely
said of Democritus that his
doctrine of atoms was taken
from the supposed Phcenician
philosopher Mochus(Phil.d. Gr.
I. 765), but this tells nothing as
to the philosophival tendency
of Posidonius, but only as to
his deficiency in historical
criticism, which is abundantly
attested by Cicero and Strabo.

63

CHAP.
111.

θ4

CHAP,

Til.

fis
anthro-

polugy.

ECLECTICISM.

fest that he must necessarily have approximated the
other systems to Stoicism, and Stoicism to the other
systems. A special opportunity for this seems to
have been afforded to him, as to his contemporary
Antiochus (vide infra), by the polemic against
scepticism. In order to repel the accusations
which were derived from the conflict of the philo-
sophic systems, it was asserted that in the main
they were agreed.! It does not appear, however,
that he allowed himself many departures in material
respects from the ancient Stoicism: our sources, at
any rate, only mention one important divergence, his
Platonising anthropology.? Whereas the Stoic doc-
trine, in opposition to that of Plato and Aristotle,
denied a plurality of faculties belonging to the soul,
and reduced all the phenomena of life to the one
intellectual fundamental faculty, Posidonius was of
opinion that the facts of the soul’s 1118 are not to be
explained in reference to one principle. He found
it, like Plato, inconceivable that reason should be
the cause of that which is contrary to reason and of
the passions ;3 and he believed that the fact of our

1 To this the following pas-
sage refers (Diog. vil. 129):
δοκεῖ 8 αὐτοῖς μήτε διὰ
τὴν διαφωνίαν ἀφίστασθαι φιλο-
σοφίας, ἐπεὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ προ-
λείψειν ὅλον τὸν βίον, ws καὶ
Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐν τοῖς προ-
TDETTLKOLS.

2 The observation mentioned
supra, Ὁ. 60, 1,concerning empty
space outside the world is quite
unimportant: and what we
otherwise know of his physical,
astronomical, and geographical

definitions, though they doubt-
less contain many amplifica-
tions and rectifications of the
earlier theories, tell us nothing
of any departure from the
Stoic doctrine in connection
with his philosophical view of
the universe. It will, there-
fore suffice to indicate the
quotations, Phil. d. Go», TIT. i,
given in the account of the
Physics of the Stoics.

3 Galen, De Hipp. et Plat.
(where this subject is treated

POSTDONITUS,

affections being frequently at strife with our will
could only be explained by an original opposition of
the faculties working in man;! he showed that
passionate movements of the mind could not arise
merely from our notions about good and evil things,
for as soon as these notions are of a rational kind,
they do not produce a passionate movement, nor
have they this result with all persons in the same
manner; and even an existing emotion does not
exclude a simultaneous and opposite activity of
reason.2 Finally he remarked that the circum-
stance that fresh impressions affect the mind more
strongly cannot be explained on the presuppositions
of the Stoic theory—for our judgment concerning
the worth of things is not changed by duration of
time. For all these reasons, Posidonius declared
himself for the Platonic doctrine that the emotions
arose not from the rational soul but from courage
and desire, as from two particular faculties,* which,

at length) iv. 3,p. 377 sq.; Vv. ὃ,
461.

1 Loe. cit. iv. 7, 424 sg.

2 Toe. cit. iv. 5, 397; ὁ. 7,
416; v. 6, 473 s¢.

8 Z.¢.iv.7,416sqg. I pass over
some further arguments. When,
however, Ritter, ili. 703, repre-
sents Posidonius as saying: Jn
order to understand the doc-
trine of the passive emotions
there is no need of lengthy
arguments and proofs, I cannot
find this in the utterance in
Galen, v. 178, ch. (502 Δ). Posi-
donius here blames Chrysippus
for appealing to passages from
the poets in regard to such

questions as the seat of the
soul, and not only in regard to
points which may be decided
simply from immediate per-
ception or self-consciousness.
As an instance of the latter he
brings forward mental condi-
tions, and says of them that
they require od μακρῶν λόγων
οὐδ᾽ ἀποδείξεων, μόνης δὲ ἀναμνή-
σεῶὼς ὧν ἑκάστοτε πάσχομεν. But
this does not mean, In order to
understand them there needs no
proof; but, Theiractual constitu-
tion is known to us immediately
through self-consciousness.

4 Galen, Z. c.v. 1, 429: Χρύσ-
ἱππὸς μὲν οὖν... ἀποδεικνύναι

65

CHAP.

111.

---

66

CHAP,

1Π,

ECLECTICISM.

being distinct from reason, are determined by the
constitution of the body:! he would have these
forces regarded, however, not as parts of the soul
but only as separate faculties of one and the same
essence, the seat of which, according to the prevail-

ing opinion of his school,

he placed in the heart.?

Desire and courage must also, he thought, belong
to the animals; the former to all; the latter only to
those capable of changing their place:* an indica~

πειρᾶται κρίσει τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ
λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δ᾽ οὐ
τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπι-
γιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ
λύσεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ τὰς πτώσεις
τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη.
ὃ Ἰποσειδώνιος δ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις διε-
νεχθεὶς ἐπαινεῖ τε ἅμα καὶ προσίε-
ται τὸ Πλάτωνος δόγμα καὶ ἂντι-
λέγει τοῖς περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον
οὔτε κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη δεικ-
γνύων οὔτε ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρίσεσι,
ἀλλὰ κινήσεις τινὰς ἑτέρων δυνά-
μεων ἀλόγων & ὃ Πλάτων ὠνόμα-
σεν ἐπιθυμητικὴήν τε καὶ θυμοειδῆ.
Ibid. iv. 8, 139, et passim.

1 Loc. cit. v. 2, 464: ὡς τῶν
παθητικῶν κινήσεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἕπο-
μένων ἀεὶ τῇ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος.

2 Loc. cit. vi. 2, 515: 6 δ'
᾿Αριστοτέλης τε καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος
εἴδη μὲν ἣ μέρη ψυχῆς οὐκ dvo-
μάζουσιν (which he has per-
haps done in inaccurate lan-
guage, infra p. 68, 5) δυνάμεις
δ᾽ εἶναί φασι μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς
καρδίας ὁρμωμένης. When Ter-
tull. (De An. 14), departing
from the above exposition,
says: Dividitur autem (sc.
anima) tn partes .. . decem
apud quosdam Stoicorum, et in
duas amplius apud Posidonium,

gui ὦ dwobus exorsus titulis,
principali, quod ajunt ἤγεμονι-
Koy, δὲ ὦ rationali, quod ajunt
λογικὸν, in duodecim exinde pro-
seeuit, this discrimination of
the ἥγεμονικὸν from the λογικὸν
shows that we have here to do
with a misunderstanding of
his own in regard to what he
had found in his authority.
For conjectures as to the origin
of this misunderstanding, vide
Diels, Dowogr. 206.

3 Galen, ὦ. ὃ. v. 6,476: ὅσα
μὲν οὖν τῶν ζῴων δυσκίνητ᾽ ἐστὶ
καὶ προσπεφυκότα δίκην φυτῶν
ταῖς πέτραις ἤ τισὶν ἑτέροις τοιού-
τοις, ἐπιθυμίᾳ μόνῃ διοικεῖσθαι
λέγει αὐτὰ, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα τὰ ἄλογα
σύμπαντα ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμφο-
τέραις χρῆσθαι τῇ τ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικῇ
καὶ τῇ θυμοειδ εἴ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον δὲ
μόνον ταῖς τρισὶ, προσειληφέναι
γὰρ καὶ τὴν λογιστικὴν ἀρχήν.
The distinction between ani-
mals which are capable of
motion from a place and those
which are not, together with
the observation that even the
latter must have sensation and
desire, is first met with in
Aristotle (cf. Phil. d. Go. IL. ii.
Il. ὃ, 498).

POSIDONTTS.

tion that Posidonius, in agreement with Panetius!
and Aristotle,? held that the faculties peculiar to the
less perfect natures were retained in the higher, and
were only completed by the addition of new faculties.
Whether Posidonius, like Plato, drew the further
inference from the opposition of the rational and
irrational soul, that the former, before its entrance
into the body, existed without the latter, and will
exist without it after death, is uncertain ;* but if he
held this, even with the modifications required by the
doctrine of the world’s destruction, his deviations
from the Stoic anthropology would necessarily be

multiplied thereby to a considerable extent.
These deviations from the Stoic tradition had not,
indeed, the influence on the other doctrines of Posi-

1 Vide supra, p. 47, 2.

2 Phil. d. Gr. IL ἢ. 499.

8 Cf. Schwenke (Jahrb. 7.
Class. Philol. 1879, Ὁ. 136 sq.),
who here appeals to the ob-
servation of Cicero, apparently
derived from Posidonius, V. D.
ii. 12, 33: Plants are endowed
(φύσει συνέχεσθαι, cf. Phil.d. Gr.
II. i. 192, 3) witha natura; bes-
tiis autem sensum et motum adedit
(sc. natura). . . hoe homint
amplius, quod addidit rationem.

4 Cicero remarks (De Divin.
i. 51, 115) in order to establish
foreknowledge in dreams: The
spirit lives in sleep liber ab
sensibus. Qui quia vixit ab
omni aeternitate versatusqgue est
cum innumeradbilibus animus,
omnia que in natura rerum
sunt, videt, &ce.; and in ὁ. 57,
131, he returns to the subject:
Cumgue animi hominum semper

Ἐ

Suerint futurique sint, [quid est]
cur tt guid ex quoque eveniat et
quid quamgque vem significet
perspicere non possint ? Ti this
agrees with the other contents
of the first book of Posidonius,
the pre-existence of the soul
(Corssen, De Posid., Bonn, 1878,
p. 31) must have been found
there. But the semper and ab
omni eternitate must even then
be laid to Cicero’s account, for
Posidonius could admit souls to
exist neither before the begin-
ning nor after the end of the
world to which they belong.
It is all the more questionable
whether the exposition of this
Stoic has not been here ampli-
fied by Cicero, or whether some-
thing which he hypothetically
quoted from Plato may not
have been taken in a more
definite sense.

°

at

67

CHAP,
111.

tis
ethics.

68

CHAP.
ΤΠ.

ECLECTICISM.

donius which we might have expected from his own

utterances; though he decidedly recognises the de-

pendence of ethics upon the theory of the emotions,!
there is nothing told us of his ethics which would
clash with the Stoic moral doctrine: for the state-
ment of Diogenes,? that he did not hold virtue to
be the only good, and sufficient for happiness, we
have already seen to be untrustworthy ;? and if he
was of opinion that many things, even for the pre-
servation of one’s country, ought not to be done,4
this, though a deviation, was, in any case, only such
a deviation from the cynicism of the oldest Stoics
as may be considered an amendment in harmony
with the spirit of the system.2 Nevertheless, we
cannot regard the Platonising anthropology of our
philosopher as a merely isolated admission of alien
elements into the Stoic system; for in this alliance
with Plato and Aristotle there comes to light an
internal, historical, and not unimportant transform-
ation of Stoicism. This system had, in its theo-
retical part, abolished the Platonic and Aristotelian
duality of form and substance, spirit and matter:

1 Loc. cit. iv. 7, 421; v. 6,
469; 471 sq.

2 vii. 103; 128.

3 Vide supra, Ὁ. 47, 4.

4 Cic. OFF. 1. 45, 159.

5 Even the contradiction
given by Posidonius to an in-
adequate explanation of the
requirement of life according to
nature (Galen, ὦ. 6. v. 6, p. 470)
does not touch the nucleus of
the Stoic theory, and his own
definition of the highest good

(ap. Clem. Strom. ii. 416, B):
τὸ (ἣν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων
ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν καὶ συγκατα-
σκευάζειν αὑτὸν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν,
κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον tard τοῦ
ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, is only
a formal extension of the older
Gefinitions. The difference be-
tween Posidonius and Chrys-
ippus (mentioned Phil. ὦ. Gr.
ITI. i, 232, 2), in regard to
diseases of the soul, is also
unimportant,

POSIDONITS.

and in connection therewith had also denied the
existence of a plurality of spiritual faculties in man.
At the same time, however, in the practical sphere,
it had demanded the withdrawal of self-consciousness
from externality, and founded an ethical dualism
such as neither Plato nor Aristotle had recognised.
The contradiction of these two determinations now
makes itself felt ; the moral dualism, which marks
the fundamental tendency of the Stoic philosophy,
reacts on the theoretic view of the world, and obliges
the Stoics in this also, at any rate in the sphere of
anthropology, to introduce an opposition of principles;
for we may easily see that it is not the Platonic
triple division of reason, courage, and desire, but
rather the twofold distinction of rational and ir-
rational in the human soul, with which Posidonius
is concerned.! Our philosopher himself clearly in-
eates this connection when, in his doctrine of the
emotions and their connection with reason, he exalts
as their principal use—that they teach us to recog-
nise in ourselves the distinction of the divine and
rational from the irrational and animal, and to
follow the demon within us, and not the evil and
un-divine.2 Here not only is the psychologic dualism

69

CHAP.
III.

1 This dualism is expressed
also in the notice in Plutarch,
Fr. 1, Utr. an. an comp. 8. (207. C.
6, which says that Posidonius
divided all human activities
and conditions into ψυχικὰ, ow-
ματικὰ, σωματικὰ περὶ ψυχὴν and

υχικὰ περὶ σῶμα,
᾿ PAD. Galen, v. 6, p. 469: τὸ
δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τουτέστι

τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακο-
δαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν
ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὑτῷ δαίμονι συγ-
γενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν
ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοι-
κοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζῳώδει
ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. of
δὲ τοῦτο παριδόντες οὔτε ἐν τού-
τοῖς βελτιοῦσι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν
παθῶν, οὔτ᾽ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς

70

CHAP,
Til.

Psycho-
logie
dualism.

A link
betreen
the Stoie
doctrine
and Neo-
Piato-
nism.

Stoies of
the first

CENTUTY,
B.C,

ECLECTICISM.

which constitutes with Posidonius the proper nucleus
of the Platonising triple division clearly enunciated ;
put it is also said that this dualism chiefly appears
necessary to the philosopher for the reason that it is
the anthropological presupposition of the ethical
opposition of sense and reason. The first symptom
of this bias we have already noticed in Panxtius—
in the distinction of ψυχὴ and duces; in its further
development in Epictetus and Antoninus we shall
find, later on, one of the phenomena which prepared
the transition from the Stoa to Neo-Platonism.
The psychology of Posidonius therefore appears as a
link in a great historical nexus; that it was not
without importance for the later conception of the
Stoic doctrine, we may see from the statement of
Galen,! that he had met with none among the Stoics
of his time who had known how to answer the
objections of Posidonius against the old Stoie
theory.”

In the period immediately following Posidonius the
spread of the Stoic schoolisindeed attested bythe great

εὐδαιμονίας Kal ὁμολογίας ὀρθο-
δοξοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ βλέπουσιν ὅτι
πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κατὰ
μηδὲν ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου τε
καὶ κακοδαίμονος καὶ ἀθέου τῆς
ψυχῆς. Cf. ibid. p. 470 sq.,and
what is quoted supra, 68, 5, from
Clemens. In opposition to the
moral dignity of the spirit,
Posidonius, ap. Sen, Ep. 92, 10,
speaks of the body as inutilis
caro et fluida receptandis tan-
tum cibis habilis.

1 Loe. cit. iv. 7, end; 402 sq.

2 In the preceding pages it

has been shown what is pecu-
liar to Posidonius as compared
with the older Stoic doctrines ;
the points on which he is
evidence for them, and as such
has repeatedly been quoted in
earlier sections of this work,
are enumerated by Bake. In his
collection, completed by Miiller,
Fragm, Hist. Gr. iii, 252 sqq.,
and Scheppig, De Posid. 45 sqq.,
are to be found the historical
and geographical fragments and
theories of this philosopher.

STOICS OF THE FIRST CENTURY B.C.

numbers of itsmemberswith whom weareacquainted;!
but only a portion of these seem to have occupied
themselves independently with philosophy, and even
of that portion there was certainly not one philosopher
to compare with Panzetius and Posidonius in scientific

importance and influence.

1 Beside those already enu-
merated, Ὁ. 52 sq., the follow-
ing may here be mentioned :—
(@) Greeks: Dionysius, who,
according to Cicero (Tuse. ii. 11,
26), must still have been teach-
ing in Athens in the year 50B.c.,
as Cicero in this treatise repre-
sents him as heard by his
young interlocutor in that city.
In that case he must be distin-
guished from Dionysius of
Cyrene, the disciple of Pans-
tius (p. 53); but he is no
doubt the same person spoken
of by Diog. vi. 43, ix. 15, and
opposed by Philodemus a. ση-
μείων, col. Tsqq.(as results from
col. 19, 4 sg. after Zeno). If
he was the head of the school,
he can scarcely have followed
immediately after Mnesarchus
(wide supra, Ὁ. 53); perhaps, as
has already been shown, lee.
cit., Apollodorus is to be placed
between them. Further, we
have the three disciples of Posi-
donius : Asclepiodotus
(Sen, Nat. Qu. li. 26, 6; vi. 17,
3, et passim); Phanias (Diog.
vii. 41) and Jason, the son of
his daughter, who succeeded
him as head of the school in
Rhodes (Suidas, swb voce; while
on the other hand, as is
shown, Phil d. Gr. IIL 1.
48, he cannot be, as Compa-
retti supposes, the anonymous
disciple of Diogenes alluded to

It is, therefore, all the

in the Ind. Here. col. 52,1);
and Leonides, whom Strabo,
xiv. 2, 13, p. 655, describes as a
Stoic from Rhodes was probably
a pupil of Posidonius. Also
the two teachers of the younger
Cato, Athenodorus with the
surname Cordylio, from Tar-
sus, whom Cato took with him
from Pergamum to Rome and
kept with him till his death
(Strabo, xiv. 5, 14, p. 674.
Plut. Cato Min. 10, 16; pit.
I%og.), previously overseer of
the library at Pergamum in
which he capriciously corrected
the writings of Zeno (Diog.
vil. 34); and Antipater of
Tyre (Plut. Cato, 4; Strabo, xvi.
2, 24, 757; Epitt. Diog.),
doubtless the same who, accord-
ing to Cicero, Off. il. 24, 86,
died shortly before the compo-
sition of this treatise, in
Athens, and had written, it
would seem, upon Duties; a
treatise of his wept κόσμου, is
quoted in Diog. vii. 139 et pass. ;
and respecting two other trea-
tises, it is uncertain to which
Antipater they belong. Ac-
cording to Ind. Here. col. 79
(supra, p. 54) he had one or
perhaps two disciples of Panz-
tius for his instructors. Apol-
lonius of Tyre seems, accord-
ing to Strabo, Z.¢., to have been
somewhat younger; treatises
under his name are quoted by

ECLECTICISM.

more probable that most of them followed the
direction which these two men had given; that
the school at that period held in the main to the
doctrine of Zeno and Chrysippus, but repudiated
alien elements less strictly than before; and partly

Strabo, and ap. Diog. vii. 1, 2,
6, 24, perhaps also ap. Phot.
Cod. 161, Ὁ. 104, , 15. Dio-
dotus, who instructed Cicero,
and who afterwards lived with
him, finally having become
blind, died at his house about
60 B.c. and made Cicero his
heir (Cic. Brat. 90, 809; Acad.
li. 36, 115; M D. i. 3,6; ad
Div, xiii. 16, ix. 4; Zuse. v. 39,
118; ad Ατέ. ii. 20); a disciple
of his, a freedman of the
triumvir Crassus, Apollonius
by name, ismentioned by Cicero,
ad Fam. xiii. 16. From him
must be distinguished the
Apollonius of Ptolemais in
the Ind. Here. col. 78, whom
the compiler of that catalogue
calls φίλος ἡμῶν ; for this man,
as is there stated, had heard
Dardanus and Mnesarchus who
were both (cf. p. 53) disciples
of Diogenes, and as such can
hardly have lived to the year 90
B.C.; whereas the Apollonius
of Cicero, as a boy in his
house, long after this date,
enjoyed the instruction of
Diodotus and accompanied
Cesar (though not probably in
extreme age) to the Alexandrian
war. Comparetti (2. 6. Ὁ. 470,
547) wrongly identifies them.
Apollonides, the friend of
Cato, who was about him in
his last days (Plut. Cat. Min.
65 sq. ; cf. PRil. ad. Gr. TIL. i. Ὁ.
48), Athenodorus, the son

of Sandon, from Tarsus or the
neighbourhood, perhaps a dis-
ciple of Posidonius, the teacher
of the Emperor Augustus, con-
cerning whom cf. Strabo, xiv.
5, l4, p. 674; Lucian, Jacrod.
21, 23; Dio Chrysost. Ov. 33,
p. 24 R; Ailian. Vi A. xii. 25;
Plut. Poplic.c. 17, and Apoph-
thegm. Reg. Ces. Aug. 7, p.
207; Qu. Conv. ii. 1, 18, 3, p.
634; Dio Cass. lili. 36; lvi. 43;
Zosim. Hist. 1.6; Βαϊ. ᾿Αθηνόδ.;
Miller. Fragm. Hist. Go. iii.
485 sq. Whether the writings
and sayings quoted from
Athenodorus belong to him
or to another person of the
same name, in most instances
cannot be discovered with cer-
tainty, but it seems to me
probable that by the Atheno-
dorus mentioned in Sen.
Trangu. An. 3, 1-8, 7,25; Zp.
10, 5, without further descrip-
tion, is to be understood our
Athenodorus, since at that
time he was certainly the best
known man of the name in
Rome; that he was likewise
the same who wrote about, 7.6.
against, the Aristotelian cate-
gories, and who was opposed
on particular points by Conutus,
we find from Simpl. 5, a. 15, δ.
41, y. (Schol. in Arist. 47, ὃ,
20; 61, a, 25 sq.) 82, ε. 47, ὦ;
Porph. ἐξήγ. 4, b, 21, ὃ (Schol. in
Arist. 48, ὃ, 12); cf. Brandis,
Abhandl. d. Berl. Akad, 1833 ;

STOICS OF THE FIRST CENTURY B.C.

in its learned activity, partly in the practical appli-
cation of its principles, came into amicable contact

on many points with other schools.

An example

showing the extent to which this eclecticism attained
in individuals will be presented to us in Arius

Phil.-Hist. Ki. 275; Prantl.
Gesch. d. Log.i. 538, 19. Some
fragments of an historical and
geographical character have
been collected by Miller, ἢ. e.
The ethics quoted in “Diog. vii.
68, 121, may also belong to the
son of Sandon; and he is no
doubt the Athencdorus Calvus,
who inspired Cicero’s treatise
on Duties (Cic. ad Att. xvi.
11, 14); while on the other
hand the author of the περέ-
matot, which Diogenes ἔτθ-
quently cites, is more probably
the Peripatetic of the same
name spoken of infra, p. 124.
To this same period belangs
Theo of Alexandria, who ac-
cording to Suidas, sub voce,
lived under Augustus and was
the author of a work on Rheto-
ric besides an epitome of
Apollodorus’ Physies. Perhaps
he may be the person al-
Iuded to in the Ind. Here.
col. 79, in the words ὧν ᾿Αλεξαι-
δρεὺς, thought by Comparetti
to be Dio of the Academy
(vide infra, p. 100). In that
case he was a disciple of
Stratocles (vide supra, p. 54)
and only the latter part of his
life ean have fallen under
Augustus. If he survived
Arius (vide infra, 106, 1: Suidas
says: γεγονὼς ἐπὶ Αὐγούστου
μετὰ Ἄρειον) he must have
lived to a great age like his
master Stratocles. (Of two

other Stoics of this name, one
of them from Antioch, men-
tioned by Suidas, Θέων Spupp.,
the other from Tithora, men-
tioned by Diogenes, ix. 82, we
do not know the dates, but
the latter must be older than
inesidemus.) Lastly, Strabo,
the famous geographer, con-
sidered himself as belonging
to the Stoic school. His birth
must be placed, as Hasen-
miiller says, De Strab. Vite
Diss., Bonn, 1863, p. 13. sq.
(who also discusses the various
theories), in or before 58 B.c.,
asin 44 B.c. he saw P. Servilius
Isauricus, who died in his nine-
tieth year (Strabo, xii. 6, %,
p. 568), and saw him in Rome,
whither Strabo can scarcely
have gone before his fourteenth
year. His native city was
Amasea in Pontus (Strabo, xii.
3, 15, 89, Ὁ. 547, 561); he lived,
however, under Augustus and
Tiberius at Rome. (At the end
of his 6th book he names
Tiberius as the present ruler
and Germanicus as his son;
this passage must accordingly
have been written between 14
and 19% after Christ.) He
betrays himself ta be a Stoic
not only by utterances such as
i. 1, p. 2 (the Stoie definition
of philosophy), i. 2, 2, p. 15,
but he also calls Zeno 6 ἡμέτερος
i. 2, 84, Ὁ. 41, and xvi. 4, 27,
p. 784; vide supra, Ὁ. 62, &

74

CHAP
111.

ECLECTICISM.

Didymus, who indeed counted himself a member of
the Stoic school, but who approximates so closely to
Alexander the Academician, that it seems preferable
to speak of him after that philosopher.

Perhaps Athenodorus, the son of
Sandon, may have introduced
him to Stoicism; whom he
calls ἡμῖν éraipos (xvi. 4, 21,
p. 779), and concerning whom
he shows himself to be accu-
rately informed (xiv. 5, 14, p.
674). Meanwhile he had also
heard the Peripatetic Tyrannio
(xii. 3, 16, p. 548) and Xen-
archus (xiv. 4, 4, p. 670) and
had had the still more famous
Boethus either as a fellow dis-
ciple or more probably (for the
word συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν in Xvi.
2, 24, p. 757, permits also this
interpretation) as a teacher.
(Of a third instructor, Aristo-
demus, he does not say in xiv.
1, 48, p. 650, to what school he
belonged, or in what he in-
structed him.) The date of
Protagoras, a Stoic, men-
tioned by Diogenes, ix. 56, is
unknown. (δὴ) Among the
Romans of this period, the
following are known to us as
adherents of the Stoic doc-
trine : Q. Lucilius Balbus,
whom Cicero praises as a dis-
tinguished Stoic (WV: D. i. 6, 15)
and whom in the second book
of this treatise he considers as
the representative of the school.
M.Porcius Cato Uticensis,
already described by Cicero

(Parad. Proem. 2, as perfectus
Stoicus; in Brut. 31, 118 as
perfectissimus Stoicus; and in
Pro Mur. 29, 61 attacked on
account of Stoical aspevities,
called in De Finibus the leader
of his school, the writings of
which Cato (iii. 27) earnestly
studied, and after his death one
of the ideals of the Stoics (Phil.
ad. Gr. JIi.i. 254,3). Histeachers,
Antipater and Athenodorus
and his friend Apollonides
have already come before us.
Concerning his Stoicism vide
also Pliny, Hist. Nat. vii. 30,113,
xxxiv. 8, 92. M. Favonius,
a passionate admirer of Cato’s,
respecting whom cf. Plut. Brut.
34; Cato Min. 32, 46; Cesar,
21; Pomp. 73; Sueton. Octan.
13; Valer. Max. ii. 10,8; Dio
Oass. XXXVIli. 7, xxxix.14. Also
Valerius Soranus, an older
contemporary and acquaintance
of Cicero’s (Cic. Brut. 46, 169),
seems from what is quoted by
Augustine (Civ. D. vii. 11, 13),
probably from his treatise on
the Gods (Bernhardy, Rom.
Lit. 229), to have belonged to
the school of Paneztius. Some
others who are also occasionally
reckoned among the Stoics, as
Varro and Brutus, will be spoken
of later on.

THE ACADEMY.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHERS IN THE FIRST CENTURY
BEFORE CHRIST.

THIS approximation and partial blending of the
schools of philosophy, as has been already observed,
was accomplished in a still more decisive manner in
the Academy. We have seen how effectively the way
was cleared for eclecticism, partly through the scep-
ticism of the Academy, and partly through the theory
of probability connected with that scepticism; and
how in consequence certain traces of this mode of
thought appear even among the first disciples of
Carneades.! It was still more definitely developed
after the commencement of the first century before

Christ, by Philo and Antiochus.
Philo,? a native of Larissa, in Thessaly,? was the
disciple and successor of Clitomachus in Athens.* In

1 Phil. ἃ. Go. 111. 1. 526, 2;
supra, p. 5, 2.

2 0, F. Hermann, De Philone
Lariss@o: Gott. 1851; ibid. De
Philone Lariss. disputatio al-
tera, 1855; Krische on Cicero's
Academica, Gaottinger Studien,
ii. 126-200, 1845.

8 Stob. Hel. ii. 38.

4 Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17: Chito-
macho Philo vester operam mul-
tos annos dedit; Plut. Cie. 3;
Stob.2.c. According to the Ind.
Here, Academicorwm (ed. Biiche-

ler Griefsw. 1869), col. 33, he
came when he was about
twenty-four to Athens, and here
for fourteen years attended the
school of Clitomachus, after he
had previously been instructed
in his native city (according
to Biicheler’s emendation, for
eighteen years ; therefore, from
his sixth or seventh year; I
should rather conjecture : περὲ
éx[ τὼ σκεδὸν ἔτη, or something
similar) by Callicles, a disciple
of Carneades. According to the

75

CHAP,
IV.

C. The
Acade-
mics.

Philo of
Larissa.

70

CHAP,
IV.

ECLECTICISM.

the Mithridatic war he fled, with others on the Roman
side, to Rome,! and here gained for himself great
esteem,” both asa teacher and asaman. Through
him Cicero was won over to the doctrine of the new
Academy, as Philo had apprehended it. Whether
he ever returned to Athens we do not know; but in
any case he does not seem to have long survived the

Roman journey.

Ind. Here. he had also enjoyed
the instruction of Apollodorus
the Stoic, at least the imper-
fect text seems to mean this;
but whether Apollodorus is the
Athenian mentioned (supra, Ὁ.
53) or the Seleucian mentioned
(Phil. d. Gr, TIT. i. 47) seems
the more doubtful, as Philo’s
own leadership of the school
(supra, Ὁ. 53) can scarcely
have begun later than that of
Apollodorus of Athens, and
as the predecessor of the latter,
Mnesarchus, was the teacher
of Philo’s pupil Antiochus (vide
infra 86,1). That he followed
Clitomachus as head of the
school, we find from the Jnd.
Herc.and Eus. Pr. Hy. xiv. 8, 9
(according to Numenius); and
from Cic. Brut. 89, 306, that he
was the most important philoso-
pher of the Academy of his time
(princeps Academie); Acad. ii.
6,17 (Philone autem vivo patro-
cintum Academie non defuit).
In Athens Antiochus was his
pupil (vide infra 86,1). Besides
philosophy he taught rhetoric
very zealously (Cic. De Orut. iii.
28, 110).

1 Cic. Brut. 89, 306. Concern-
ing the instructions he gave
there in philosophy and rhe-

As a philosopher he at first, we

toric, rede Tuse. 11. 8,9; 11, 26.

5 Plut. Οἷα. ὃ : Φίλωνος διήκουσε
τοῦ ἐξ ᾿Ακαδημίας, ὃν μάλιστα
Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν Κλειτομάχου συνή-
θων καὶ διὰ τὸν λόγον ἐθαύμασαν
καὶ διὰ τὸν τρόπον ἠγάπησαν.
Cic. Acad. i. 4, 18: Philo, mag-
nus vir. Of. the following note,
and also Stob. Hel, ii. 40.

3 Plut. ὦ. δ.; Cic. Zuse. 2. ¢.;
N. D.i. 7,163 Brut. 1.6., totum
δὲ mé tradidr.

4 The Mithridatic war broke
out in 88 B.c., and probably
Philo came immediately after
this to Rome. We hear of a
treatise he had composed while
Antiochus was with Lucullus
in Alexandria (Cic. Acad. ii. 4,
11), which, according to Zumpt
(Abh. d. Berl. Acad. 1842;
fist. Phil. Kt.p. 67), would fall
in the year 84, according to Her-
mann ὦ. 6. 1. 4, in 87. When
Cicero came to Athens in 79 B.c.
he cannot have been there, as he
would otherwise have been
mentioned in Plut. Cie. 4; Cic.
Brut. 91, 315; Fin. v. 1,1. Per-
haps he remained in Rome, or,
as seems to me more probable,
was no longer living. How the
statement as to the length of
his life is to be completed can-
uot be ascertained. Biicheler

PHILO.

are told, zealously defended the doctrine of Carneades
in its whole content; in the sequel, however, he
became unsettled in regard to this doctrine, and
without expressly abandoning it, he sought greater
fixity of conviction than the principles of his pre-
decessors afforded. Though it was not in itself con-
trary to the spirit of scepticism that he should
regard philosophy from the practical point of view,?
yet this mode of treating it received from him an
application which went beyond scepticism: he was
not satisfied, like Pyrrho, by the destruction of
dogmatism to clear away hindrances, with the re-
moval of which (according to that philosopher)
happiness came of itself; but in order to attain this
end he found complete directions for right conduct
to be necessary. The philosopher, he says, may be
compared with a physician ; as health is for the latter,
so is happiness for the former, the final end of his
whole activity ;* and from this definition of its aim,

prefers ἐξήκοντα τρία, for he says
there is no room in the lacuna
for ἑβδομήκοντα (Ind. Here.
Acad. 33, 18).

1 Numen. ap. Hus. Pr. Hv.
xiv. 9,1: At the beginning of
his career as a teacher, Philo
was full of zeal in defending
the doctrine of the Academy :
kal τὰ δεδογμένα τῷ Ἀλειτο-
μάχῳ note καὶ τοῖς Στωικοῖς
ἐκορύσσετο νώροπι χαλκῷ. Sub-
sequently, however, οὐδὲν μὲν
κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ ἐνόει, 7 δὲ τῶν
παθημάτων αὐτὸν ἀνέστρεφεν
ἐνάργειά τε καὶ ὁμολογία. πολ-
λὴν δῆτ᾽ ἔχων ἤδη τὴν διαίσθησιν

; > > a
ἐπεθύμει, εὖ οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι, τῶν ἐλεγξ-
“ ld
ὄντων τυχεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐδόκει μετὰ

νῶτα βαλλὼν αὐτὸς ἑκὼν φεύγειν.

That Philo had at first professed
the Academic scepticism more
unconditionally than he after-
wards did, follows from Cic,
Acad. ii. 4,11 sg.3; vide infra,

p- 80, 2.

2 Pyrrho had already done this
(cf. Phil. ὦ. Gr. TIL i, 484, 8).

$ Stob. Hel. ii. 40 sq. : ἐοικέναι
δέ φησι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἰατρῷ...
καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἰατρικῇ σπουδὴ πᾶσα
περὶ τὸ τέλος, τοῦτο δ᾽ Fv ὑγίεια,
καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ περὶ τὴν εὐδαι-
μονίαν.

CHAP,

His prac-
tical bias.

78

CHAP.
* IV,

ECLECTICISM.

he derives the six divisions of philosophy which he
assumed,! and according to which he himself treated

of ethics in its whole extent.?

Where the interest

for a systematic form of doctrine, though primarily
only in the sphere of practical philosophy, was so
strong, there also the belief in the probability of scien-
tific knowledge must necessarily have been strength-

1 According to Stobeus, ὦ. ¢.,
they are the following. The
first thing that is necessary, he
says, is that the sick man
should be prevailed upon to
submit himself to medical
treatment, and that other
counsels should be opposed—
this is the λόγος προτρεπτικὸς
(παρορμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν), which
has partly to prove the worth
of virtue (or, perhaps more ac-
curately, of philosophy) and
partly to confute the objections
against philosophy. (The προ-
τρεπτικὸς of Philo is thought
by Krische, ἢ. 6. p. 191, and Her-
mann, i. 6, ii. 7, to be the pro-
totype of Cicero’s Hortensius ;
cf., however, Phil. d. Gr. II. ii.
63). This being attained, there
must, secondly, be a remedy
applied—on the one hand,
false and injurious opinions
must be discarded, and, on the
other, right opinions must be
imparted—é περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ
κακῶν τόπος, The third is the
λόγος περὶ τελῶν. In this part
of Philo’s ethics Hermann con-
jectures (ii. 7) the source of
the 4th book of Cicero’s treatise
De Finidus. This, however,
not only cannot be proved, but
it is also improbable, as Philo,
and not Antiochus, was the first

to maintain that the Stoic
ethics agreed so entirely in all
things essential with those of
the Academy and Peripatetics,
that Zeno had no occasion to
separate himself from the Aca-
demy. The fourth part treats
περὶ βίων, and fixes the θεωρή-
ματα Ov ὧν ἣ φυλακὴ γενήσεται
τοῦ τέλους, primarily for the
conduct of individuals. The
same problem is undertaken by
the jifth part, the πολιτικὰς, in
regard to the commonwealth.
In order to provide not only
for the wise, but also for the
μέσως διακείμενοι ἄνθρωποι, who
are unable to follow logical in-
vestigation, the sixth part is
required, the ὑποθετικὸς λόγος,
which coins the results of ethics
into rules for individual cases.

2 This is evident from the
concluding words of Stobseus,
Ῥ. 46 (in regard to Arius Didy-
mus): οὕτως μὲν οὖν Φίλωνος
ἔχει διαίρεσις. ἐγὼ δ᾽ εἰ μὲν
ἀργοτέρως διεκείμην, ἀρκεσθεὶς ἂν
αὐτῇ συνεῖρον ἤδη τὰ περὶ τῶν
ἀρεσκόντων, τῇ τῆς ἐἑξαμερείας
ἐπικουφιζόμενος περιγραφῇ, &c.
Any one who agrees with Her-
mann’s conjecture respecting
Fin. iv. has the less right to
dispute this, as Hermann does
(ii. δ). .

PHILO,

ened and the inclination to scepticism weakened ;!
and so we actually find that Philo withdrew from
the standpoint which had simply disputed the pos-
sibility of knowledge. The Stoic theory of know-
ledge he could not, of course, adopt; against the
doctrine of intellectual cognition, he argued with
Carneades that there is no notion so constituted
that a false notion may not co-exist with 10:3 and
the truth of sensible perception from which the
Stoics ultimately derived all notions he denied for
all the reasons which his predecessors in the Academy
had given ;* and little as he could agree with the

1 This connection is, indeed,
denied by Hermann, J. ¢.; but
as we know (from Stob. 1.6.)
that Philo placed the ultimate
end of philosophy in happiness,
that he believed this to be
conditioned by right moral
views (ὑγιῶς ἔχουσαι δόξαι, θεω-
ρήματα ἐπὶ βίου), and by a whole
system of such views, and de-
voted one of the six sections of
his ethics expressly to the re-
moval of false and the impart-
ing of true opinions, the in-
ference is inevitable that he
held true opinions to be neces-
sary, and consequently did not
maintain—at any rate, for the
practical sphere—the stand-
point of pure doubt, nor was
satisfied with mere probability ;
and what we know of him
shows that this was not the
case.

2 Cic. Acad. li. 6, 18: Cum
enim ita negaret, quicquam. esse
quod comprehendi wposset,...
si tllud esset sicut Zeno definiret
tale visum... visum igitur

impressum eéffictumgue ex eo,
unde esset, quale esse non posset
ex co, unde non esset ... hoe
cum infirmat tollitque Philo,
judicium tollit ineogniti et
cognitt. But this does not
mean, as Hermann (ii. 11) as-
serts, that Philo maintained
that if there were a risum like
that required by Zeno, no com-
prehensto would be possible;
but rather, if the comprehen-
sible must be a visum tmpres-
sum, and so forth, there would
be nothing comprehensible; the
same statement that is made by
Sext. Pyrrh. i. 235 (infra, Ὁ.
81, 2). Cf. as to the corre-
sponding propositions of Car-
neades, DPhil. d. Gr.III. i. 501 sg.

If we have no direct in-
formation on this point, it
follows with great probability
from what we can gather of
the contents of the lost Ist
book of Cicero’s Academica
Priora and the 2nd book of
the Academica Posteriora; from
Acad. ii, 25, 79, and from the

79

CHAP.
IV.

Modifica-
tion of the
Scepticism
of the
Academy.

80

CHAP.
IV.

ECLECTICISM,

adversaries of the Academic doctrine as hitherto
understood, he δὲ little desired to renounce the
doctrine itself. When his disciple Antiochus ad-
vanced the proposition that the school of the
Academy had been untrue to its original tendency
since the time of Arcesilaus, and that there must
therefore be a return from the new Academy to the
old, Philo raised the liveliest opposition to this de-
mand, and to the whole statement: the new Academy,
he declared, was not distinct from the old, and there
could, therefore, be no question of a return to the
latter, but solely and entirely of maintaining the
one genuine Academic doctrine.’ But when we
look more closely, this union of the new Academy
with Plato, as that of Philo with the new Academy,
is only to be attained by a subtlety which even his
contemporaries did not fail to rebuke.* Scepticism,

fragments preserved by Nonius
(cf. the arguments of Krische,
ὦ. ¢., Ὁ. 154 sqg., 182 sg.; Her-
mann, ii. 10).

1 Cic. Acad. i. 4, 18: An-
tiochi magister Philo. . . negat
ὧν libris, quod coram etiam ex
ipso audiebamus, duas Acade-
mias esse, erroremgue eorrm, que
ita putarunt (as Antiochus, vide
infra), coarguit. The same is
maintained by Cicero as an
adherent of Philo’s doctrine
(be has just before directly ac-
knowledged himself a follower
of the new Academy), c. 12, 46.
In relation to this subject
Cicero says (dead. ii. 6, 17):
Philone autem vivo patrocinium
Academie non defuit. The
Academy which he defends is

the new Academy, that of Cli-
tomachus and Carneades, which
he undertakes to defend against
Antiochus. Cf. Augustin, ec.
Acad. iii, 18, 41: Hute (An-
tiochus) arreptis iterum illis
armis et Philon restitit donee
morveretur, et omnes ejus reli-
quias Lutlius noster oppressit.
From Philo are probably de-
rived the arguments of Cicero
(ap. August. 111, 7, 15) on the
superiority of the Academy to
all other schools.

? When Philo’s treatise came
into the hands of Antiochus
(as Cicero relates, Acad. ii. 4,
11) he was quite startled, and
asked Heraclitus of Tyre, for
many years the disciple of Philo
and Clitomachus: Viderenturne

PHILO.

Philo believed, was, as against the Stoic arguments,
perfectly well established; for the rational concep-
tion, which they had made the criterion, was as such
not available: but in themselves things are not un-
knowable;! and in connection with this, he main-
tained that the scepticism of the Academy was,
from the beginning, only meant in this sense; it
was not its design to deny all and every knowledge
of things; this was denied only in opposition to
the Stoics, and with reference to the Stoic crite-
rion,? while genuine Platonism was maintained as
the esoteric doctrine of the school.# As the
danger from the Stoics no longer appeared to be
pressing, he considered it an opportune time to go
back to the original doctrines professed by the

81

CHAP,
IV.

illa Philonis, aut ea num vel e
Philone vel ex ullo Academico
audivisset aliquando ? to which
he replied in the negative. In
thesame work Philo’sstatement
concerning the doctrine of the
new Academy is described as
an untruth, and this censure is
repeated, 6, 18.

1 Sext. Pyrrh. i. 235: of δὲ
περὶ Φίλωνά φασιν, ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ
τῷ Στωϊκῷ κριτηρίῳ, τουτέστι τῇ
καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἄκατά-
ληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ
ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν
καταληπτά. But the expression
καταληπτὸς must here be taken
in a somewhat wider sense;
cf. inf. p. 82, 3.

2 Cic. Acad. ii. 4, 12. The
arguments of Antiochus against
Philo he will pass over, minus
enim acer adversarius est 18, gut
ista, que sunt hert defensa (the

pure Carneadean scepticism,
the representative of which in
the first edition of the Aca-
demica was Catulus), negat
Academicos omnino dicere (ci.
ibid. 6, 18).

* Thus the rise and design
of the scepticism of the Aca-
demy is represented by Augus-
tine (C. Acad. ii. 6, 14), who no
doubt derived this conception
from Philo as explained by
Cicero. Cf. supra, note 1.

* This statement meets us
often (vide Phil. d. Gr. 11]. i.
493, 4); that it is ultimately
derived from Philo is probable,
partly from its inter-connection
with all other presuppositions
of his, and partly because it is
not only found in Augustine,
C. Acad. 111. 17,38; 18,40; but
in c. 20, 43, Augustine expressly
appeals to Cicero for it,

G

His theory
of hnon-
ledge.

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.

Platonic school;! but he could not see in this re-
storation of the old Academy any abandonment of
the tendency of the new, since he held that the new
Academy had not departed at all from the original
Platonism.2 But if we ask in what consisted this
genuine Platonism, the answer is not very satis-
factory. On the one hand, Philo, in agreement with
his predecessors of the new Academy, denied the
possibility of a complete knowledge, of compre-
hending ; not merely in regard to the Stoic theory
of knowledge, but quite universally; for like those
predecessors, he lacked a sure criterion for the dis-

erimination of true and

1 August. iii. 18, 41 (doubt-
less after Cicero): Antiochus
Philonis auditor, hominis quan-
tum arbitror circumspectissimt,
qui jam veluti aperire ce-
dentibus hostibus portas cape-
rat etad Platonis auctoritatem
Academiam legesque revocare
(as he saw the enemy in re-
treat, he had begun to open
the gates of the city they
were besieging, and to re-
establish the previous order
which had been interrupted by
the war).

2 So far Plutarch (Lue. 42;
Brut. 2) may call Philo the
head of the new Academy, and
Antiochus that of the old ; and
similarly Cicero (Acad. 1. 4, 13;
ii. 22, 70) may describe Antio-
chus as the man who through
the renovation of the old Aca-
demy fell away from Philo
while he himself conversely sees
in his retrogression from An-

false? Notwithstanding,

tiochus to Philo a remigrare in
novam domum e vetere.

3 This is evident from Cic.
Acad. ii. 22, 69. After Cicero,
as an adherent of Philo, has
defended the proposition, nihil
esse quod percipt possit, with
the old sceptical argument, the
impossibility of finding a crite-
rion for the discrimination of
true and false, he here con-
tinues: Sed prius pauca cum
Antiocho, qui hee tpsa, que a
me defenduntur, et didictt apud
Philonem tam diu, ut constaret
diutius didicisse neminem, et
seripsit de his rebus acutissime ;
et idem hec non acrius accusavit
in senectute quam antea defensi-
taverat ... quis enim iste dies
intuxerit, quero, qui ill osten-
derit eam, quam muitos annos
esse negitavisset, veri et falsi
notam? Vide the following
note,

84

CHAP.
IV.

ECLECTICISH.,

part with his disciple Cicero. When, however, we
find that he did not venture to ascribe to this know-
ledge the full certainty of intellectual cognition, and
consequently assumed manifestness to be a kind of
conviction, the certainty of which transcends mere
probability, but does not reach the unconditional cer-
tainty of the conception—this is very characteristic
of the middle position of our philosopher between
Carneades and Antiochus,! and it was so far not
without reason that Philo was distinguished from
his predecessors, no less than from his successors,’ as
the founder of the fourth Academy; while, on the
other hand, this appellation tells in favour of the
opinion that between the doctrine of Philo and that of
Carneades an important divergence had really taken
place. That directly certain element, Philo, like Cicero
after him, might seek before all things in the utter-
ances of moral consciousness, and so his theory of know-
ledge might serve him as a foundation for practical
philosophy, the necessity for which seems to have been
his determining influence in originating the theory.*

1 This opinion I believe to
be justifiable, notwithstanding
Hermann’s contradiction (ὦ. 6.
ii. 13), for I cannot admit that
Philo’s perspicuitas coincides
with the unconditioned cer-
tainty, which, according to
Plato, is present in the intuition
of ideas, and excels in truth
the intellectual knowledge of
the Stoics. Had this been
Philo’s meaning he could not
possibly have maintained uni-
versally as he does (vide supra,

79, 2; 82, 3) that there is no
nota vert et falsi, nihil esse
quod percipi possit. On the
contrary, when he missed even
in the Stoic φαντασία κατα-
ληπτικὴ the sign of true know-
ledge, and consequently the
nota vert et falsi, he must have
discovered it all the more in
that knowledge to which he
ascribes such unconditional
certainty.

2 Cf. Phil. d. Gr. TIL i. 526, 2.

8 Supra, Ὁ. 77 sq.

PHILO.

But in itself Philo’s scientific position could not
long be maintained. He who assumes a certainty,
as Philo did in his doctrine of the self-evident or
manifest, could not, without inconsistency, deny that
every sure token of distinction between the true and
the false is wanting to us; he could no longer pro-
fess the principles of the new Academy; conversely,
he who did profess them could not logically go be-
yond Carneades’ doctrine of probability. If a man
found it impossible to satisfy himself any longez
with that doctrine, there remained nothing for him
but to break with the whole standpoint of the scep-
ticism of the new Academy, and to claim afresh for
human thought the capability for the knowledge of
truth. This further step was taken by the most
important of Philo’s disciples) Antiochus? of
Ascalon.®

This philosopher had for a long time enjoyed
Philo’s instructions, and had himself embarked upon
works advocating the scepticism of the Academy,
when he began to grow uncertain about it. This
may have been in great measure the result of his
having attended the lectures not only of Philo, but

1 Of whom those known to
us are mentioned infra, Ὁ. 99 sq.
2 Concerning him, vede
Krische, Gétt. Stud. ii. 160-170 ;
and OC. Chappius, De Antioachi
Ase. vita et doctrina, Paris,
1854; who, however, does not
go beyond what is well known.
A literal copy of this disserta-
tion appeared in D’Allemand’s
De Antiocho Ase. Marb. and

Par. 1856 ; but, asthe treatise of
Chappe was unknown in Ger-
many, this flagrant plagiarism
was only discovered after the
death of its author.

8 Strabo, xvi. 2, 29, Ὁ. 759;
Plut. Lue.42; Cie.4; Brut. 2;
Blian, V. A. xii. 25. ᾿Ασκαλωνίτης
is his most usual appellation.

* Supra, Ὁ. 80, 1; 82, 1, 3;
Cic. Acad. li. 2,4; 19, 63.

CHAP,
IV.

Antiochus
of Asca-
lon.

86

CHAP.
IV,

ECLECTICISM.

of the Stoic Mnesarchus,! who, as the disciple of
Panetius, had indeed opposed the scepticism of
the new Academy, but at the same time prepared
the way for that blending of Stoicism with the
Platonic doctrine which in the sequel was completed

by Antiochus.

During the first Mithridatic war,

we find him with Lucullus in Alexandria;? and
only then did things come to an open rupture be-~

tween him and Philo.?

1 Numen. ap. Eus. Pr. Ze.
xiv. 9, 2; Augustine, C. Acad.
iii. 18,41, doubtless taken from
Cicero; cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 22,
69: Quid? eum Mnesarchi
penitebat? gud? Dardani?
qui erant Athenis tum prin-
cipes Stoivorum. He only sepa-
rated himself from Philo at a
later date. Concerning Mne-
sarchus and Dardanus, vide
supra, p. 52, 3.

* Cic. Acad. ii. 4, 11 (cf
supra, 76, 4); tbid. 2, 4; 19,
61. Whether he went straight
from Athens to Alexandria,
however, or had accompanied
Philo to Rome, and here allied
himself with Lucullus, is not
stated.

8. According to Cicero, J.¢., it
was in Alexandria that An-
tiochus first saw the work of
Philo, which he was so unable
to reconcile with those doc-
trines of Philo already known
to him that he would scarcely
believe the treatise to be
genuine (vide sup. p. 80, 2); and
this induced him to write a work
against it, called Sosus (vide
N. D.i. 7, 16), to which Philo
seems again to have responded
(vide sup. Ὁ. 80,1, and concern-

He afterwards stood at the

ing the Stoic whose name the
treatise of Antiochus bore, p.
53,”.). Hither in this work or
in the Κανονικὰ, from the second
book of which a passage is
quoted in Sext. Math. vii. 201
(vide sup. Ὁ. 30,1), but pro-
bably in the former, we have
the source of the whole polemic
against the scepticism of the
Academy, which Cicero (Acad.
ii. 5 375.) represents Lucullus
as repeating from spoken dis-
courses of Antiochus (vide 5,
12; 19, 61). Cf. Krische, 7. ὁ.
168 sgqg. Of the second version
of the Academica Cicero ex-
pressly says (Ad Att. xiii. 19),
que erant contra ἀκαταληψίαν
preclare collecta ab Antiocho,
Varronit dedi; but Varro had
now taken the place of Lucullus.
Cicero also made use of Antio-
chus by name in the books De
Hinibus, the fifth of which is
taken from him. Also, in re-
gard to the Yopica, Wallies (De
Lont. Topie. Cic., Halle, 1878)
shows it to be probable that
Cicero follows Antiochus in
chapters 2-20. But as in the
rapid compilation of this short
treatise he had no books at hand
and consequently wrote from

ANTIOCHUS.

head of the Platonic school in Athens when Cicero,
in 79-78 B.c., was his pupil! for halfa year. About
ten years later he died.’

Through Antiochus the Academy was so decidedly
diverted from the sceptical tendency to which it had
abandoned itself since Arcesilaus, that it never, as a
whole, returned to it; and Antiochus is, therefore,
called the founder of the fifth Academy.* When
he had once freed himself from the scepticism of
Carneades, he made a polemic against it the special
task of his own life The sceptic, as Antiochus
believes, abolishes, with the certainty, even the
probability which he himself maintained; for if

memory (Zop. i. 5) we may
also perhaps discover in it
the substance of a lecture
which he heard while with
Antiochus, and with the help
of written notes brought away;
nothing is known besides this
of any treatise of Antiochus on
Topica.

1 Plut. Cie. 4; Cic. Fin. v.1,
1; Brut. 91, 315; ef. Aead. i.
4,13; ti. 35, 113; Legg. 1. 21,
54. Atticus also had made his
acquaintance in Athens (Legg.
l.¢.). Tothis later time must
be referred what is said in the
Ind. Acad. Herc. 34, of mis-
sions (πρεσβεύων) to Rome and
to the generals in the pro-
vinces.

3 Wesee this from Cic. Acad.
ii. 2, 4, and more distinctly
from c. 19, 61: Hee Antiochus
fere et Alexandree tum et mul-
tis annis post muito etiam ad-
severantius, in Syria cum esset
mecum, paulo ante quam est

mortuus (cf. Plut. Luc. 28, ac-
cording to which Antiochus
had mentioned the battle at
Tigranocerta, perhaps as an
eye-witness). Since this battle
took place on October 6, 685
A.u.c. (69 B.C.) Antiochus
must have lived at least till
the following year. On the
other hand, we see from the
Ind. Here. 34, 5, that he
died in Mesopotamia in con-
sequence of the hardships of
the expedition. Brutus some
years later heard no longer
Antiochus but his brother Aris-
tus in Athens (Cic. Brut. 97,
332, with which Tuse. v. 8, 21,
does not disagree). More pre-
cise dates for the life of An-
tiochus it is not possible to fix.

3 Phil. ὦ. Gr. 111. 1. 526, 2.

1 CE Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 12;
Augustine, ὦ. Acad. 6, 15:
Nihil tamen magis defendebat,
quam verum percipere posse
sapientem,

87

CHAP.
ΤΥ.

His
polemic
Against
scepticism.

ECLECTICISM.

the true does not allow itself to be known as such, it
cannot be said that anything appears to be true; !
consequently he not only contradicts the natural
necessity for knowledge,? but also makes all action,
impossible ; for Antiochus, like Chrysippus, rejected
the notion that we might follow probability in action,
even without knowledge and assent; partly because,
as we have seen, without truth there can be no
probability, and partly because it is impossible to act
without assent and conviction, or, on the other hand,
to refuse assent to the self-evident, the possibility
of which a portion of the adversaries conceded?
This practical interest is just what is, in his eyes, of
the highest importance: the consideration of virtue
is, as Cicero expresses it, the strongest proof of the
possibility of knowledge, for how could the virtuous
man make a sacrifice to his fulfilment of duty, if he
had no fixed and unassailable conviction? how would
practical wisdom be possible if the aim and problem
of life were unknowable?* But he also believed he
had the better of his adversaries even in the sphere
of theory. The whole question here turns on the
statement, against which Carneades had chiefly
directed his attacks—that true conceptions have
tokens in themselves, by which they may be dis-
tinguished with certainty from false.6 Against this

1 Cic. Acad. ii. 11, 33, 36; In the first of these passages
17, 54; 18, 59; 34, 109. Lucullus says, in reference to

* Loe. cit. 10, 30 sq. Philo’s objections against ra-

® Loe. cit. 8, 24; 10,32; 12, tional conceptions (supra, 79,
37 sqq. 2): Omnis oratio contra Acade-

4 Loe cit. 8, 23; of. 9, 27. miam suscipitur a nobis, ut

5 Phil. ὦ. Gr, IT. i. 501 ὅσῳ. retineamus eam definitionem,
and Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18; 13, 40. quam Philo volwit evertere.

ANTIOCHTS.

the sceptics had chiefly urged the various cases
of deceptions of the senses, and similar errors. The
existence of these errors Antiochus does not deny,
but he believed we ought not on that account to
discard the dicta of the senses; it merely follows
that the senses are to be kept healthy—that all
hindrances to correct observation are to be ban-
ished, and all rules of foresight and prudence are
to be observed, if the testimony of the senses is
to be valid.! In themselves the senses are for us
a source of true conceptions; for though sensation
is primarily only a change taking place in ourselves,
it also reveals to us that by means of which this
change is effected.2 We must likewise, as Antiochus
readily admits, allow truth to general concepts, if we
would not make all thought, and all crafts, and arts
impossible. But if, as against this, the imagina-
tions of dreamers or lunatics are brought forward by
his opponents, Antiochus replies that these are all
wanting in that self-evidentness which is proper to
true intentions and conceptions ;4 and if they seek
to embarrass us with their sorites,> he answers
that from the similarity of many things it does not
follow that there is no distinction between them;
and if in particular cases we are obliged to
suspend our judgment,® we need not, therefore,

1 Loe. cit. 7,19 sqq. 6 That Antiochus after the
2 Sext. Math. vil. 162 sg. precedent of Chrysippus (PAid.
8. Cic. ὦ, 6. 7, 21 87. d. Gr. IIT. 1.115, 2) adopted this

4 Loc. cit. 15,47 sqq.; 16,51 expedient even in regard to
sq. According to 16, 49, An- purely dialectical objections,
tiochus must have discussed such as the so-called ψευδόμενος
this objection at great length. wesee from Cic. Acad. li. 29,

5. Cf, Phil. d. Gr, TT. 1, 508. 95 sgq.

BO

CHAP.
IV.

90

CHAP.
IV.

ECLECTICISM.

permanently renounce all claim to it.’ The scep-
tics themselves, however, are so little able to carry
out their principles that they involve themselves
in the most striking contradictions. Is it not
a contradiction to maintain that nothing can be
maintained, and to be convinced of the impossibility
of a firm conviction? ? Can a person, who allows no
distinction between truth and error, use definitions or
classifications, or even a logical demonstration, of
which he is absolutely ignorant whether truth belongs
toit?? Lastly, how can it be simultaneously main-
tained that there are false notions, and that between
true and false notions there is no difference, since
the first of these propositions presupposes this very
difference?* We must allow that some of these
arguments, especially those last quoted, are not
deficient in subtlety, but others must certainly be
called very superficial, and rather postulates than
proofs.

In any case, however, Antiochus believed him-
self justified by such reasoning in repudiating the
demand that we should refrain from all acquies-
cence ;° and in striving after a dogmatic knowledge

1 Loc. cit. 16, 49 sq.; 17, 54 tiochus. Arcesilaus drew this

877.

2 Loe. cit. 9, 29; 84, 109.

3 Loc. cit. 14, 43.

4 Loc. cit. 14, 44; 34, 111,
where there is also the obser-
vation that this was the objec-
tion which caused Philo the
most embarrassment.

5 Cic. ὦ δ. 21, 67 sq. He thus
formulates the relation of Ar-
cesilaus, Carneades, and An-

inference: Si wllt ret sapiens
adsentietur unguam, aliquando
etiam opinabitur; nunguam
autem opinabitur ; nullt tgitur
ret adsentietur. Carneades ad-
mitted that the wise man some-
times agreed, and therefore
had an opinion. The Stoics and
Antiochus deny this latter ; but
they also deny that from agree-
ment opinion necessarily fol-

ANTIOCHTUS.

instead of sceptical nescience. But he was not
creative enough to produce an independent system ;
he therefore turned to the systems already existing,
not to follow any one of them exclusively, but to
adopt that which was true from all; and as it was
the mutual contradiction of the philosophical
theories which appeared to give to scepticism its
greatest justification, Antiochus believed that he
could not better establish his own conviction than
by asserting that this contradiction in some cases
did not exist, and in others concerned only un-
essential points; that all the most important schools
of philosophy were in the main agreed, and only
differed from each other in words. He counted
himself, indeed, as belonging to the Academy; he
desired to re-establish the Platonism which his pre-
decessors since Arcesilaus had abandoned, and to
return from the new Academy to the old.t But
this, in his opinion, did not exclude a simultaneous
alliance with Zeno and Aristotle. The Academic
and Peripatetic doctrines are, he says, one and the
same form of philosophy bearing different names;
their diversity lies not in the fact but only in the
expression.? The same is the case with the Stoics:
they also adopted the Academic-Peripatetic philo-

lows ; for a man can distinguish
false and true, knowable and
unknowable. The ultimate
question, therefore, is always
this : whether there is anything
which lets itself be known
with certainty, 2@ φαντασία
καταληπτικὴ (cf, sup. 87, 4; 88,5).

1 Sup. 82, 2; Cie. Acad. i.
12,43; fin. v.3,7; Brut. 91,
315 ; Augustine, C. Aead. ii. 6,
15; ili. 18, 41.

5 Cic. Acad. 1. 4, 17; 6, 22;
ii. 5,15; 44, 186; Fin. v. 3,7;
5, 14; 8, 21; cf. iv. 2, 5.

91

CHAP.
IV.

-Vaintains
the essen-
tial agree-
ment of all
the chief
systems.

CHAP.

tlis eclec-
EtCiSM.

ECLECTICISM,

sophy, and only changed the words:! or, if it be
admitted’ that Zeno introduced much that was new
in substance also,” this was of such a subordinate
kind, that the Stoic philosophy may, nevertheless,
be considered as an amended form of the philosophy
of the Academy, and not as a new system.’ Antio-
chus himself adopted so many Stoie doctrines that
Cicero says concerning him: ‘he desired, indeed,
to be called a member of the Academy, but was,
with the exception of a few points, a pure Stoic.’ 4
Yet these points, as a review of his doctrine will
show, are of such importance that we can in truth
6811 him as little a Stoic as an Academician or Peri-
patetic; and in spite of the affinity of his mode of
thought with Stoicism, he must be considered an
eclectic.

Antiochus divided philosophy in the usual man-
ner, into three parts;° that he did not ascribe the
same value to each of these is clear from the posi-

1 Cic. Acad. ii. 5,15; 6,16; Cf. Plut. Cie. 4. When Cicero

Fin. v. 8, 223 25, 74; 29, 88;
N. 2.1.1, 16; Legg. i. 20, 54;
Sext. Pyrrh. i. 235.

* Acad. i. 9, 35 89.

3 Thid. 12, 43: Verum esse
autem arbitror, ut Anttiocho
nostro familiart placebat, cor-
gectionem veteris Academie
potius quam aliquam novam dis-
ciplinam putandam [ Stotcorum
philosophiam |.

4 Acad. ii, 43, 132: Antio-
chus, qui appellabatur Acade-
MLCUS, erat quidem si perpauca
mitavissel, germanissimus Sto-
acus ; OY, AS itis said in 45, 137,
Stoicus perpauca balbutiens.

heard Antiochus, he had already
left the new Academy: τὸν
Στωϊκὸν ἐκ μεταβολῆς θεραπεύων
λόγον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, Sext.
Pyrrh, i. 235: ὃ ᾿Αντίοχος τὴν
Στοὰν' μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν ᾿Ακαδη-
μίαν, ὡς καὶ εἰρῆσθαι ἐπ’ αὐτῷ,
ὅτι ἐν ᾿Ακαδημίᾳ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ
Στωϊκά. August. C. Acad. iii.
18, 41.

5 Cie. Acad. i. 5, 19 (ef. ii.
36, 116). That these two re-
presentations reproduce the
views of Antiochus, Cicero ex-
pressly states, Acad, i. 4, 14;
Fin, v. 8, 8.

ANTIOCHTS.

tion he assigned to them; for he placed ethics, as
the most important division, first, physics second,
and logic third.’ He paid most attention to the
theory of knowledge and ethics.2 Ethics, especially,
is said by Cicero to have been in his opinion
the most essential part of philosophy. In his
theory of knowledge the principal thing is that
refutation of scepticism which we have already
mentioned; for the rest he adhered, according to
Cicero,* strictly to the principles of Chrysippus; and
this is not contradicted by the fact that he also held
the Platonic theory; for he seems to have regarded
as the most essential element of the latter those
universal determinations in which Platonism agreed
not only with the Peripatetic doctrine, but also
with that of the Stoics: that all knowledge pro-
ceeded, indeed, from sensible perception, but in
itself was an affair of the understanding.* The

1 So at least we find in Acad.
i. 5 sgq., notonly in the enume-
ration, but also, and repeatedly,
in the exposition of the three
divisions.

2 Antiochus, ap. Cic. dead.
li. 9, 29, etenim duo esse hec
maxima in phitosophia, judicoum
vers et finem bonorum, &c.

8 Acad. i. 9, 34.

4 Acad. ii. 46, 142: Plate
autem omne judicium veritatis
veritatemgque ipsam, abductam
ab opinionibus et ὦ sensibus,
cogitationis ipsius et mentis
esse voluit. Numgquid horum
probat noster Antiochus? ille
vero ne majorum quidem suorum,
ubii enim aut Xenocratem se-

quitur ... aut ipsum Aristo-
telem .. . 2a Chrysippo pedem
nusquam. So, in c. 28-30, An-

tiochus is throughout opposed
on the assumption that he re-
cognises the dialectical rules of
Chrysippus.

5 Acad.i.8, 30: Tertia deinde
philosophi@ pars... sie trac-
tabatur ab utrisque (Plato and
Aristotle) ; qguanguam oriretur
a sensibus tamen non esse judi-
cium veritatis in sensibus.
Mentem vulebant rerum esse
judicem, &c. But the disciple
of Antiochus speaks in a pre-
cisely similar manner of Zeno
(li, 42).

93

CHAP,
ΤΥ,

Lis theory
of knon-
ledge.

94

CHAP,
IV.

Metaphy-
sics and
physics.

ECLIECTICISM.

doctrine of ideas, on the other hand, he abandoned,!
and thus, in his efforts for unity, it might well
appear to him at last that the Stoic theory of know-
ledge was only an extension and closer definition of
the theory of Plato and Aristotle? To what an ex-
tent Aristotelian and Stoic definitions and expres~
sions were mingled in his logic, we see in Cicero’s
Topica,’ supposing this account really follows
Antiochus.* In the same superficial manner, Antio-
chus combines the Platonic metaphysics not only
with those of Aristotle, but also of the Stoics; for
he, or Varro in his name,® represents the supposed
identical doctrine of Plato and Aristotle as follows:
there are two natures, the active and the passive,
force and matter, but neither is ever without the
other. That which is compounded of both is called
a body or a quality.6 Among these qualities the
simple and the compound are to be distinguished ;
the former consisting of the four, or, according to
Aristotle, five, primitive bodies; the latter, of all
the rest; of the first category, fire and air are the
active, earth and water the receptive and passive.
Underlying them all, however, is the matter without
quality, which is their substratum, the imperishable,

1 Vide Acad. i. 8, 30, com- as he himself remarks, he in-
pared with 9,38 and sup. p.93,4. troduces the word qualitas

2 Of. Acad.i. 11, 42 sq. newly into the Latin language

3 Vide sup. Ὁ. 86, 3. as a translation of the Greek

4 As Wallies demonstrates ποιότης, he must have found
thoroughly (De Font. Top. Cie. ποιότης and not ποιὸν, employed
22 sqq.). by his predecessor. Qualities

5 Acad. 1. 6, 24 874. were declared to be bodies by

6 Cicero expressly says, guali- the Stoics (cf. Phil. d. Go. TIL. i.
tas; and as on this occasion, 99, 111).

ANTIOCHUS,

but yet infinitely divisible elements, producing in
the constant change of its forms definite bodies
(qualia). All these together form the world; the
eternal reason which animates and moves the world
is called the Deity or Providence, also Necessity ;
and, because of the unsearchableness of its workings,
sometimes even Chance. To the man who could so
entirely mistake the fundamental doctrines of the older
systems, and mingle together earlier and later ele-
ments in so arbitrary a manner, the opposition of the
Stoic system to the system of Plato and Aristotle
could no longer appear specially important; and so
in the work we have so often mentioned,! it is only
said that Zeno discarded the fifth element of Aris-
totle (ether), and was likewise distinguished from
the earlier philosopher in that he held bodies alone
to be real. How far even this one distinction ex-
tends, the eclectic does not seem to suspect. He
expressly confounds mind with sense;? and says
of Aristotle that he represents spirits as consisting
of ether, for which Zeno substituted fire.2 We may
with certainty assume that he did not enter into
special physics.

In regard to morals also, Antiochus remained
true to his eclectic character. He starts, like the
Stoics, from self-love, and the fundamental impulse
of self-preservation as the fundamental impulse of
human nature, and attains from this starttmg point

1 Zoe. cit. 11, 39. suum fons est, atque etiam ipsa
2 Acad. ii. 10, 30, Lucullus sensus est, &c.
says: Mens enim ipsa, que sen- 8 Acad, i. 7, 27; 11, 39.

95

CHAP.
IV.

Ethies.

96

CHAP.
IV.

ECLECTICISM.

the ground principle of the Stoics and Academics,
that of life according to nature.t It is as much a
doctrine of the Stoics, however, as of the Academy
that that which is according to nature is determined
for each creature according to its own particular
nature, and that therefore the highest good for man
is found in a life according to human nature, per-
fected on all sides.2 But herein the point is already
indicated at which our philosopher diverges from
Stoicism. Whereas the Stoics had recognised only
the rational element in man as his true essence,
Antiochus says that sensuousness also belongs to per-
fected human nature, that man consists of soul and
body, and though the goods of the noblest part have
the highest worth, those of the body are not on that
account worthless ; they are not merely to be desired
for the sake of another, but in and for themselves.®
The highest good, therefore, according to him, con-
sists in the perfection of human nature in regard to
soul and body, in the attainment of the highest
mental and bodily completeness ;* or, according to
another representation,® in the possession of all
mental, bodily, and external goods. These con-
stituents of the highest good are doubtless of un-

1 Cic. Fin. v. 9, 11,

2 Vivere ex hominis natura
undique perfecta et nthil re-
quirente (Cic. ὁ. ὁ. 9, 26).

3 dead. i. 5, 19; Fin. v. 12,
34;13, 38; 16, 44;17,47. Beauty,
health, strength, are desired
for themselves: Quoniam enim
natura suis omnibus exuplert
partibus vult, hune statum cor-

ports per sé ipsum expetit qué
est maxime e natura. So also
Varro, as will be shown later
on.

* Fin. v. 18, 87; 16, 44; 17,.

5. Acad.i. δ, 19, 21 sq, in the
description of the Academic-
Peripatetic philosophy

ANTIOCHUS.

equal worth: mental endowments have the highest

value, and among these, moral endowments (volun- _.

tarie) have a higher place than merely natural
gifts;! but although corporeal goods and evils have
only a slight influence on our well-being, it would
be wrong to deny all importance to them ;? and if
it be conceded to the Stoics that virtue for itself
alone suffices for happiness, yet for the highest stage
of happiness other things are likewise necessary.?
Through these determinations, in which he agrees
with the old Academy,* our philosopher hopes to
strike the true mean between the Peripatetic school
which, in his opinion, ascribed too much value to
the external,’ and the Stoic school which ascribed
too little;® but it is undeniable that his whole
exposition fails in exactness and consistency.

The same observation applies to other particulars.
If Aristotle had given precedence to knowledge, and
Zeno to action, Antiochus placed the two ends side
by side, since both depend upon original impulses of
nature.’ If the Stoics had maintained the unity,

1 Fin. v. 13, 38; 21, 58, 60.

3 Fin. v. 24, 72.

3 Acad. 1. 6, 22: In wna
veirtute esse positam beatain
vitam, nec tamen beatissimam,
nisi adjungerentur et corporis
et cetera que supra. dicta sunt
aad virtutis usum idonea (il. 43,
134; Fin. v. 27, 81; 24, 71).

4 Cf. Phil. ὦ. Gr TL.i. 881, 5.

5 Fin. v. 5, 12; 25, 1.
Aristotle himself is thus sepa-
tated from his school, and
beside him Theophrastus only
(though with a certain limita-

tion) is recognised as an anu-
thentic source of the Peripa-
tetic doctrine; so that even
herein respect to the Academic
school, Antiochus wishes his
innovations to be regarded
merely as a resuscitation of
the original doctrine of the
Academy.

§ Fin. v. 24, 72.

7 Fin. v. 21, 58: Actionwm
autem genera plura, ut ob-
scurentur etiam minora major-
thus. Maxime autem sunt . .
primum consideratio cognitiog ve

7

CHAP.
YI.

ECLECTICISM.

and the Peripatetics the plurality of virtue, Antiochus
declares that all virtues are inseparably connected
with one other, but that each of them presents itself
in an individual activity;! he does not, however,
attempt, as Plato did, to give any deeper account
of their difference. If the Stoic schools were not
quite agreed whether or not community with other
men were a good in the strict sense—something to
be desired in and for itself—Antiochus here again
seeks to mediate; for while he most fully acknow-
ledges the value and necessity of this relation,? he
makes a double distinction among things of value
in and for themselves: viz., those which are directly
a constituent of the highest good (the endowments.
of the soul and the body), and those which are to be

rerum celestium, &e. Deinde
rerum publicamum adminis-
tratio .. . reliquceque virtutes
et actiones virtutibus congriten-
tes. Cf. 18, 48; 20, 55; 23, 66.

1 Fin. v. 23, 66 sq.

2 Hin. v. 23, 65 sqq.; Acad.
i. 5,21. In both passages the
community of men with one
another is treated as something
inherent in human nature; and
in the former it is shown how
the feeling for this, from its
first appearance in family love,
spreads itself in an ever widen-
ing circle and finally becomes
universal love of mankind
(caritas generis humant). This
is essentially Stoic, and more
particularly in the spirit of the
later Stoicism; but the thought
of a universal love of mankind,
based upon the natural interde-
pendence of men, was not alien

to the Peripatetic school. Cf.
Phil. @.Gr. IL, ti. 693; 851, 1; 865,
and Arist. Hth. N.viili.1, 1155, a,
16 sqqg., where it isshown in the
same way as by Antiochus that
nature has implanted the love
of parents to children (φιλία)
and of members of the same
race to each other, καὶ μάλιστα
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλαν-
θρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν, and it is
added: ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν ris καὶ ἐν ταῖς
πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. The same
is developed (by Arius Didy-
mus) in the account of the
Peripatetic ethics, ap. Stob.
fel. ii. 250 sq., in a discussion
which so distinctly recalls the
manner of Theophrastus that
we may doubtless derive it
from this Peripatetic, of whom
something similar is observed,
Phil. ad. Gr. ΤΙ. ti. 851.

SCHOOL OF ANTIOCHUS.

desired as an object of moral activity: enly in the
latter class does he place friends, relations, and
fatherland.! Like the Stoies, Antiochus would only
allow the wise to be regarded as rulers, as free, rich,
and noble; like them he declares all the unwise to
be slaves, and mad; and demands from the wise
man a complete apathy;? notwithstanding that he
thereby contradicted the doctrine of the older
Academy, and had himself no right to such un-
qualified statements, considering his own opinions
respecting the highest good. But when we find
him violently opposing the closely connected pro-
position of the equality of all faults,? this trait may
likewise show us that he was not very scrupulous
about scientific consistency.

Consistency, however, was not the quality on
which the success of a philosopher at that time
chiefly depended. Among the contemporaries of
Antiochus in the Academy, who are mentioned to
us, only the elder seem to have held to the doctrine
of Carneades;* among the younger generation, on

1 Fin. v. 23, 68: Ζέω ftut duo tus of Tyre, who is known to us

genera propter 86 expetendorum
reperiantur, UNUM, guod est in
tis, in quibus completur illud
extremum, que sunt aut anime
aut corporis: hee autem, que
sunt eatrinsecus ... ut amici,
ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propin-
qui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa
quidem sua sponte cara, sed
eodem ὧν genere, quo tila, non
sunt, &e.

2 Acad. ii, 44, 135 sq.

3 Thid. 43, 135 sq.

4 This is true of Heraclei-

B

through Cicero (dead. ii. 4,
11 sq.) as a disciple of long
standing of Clitomachus and
Philo, and a distinguished re-
presentative of the new Aca-
demy ; for the Academy is cer-
tainly meant by the philosophia,
que nune prope dimissa revoca-
tur, as will be immediately
shown. Through a misunder-
standing. of the expression,

Zampt (Veber den Bestand der

Phil. Schul. in. Athen.) Abh. ὦ.
Berl. Akad. 1842; Hist. Phiilol.

FS)

-

09

‘HAP.
IV.

Sedool of
Antiochus.

ECLECTICISM.

the contrary,! Antiochus was so successful, that,
according to the testimony of Cicero, the doctrine

Kl. 67 sq.) has been misled into
considering the disciple of Cli-
tomachus and Philo as a Peri-
patetic. He is perhaps the
same person of whom it is said
in the Ind. Here. Acad. 33, 4,
that he was seventy years old.
Among the Romans who occu-
pied themselves with Greek
philosophy, C. Cotta is men-
tioned (who was consul in 76
B.C.) by Cicero LV. J. i. 7, 16
sq.) as an acquaintance of An-
tiochus, but a disciple and
adherent of Philo. He criti-
cises the Epicurean (ὦ. 6. 1. 2]
sgq.) and (ili. 1 sqgg.) the Stoic
theology from the standpoint
of the new Academy. As
hearers of Philo, Cicero also
(Acad. li. 4, I1) mentions
Publius, Caius Selius, and
Tetrilius Rogus. Diodo-
rus, a partisan of Mithridates,
is also mentioned in this period,
who held to the Academic school
(Strabo, xiii. 1, 66, p. 614); but
he can scarcely be counted
among the philosophers.

1 Pre-eminent among their
numberis Aristus, the brother
of Antiochus, who succeeded
him in his position of instruc-
tor at Athens (Cic. Brut. 97,
3382; Acad. ii. 4, 12; 1. 3, 12;
Tusc. v. 8, 21; Plut. Brut. 2;
Ind. Here. 34, 2 sq. Tn 51 B.c.
Cicero (ad Att. v.10; Tuse. v.
8,22) met him there, and de-
scribes him as the only man
who formed an exception to
the generally unsatisfactory
state of philosophy in Athens.
According to the Jnd. Here.,
he had heard many other philo-

sophers besides his brother.
Plutarch (Brut. 2) places his
moral character higher than his
ἕξις ἐν λόγοις. Also Dio, doubt-
less the same who (according
to Strabo, xvii. 1, 11, Ὁ. 796;
Cic. Pro Cel. 10, 23; 21, 51)
perished as a member of an
Alexandrian embassy to Rome
in 56 B.C. and is the person
mentioned by Plutarch as the
author of table conversations
(Plut. Qu. Conv. Pro. 8). Also,
according to the Ind. Here. 34,
6 δ. (where by αὐτοῦ ΒᾺΝ other
philosopher than Antiochus can
scarcely be intended), Apol-
las, of Sardis; Menecrates,
of Methyma; and Mnaseas,
of Tyre. Concerning Aristo
and Cratippus, who went
over to the Peripatetic school,
vide infra, Ὁ. 121, 2. Aristus
seems to have been followed by
Theopompus, whom Brutus
heard in Athens (Plut. Brut.
24) in 44 B.c., and who is men-
tioned by Philostratus (@.
Soph. i. 6). At the same date
there lived in Alexandria at the
court of Ptolemy XII. (Diony-
sus) Demetrius (Lucian, De
Calumn. 16), of whom we
know, however, nothing further ;
but, at any rate, he was a
worthier member of the school
than the Philostratus men-
tioned by Plutarch (Anton. 80).
Among the Romans, besides
Cicero, Varro, of whom we
shall have to speak more par-
ticularly later on, was also
a disciple of Antiochus. M.
Brutus had been instructed
by Aristus (Cic. Brut. 97, 332;

SCHOOL OF ANTIOCHTS.

of the new Academy was in his time almost entirely

abandoned. !

Acad, i. 8, 12; Fin. v. 3, 8;
Tuse. v. 8, 21), whom he re-
sembled both personally and in
his opinions. Cicero (Acad. 1. ¢.;
ad Att. Xlii. 25) classes him as
a follower of Antiochus with
Varro, and in Parad. Pro. 2,
with himself. In Brut. 31,120;
40, 149, he enumerates him
with the followers of the old
Academy, and (786. ὦ. 4.) puts
a proposition of Antiochus into
his mouth. Plutarch also (Z.c.,
cf. Dio, 1) says that he was
indeed well acquainted with
all the Greek philosophers, but
was himself an admirer of An-
tiochus and an adherent of the
old Academy, as opposed to the
later and new Academy. His
talent and knowledge are
praised by Cicero (ad Aft. xiv.
20; ad Div. ix. 14; Brut. 6,
22; Fin. ill. 2,6; his writings
in Acad. 1. 38,12; Zuse.v. 1,1:
Fin. i. 8, 8; vide also, in regard
to his writings, Sen. Consol. ad
Hely.9,4; Hp. 95, 45; Quintil.
x. 1, 123; Charisius, p. 83;
Priscian, vi. p. 679; Diomed.
p- 378. On the preceding, vide
Krische, Gott. Stud. ἢ. 163 sqq.)
M. Piso also heard Antiochus
with Cicero (according to Cic.
Fin. v. 1 sqq.), acknowledged
himself his disciple (J. ce. 8,7 s¢.),
and expounded his ethical prin-
ciples (c. 4-25), but in such a
manner that he still wished to
retain his loyalty to the Peri-
patetic school into which his
housemate Staseas, of Naples,
had introduced him (J. 6. 8, 8;
25, 75; De Orat. 1. 22, 104).
Cf. ad Att. xiti. 19 (according

‘Mnesidemus says the samething; and __

to which he was not living when
Cicero wrote De Finibus).

‘In Acad. ii. 4, 11, Cicero
mentions, as we have observed,
Heracleitus the Tyrian: Homo
sane in ista philosephia, que
nune prope dimissa revocatur,
probatus et nobilis. That this
philosophy can only mean the
new Academy, is clear from the
context. For when a disciple
of Clitomachus and Philo is
mentioned, we can but conclude
that the philosophy in which
he distinguished himself was
the philosophy of these men;
and Cicero says expressly that
Heracleitus opposed Antiochus,
the rival of the Academy (of
Carneades, &c.), dispassionately
indeed, but zealously. The new
Academy, therefore, which in
Cicero’s time had been almost
universally abandoned, was by
him revived. Cicero says the
same thing most distinctly,
NV. D.1.5, 11: Nee vero deser-
tarum relictarumque rerum pa-
trocinium suscepimus (through
the defence of the doctrine
of the new Academy) ; non enim
hominum interitu — sententie
quoque oecidunt, sed lucem auc-
toris Jortasse desiderant, ut hee
in philosophia ratio contra om-
nia disserendi nullamque rem
aperte judicandi profecta a
Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila,
confirmata a Carneade usque ad
nostram veguit @etatem ; quam
nune prope orbam esse in ipsa
Grecia intelligo. If these evi-
dences are considered to be dis-
proved by the saying of Augus-

tine, (. Acad. tii. 18,41 wide

101

CHAP.
IV.

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.

with these testimonies everything that we know
regarding the tendency of the Academic school ! until

nearly the end of the first century coincides.

Our

knowledge of this school at that time is certainly
very incomplete,? but that the eclecticism of Antio-
chus still maintained itself there, is plain from the

supra, p. 79, 2), according to
which Cicero would only have
had to finish suppressing the
rveliquie of the false doctrines
of Antiochus opposed by Philo.
This is to ascribe an Importance
to the Augustinian phrase
which clearly does not belong
to it, since it is plain that the
notion of Cicero’s refuting the
eclecticism of Antiochus is false.

1 Ap. Phot. Cod. 212, p. 170,
14: of & ἀπὸ τῆς ᾿Ακαδημίας,
φησὶ, μάλιστα τῆς νῦν, Kal Srwi-
Kats συμφέρονται ἐνίοτε δόξαι,
καὶ εἰ χρὴ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, Srwi-
κοὶ φαίνονται μαχόμενοι Στωϊκοῖς.
Cicero and others judged in a
similar manner of Antiochus;
cide supra, Ὁ. 92, 4.

2 Of the heads of the Athe-
nian school we know none
between Theomnestus (ride
supra) and Ammonius, the
teacher of Plutarch; of other
members of the Academy, be-
sides Eudorus, Nestor of Tar-
sus (Strabo, xiv. 5, 14, p. 675,
expressly distinguishes this
Nestor from the previously-
mentioned Stoic of the same
name—vide supra, p. 54: the
former, according to him, was
the teacher of Marcellus, son
of Octavia) and the Tubero
spoken of in Phil. d. Ga. IILI.,
ii. 7, 5, only Dercyllides
and Thrasyllus. Even of
these we are told very little.
Of Dercyllides, whose date

cannot be definitely fixed, but
who seems to have lived earlier
than Thrasyllus, we find from
Albinus, Intvod. in Plat. 4;
Procl. in Tim. 7, B.; Porph.
ap. Simpl. Phys. 54, b,; 56,
ὃ, that he had composed a
great work on the Platonic
philosophy, from which perhaps
the extensive astronomical frag~
ment in Theo Smyrn. Astron.
c. 40 sg., and the smaller excerpt
in Proclus in Plat. Remp.
(quoted from A. Mai, Class.
Auct. i. 362, by Martin on Theo,
p. 74) are taken. Thrasyllus
became acquainted in Rhodes,
perhaps his native city, with
Tiberius, to whom he succeeded
in making himself indispen-
sable as an astrologer (what is
related, however, as to the proofs
of his art in Tacit. Ann. vi. 20;
Sueton, Viher. 145 and, still
more, in Dio Cass. lv. 11 ; lviii.
27, is embellished with fables).
He then lived, from the last
years of Augustus (Sueton. Aug.
98 ; Dio Cass. lvii. 15), in Rome,
and died a year before Tiberius,
36 A.D. (Dio, lviii. 97). He is
chiefly known to us through
his division of the Platonic dia-
logues into tetralogies (wide
Phil. ὦ. Gr. 11. i. 428). He is
mentioned as a Platonist with
Pythagorean tendencies by Por-
phyry, Plot. 20. But as both
Thrasyllus and Dercyllides
seem to have been gramma-

EVDORTS,

example of Eudorus,' a philosopher of Alexandria,?
and a contemporary of the Emperor Augustus. ot
This philosopher is denominated a member of i. Ludorus

the Academy,* but he had expounded the works

Aristotle,> as well as those of Plato,® and had dis-
coursed at length on the Pythagorean doctrine, which
he apprehended in the sense of the later Platonising

Pythagorism.*

rians rather than philoso-
phers, it may here suffice to
refer, in regard to Thrasyllus,
to K. F. Hermann, De Thrasyllo
(Ind. Schol. Gétting. 1852);
Miller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii.
501; Martin on Theo. Astron.

. 69 sg.3; and in regard to
Dercyllides to the work last
mentioned, Ὁ. 72 s¢q,

1 Concerning Eudorus, vide
Roper, Philologus, vii. 534 8q.;
Diels, Dowxogr. 22, 81 sq. δέ
passim.

5 Stob. Hel, il. 46.
_ fra, Ὁ. 104, 1.

3 The date of his life cannot
be determined with accuracy.
Strabo (xvii. i. 5, p. 790) de-
scribes him as his contemporary.
Brandis ( Veber die Griech. dus-
leger des Aristot. Organons, Dh.
der Berl. 4cad. 1833; Hist. Phil.
Al. Ὁ. 275) infers that he was
earlier than the Rhodian An-
-dronicus, from the manner in
which Simplicius (Sehol. in
Arist. 61, a, 26; 73, 6,18) com-
pares him with Andronicus, and
the latter passage, at any rate,
seems to me conclusive. If, on
the other hand, Stob. el. ii.
46 sqq. is taken from Arius
Didymus (on this subject, ede
infra), he must have written

before him.

Fide in-

This many-sided occupation with

* (Ar. Did. ap.) Stob. 7. ὡς:
Εὐδώρου τοῦ ᾿Αλεξανδρέως, ἀκαδη-
μικοῦ φιλοσόφου. Simp. Schol.
in Arist. 63, a, 43; Achil. Tat.
Isag. Vi. 6 Cin Petar. Doctr.
Temp. tii. 96; Eudorus is also
quoted in Jsag. 1.2, 13, Ὁ. 74,
79).

5 His commentary on the
Categories is often quoted in
that of Simplicius (cf. Sehod. tn
Arist. 61, a, 25 sqq.; 68, a, £3;
66, 6,18; 70, 6, 26; 71, ὃ, 22;
73, 6,18; 74, ὃ, 2, and Cat. ed.
Basil. 44, «. 65,€). That he also
expounded the Metaphysics
does not certainly follow from
Alex. etaph. 44, 23; Bon.
Sehol. 552, ὃ, 29.

5. Plut. De in. Proer. 3, 2;
16, 1, p. 1015, 1019 sq., seems
also to refer to a commentary
on the Timeus.

7 In the fragment quoted in
Phil. d. Gr. 1, 331, 4, from Simpl.
Phys. 39, a, not only are the
two Platonic principles, the
One and Matter, attributed to
the Pythagoreans, but these
principles are themselves re-
ferred (in agreement with the
Neo-Pythagoreans, cf. 7bid. 111.
li. 113 99.) to the One or the
Deity as their uniform basis.
The same theory, however, is
ascribed by Eudorus even to

105

CHAP.
IV.

leg
of of Alex

ἡ γίς.

ECLECTICISM.

the older philosophers, and especially his digest of
the Aristotelian categories, would at once lead us
to suppose that the Platonism of Eudorus was not
entirely pure; and this is confirmed by the state-
ments of Stobeeus concerning an encyclopedic work
of his, in which we are told he treated the whole of
science problematically: ὁ.6. he gave a summary of
the questions with which the different parts of
philosophy are concerned, and compared the answers.
given to them by the most important philosophers.!
In the epitome of ethics, which has been preserved
to us from this work, the classification and termino-
logy is rather Stoic than Platonic;? and no doubt

Plato, when, according to Alex.
(in. Metaph.i. 6, 988, a, 10), after
the words τὰ yap εἴδη τοῦ τί
ἐστιν atria τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ᾽
εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν, he added καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ.
On this theory, in agreement
with the Stoic monism (on
whichef. Phil. d.G@r.IIL.i.p.131,
138, 145 sg.) though without
its materialistic interpretation,
even the ὕλη must have sprung
from the Deity orthe primal One.

1 Hel. ii. 46: ἔστιν οὖν Evid-
ρου τοῦ ᾿Αλεξανδρέως ἀκαδημικοῦ
φιλοσόφου διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ
φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, βιβλίον ἀξιό-
κτήτον, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσαν ἐπεξελήλυθε
προβληματικῶς Thy ἐπιστήμην.
The above explanation of this
expression results from p. 54
sqq., where the author, after
he has given Eudorus’ division
of ethics, continues, ἀρκτέον
δὲ τῶν προβλημάτων, and then
gives the views of the vari-
ous philosophers—first concern-
ing the τέλος, then concern-
ing goods and evils, lastly

concerning the question εἰ πᾶν
τὸ καλὸν 8” αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν. These
extracts also, as far as Ὁ. 88,
are no doubt borrowed from
Eudorus by Arius Didymus
whom Stobzeus is here tran-
scribing.

53 Having divided the whole
of philosophy into ethics, phy-
sics, and logic, Eudorus dis-
tinguishes three parts in ethics:
περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον.
ἀξίας, π. τὴν ὁρμὴν, π. τὴν πρᾶξιν"
(θεωρητικὸν, ὁρμητικὸν, πρακ-
τικόν). The first of these
parts then falls into two sec-
tions: (1) the ends of life, and
(2) the means for their attain-
ment, and each of these into a
number of subdivisions among
which we find the truly Stoical
titles mepl τῶν προηγουμένων,
περὶ ἔρωτος, περὶ συμποσίων-
(cf. Phil. d. Go. TIL. i. 260 sq.3
241, 1; 273, 7; 283, 2). Hven
the doctrine of virtue, one of
the sections of the second
division (for this must be-

ELUDORUS.

it was the same with the details of his ethics,! so
that Eudorus in this respect entirely followed the

precedent of Antiochus.

That he did not confine

himself to ethics appears from what has been already
quoted, and from certain other indications.?
How widely spread, in the second half of the last

divided by the words, p. 50,
τὸ μέν ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, KC.,
before which οὗ or τούτου δὲ
may probably have been lost)
primarily indicates the Stoic
view, though among the four
cardinal virtues, φρόνησις takes
the place of the Platonic σοφία.
The second main division of
ethics treats partly of the ὅρμὴ
generally and partly of the
πάθη. which are defined quite
in the Stoic manner, into épuy
πλεονάζουσα and ἀρρώστημα.
The third main division is
separated by means of sub-
ordinate classes into eight
τόποι : παραμυθητικὸς, παθολο-
γικὸς, περὶ ἀσκήσεως, περὶ καθη-
κόντων, περὶ κατορθωμάτων, περὶ
χαρίτων, περὶ βίων, περὶ γάμου.
How closely this whole classifi-
cation resembles that of the
Stoics will be seen from Phil. ὦ.
Gr. 17171.1. 206 sg. Hucorus is so
completely in agreement with
what is there quoted from Sen.
Hp. 84, 14, and the commence-
ment especially of his classifi-
cation quoted by Stobeus
bears such striking resemblance
to the passage of Seneca, that
either Seneca must have fol-
lowed EHEudorus, or both must
have followed some common,
and in that case Stoic, source.

1 This is clear from the next
section of Stobseus, which, as
before observed, seems also to

be taken from Eudorus, espe-
cially from Ὁ. 60: ὑποτελὶς δ᾽
ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον τοῦ ζῴου
πάθος, ἀφ᾽ οὗ κατήρξατο συναισ-
θάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον τῆς συστάσεως
αὑτοῦ, οὕπω λογικὸν ὃν ἀλλ᾽
ἄλογον, κατὰ τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ
σπερματικοὺς λόγους... γενό-
μενον γὰρ τὸ ζῷον φκειώθη τινὶ
πάντως εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς (Phil.d.Gr.
ITT. i. 208 sg.). How Hudorus
was allied with Antiochusin this
is shown by a comparison of
the words immediately follow-
ing ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὑποτελὶς, κεῖται δ᾽
ἐν τινι τῶν τριῶν" ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἡδονῇ ἢ
ἐν ἀοχλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις κατὰ
φύσιν) with what Cicero, Fin. vy.
6,16 (vide ibid. III. i. 518, 1),
quotes from Antiochus.

2 According to Strabo, xvii.
1,5, 790, Endorus and Aristo
the Peripatetic mutually ac-
cused each other of plagiarism
in regard to a treatise on the
Nile (Strabo will not decide who
is in the right, but he says that
the language of the treatise is
more like Aristo’s). Achil. Tat.
Isag. 96 (169), mentions that
Eudorus, agreeing with Pane-
tius, believed the torrid zone
to be inhabited, and the same
writer (as Diels shows, Dozagr.
22) quotes something further,
taken by Eudorus from Dio-
dorus the mathematician, and
from Diodorus by Posidonius.

105

CHAP,
ly.

106

CHAP.
IV.

ii. Arius

Didy mus.

ECLECTICISM.

century before Christ, was this eclecticism of which,
as we have seen, Antiochus was the foremost repre-
sentative, is also clear from the example of Arius

Didymus.'

For though this philosopher is reckoned

with the Stoic school,? his views approximate so

1 He is no doubt the same
᾿Αρεῖος of Alexandria who is

known to us (from Plut.
Anton. 80 sq.; Reg. Apophth.
Aug. 3, 5, p. 207; Prec.
Ger, οὶ». 18, 3, p. 814;

Sen. Consol. ad Mare. 4 8q.;
Sueton. Octav. 89; Dio Cass.
li, 16, 111. 86; Allian. V. H. xii.
25; M. Aurel, viii. 31 ; Themist.
Or. Xx. 130, 2, Pet.; Julian. Zip.
51, p. 96, Heyl.; cf. On. viii.
265, C; Strabo, xiv. 5, 4, p.
670) as a teacher of philosophy,
a confidant of Augustus and
friend of Meecenas. He was
so highly esteemed by Augustus
that, as we read in Plutarch,
Dio, and Julian, he declared
to the people of Alexandria,
after the capture of that place,
that he pardoned them for the
sake of their founder Alexander,
their beautiful city, and their
fellow citizen Arius. From a
consolatory epistle of Arius to
Livia, after the death of Drusus
(9 B.c.), whom Arius must
have survived, Seneca, 2. ¢.,
quotes a considerable fragment.
It is true that in none of these
passages is Arius called Didy-
mus, while on the other hand
none of the authors who have
transmitted to us fragments
from Δίδυμος or “Apetos Δίδυμος,
describe him as an Alexandrian
ora friend of Augustus. But
as none of these authors had
any occasion to enter into the
personal circumstances of Arius

Didymus this does not justify
us in distinguishing with Heine
(Jahrb. f. Class. Phil. 1869,
613) the friend of Augustus
from Arius Didymus the Stoic.
It is rather an instance of that
which Diels, Doxogr. 86, asserts,
and of which he adduces many
examples in this period, that the
same man is designated some-
times by his own name, some-
times by the addition of his
father’s, to distinguish him from
others bearing the same name,
and sometimes by both names
together: eg. the well-known
Rhodian rhetorician Apollonius
is sometimes called ᾿Απολλώγιος
6 Μόλωνος, sometimes ᾿Απολλώ-
vios ὃ Μόλων; and even by his
disciple Cicero, Apollonius (Cic.
ad Att.ii.1; Brut. 89, 307; 91,
316); Molo (De Orat. 1.17, 75;
28, 126; De Invent. i. 56) ; and
the Stoic Musonius Rufus is
called by Epictetus, Rufus only,
and by others, as a rule, Mu-
sonius only (wide infra, ch. vi.).
As inthe case of Arius some-
times the name and sometimes
the surname stands first, we
cannot be certain whether
Ἄρειος or Δίδυμος was the
original name of this philo-
sopher; but Diels, ὦ. 6., seems
to show that the latter is the
more probable.

2 The Hpit. Diog. (aide Phil.
ad. Gr, ΠῚ. i. 33, 2) mentions
Arius between Antipater (the
Tyrian, concerning whom wide

ARIUS DIDYMTS.

closely to those of Antiochus that we should be
tempted to consider him his disciple,! if there were

not express testimony as to his Stoicism.

We are

only acquainted, indeed, with historical expositions
of his, of the older doctrines, probably taken from

one and the same work ;?

supra, Ὁ. ΤΊ, ἢ.) and Cornutnus,
the contemporary of Nero.

' Imyself shared this opinion
(supported by the Hpit. Divg.)
in the second edition of the
present volume; and in con-
nection with it the supposition
that in the notice of Suidas,
Δίδυμος ᾿Ατήϊος (ἢ “Arrios) xpn-
ματίσας φιλόσοφος ᾿Ακαδημαϊκὸς,
the word ᾿Ατήϊος had been sub-
stituted for “Apesos. I must
now abandon that theory. The
Atejus Didymus who wrote two
books πιθανῶν καὶ σοφισμάτων
λύσεις καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ might
more probably be the double of
the Alexandrine grammarian
Δίδυμος νέος, afterwards quoted,
to whom also πιθανὰ are
ascribed; but this too is quite
uancertain.

7 A number of fragments
from this work are quoted
under its name and that of its
author. Such are the follow-
ing :—(1) An exposition of the
Stoic theories of God and the
world, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιτομῆς ᾿Αρείου
Διδύμου (ap Hus. Pr. Εν. xv.
15). (2) The Stoic psychology,
from the ἐπιτομὴ ᾿Αρείου Διδύμου,
ibid. c. 20, chap. xvili. s¢., con-
cerning the conflagration and
renewal of the world, seems to
be taken from the same source.
(3) To the same treatise no
doubt belongs the account of
the Platonic doctrine of ideas

but among these there is

which is quoted anonymously
(ἐκ τῶν Διδύμῳ περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόν-
τῶν Πλάτωνι συντεταγμένων) by
Eusebius, ἢ, δ. xi. 38,3. 54.: and by
Stobeus, Ερί. 1. 880. Likewise
(4) the remarks on two maxims
of the seven sages quoted by
Clemens, Strom, i. 300, B, from
Didymus ; and (4) a statement
respecting Theano, 7. δ. 309, C,
from Δίδυμος ἐν τῷ wept Πυθαγο-
ρικῆς φιλοσοφίας. Lastly (6) 8
passage isquoted in Stob. #ordl,
105,28 (ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς),
concerning the Peripatetic doc-
trine of εὐδαιμονία ; this passage,
however, is found, as Meineke
discovered (Miitzell’s Zeitsche.
Sir d. Gymnasialw. 1859, p.563
sqq.) in the exposition of the
Peripatetic ethics, ap Stob. Led.
ii. 274 κῳ. : and thus it is shown
that not only this whole section
(from p. 242-334), but also the
corresponding section on the
Stoic coctrine, p. 90-242, is
borrowed from the epitome of
Arius. From the same source
Stobeus has probably taken
aiso the four preceding sections
of the same (sixth) chapter,
beginning at Ὁ. 32. We there-
fore possess very considerable
fragments from the work of
our philosopher, which show
that it contained a comprehen-
sive survey of the doctrines of
all the earlier philosophers.
The proved or supposed frag-

CHAP,

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.

a review of the Peripatetic ethics, which approaches
so nearly to the ethics of the Stoics, and so entirely
agrees with the opinions of Antiochus as represented
by Cicero, that it is scarcely possible to mistake its
ultimate source;! and though the work is ostensibly

ments of this treatise relating
to physics have Leen collected
by Diels, Dowogr. 145-472, with
some limitations of Meineke's
conjectures. The same writer
treats of Arius and his works,
i. c. Ὁ. 69-88.

1As Antiochus, in his ac-
count of the Peripatetic ethics
(which for him coincided with
those of the Academy), pursued
the double end of defending
the Platonic-Aristotelian doc-
trine against the attacks of the
Stoics, and of combining it with
the Stoic doctrine (vide supra,
p. 95 sqq.), so do we find with
Arius. Like Antiochus, he takes
as his basis the commonly re-
cognised demand of life accord-
ing to nature, and this in its
Stoic acceptation. The φυσικὴ
οἰκείωσις is the point of view
according to whichit is decided
what is a good, a δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν
(of the αἱρετὸν itself a definition
is given, p. 272, corresponding
with the Stoic definition quoted
Phil. ἃ. Gr. 111.1. 228,4). The
instinct of self-preservation is
acknowledged as the funda-
mental impulse: φύσει γὰρ
φκειῶσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (Stob. 246
8.1; 252, 258 ; cf. what is quoted,
Phil. d. Gr. UII. 1. 209, 1, about
the Stoics, and, supra, p. 95
874... about Antiochus); the καθή-
κοντα (this conception also is
Stoic) are reduced’ to the ἐκλογὴ
τῶν κατὰ φύσιν and the ἀπεκλογὴ
τῶν παρὰ φύσιν (Ρ. 350; cf. Phil.

ad. Gr. II. i. 258,3). Like Antio-
chus, he then seeks to show that
from this point of view belong-
ings,friends,countrymen,human
society generally, are to be de-
sired for themselves; also praise
and glory, health, strength,
beauty, corporeal advantages of
all kinds: only the goods of
the soul are incomparably more
valuable than all others (p. 246—-
264). His discussion of the
natural love of all men for each
other (already mentioned) es-
pecially reminds us of his pre-
decessors inthe Academy. Like
Antiochus (wide supra, p. 97,
1), he classes the πολιτικαὶ καὶ.
κοινωνικαὶ and the θεωρητικαὶ
πράξεις togetheras equally origi-
nal problems (p. 264 sq.); like
him, he distinguishes two kinds
of goods—those which are to be
considered as constituents (συμ-
πληρωτικὰ) of happiness, and
such as only contribute some-
thing to happiness (συμβάλ-
λεσθαι) ; corporeal goods he will
not, like Cicero’s Antiochsan,
reckon under the first, but the
second class: ὅτι ἢ μὲν εὖδαι-
μονία βίος ἐστὶν ὃ δὲ βίος ἐκ πρά-
ξεως συμπεπλήρωται (Ὁ. 266 5χ.;
cf. p. 274 for the distinction be-
tween καλὰ and ἀναγκαῖα, the
μέρη εὐδαιμονίας and ὧν οὐκ &vev);
he opposes, like Aristotle, the
theory that the virtuous man is
happy even in the extremity of
suffering; also the Stoic pro-
position concerning the αὐτάρ--

POTAMO.

and chiefly a mere reproduction of the Peripatetic

doctrine, still it is clear that Arius could not have ~

brought that doctrine so near to that of the Stoics,
or adopted an older exposition which did so (that of
Antiochus),! if the distinctive doctrines of the dif-
ferent schools had had the same importance for him
as for the ancient Stoic authorities, if be had not
‘shared the mode of thought which inspired the
exposition of Antiochus, and had not been disposed,
like Antiochus, to disregard the opposition of Stoics,
Academics, and Peripatetics, as compared with their

common conviction.?

With Arius and Antiochus we must connect
Potamo of Alexandria, who, according to Suidas, was

κεια Of virtue, and the impos-
sibility of losing it; and the
statement that there is nothing
intermediate between happi-
ness and unhappiness (p. 282;
cf. p. 314); thus showing him-
self in these particulars less
strictthan Antiochus (sup. p. 97,
3). On the other hand (p.
266), the Stoic doctrine of the
εὔλογος ἐξαγωγὴ (Phil. d.Gr. 111.
i. 305 sg.) is also forced upon
the Peripatetics' For the doc-
trine of virtue, Arius makes use
especially of Theophrastus (ride
ibid. ΤΙ. ti. 860, 1) as well as
Aristotle; and the disciple of
Antiochus (Cic. #in.v. 5) quotes
only from these two philo-
sophers (supra, 97, 5); but in
expounding the doctrine (p. 314)
he uses the Stoic distinction of
the καθήκοντα and κατορθώματα
(III. i. 264 sq.), and imports
into it (p. 280) the Stoic προ-

κοπῆ. In his (Economics and
Politics he keeps entirely to
Aristotle, only that he calls the
third of the right constitutions
not Polity, but Democracy, and
its defective counterpart Ochlo-
cracy, and introduces, beside the
right and wrong forms of govern-
ment (p. 330), the mixed forms
compounded from the three
first (those of Diceearchus, dis-
cussedin PAil. ἃ. Gr. ΤΙ. ii. 892).

1 Their common use of this
philosopher may perhaps ex-
plain why Cicero and Arius
Didymus, in expounding the
ethics of the Stoics, use the very
same words (cf. ibid, III. i. 226,
6; 227, 4; 232, 2).

2 He seems at times entirely
to forget that he is merely giv-
ing an account of the doctrines
of others, for he passes from in-
direct to direct narration (cf. id.
IIT. i. pp. 256, 270, 276, 322’.

iii. Pota-
mo.

ECLECTICISM.

a contemporary of Arius,’ while Diogenes Laertius
speaks as though he had lived not long before his
own time, therefore towards the end of the second
Christian century ;? perhaps, however, he may be
here merely transcribing the statement of an older
writer. That which his predecessors had actually
attempted, the setting up of a system which should
combine in itself the true out of all the philosophical
schools of the time, Potamo also avowed as his express
design; for he designated his school as eclectic ;*
and the little we know of his doctrine certainly
shows that he had not chosen this name without
cause; for it apparently combines, regardless of

1 Suid. sub. voce: TWorduwy or to reconcile them, and to
᾿Αλεξανδρεὺς, φιλόσοφος, γεγονὼς discover something more about
πρὸ Αὐγούστου καὶ per’ αὑτόν the life and circumstances of
(probably κατ᾽ αὐτὸν is here to Potamo, cf. Fabric. Bibl. Gr.
be read). ili. 184 sg. Harl. ; Brucker, Hist.

2 Procem. 21: ἔτι δὲ πρὸ Crit. Phil.ii.193 sgg.; J. Simon,
ὀλίγου καὶ ἐκλεκτική τις αἵρεσις Histoire de VHcole dAlexan-
εἰσήχθη ὑπὸ ποτάμωνος τοῦ ᾿Αλεξ- drie,i. 199 544. In these there
avdpéws ἐκλεξαμένου τὰ ἀρέσκοντα is also a review of the other
ἐξ ἑκάστης τῶν αἱρέσεων. (The menof this name known to us —
same, but with the omission of the rhetorician Potamo, of My-
the expression still more un- tilene, who, according to Suidas,
suitable to him, πρὸ ὀλίγου, is sub. voce (cf. Θεόδ, Tad. and
found in Suidas, αἵρεσις, 5. II. Δεσβώναξ, where the rhetorician
48 B.). is called φιλόσοφος), taught

3 This theory, advanced by under Tiberius in Rome; and
Nietzsche (Rhein. Mus. xxiv. Potamo, the ward of Plotinus
205 sg.; Beitr. ὁ. Quellenk. ἄ. (Porph. ve. Plot. 9), whom, how-
Diogenes Laertius, 9), and ad- ever, the new editions call
vocated among others by Diels Polemo. There is also the
(Dowogr. 81, 4), ascribes to Potamo from whom some
Diogenes great want of thought, mathematical observations are
but not, on the whole, more quoted, according to Alexander,
than might be expected in in Simpl. De Calo, 270, a, 42;
him. Ooncerning the different 289, a, 23K; Schol. in Ar. 513,
attempts to decide between the 0,8; 515, a, 42.
accounts of Diogenes and Suidas, 4 Tide preceding note.

POTAMO.

logical consistency, Platonic! and Peripatetic ele-
ments with an essentially Stoie foundation. In the
question of the criterion, he allied himself with the
Stoics, only that, instead of the ‘ intellectual notion,’
he substituted a vaguer form of expression, the
‘most accurate notion.’ In his metaphysics he
added quality and space to substance and efficient
force as the highest principles ; that he reduced, like
the Stoics, efficient force itself to substance is not
stated. The highest good, he thought, consisted in
the perfection of the life, the most essential con-
dition of which lay in virtue, for which, however, in
agreement with Aristotle and the older Academy, cor-
poreal and external goods were found indispensable.’
Scarcely any original thoughts are to be found in
this superficial combination and modification of
older doctrines; and so the ‘ Eclectic school,’ except
for the one mention of it by Diogenes and his
Byzantine followers, has left no further trace in
history.

1 According to Suidas, he
wrote a treatise on the Platonic
Republic.

3 "᾿Αρέσκει 8 αὐτῷ (continues
Diog. 1. 6.0, καθά φησὶν ἐν στοι-
χειώσει, κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας
εἶναι τὸ μὲν as ὕφ' οὗ γίνεται ἢ
κρίσις, τουτέστι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, τὸ
δὲ ὡς δὲ οὗ, οἷον τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην

φαντασίαν. ἀρχάς τε τῶν ὅλων
τὴν τε ὕλην καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν, ποιό-
τητά τε καὶ τόπον" ἐξ οὗ γὰρ καὶ
ὑφ᾽ οὗ καὶ ποίῳ καὶ ἐν ᾧ. τέλος
δὲ εἶναι ἐφ᾽ ὃ πάντα ἀναφέρεται,
ζωὴν κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τελείαν
οὐκ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν
ἐκτός.

112

CHAP,
Vv.

---

D. The
Per ipate-
tie School.
Its later
aderection.

ECLECTICISM.

CHAPTER V.

THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL IN THE FIRST CENTURY
BEFORE CHRIST.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the tendency which was in-
troduced into the Academy by Antiochus, the school
of the Peripatetics also received a new impulse and
pursued a partially altered course. As Antiochus
wished to bring back the Academy to the doctrine of
their founder, so the Peripatetics turned anew to the
works of Aristotle: it is to the expounding of these
works to which for whole centuries, down to the
times of Neo-Platonism, their entire strength is
directed, and in which their principal task consists.
Here also there is displayed the phenomenon so
characteristic of this whole period: the more un-
mistakable and pressing is the feeling of mental
lassitude, and the stronger the mistrust of its own
scientific power, of which scepticism has been the
formal expression, the more obvious becomes the
necessity to return to the old masters and to lean
upon them. No other school, however, has so
zealously and carefully carried on the work of ex-
position, and none has produced such a long and
connected line of commentators as that of the Peri-
patetics.}

' Concerning these, vide Zumpt (Cuber ὦ. Bestand der

THE PERIPATETICS.

_ The scientific activity of this school, since the
middle of the third century, had already, so far as
we can judge from the accounts we have received,
confined itself to the propagation, exposition, defence,
and popularising of the doctrines of Aristotle and
Theophrastus; and even Critolaus, its most im-
portant representative in the second century, did
not go beyond this. After Critolaus the school itself
seems to have lost more and more the precise know-
ledge of the Aristotelian doctrines and writings.
Cicero! and Strabo? expressly tell us so, and the
assertion is confirmed by the circumstance that,
excepting the approximation of Diodorus to the
Epicurean ethics,? not a single scientific propo-
sition has been handed down to us from any of
the successors of Critolaus, during a period of
nearly a century. Andronicus of Rhodes first
gave a new impulse to the scientific life of his
school. This distinguished man was, in the second
third of the first century before Christ, head of
the school in Athens. His edition of Aristotle’s

patetics are not here mentioned,

Philosoph. Schul. in Athen.)
it cannot be supposed that the

Abhandl. der Berl. Akademie,

1842; Hist. Phil. Kl. 93 sq.;
Brandis, Ueber die Griech.
Ausleger des Arist. Organons,
ibid. 1833, 273 sq.

1 Top. i. 3. A distinguished
rhetorician had declared that
the Topica of Aristotle was un-
known to him: Quod quidem
minime sum admtratus, eum
philosophum rhetort non esse
cognitum, qui ab tpsis philo-
sophis preter admedum paucos
ignorarctur. Though the Peri-

great mass of the philosophers
of the time were unacquainted
with Aristotle’s writings, if they
were not neglected in the Peri-
patetic school itself.

2 Inthe passage quoted, Phil.
ad. Gr, ΤΙ. ii. 139, 2.

8 Of. ἐδέὲά. ΤΙ. ii. 934.

4 Andronicus was, according
to Plot. Suila,25,a contemporary
of Tyrannio (vide infra, p. 115,
1); and as Tyrannio appears to
have only come to Rome in 66

I

113
CHAP.

The Com-
MENTEAEO?S.

Andro-
nicus of
Rithodes.

i

ECLECTICISM.

works,! for which Tyrannio

B.c., and Andronicus used his
transcripts of Aristotle’s writ-
ings for his own edition of them,
this must certainly be placed
after 60 B.c. His invariable
surname 6 Ῥόδιος designates
his birthplace; Strabo mentions
him among the celebrated phi-
losophers of Rhodes (xiv. 2, 13,
p. 655). That he was head
of the Peripatetic school (in
Athens) is asserted by David,
Schol. in Arist. 24, a, 20; 25, ὃ,
42; Ammon. De Interpret. ἰ. δ.
94, a, 21; 97, a, 19. He is here
called the ἑνδέκατος ἀπὸ τοῦ
᾿Αριστοτέλους ; following the
Scholium in Waitz, however,
(Aristot. Org. i. 45), which is
also ascribed to Ammonius, his
disciple Boéthus was this
eleventh philosopher. Accord-
ing as we give the preference
to the one or the other state-
ment, and reckon Aristotle him-
self, or omit him, there will be
wanting to the number of the
known heads of the school
(Aristotle, Theophrastus, Strato,
Lyco, Aristo, Critolaus, Dio-
dorus, Erymneus, Andronicus)
one, two, or three names. If
three are found deficient, I
should be inclined to insert
them, not with Zumpt (Phil. ὦ.
Gv. II. 11.927, 1) between Aristo
and Critolaus, but in the evident
gap between Erymneus and
Andronicus. It seems to me
most probable, however, that
only two are wanting, and that,
according as we reckon, An-
dronicus or Boethus might thus
be called the eleventh (counted
not after, but from Aristotle—
ἀπὸ "ApiororéAous),.

1 Porphyry (Plot. 24) says he

the grammarian furnished

himself arranged the writings
of Plotinus: μιμησάμενος...

᾿Ανδρόνικον τὸν περιπατητικὸν,
who τὰ ᾿Αριστοτέλους καὶ Θεο-
φράστου εἰς πραγματείας διεῖλε,
τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν
συναγαγών, This statement, as
well as that of Plutarch (Sudia,
26): παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ [Tupavviwvos]:
τὸν Ῥόδιον ᾿Ανδρόνικον εὐπορή-
σαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων (Supplied
with transcripts by Tyrannio)
eis μέσον θεῖναι, can only be
understood of an actual edition
of Aristotle’s works, especially
if we remember that, according
to Plutarch, the Peripatetics
before Andronicus had wan-
dered from the doctrine of their
founder on account of their
scanty acquaintance with his
works. When the same writer
adds to the words already
quoted, καὶ ἀναγράψαι τοὺς νῦν
φερομένους πίνακας, we must
understand by these lists of
writings a supplement to the
edition which probably did
not confine itself to a mere
enumeration of the works, but
embraced also enquiries as to
their genuineness, contents, and.
arrangement. In any case, An-
dronicus had instituted such
enquiries, as is shown by his
condemnation of the so-called.
Post-predicamenta and the
book περὶ ἑρμηνείας (cf. Phil. ἃ.
Gr. II. ii. 67, 1; 69, 1), and
the reasons he gives forit. The
proposition (cf. David, Sehol.
in Arist. 25, ὁ, 41) that the
study of philosophy should
begin with logic may also have
been brought forward in this
connection. On the other hand,
what David says (J. 6. 24, a, 19)

ANDRONICTS.

him with the means,’ did them inestimable service by

promoting their universal

diffusion and more syste-

matic study.? At the same time by his enquiries into
their authenticity and arrangement,’ and by his
commentaries * on several of them, he showed the

on the division of the Aristo-
telian writings cannot be taken
from Andronicus because of the
quotation from the treatise
περὶ κόσμου; and the treatise
of Andronicus De Divisione
(Boét. De Divis. Ὁ. 638) cannot
have dealt with the division of
the books of Aristotle.

δ This great scholar was born
in Amisus in Pontus. When the
place was conquered by Lu-
cullus, he became the slave of
Murena, was then set at liberty,
and taught in Rome (cf. Phil.
ad. Gr. ΤΙ. ti, 189, 1). Here he
gained considerable property,
collected a famous library, and
died at a great age (Suidas,
sub voce; Plot. ZLueull. 19).
Strabo (xii. 8, 16, Ὁ. 548) says
that he had heard him lecture.
That he belonged to the Peri-
patetic school is nowhere as-
serted, but his study of Aris-
totle’s writings shows that he,
like so many other gramma-
rians, was connected with it.
He is to be distinguished from
his namesake and disciple, the
freedman of Terentia. Cf.
Suid. Τυραν. vedr.

Tyrannio had found oppor-
tunity of making use of Apel-
lico’s library, which Sulla had
brought to Rome; and many
besides himself made copies of
the Aristotelian works therein
(Strabo, xiii. 2, 54, Ὁ. 609).
Through him Andronicus re-

T

ceived his copies (cf. preceding
note, and Phil. εἰ. Gr. 11. ii. 189).
Whether Andronicus had also
come to Rome, or had merely
received copies of Trrannio’s
recension, is not stated.

* This, at any rate, may be
conceded, if even the further
statement that the principal
works of Aristotle were abso-
lutely wanting in the Peripa-
tetic school before the time of
Andronicus cannot be main-
tained (Phil. d.G'r.I1. ii. 139 sq.).

3 Vide supra, 114, 1.

* Of these his exposition of
the categories is most fre-
quently quoted. It is men-
tioned by Dexipp. in Cat. Ὁ.
25,25 Speng. (Sehol. in Arist.
42,a,30); Simpl. in Cat. Schol.
40, ὃ, 23; 61, a, 25 sqgq.3 and in
about thirty other passages.
Atp. 6 ε. 7, δ. (Schol. 41,8, 25;
42, a, 10), Simplicius seems to
describe the work of Androni-
cus as a mere paraphrase ("Avip.
παραφράζων τὸ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν
βιβλίον). Meantime we see
from other statements, as those
which are quoted below, that
the paraphrase was only a part
of the task which Andronicus
had set himself, and that he
afterwards entered into the ex-
planation of words, criticism of
texts, and questions as to the
genuineness of particular sec-
tions (cf. Pail. ἃ. Gr. I. ii. 67,1;
69,1) and philosophic investiga-
9

wad

CHAP,

ἘΘΡΔΕΟΤΙΟΊΘΙ.

Peripatetic school the way in which from henceforth
their criticism and exegesis was to proceed. He did
not confine himself to mere explanation, but sought
to maintain as a philosopher the same independence
with which as a critic he departed from tradition in

the treatment of weighty questions.

This we see

from various and not altogether unimportant deter-
minations by which in the doctrine of categories he
diverged from Aristotle,’ and still more clearly,

tion of the contents.1 Cf. Bran-
dis, 1.9. 218 385. That Andronicus
had also commented on the
Physics does not certainly fol-
low from Simpl. Phys. 101, a;
103, δ; 216, @; although it
is probable from the first of
these passages. Simplicius,
however, does not seem to
have had this commentary in
his own hands, or he would
have quoted from it more fre-
quently. The observations on
Arist. De An. i. 4, 408, ὃ, 32
sqq., and the Xenocratic defini-
tion of the soul there discussed,
which is quoted from Androni-
cus by Themist. De An. il. 56,
11; 59, 6 Speng., point to an
exposition of the treatise on the
soul (vide infra, Ὁ. 117,2). The
definition of πάθος, ap. Aspas. in
Eth. N.(infra,p 118, 3)is taken,
perhaps, from a commentary
on the Hthics. Of the two
treatises still in existence, bear-
ing thename of Andronicus, one,
the treatise De Animt Affec-
tionibus, is the work of Andro-
nicus Callistus in the fifteenth
century, the other, the com-
mentary on the Nicomachzan
Ethics,is written by Heliodorus,
of Prusa (1367); cf. Rose,

Hermes, ii. 212. Andronicus
cannot possibly have been con-
cerned with either of them.

1 According to Simpl. Cat. 15,
ε, (Schol. 47, ὃ, 25), he regarded
with Xenocrates (cf. Phil. ὦ.
Gr. IT. i, 865, 4)—this division,
however, is inthe main Platonic
(cf. 2. 8. 556, 4)—as the funda-
mental categories, the καθ᾽ αὑτὸ
and the πρός τι (the Aristotelian
definition of which he expounds,
ap. Simpl. Cat. 51, B. y. Sehol.
66, ὦ, 39; Porph. Ἐξήγ. ἐ. τ.
Kkarny. 48, a). The καθ᾽’ αὑτὸ
he must then have divided still
further, for (according to Simpl.
p. 67, y. 69, a; ϑολοῖ. 73, 6,10;
74, ὃ, 29) he added to the four
Aristotelian kinds of quality
(cf. Phil. d. Gr. IL. ii. 269, 2) a
fifth kind under which thick-
ness, heaviness, &c., must fall,
but which, as he observed, may
itself be reckoned under the
παθητικαὶ ποιότητες : and it is
only with reference to the cate-
gories arising from further
division that he can have as-
serted (Simpl. 40 ᾧ; Schol. 59,
b, 41; cf. 60, a, 38) Relation
to be the ultimate category of
all. Observations of his are
also mentioned concerning the

ANDRONICU.

11

from his view of the soul, which in the spirit of CHAP
Aristoxenus and Dicearchnus,! and consequently in δ
approximation to the Stoic materialism, he held to

be a product of the bodily organism.?

His whole

standpoint, however, we must assume to have been
that of the Peripatetics, though he strove to improve
the doctrine of his school in regard to particular

points.

The work of Andronicus was continued by his
disciple Boéthus of Sidon,? who is often mentioned

ἕξις (Simpl. δῦ, ε.; Schol.
65, ὦ, 7), ποιεῖν, and πάσχειν
(Simpl. δέ, 8.), and those

conceptions which he called
indefinite magnitudes, and de-
sired, therefore, to reckon not
only under Relation, but also
under Quantity (2. 6. 36 &.;
Schol. 58, a, 37). Lastly, he
wished to substitute Time and
Space for the ποῦ and ποτὲ, and
to reckon under these categories
not only ποῦ and ποτὲ, but all
other determinations of Place
and Time. Simpl. 34, β. 36, 8.
87, a 88, a. B. 91, β.; Sehol. 57,
a, 24; 58, a, 16; 79, 6,1; 30,
37; 80, ὁ, 3; cf. also Brandis,
4.6. p. 273 sq.; Prantl, Gesch. ὦ.
Log. i. 537 sq.

1 Cf. Phil. d. Gr.IT. ii.888, 890.

3 This is maintained by
Galen, Qu. Animi Mor. « 4,
vol. iv. 782 sq. K. As Androni-
cus, he says, was wont to speak
freely and without obscure cir-
cumlocutions, he plainly de-
clares the soul to be the κρᾶσις
(se. τοῦ σώματος) or the δύναμις
ἑπομένη τῇ κράσει. In the same
sense he explains (according to
Themistius, De An. ii. 56,11;

59, 6 sqg. Sp.) the well-known
definition of Xenocrates (Phil.
d.G@r.1Li.871). W hile censuring
Aristotle because in his objec-
tions to that detinition he kept
exclusively to the expression
τοὔνομα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, he himself
perceived in it the thought that
all living natures consist of a
mixture of the elements formed
κατά τινας λόγους καὶ ἀριθμοὺς ;
so that it coincides in the main
with the reduction of the soul
to the harmony of the body.
But when he adds that this
number is called 8, self- -moving
number (αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἣ ψυχὴ
τῆς κράσεως. ταύτης αἰτία καὶ τοῦ
λόγου καὶ τῆς μίξεως τῶν πρώτων
στοιχείων), this does not agree
with Galen’s statement, accord-
ing to which it was in ‘the first
place a product of the κρᾶσις ;
and it is questionable whether
Galen has not missed the mean-
ing of Andronicus.

8 Strabo mentions that he was
a native of Sidon, xvi. 2, 24,
Ὁ. 757; Andronicus names as
his teacher Ammon. in Categ. 5
(ap. Zumpt f.c. 94); that he
was also a follower of his seems

Boéthus
of Sidon.

118

CHAP.

γ.

Kae? ἑκάστην λέξιν.

ECLECTICISM.

with him.

He, too, acquired considerable fame! as

an expounder of the Aristotelian writings: the best
known of his works is a commentary on the catego-
ries:? but some traces are found of commentaries on
the Physics and the Prior Analytics—perhaps also

on the treatise ‘De Anima’

to result from the Scholion,
quoted supra, Ὁ. 118,4. But, in
opposition to this theory, we
find that in the years 45 and
44 B.0. Cicero himself (Of. 1.
1, 1) and Trebonins (in Cicero's
ip. ad Fam. xii. 16) mention
only Cratippus as teacher of
the Peripatetic philosophy in
Athens. DBoéthus is not men-
tioned, whereas this philoso-
pher, whom Strabo, ὦ, ¢., desig-
nates (ᾧ συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν ἡμεῖς
τὰ ᾿Αριστοτέλεια) as his own
teacher, survived this date by
at least one decade, perhaps
several. Strabo also would, no
doubt, have said if he had heard
him lecture in Athens. Boéthus,
therefore, must have been a
teacher of philosophy elsewhere.
Perhaps Strabo may have
availed himself of his instruc-
tions in Rome.

1 Simplicius (Cut.1, a. 41 B.;
Schol. £40,a, 21; 61, a, 14) calls
him θαυμάσιος and ἐλλόγιμος ;
and on page 209 8.; Sehol. 92,
(ὦ, 42, he praises his acuteness.
Ci. Ὁ. 8, γι; Sehol. 29, a, 47;
τὰ τοῦ Βοηθοῦ πολῆς ἀγχινοίας
γέμοντα.

2 According to Simplicius
(. @) one of those which βαθυ-
τέραις περὶ αὐτὸ (the Aristotelian
book) ἐννοίαις ἐχρήσαντο, but at
thesame time (7,6. 7, y.; Schol.
12, a,8) a continuous exposition
This com-

and the Ethics.? In his

mentary is frequently quoted in
that of Simplicius and also that
of Dexippus. In it, perhaps,
was the statement which
Syrian, in Metaph. Schol. 893,
a, 7, contests, that the Platonic
ideas are the same as class-
conceptions. A separate trea-
tise of his on the πρός τι is
mentioned by Simplicius, 42, a,
Schol. 61, ὃ, 9.

3 That there was a com-
mentary on the Vhysics is
shown by the quotations in
Themistius, Phys. 145, 14; 337,
23; 341, 9 Sp.; which Sim-
plicius, no doubt, has borrowed
from him (Phys. 46, a; 180, a;
181, δ), as in the last of these
three passages he expressly
quotes the words of Themis-
tius, and only in them those of
Boéthus ; and nowhere adduces
anything from Boéthus’ Physics
except what he finds in his pre-
decessor. An exposition of the
First Analytics may be con-
jecturecdl from the quotations of
the pseudo-Galen Εἰσαγ. διαλ.
p- 19, and of Ammon. in Arist.
Org. ed. Waitz, i. 45, from the
doctrine of the syllogism; an
exposition of the books on the
soul (though less certainly)
from what Simplicius (De An.
69, 6) tells us concerning his
objections against iinmor tality ;
an exposition of the Nicoma-
chean Ethics from what Alex-

BOETHUS.

apprehension of the Peripatetic doctrine he likewise,
so far as we can judge, shows much independence,
and an inclination to that naturalism which in the
immediate followers of Aristotle had already over-
powered the Platonic and idealistic element, and
which was especially prominent in Alexander of
Aphrodisias. This also appears in the fact that he
‘wished the study of philosophy to be commenced not
with logic but with physics! When, moreover, he
denied that the universal of nature was prior to the
particular,’ and would not allow form to be regarded
as a substance in the strict sense (πρώτη οὐσία),
but only matter, and in one aspect, that which
is compounded of matter? and form—this presup-
poses a theory of the value and priority of matter
in things, which diverges from Aristotle, and rather
approaches to the materialism of the Stoics. The
same mode of thought is apparent in his utterances
concerning immortality, which place him on the side

of those who understood

ander (De ἀρ. 154, a) says of
his observations on self-love
and the πρῶτον οἰκεῖον; and
what <Aspas. (Schol. in £th.
‘Classical Jonrnal, xxix. 106)
and Rose CAvistot. Pseudo-Epigr.
109) says of his and Andronicus’
‘definition of the πάθος.

1 David, Sehol. in Ar. 25 0,
41. For what follows, Prantl’s
Gesch. der Logik, i. 540 sqqy. has

-been gratefully made use of.

2 Dexipp. in Categ. 54; Speng.
Schol. in Arist. 50, ὁ, 15 sqy.

5. Simpl. Categ. 20 B 8φ.;

Schol, 50, a, 2. At the begin-
ning of this passage, Boéthus

the Aristotelian doctrine

entirely waives the enquiry
concerning νοητὴ and σωματικὴ
οὐσία, but only because it
does not belong to the sanie
connection. He desired (vide
Themist. Phys. 145, 14 Sp.;
Simpl. Phys. 16, a) that mat-
ter should be called ὕλη only
in relation to the form which
it has not yet assumed, and
ὑποκείμενον in relation to the
form imparted to it, but this
is merely a matter of verbal
expression. What Simplicius
quotes from Boéthus (24 ¢ sy.
Schol. 53, a, 38-45) seems to
me of small importance.

ECLECTICISM.

as a simple denial of it ;! and in further agreement
with these tendencies we learn that in the sphere
of Ethics he maintained that the primary object of’
desire for everyone (the πρῶτον οἰκεῖον.) was naturally
his own self, and everything else must be desired

only because of its relation to one’s self.”

In other

instances, Boéthus now and then sought to justify
the Aristotelian determinations,’ and sometimes de--
fended them, especially against the Stoics;* but

1 Simpl. De An. 69, ὁ : ἵνα
μὴ ὥς 6 Bondds οἰηθῶμεν τὴν ψυ-
χὴν, ὥσπερ τὴν ἐμψυχίαν, ἀθάνα-
Tov μὲν εἶναι ὧς αὐτὴν μὴ ὕπο-
μένουσαν τὸν θάνατον ἐπιόντα, ἐξ-
ισταμένην δὲ ἐπιόντος ἐκείνου τῷ
ζῶντι ἀπόλλυσθαι. This refers
to Plato’s ontological proof
of immortality. Boéthus con-
cedes to him that, strictly speak-
ing, the soul does not die, but
only the man (because death,
according to the Phedo, 64 Ὁ,
consists in the separation of
soul from body, and therefore
denotes the dissolution of man
into his constituent parts, and
not the destruction of those
parts as such); but he thinks
the continuance of the soul
does not follow from this. ἘΠ-
sebius (Pr. Hv. xi. 28, 45; xiv.
10, 3) gives extracts from a
treatise of Porphyry, περὶ ψυχῆς,
in which he defended immor-
tality against Boéthus. From
the former of these passages it
is clear that Boéthus had also
attacked the proof derived
from the kinship of the human
Spirit with God (Piedo, 78, B
δ0.). ;

* This view is ascribed by
Alex. De An. 154, a, to Nen-
archus and Boéthus, who appeal
in support of it to Arist. Lith.

dV. viii. 1, 1155, ὃ, 16 seg. ; ix.
8, 1168, ὦ, 35 δῷ. Our text
names the 9th ancl 10th books,
evidently by a confusion of
the alphabetical designations
of the books (@1) with the
corresponding numerical signs,

3 To these attempts belong
(1) aremark, ap. Simpl. Cat.109,.
B; Schol. 92, a, 33; Categories,
14, 15, 6, 1 897.) on the appli-
cability of the opposition of
ἠρεμία and κίνησις to qualitative
change ; (2) the demonstration
in which Theophrastus had
already anticipated him, that
the syllogisms of the first and.
second figure are perfect (Am-
mon. in Anulyt. Pr. i. 1, 24, b,
18; ap Waitz, sist. Org.i, 45);
(3) the doctrine evolved from
the hypothetical syllogisms as
the ἀναπόδεικτοι and πρῶτοι ἂν-
απόδεικτοι (Pseudo-Galen. Eicay.
διαλ. Ὁ. 19; Min. ap. Prantl, p.
554); (4) the remarks on the
question whether time is a
number or a measure, and
whether it even existed without
the soul that reckons it, ap.
Themist. Phys. 337, 23; 341, 9
Sp.; Simpl. Phys. 180, a, 181,
ὃ; Simpl. Categ, 88, B; Schol.
79, ὃ, 40.

4 Thus he defends (ap. Simpl.
43,0, 8; Schol, 62, a, 18, 27}"

ARISTO.

what has come down to us in this connection is of
little importance as affecting the special character of

his philosophy.

A third interpreter of Aristotle’s writings, be-
longing to the same period, is Aristo,! a disciple

of Antiochus,

the Peripatetic doctrine of the
πρός τι against the Stoic doc-
trine of the πρός τι πως ἔχον,
while at the same time he tried
to apprehend Aristotle’s de-
finition more exactly, in the
way pointed out by Andronicus
(Simpl. 51, 8B; Sehol. 66, a, 34;
ef. Simpl. 41, 8 sq.; £2, a; Schol.
61 a, 9, 25 sqq. 6,9). He consi-
dered the division of ποιεῖν and
πάσχειν as two distinct catego-
ries (Simpl. 77 8; Sehol. 77,4, 18
sqq.), and also the category of
Having, which he examined
particularly (Simpl. 94 €; Schel.
81, a, 4) as well founded.

1 He is mentioned by Simpl.
41, y.; Schol. 61, a, 25, together
with Boéthus, Eudorus, Andro-
nicus, and Athenodorus among
the παλαιοὶ τῶν Karnyopiay ἐξη-
γηταὶ, and, consequently, no
doubt the author of a com-
mentary on this book, and not
of a mere treatise on the πρός
τι, Which Simplicius in his men-
tion of him in. this place as
well as at Ὁ. 48, a; 51,8; Sehol.
63, 6, 10; 66, a, 37 sgq. alone
allows. In the latter passage
the definition given also by
Andronicus and Boéthus of the
πρός τί πως ἔχον is quoted pri-
marily from him, with the
remark that Andronicus has the
same. He is no doubt that
Aristo of Alexandria, who, ac-
cording to Apul. Dogm. Plat.

who afterwards went over from
the Academy to the Peripatetics.?

But we know

lili. Ὁ. 277 Hild. (where he is
rightly censured for this)added
to the Aristotelian syllogistic
forms (perhaps in a commen-
tary on the Prior Analytics)
three modi of the first and two
of the second figures, and to
whom, in the following pas-
sages (where Prantl, Gesch. der
Logik, i. 590, 23, restores the
Aristo of the MSS. instead of
Aristotle), an account of the
syllogistic figures is ascribed.
He is likewise the Alexandrian
Peripatetic Aristo whom Dio-
genes mentions (vi. 164; also
vide supra, Ὁ. 105, 2).

2 Ind. Acad. Herecul. col. 35:
fAntiochus had for disciples]
᾿Αρίστωνά τε καὶ Δίωνα ᾿Αλεξαν-
δρεῖς καὶ Κράτιππον Περγαμηνὸν,
ὧν ᾿Αρίστων [μὲν] καὶ Κράτιππος

ἐγένοντο Περιπατητεκοὶ
ἀποστατήσαντες τῆς ᾿Ακαδημείας.
Cic. (dead. ii, 4, 12) shows
him and Dio to us at Alexan-
dria in the company of An-
tiochus, with the observation
quibus tlle (Antiochus) secun-
dum fratrem plurimum tri-
buebat. If Seneca (Hp. 29, 6)
resorted to him, he must have
taught in Rome in the latter
part of his life; meanwhile,
the lepidus philosophus Aristo,
of whom Seneca here relates
certain anecdotes, must mean
another person of the same
name; not only because Seneca

12

CHAP,
v.

1

ulristo.

122

CHAP,

V.

Staseas.
Cratip-
pus.

ECLECTICISM.

little about him, and that little does not lead

us to suppose him a great philosopher.

Concern-

ing the philosophy of the other Peripatetics of the
first century before Christ—Staseas,! Cratippus,?

reckons this man among the
circulatores qui philosophiam
honestius neglexissent quam ven-
dunt, but also because the
Julius Greecinus, from whom a
remark on him is quoted, only
died under Caligula; whereas
the disciple of Antiochus, who
was with him about 84 B.c.
(vide sup. 76, 4), scarcely sur-
vived the beginning of the
reign of Augustus, or at any
rate cannot long have survived
it. The Aristo of Cos mentioned
by Strabo, xiv. 2, 19, p. 658,
must not be taken for our
Aristo (as Zumpt supposes,
Abh. ὦ. Berl. Ahad. 1842; Hist.
Phil. Al. 68), for the former is
described as the disciple and
heir of the well-known Peripa-
tetic, Aristo of Julis (Phil. ὦ.
Ge. 11. ii. 925).

1 Staseas of Naples, the in-
structor of Piso, who resided
with him (Cie. De Orat. i. 22,
104; Min. v. 3, 8, 25, 75; ede
sup. Ὁ. 100, 1, end) is also called
by Cicero, nobilis Peripateticus ;
but is censured by him for
ascribing too much importance
to external fortunes and corpo-
real conditions (fin. v. 25, 75).
An unimportant theory of his
is quoted in Censorinus, Dé.
Wat. 14,5,10. As Piso heard
him lecture about 92 B.c. (J. 6.
De Orat.) he must have been
at least as old as Andronicus.

2 This philosopher, born in
Pergamus, was likewise origi-
nally a disciple of Antiochus.

In the years 50-46 B.c. we
meet with him in Mytilene
(Cic. De Univ. 1; Brut. 71. 250 ;
Plut. Pomp. 75). Soon after
this he must have settled in
Athens, where Cicero got for
him the Roman citizenship
from Crsar, but at the same
time induced the Areopagus
to request him to remain
in Athens (Plut. Cic. 24). Here
about this time Cicero’s son
heard him (Cic. Off i. 1, 1;
111. 2,5; «ὦ Fum. xii. 16; xvi.
21) and Brutus visited him
(Plat. Brut. 24). That he was
the head of the school is not
expressly stated, but is very
probable. Cicero, who was a
ereat friend of his, speaks with
the highest appreciation of his
scientific importance (Brut. 71,
250; Of. i. 1, 13; ili. 2, 5;
Divin. 1. 3,5; De Univ. 1), but
this praise is scarcely altogether
impartial, As to his views,
nothing has been transmitted
to us except what we are told
by Cicero, Divin. i. 3, 5; 32, 70
sq. (cf. Tertullian, De An. 46):
that he admitted prophecy in
dreams, and ecstasy (furor), and
that he based this theory upon
the Peripatetic doctrine of the
divine origin of spirit, and upon
the numerous cases of fulfilled
prophecies. The anthropology
presupposed by him in this is
the Aristotelian: animos honi-
num quadam ex parte extrin-
sécus (= θύραθεν, from the divine
spirit) esse tractos et haustos

NICOLATS OF DAMASCTS, 123

Nicolaus of Damascus,! and others, our information

is too scanty, and too unimportant to detain us with

Ἧδ i -Vicolaus
one ὦ of Damas
cus.

“ὦ na

CHAP,
Yv.

concerning the gods.

“νιν €AM partem, que sensum,
called in Athen. Vi.

que motum, que adpetitum ha-

beat, nen esse ab actione corporis
sejugatam ; the sequel, however,
sounds rather more VPiatonic:
que autem pars animi rationis
atque intelliyenti@é sit particeps,
cum tum maxrime vigere, cum
plurimum absit ὦ corpore.

1 Nicolaus (concerning whom
vide Miiller, Hist. Gr. iil. 343
sqq.), born in Damascus about
64 B.c. (therefore called ὃ
Δαμασκηνὺς, Athen. iv. 153 f. et
pass.; Strabo, xv. 1, 72, Ὁ. 719),
and carefully brought up by his
father Antipater, a prosperous
and respectable man, lived many
years at the court of the Jewish
King Herod, was one of his
contidants and came in his
company and, some years later,
(8 B.c.) for the second time,
on his affairs, to Rome, where
he gained the favour of Augus-
tus. After the death of Herod
the Great he accompanied his
son Archelaus thither, and from
this journey he never seems to
have returned, but to have
passed the latter part of his life
in Rome (vide the references in
Suidas, Avrimarpos and Νικόλ, ;
Nicol. Fragm. 3-6, taken from
the Hacenpta de Virtutibus;
Joseph. -Antiguit. x11. 3,2; xvi. 2,
3; 9,4; 10,8; xvii. 5,4; 9,6; 11,
.8, who also, like Suidas, follows
Nicolaus’ own statements in
Miiller). The theory that he
was a Jew, shared also by
Renan, Vie de Jésus, Ὁ. 33, is
at once refuted by what we
read (ap Suid. ᾿Αντίπ, ) respect-
ing an offering to Zeus, and

266, e; x. 415, δ xii. 5438, ὡς
iv. 153 f£., an adherent of the
Peripatetic doctrine {Περιπατης-
vwiuxos) to Which he had early
allied himself (Suid. Νικόλ.)
and to which he devoted ἃ
portion of his writings. Simp.
(De Cele, Schol. in Ar. £93, ὡς
28) mentions his treatise περὶ
᾿Αριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας (out
of which may perhaps be taken
the quotation from his θεωρία
τῶν ᾿Αριστοτέλους μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ
in the inscription to Theo-
phrastus’ metaphysical frag-
ment, p. 323, Brand.). A second
work, wept τοῦ Παντὸς, which
treated περὶ πάντων Trav ἐν τῷ
κόσμῳ κατ᾽ (not καὶ) εἴδη ; Id.
ἰ. ο. 469, a, 6; a third, wep:
θεῶν, trum which statements
concerning Xenopliancs and
Diogenes of Apollonia are re-
ported, is mentioned by “inmpi.
(Phys. 6, a, 6; 32, a, ὃ; an
ethical work περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς
πρακτικοῖς καλῶν {τε περὶ τῶν
καθηκόντων, ὃ. πολύστιχος πραγ-
ματεία, as mentioned Ly Simpl.
in Epict. Enchir. 194, c.; here
he may perhaps have said of
Epicurus, what Diogenes asserts
(Diog. x. 1). In none of these
passages, however, is any phi-
losophical proposition quoted
from him; and Nicolaus was
doubtless far more of a scholar
than a philosopher. Suidas
calls him Περιπατητικὸς ἢ TAa-
τωνικὸς, Which might point to
his combination of the views of
Plato and Aristotle, if any de-
pendence could be placed upon

Ἀ

194

CHAP.

Υ.

ACT
Chus.

ECLECTICIS.Y.

them.!

But Xenarchus? and his treatise against the:

Aristotelian theories respecting the zther may here be

the passage. As an historian he
is censured by Josephus CAv-
tiquit. xvi. 7,1) on account of
his partiality for Herod; and
his life of Augustus was no
doubt only a panegyric. For
the rest vide, concerning his
historical works, Muller; cf.
Dindort. Jahrbiicher fiir Class.
Philol. vol. xcix. H, 2, 107
sqq. Meyer's supposition that
he wrote the treatise περὶ φυτῶν,
is discussed Phil. d. Gr. ΤΊ,
ii. 98, note.

1 Among them the owner of
Theophrastus’ library, Apel-
lico, of Teos (Phil. d. Gr. IL.
ii, 189); but though this man

occasionally occupicd himself .

with the Peripatetic philosophy
(Athen. v. 214, @), and com-
posed a treatise on Hermias
and Aristotle (Aristocl. ap. Hus.
Pr. Hv. xv. 2, 9), Strabo (Ὁ.
609), no doubt rightly, calls
him φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλό-
somos. <Aslittledoes Athenio
or Aristio (cf. Phil. d. Go. 111,
li. 934, 3) deserve a place
among the philosphers, even
supposing he really taught the
Peripatetic philosophy. Some-
what later we have Alex-
ander,the teacher and friend of
M. Crassus, the Triumvir (Plut.
Crass. 3); Athenseus, of Se-
leucia in Cilicia, in the time of
Ceesar (Strabo, xiv. 5, 4, Ὁ. 670);
Demetrius, the friend of
Cato, who was with him in his
last days (Plut. Cato Min. 6,
67 sq7.); Diodotus, the brother
of Boéthus of Sidon (Strabo,
xvi. 2, 24, p. 757). To the
Peripatetic school belong also,
no doubt, Athenodorus, the

Rhodian, named by Quintillian, |
inst. ii. 17, 15, with Critolaus as
the enemy of rhetoric (cf. Phil.
ad. Gr. TI. ii. 980, 2); and per-
haps the author of the Περίπτατοι
quoted in Diog. ill. 3; v. 36;
vi. SL; ix. 42. When he lived
we do not know, but he seems
to be later than Critolaus, whom
Quintilian places before him.
In Rome, according to Cicero,
there must already have been,
about the beginning of the first
century, persons acquainted
with the Aristotelian philo-
sophy and writings, if M. An-
tonius and Q. Lutatius
Catulus really spoke as he
(Orat. li. 36, 152 sgqg.) repre-
sents. We have no warrant,
however, for supposing that
this representation is histori-
cally true; indeed, Cicero him-
self implies clearly enough
both here and inc. 14, 59, that
Antonius was not accuainted,
so far as he knew, with Greck
literature; and though it may
certainly have been otherwise
with Catulus, we are hardly
justified in ascribing to him an
accurate knowledge of that
literature, and particularly of
the Peripatetic philosophy. The
only Roman adherent of this
philosophy of whom we hear
in the first century B.c. is that
Pisoot whom we have spoken, ,
supra, Ὁ. 100, 1, end; but, as
is there shown, he also attended
the instruction of Antiochus,
whose eclectic principles Cicero
puts into his mouth.

2 Xenarchus, of Seleucia, in
Cilicia, passed the greater part
of his life as a teacher in Alex-

TREATISE ON THE COSNOS.

mentioned ;' for this polemic against so integral a por-
tion of the Aristotelian physics affords a further proof
that the Peripatetic school was not so absolutely united
by the doctrine of its founder as to preclude many
departures from that doctrine among its members.
But there is still stronger evidence of this fact
in a treatise which perhaps dates from the first cen-
tury before Christ, and has been transmitted to us
as the work of Aristotle—the book of the Cosmos.’
The authenticity of this work was already questioned
in antiquity,? and denied by Melanchthon;‘ in

andria, Athens,and Rome. Τὸ
was in the first of these cities
that Strabo probably heard
him. Befriended by Arius, and
patronised by Augustus, he
died in Rome at a great age
(cf. Strabo, xiv. 5, 4, p. 670).

1 Vide concerning this trea-
tise and the objections de-
veloped in it against the Aris-
totelian doctrine: Damasc. De
Calo, Schol. in Arist. 456, a, 6;
460, 6, 15; Simpl. De Cela,
Schol. 470, ὁ, 20; 472, a, 22;
472, ὃ, 38 sqq.; 473, a, 9; 43, Ὁ,
24;(9, a, 11; 11, 6, 41; 13, ὁ,
6; 36; 14, a, 193; 21, ὃ, 32 sqq.;
25, 6,43; 27, ὃ, 20-34, a, 18 K);
Julian. Orat. v. 162, A, sg. Sim-
plicius calls it: af πρὸς τὴν
πέμπτην οὐσίαν ἀπορίαι, τὰ πρὸς
τὴν ™. οὖσ. ἠπορημένα or γε-
γραμμένα. In thesame treatise
were perhaps to be found the
observations against Chrysip-
pus’ doctrine of empty space,
ap. Simpl. ὦ ¢. 129,4, 18 K.
His opinion concerning the
πρῶτον οἰκεῖον (supra, 120, 2),
and his (Aristotelian) detinition
of the soul (Stob. Hel. i. 798)
are also quoted elsewhere.

7 Weisse, <Avistoteles ron der
Seele und von der Welt, 1829,
p. 373 sgqy.; Stahr, Avristoteles
bei den Romern, 1834, Ὁ. 168
sgq.; Osann, Beitrage cu Griecn.
und Rom. Iateraturgesch. 1. 143
sqq.: Petersen in the review of
this treatise, Jahrb. 7. wissenseh,
Arit. 1836, 1, 550, sgg.; Ideler,
Aristot. Meteorol. i. 286 sq.;
EF. Gieseler, ib. ἃ. Verf.d. Buchs
v.d. W. Ztschr. f. Alterthumsn,
1838, Nr. 146 sg.; Spengel, De
vist. Libro X. Hist. Anim,
Heidelb. 1842, Ὁ. 9 sqq.; Hil-
debrand, .tpulej. Opera, i. 44
egq.; Rose, De aAvist. Libs.
Ordine et uct. Ὁ. 36, 90 sqq. ;
Adam, De ductore Libri Pseudo-
aArvistotelici π. K. Berl. 1861;
Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, A/é-
téoralogie ad Aristote, Par. 1863.
p- 88 sgg.; Goldbacher, Ztschr.
J. Ocesterreich. Gymn. πεῖν.
(1873), 670 8.;: Z Avitik von
Apulejus De Ando, &c.

* Procl. in Tim.322, EB: ᾿Ἄρισ-
TOTEANS, εἴπερ Exeivou τὸ περὶ
κόσμου βιβλίον.

+ Physica, Opp. ed. Bretschn,
Elli. 213 sq.

CHAP,
Y.

The trea-
tise περὶ
Κόσμου.

larious
theories ag
tu tts
Origin,

ECLECTICISM.,

modern times it has found some advocates,! but is
nevertheless quite untenable. As little, however,
can the treatise be ascribed to any other school than
the Peripatetic, or regarded, not as a writing foisted
upon Aristotle, but as the work of a younger philo-
sopher, which did not itself claim to be Aristotelian
—or even the elaboration of such a work. In
modern times its authorship has been assigned
sometimes to Chrysippus,”? sometimes to Posidonius,?
sometimes to Apuleius,t but against each of these
conjectures there are most important objections. In
regard to Chrysippus it is highly improbable that
he should have sent forth a work under a borrowed
name, and quite inconceivable that he should have
adopted for the purpose that of Aristotle ; but that the
work claims Aristotle’s name for itselfis incontestable,®

1 Tts authenticity has been
finally maintained most confi-
dently by Weisse. I am the
more willing to spare myself a
detailed exposure of the weak-
nesses of this attempt, as that
has already been fully accom-
plished by Osann, Stahr, and
Adam (p. 14 sqq. &c.), and as
the decisive points in the matter
will be brought forward in the
following pages.

2 Osann, J. ὃ... seeks to es-
tablish this theory at length.

3 Tdeler, J. ¢., following Aldo-
brandinus, Huetius, and Hein-
sius.

4 Stahr, 2. ¢., and, in another
way, Adam. Barthélemy Saint-
Hilaire follows the former,
without naming him,

5 Osann, indeed, declares
himself, p. 191, very decidedly

against the supposition that the
work was designedly foisted
upon Aristotle. Both in manner
of exposition, he says, and in
substance, its unlikeness to
Aristotle is so unmistakably evi-
dent, that only a person entirely
unacquainted with Aristotle, or
a fool, could have indulged the
fancy that it could possibly be
regarded as the work of that
philosopher. But this, the only
argument that he adduces, tries
to prove too much. How many
are the forged writings in
which we, at the first glance,
can detect the forgery? From
this it does not follow that
they are not forgeries, but that
they are not clumsy forgeries.
In the present case, however, the
forgery was not clumsy enough
to prevent numerous persons

ITS ORIGIN.

and when QOsann would separate its dedication to
Alexander! from the rest of the work, this is an
arbitrary proceeding which is wholly unjustifiable.2
Moreover, the exposition of Chrysippus, according
to the unanimous testimony of antiquity and the
specimens in our possession, is distinguished as
much by its learned prolixity, as by its dialectic
pedantry and contempt of all rhetorical adornment ;3
whereas the treatise περὶ Κόσμου exhibits through-
out the most opposite qualities, so that even on this
ground it is quite impossible to attribute it to Chry-
sippus. No less, however, is such a theory excluded
by its contents. That it has adopted many Stoic
doctrines and definitions, and expresses some of
these in the formule which, after Chrysippus, had
been transplanted into the Stoic school, is indeed
undeniable; nevertheless, as will immediately be
shown, this work so entirely contradicts the most
important distinctive doctrines of the Stoic school

and even philosophers and

with his theory of the author
critics of our own time—Weisse,

of the book. Apart from this

for example—from being de-
ceived. And would a work
that was evidently not written
by Aristotle pass more easily
for his if it were anonymons
than if it went forth under his
name ?

1 Naturally Alexander the
Great ; for that this Alexander
was another man of the name
of whom nothing further is
known, no reader of Osann’s
book (p. 246) will easily believe.

7 Osann (Ὁ. 246 sy.) has no
further proof to give than that
the dedication is incompatible

there is no trace either in
external evidence or the in-
ternal character of the passage
that it was originally absent.
Even in C. 6, 398, ὁ, 10, the
language is such that the Per-
sian empire must be supposed
to be still existing, and if the
writer, in his necessarily nu-
merous references to older
philosophers, has carefully
avoided every definite allusion
to what is post-Aristotelian,
we see from this that he wishes
his work to pass as Aristotelian.
3. Cf. p. 42.

ECLECTICISM.

as compared with the Peripatetic, that it might be
ascribed to any author rather than to Chrysippus.
Lastly, though we will not here anticipate the more
particular demonstration of the date of this book, it
is sufficient for the refutation of Osann’s hypothesis,
to observe that Chrysippus’s work on the Cosmos
consisted of at least two books, and that quotations
are made from it which are nowhere to be found in
the writing we are considering.' The same argu-
ments hold good in great measure against those
who conjecture Posidonius to have been the author
of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise. Its ornate
language, however, can with far more probability
be attributed to him than to Chrysippus ; and there
are many particular details which approximate much
more to the time of Posidonius than to that of
Chrysippus: indeed, we shall find that the author
probably in a considerable part of his work made
direct use of this philosopher. But that Posidonius
should have forged a work of Aristotle is as wholly
unlikely as that Chrysippus should have done so; and
though we can certainly remark in him concerning
special points, a leaning to the Academic and Peri-
patetic philosophy, this never makes him untrue (like
the author of περὶ Κόσμου) to the fundamental doc-
trines of his school—so as to deny the substantial
presence of God in the world, the destruction and
conflagration of the world, or to distinguish sther

' Stob. Hel. i. 180; Alex. Against Osann, cf. Petersen, p.
Aphr. nal. Pr. 58, ὁ (supra, 554 sgq.; Gieseler, Spengel,
Phil. ὦ. Gr. TIT. i. 158, 1). Adam, ἐ. ε.

THEORIES RESPECTING IT.

and all elementary bodies whatever.’ As to Apu-
leius this objection, it is true, would not hold good:
in his treatise on the Cosmos he has entirely appro-
priated the contents of the so-called Aristotelian
treatise. But how are we justified in regarding him
not merely as the translator or reviser, but also as the
author of the latter? Ifthe work isnot mentioned
before Apuleius,” in the remains of ancient literature
which we possess, it does not follow from this that it
did not exist: and though Apuleius, in the introduc-
tion to his Latin recension, speaks as if it were not a
mere translation, but an independent work on the
foundations of Aristotle and Theophrastus,® there is
no proof whatever that he was sufficiently scrupulous
about literary right of property, and sufficiently free
from boastfulness, not to found a claim of original
authorship on the minor alterations and additions by
which his work is distinguished * from Aristotle’s.’

Theophrastum auctorem séciti,
quantum possumus cogitatione

1 For these reasons the hypo-
thesis of Posidonius is opposed

by Bake, Posidon. Rel. 237 sq.3
Spengel, p. 17; Adam, p. 32.

2 The quotation in Justin,
Cohort. ad Gr. c. 5, cannot be
placed earlier than Apuleius,
since the authenticity of this
treatise, as has lately been
shown by Adam (p. 3 8924.) in
opposition to Semisch, has de-
cisive reasons against It.

8 At the end of the dedication
to Faustinus, which is distin-
guished from that of the
pseudo-Aristotle to Alexander
only by unimportant alterations
and omissions: Quare [nos
Aristotelem prudentissimum &é&
doctissimum philosophorum] et

contingere, dicemus dé omni hae
celesti ratione, xc. The words in
parenthesis are wanting in the
best MSS.; but are neverthe-
less to be considered genuine.
Cf. Goldbacher, 2. δ. p. 690.

4+ Concerning these, εδώ Hil-
debrand, pul. Opp. 1. xlviii. sq.

5 The ancients, aS is well
known, had much less strict
ideas than we have on this
subject ; and many others be-
sides Apuleius behave in such
matters with a surprising laxity.
Eudemus, ¢.g., seems nowhere
to have said that his work
on ‘Physics’ was only a new
edition of Aristotle’s nor does

K

ECLECTICISM,

Closer investigation leaves no doubt that his Latin
work on the Cosmos is not (as Stahr and Barthélemy
Saint-Hilaire assert) the model, but only a revision
of the Greek work which is to be found in our col-
lection of Aristotelian writings; for the latter has
throughout the conciser, sharper, more original form
of expression, while the former has the character of a
paraphrased translation: the flowery language of
the one too often in the other becomes bombast,
which is sometimes hardly comprehensible without
a comparison with the Greek text ; and while there
is nothing in the Latin which cannot be regarded as a
paraphrase or translation of the Greek, the Greek,
on the contrary, has passages which could not possibly
have arisen from the Latin, but must evidently
have been before the eyes of the Latin writer.! But
to admit this, and to make Apuleius the author of
the Greek book which he then himself translated
into Latin,? is equally impossible. For in the first
place we thus abandon the only ground on which
the hypothesis of his authorship could even plausibly
be maintained—viz., the credibility of his own

he say so of his Ethics. He
speaks, even where he adheres
quite closely to Aristotle, as an
independent author in his own
name; and so does the writer
of the Magna Moralia. Cicero,
too, notoriously translated, or,
at any rate, transcribed exten-
sive portions in his writings
from the Greeks, without men-
tioning the sources from which
they came. And would Apu-
leius, in his Avistoteles et Theo-
phrastus auctor, have really

named the sources of a treatise
which has taken so much from
Stoic authors and Stoic doc-
trine ?

1 Some of the most striking
are these: περὶ Κόσμου 392, a,
5; 325, a,7; 398, ὁ, 23; 400, a,
6; ὁ, 23; compared with the
corresponding Apul. De Mundo,
c. 1, 12, 27, 88, 35, Ὁ. 291, 317,
362, 368 Oud. For the rest I
must refer to Adam, Ὁ. 38 sqq. ;
Goldbacher, 671 sq.

* Adam, J, ¢., 41 sqq.

APULEIUS NOT THE AUTHOR.

assertions; we regard it as impossible that he
should have represented his writing as an indepen-
dent work if it were merely the revision of the
work of another, but we unhesitatingly charge him
with having foisted his own work in its Greek
original upon Aristotle.! In order to clear him
from the imputation of boasting we attribute to him
a forgery.2 But in the second place this theory
would lead us to the improbable conclusion that
Apuleius, the Latin rhetorician, had expressed him-
self far better, more simply and to the point, in
the Greek language than in his own; and that, in
spite of his being himself the author, he had not
unfrequently in the Latin version confused and
obscured, nay, completely misunderstood that which
in the Greek is perfectly clear. Finally, passing
over other difficulties, from the evidence furnished
by his other writings of his philosophical capacity,
we can scarcely ascribe to Apuleius so important a

1 That the author of the
Greek treatise asserts it to be
Aristotelian has been already
shown, p. 127, 2. Apuleius also
designates it as such in the
passage quoted supra, p. 129, 3,
from the Procemium, and c. 6,
p. 300 Oud., where he says, in
reference to περὲ Κόσμου, 3, 393,
a, 27: [Mare] Africum, quod
quidem Aristoteles Sardiniense
maluit dicere.

2 Nor would his forgery have
answered his purpose; for if he
declared the Greek version of
his book to be the work of
Aristotle, and the Latin to
be his own, these statements

would be nullified by each
other.

3 A number of the most
striking proofs, not only of the
dependence of Apuleius on one
Greek text, but also of the
misunderstandings which beset
him in the reproduction of it,
some of which arise from false
readings, are given by Gold-
bacher, p. 679 δῷ. The same
writer shows, Ὁ. 674 sg., how
untrue is the statement of
Adam, that Apuleius, according
to his own assertion, was in the
habit of composing the same
treatise in Latin and Greek.

K2

131

CHAP.
Vv.

182 ECLECTICISM.

Cap, work as the treatise on the Cosmos undoubtedly is;
and we must necessarily have expected to find in this
writing, if it had emanated from him, much more
distinct traces of those Platonising metaphysics and
theology, and especially of that demonology, which
we shall presently discover in Apuleius. This third
attempt, therefore, to find a definite author for the
book must also be considered unsuccessful, and the
question for us can only be, not by whom it was
composed, but to what period and school its author
belonged.
tts stand- That this author reckoned himself among the
point and . .
character. Peripatetics seems probable from the name of
Aristotle, which the work bears; for by that name
it claims to be considered one of the genuine
records of the doctrines of the school. The same
is confirmed, however, by its contents. Though
the conception of the world which it advances is far
enough from the truly Aristotelian conception, and
though it is full of foreign constituents, yet its
fundamental features are taken from the Aristotelian
doctrine, and it approximates at least as closely to
it as the philosophy of Antiochus, for example,
approximates to the Platonic philosophy. The
metaphysical foundations of the Aristotelian system,
the author leaves, indeed, in the spirit of his time,
unnoticed, but in his presentation of the universe
and its relation to God, he chiefly allies himself
with Aristotle. He does so when he asserts the
distance of our world from the higher world, its
changefulness and imperfection in contrast with

DOCTRINES CONTAINED IN IT.

the purity and invariability of the heavenly spheres,!
and when he makes the perfection of Being gradu-
ally diminish with the distance from the supreme
heaven ;? and when he expressly maintains the dis-
tinction between the ether, of which the heavenly
bodies consist, and the four elements, in unmistak-
able contradiction to the Stoic doctrines. Further,
while the divine essence, according to the Stoic
doctrine, permeates the whole world even to the
smallest and ugliest things, our author finds this
presentation of the Divine Majesty altogether un-
worthy; he declares himself, on the contrary, most
decidedly for the Aristotelian theory that God, re-
moved from all contact with the earthly, has His
abode at the extreme limits of the universe, and from
hence, without moving Himself, and simply through

His influence, effects the

1 ©. 6, 897, ὁ, 30 sq.; 400, a,
5, δ. 21 sqq.

2 Ὁ. 6, 397, ὁ, 27 377.

8 C.2,392,a,5, 29 sq. 3c. 3,392,
6,35; οὗ, Phil. ἃ. G.I. i. 434, 8.
How closely this work adheres
to Aristotle’s expositions has
been already observed, 7. 6. Ὁ.
437, 6. That it should speak
(392, ὃ, 35 a, 8) of five στοιχεῖα,
sether, fire, &c., 15 unimportant.
Aristotle himself had called the
ether πρῶτον στοιχεῖον (cf. PAil.
ad. Gr. I. ii. 487, 7), and if he de-
scribed itas ἕτερον σῶμα καὶ θειό-
τερον τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων
(Gen. An. il. 3,736, b, 29) thetrea-
tise means the same in 392, a, 8,
85 στοιχεῖον ἕτερον τῶν τεττάρων,
ἀκήρατόν τε καὶ θεῖον. Osann, p
168,203 sq., moreover allows that

movement of the whole,

the theory of the treatise περὶ
Κόσμον concerning the ether
is Aristotelian ; it is, therefore,
all the more astonishing that he
can believe Chrysippus to have
also advanced the same theory ;
for our treatise declares itself
expressly against the Stoiciden-
tification of ether with fire
(2. ¢. IT. 3.185, 2, 3); and, as we
see from Cic. (Acad. i. 11, 39),
this was one of the most
notorious points of contest
between Stoics and Peripa-
tetics. The question is not
unimportant, for on the discri-
mination of the ether from the
four elements Aristotle bases
the antithesis of the world
below and the world above.

CHAP,

184

CHAP.
V.

ECLECTICISM.

however manifold the forms it may assume in the
world.! Still less, of course, can he admit the
identification of God and the world: a Stoic defini-
tion which expresses this he only adopts after
having altered its pantheistic language.? Finally,
the author shows himself to be a Peripatetic by
expressly defending * the eternity and unchangeable-
ness of the world (also a distinctive doctrine of
this school) against Stoicism. Though it is clear
from all this that the work cannot have been
written by a Stoic or by any leader of the Stoic
school, such as Posidonius or Chrysippus, yet in

it the endeavour is very

1 This occupies the whole of
the sixth chapter. Here again
the polemic against Stoicism is
unmistakable (cf. p. 397 .Ὁ, 16
sqq.; 898, a 1 sq. ὃ, 4-22 ; 400,
ὁ, 6 sg.) and the theory (Osann,
207) that the divergence from
it is only a concession to the
popular religion is quite in-
admissible; the popular re-
ligion is not at all in question
here, but the Aristotelian theo-
logy; if Chrysippus, however,
wished to support the popular
religion, he was quite able to
do this, as we have seen, without
contradicting the fundamental
principles of his system. We
may quote as a special indica-
tion of the Peripatetic origin
of our treatise that the passage
398, ὦ, 16 δῷ. seems to have
reference to De Motu Anim. 7,
701, ὃ, 1 sqq.

2 The treatise περὶ Κόσμου,
begins, after the introduction,
c. 1, with definitions of the

perceptible to unite the

κόσμος, in which it shows re-
semblance not only to the Stoics
in general, but more particu-
larly to that exposition of their
doctrines from which Stob. £cl.
1.444 (Phil.d. Gr. TIL.i.147,1)has
given us extracts. The altera-
tions which are found necessary
in the treatise are all the more
worthy of note: Κόσμον δ᾽, we
read in Stob., εἶναί φησιν ὁ Xpi-
σίππος σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ
γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων, ἢ
τὸ éx θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα
καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων “γεγονό-
των. λέγεται δ᾽ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὃ
θεὸς, καθ᾽ ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται
καὶ τελειοῦται Our treatise
takes the first of these defini-
tions literally, and passes over
the second; for the third it
substitutes these words: λέγεται
δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως κόσμος ἢ τῶν ὅλων
τάξις τε καὶ διακόσμησις, ὑπὸ θεῶν
τε καὶ διὰ θεῶν φυλαττομένη.

3. C. 4, end; c. 5, beginning;
b. 6. 397, a, 14 sq. ὃ, 5.

AFFINITY WITH STOICISM.

Stoic doctrine with the Aristotelian, and partially
to admit even those determinations to which an
unqualified recognition is denied. With the Stoic
writings which the author has employed, and even
transcribed, he has also appiopriated Stoic doc-
trines to a considerable extent; and this may be
said not merely of the cosmological, astronomical,
and meteorological details which Osann brings for-
ward,” but also of definitions deeply affecting the
whole system. Quite at the beginning of the
cosmological exposition,* we encounter a Chrysippean
definition of the Κόσμος. Further on it is de-
monstrated, in the spirit and after the precedent of
the Stoic system, that it is precisely the contrast
between the elements and parts of the world, on
which depends the unity and subsistence of the
whole:* this unity itself is called, in Stoic language,
sympathy :° and that his harmony with the Stoics
shall not escape us, the author does not hesitate to
‘quote, expressly as a witness in his own behallf,é
the great authority of this school, Heracleitus. In
his theory of the elements, he allies himself with
the Stoics, though he diverges from Aristotle in
making cold the fundamental quality of air.” He
adopts the Stoic doctrine of the πνεῦμα, with which

1 This will be proved later 10, 2, 392, δ, δ: 6 anp...

on. ζοφώδης ὧν καὶ παγετώδης τὴν
2 Page 208 sqq. φύσιν. Likewise, 85 15 shown Ὁ.
$C. 2, beginning; vide sup. 183, 2, the Stoics, against whom
p. 134, 2. Aristotle (cf. Phil. d. Gr. ΤΙ. ii.
4 6, δ. 444) maintains cold to be the
5 C.4, end, αἱ τῶν παθῶν ὅμοιόε fundamental determination of
“THTES. water, and moisture that of

6 C.5, 396, 0,13; cfi.c.6,end. air.

ECLECTICISM.

there are points of contact even in the Peripatetic.
doctrine.t But his approach to Stoicism is most
striking in regard to theology. While repudiating
the Stoic Pantheism as such, the diffusion of the.
divine substance through the world, the author quite
approves of its propositions as soon as they are
applied, not to the divine essence, but the divine
force ;? and he accordingly teaches that the active
influence emanating from the Deity only extends,,
indeed, primarily to the outermost sphere of the
universe, but spreads from this to the inner spheres,
and so is transmitted through the whole? God is,.
therefore, the law of the whole ;* from Him proceeds
the order of the world by means of which it is
classified into the various species of existences,
through their individual seminification ;5 and be-
eause of this, his all-governing influence, God
bears the manifold names, the enumeration and
explanation of which in the treatise περὶ Κόσμου
are stamped with the most genuine Stoicism. The
name, the predicates, and the origin of Zeus are.
here explained quite in the Stoic sense; ἀνάγκη..

1C, 4, 394, δ, 9: λέγεται δὲ 5. 0. 6, 398, 0, 6 sgg. 20 s¢q.;
καὶ ἑτέρως πνεῦμα ἥ τε ἐν φυτοῖς cf. 396, Ὁ, 24 sq.

καὶ ζώοις καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα
ἔμψυχός τε καὶ γόνιμος οὐσία. Cf.
the quotations, Phil. ὦ, Gr. ΤΙΤ. 1,
p. 138, 1; 191, 1; 331, 3.

2 C. 6, 397, 6,16: διὸ καὶ τῶν
παλαιῶν εἰπεῖν τινὲς προήχθησαν
ὅτι πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι θεῶν πλέα
τὰ καὶ δι’ ὀφθαλμῶν ἰνδαλλόμενα
ἡμῖν καὶ δι᾽ ἀκοῆς καὶ πάσης αἰἱσ-
θήσεως, τῇ μὲν θείᾳ δυνάμει πρέ-
ποντὰ καταβαλλόμενοι λόγον οὐ
μὴν τῇ γε οὐσίᾳ.

* C. 6, 400, 6, 8: νόμος γὰρ.
ἡμῖν ἰσοκλινὴς 6 θεός. The con-
ception of νόμος for the order
of the universe is, as is well
known, pre-eminently Stoic.
Cf. Phil. d. Gr. TIL i. p. 140,.
222 sq. 303 sq.

°C. 6, 400, ὁ, 31 sq. This
exposition likewise reminds us
of the Stoics, in the doctrine
of the λόγοι σπερματικοί,

THEOLOGY.

εἱμαρμένη, πεπρωμένη. Nemesis, Adrasteia, the
Moiree, are referred to him by means of Stoic etym-
ologies; and for the confirmation of philosophic
doctrines, the sayings of the poets are interspersed,
after the manner of Chrysippus.! It is clear that
the author wishes indeed to maintain the Peripatetic
doctrine, but also to combine with it as much
Stoicism as was possible without absolute incon-
sistency.” That Plato likewise agrees with his
proposition is indicated at the close of the work,
by the approving citation of a passage from the
‘Laws’ ([V., 715, E.), and we are again reminded
of Plato, when God is extolled not merely as the
Almighty and Eternal, but also as the prototype
of beauty.2 But this, like all eclecticism, was
naturally only possible by the relaxation of the
strictly philosophic interest and philosophic de-
finiteness; and thus we see in the writing περὶ
Κόσμου, side by side with the cheap erudition dis-
played especially in Chapters IT. to IV., the popular
theological element decidedly preponderating over
the purely philosophical element. In the discus-
sions on the transcendental character of the divine
essence this religiosity even assumes a mystic

tinge when the dignity

1C.7; cf. Osann. Ὁ. 219 s¢q.

2 That he, therefore, ceased
to be a Peripatetic and conse-
quently ‘Zellerus ipse suam
sententiam egregie refetlere
videtur’ (Adam. p. 34) is a sin-
eular assertion. As if no
philosopher had ever mingled
foreign elements with the doc-

of God and His exalta-

trines of the school to which
he belonged and desired to
belong.

3 ©. 6, 399, ὃ, 19 : ταῦτα χρὴ
καὶ περὶ θεοῦ διανοεῖσθαι δυνάμει
μὲν ὄντος ἰσχυροτάτου, κάλλει
δὲ εὐπρεπεστάτου, ζωῇ δὲ ἀθανά-
του, ἀρετῇ δὲ κρατίστου, &c.

Probable
date of
comuposi-
tion.

LCLECTICISM.

tion above all contact with the world is made the
chief argument against the immanence of the
divine essence in the universe. We see here how
eclecticism accomplished the transition from pure
philosophy to the religious speculation of the neo-
Platonists and their predecessors. The road of
strict enquiry being abandoned, and those results of
speculation alone maintained which commended
themselves to the universal consciousness as true
and expedient, metaphysics must necessarily be
replaced by theology, in which the majority of man-
kind satisfy their theoretical wants; and if, at the
same time this theology were based on the Aristotelian
doctrine of the transcendency of God, and the Stoic
idea of his omnipresent influence on the world,
there resulted at once a theory of the universe in
which the Peripatetic dualism and the substantial
Pantheism of the Stoic school were reconciled in a
system of dynamic Pantheism.!

To what period the attempt at such a reconcilia-
tion contained in the book we have been consider-
ing, may be assigned, is not certain, but itwmay be
approximately determined. The revision of the
treatise by Apuleius shows that it was in circulation
as an Aristotelian work about the middle of the
second century after Christ. The only question is,

1 The view above developed,
of the character of the treatise
περὶ Κόσμου, has also in the
main been advanced by Peter-
sen (ὦ. δ. p. 557 sqq.). As it
had already been the result of
my own investigation, in the

first preparation of this work,
independently of Petersen, to
whose book my attention was
first drawn by Adam, this will
be in favour of its correct-
ness.

EVIDENCE AS TO DATE.

therefore, how long before this date it was com-
posed ? That we cannot place it earlier than the first
century before Christ, is probable from the evidence
of external testimony. If the first trace of its exis-
tence is met with in Apuleius; if a Cicero and an
Antiochus—to whom, by its intermediate position be-
tween the Peripatetic and Stoic doctrine, its distinct
arrangement, general comprehensibility, and rhetori-
cal language, it would so greatly have commended
itself—never betray by any indication that it was
known to them, we can scarcely suppose that it was
written earlier than the beginning of the first cen-
tury before Christ. But its whole character would
lead us still more definitely to assign it to this cen-
tury or the century immediately following. For
before the attempt could have been made to put
into the mouth of the founder of the Peripatetic
school, such important concessions to the Stoics,
the individuality of both schools must already, in
great measure, have disappeared, and the knowledge
of them become obscured ; in a word, philosophic
eclecticism must have attamed a development,
which, according to all other traces, it did not attain
before the time of Antiochus, the Academician.
When, therefore, Rose! would place the date of
this work before the middle of the third century
before Christ, the proof for this assertion must be
very strong to counterbalance the opposite pro-
bability. But this is so little the case? that we are

1 De Arist. libr. Ord. et Auct. 3 Rose’s arguments are the
36, 97 sqq. folowing: (1) The passage

ECLECTICISM.

rather constrained by decisive facts to suppose that
the work περὶ Κόσμου must be later than Posidonius,,
one or more of whose writings the author employs,,

περὶ Κόσμου c. 6, 399, ὁ, 33 to
400, a, 3, was already tran-
scribed in the pseudo-Aristo-
telian treatise περὶ θαυμασίων
ἀκουσμάτων (6. 155, Ὁ. 846),
which cannot be more recent
than Antigonus of Carystus,
who died about 220 B.c. But
which of the two works
has borrowed from the other
cannot be discovered from a
comparison of the passages;
moreover the passage in the
treatise περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσ-
μάτων, which Rose believes to
be copied in περὶ Κόσμου, belongs
to a section which he himself
considers to be a later addition
(cf. Phil. ὦ. Gr TI. 11.109,1). On
this argument, therefore, no-
thing can be based. (2) Rose ob-
serves that in περὶ Κόσμου (c. 3,
393, 6,18) the breadth of the
habitable plain of the earth,
ὥς φασιν of εὖ γεωγραφήσαντες,
is given as nearly 40,000 stadia,
and its length about 70,000
stadia; and this proves that
the work was written not only
before Hipparchus, but also
before Hratosthenes; for Era-
tosthenes reckoned its length
at 77,800, and its breadth at
38,000 stadia; and Hipparchus,
whom the later writers mostly
followed, counted 70,000 for
its length and 30,000 for its
breadth (Strabo, i, 4, 2, p. 62
sqq.3 Ui. 5, 7, Ὁ. 118 sgq.). But
how do we know that our
author must have kept pre-
cisely to these predecessors if
he were later than they? Rose

himself says that others even
after Hipparchus set up other
computations: Artemidorus, for
example, in agreement with the
περὶ Κόσμου, gives the length of
the terrestrial plain as more
than 68,000 stadia, and its
breadth more than 39,000 (Plin.
Hist. Nat. ii. 108, 242 sq. Of
Posidonins we know only that
he reckoned the length at
70,000 (Strabo, ii. 3, 6, p. 102);
what he said of the breadth
tradition does’ not inform us.
How anything concerning the
date of the treatise, therefore,
is to be deduced from its di-
vergence from Eratosthenes
and Hipparchus, it is hard to
see, (3) According to c. 8,
393 6, 23, as Rose asserts,.
between the Caspian and Black
Seas there is στενώτατος ἰσθμὸς;
and this could not be main-
tained after Hratosthenes had
placed the breadth of this
isthmus at 1,000 (?) stadia, and
Posidonius at 1,500 (Strabo xi.
1, 5, p. 491). Our awuthor,,
however, does not maintain
this; he says, the boundaries
of Europe are μυχοὶ Πόντου'
θάλαττά τε Ὑρκανία, καθ᾽ hy ore-
νώτατος ἰσθμὸς εἰς τὸν ἸΙόντον
διήκει, 1.6. the Caspian Sea at
the place where the isthmus
between it and the Pontus
(which was also designated as
the boundary between Hurope
and Asia, according to Dionys.
Perieg. Orb. Descer. v. 20) is
narrowest. The further ob-
servations of Rose I venture to.

LATER THAN POSIDONITS.

and from whom he has, perhaps, borrowed the greater

part of the natural science he imparts to us.!

pass over, as, even supposing
they are correct, they would
only prove the possibility and
not the probability or truth
of his theory.

1 It has already strnck other
writers how many points of
contact are presented by our
treatise with the fragments of
Posidonius ; and the phenome-
non deserves all consideration.
Thus we find in w K. c +
395, a, 32, the definition: ips
μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἔμφασις ἡλίου τμή-
paros ἢ σελήνης, ἐν νέφει νοτερῷ
καὶ κοίΐλῳ καὶ συνεχεῖ πρὸς φαν-
τασίαν ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ θεωρουμένη
κατὰ κύκλου περιφέρειαν. This
singular definition is quoted by
Diogenes, vii. 152, with the
same words and with only
slight and unimportant differ-
ences from Posidonius, Mevew-
ρολογικὴ. In c. 4, 394, ὁ, 21
sgg. our treatise maintains that,
of the east winds, καικίας is the
wind that blows from the place
of the sun’s rising in summer,
ἀπηλιώτης that which comes
from the ἰσημεριναὶ, εὖρος from
the χειμεριναὶ ἀνατολαὶ : of the
west winds, ἀργέστης blows
from the θερινὴ δύσις, ζέφυρος
from the ἰσημερινὴ, λὶψ from the
χειμερινὴ δύσις. These very de-
finitions are quoted by Strabo,
1, 2, 21, Ὁ. 29, from Posidonius.
In c. 4, 395, 0, 33, we read:
Earthquakes are occasioned by
winds being pent up in the
cavities of the earth and seek-
ing to escape: τῶν δὲ σεισμῶν
of μὲν εἰς πλάγια σείοντες κατ᾽
ὀξείας γωνίας ἐπικλίνται καλοῦν-
ται, οὗ δὲ ἄνω ῥιπτοῦντες καὶ κάτω

The

Kar ὀρθὰς γωνίας βράσται, of δὲ
συνιζήσεις ποιοῦντες εἰς τὰ κοῖλα
χασματίαι" of δὲ χάσματα avoi-
Ὕοντες καὶ γῆν ἀναρρηγνύντες
ῥῆκται καλοῦνται, Cf. Diog. vii.
154: τοὺς σεισμοὺς δὲ γίνεσθαι
πνεύματος εἰς τὰ κοιλώματα τῆς
γῆς ἐνδύοντος ἢ [καὶ] καθειρχθέν-
τος, καθά φησι Ἰϊοσειδώνιος ἐν τῇ
ὀγδόῃ" εἶναι δ' αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν
σεισματίας, τοὺς δὲ χασματίας,
τοὺς δὲ κλιματίας, τοὺς δὲ βρασ-
ματίας, also Sen. Vat. Yu. vi.
21, 2. In c. £ we read that
there are two kinds of vapours,
dry and moist; from the latter
arise fog, dew, hoar-frost,
clouds, rain, &c.; from the
former, winds, thunder, light-
ning, kc. Compare with this,
Seneca, Var. Qu. iu. 54: une
ad opinionem Posidonti rever-
ter: δ terra terrenisque ome-
nibus pars humida eflatur, pars
sieca et fumida: hee fulminibus
alimentum est, illa imbribus
(which Posidonius himself
must naturally have given
much more at length). If dry
vapours are shut up in the
clouds, they break through
them, and this causes thunder.
With this explanation of thun-
der our treatise also agrees (c.
4, 395, a, 11): εἱληθὲν δὲ πνεῦμα
ἐν νέφει παχεῖ τε καὶ vorep@ Kal
ἔξωθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ βιαίως ῥηγνύον
τὰ συνεχῆ πιλήματα τοῦ νέφους,
βρόμον καὶ πάταγον μέγαν ἄπειρ-
γάσατο, βροντὴν λεγόμενον. With
the explanation of snow quoted
by Diogenes (vil. 153), and no
doubt abbreviated from Posi-
donius, the somewhat more
detailed account in περὶ Κόσμον

141

CHAP,
Y.

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.

work cannot, according to this, have been written
before the middle of the first century before Christ ;

harmonises (c. 4,394, a,32). The
definition of the σέλας (ap.
Diog. ἃ ¢.), which is most
probably taken, like most of
the meteorological portions of
his expositions of Stoicism,
from Posidonius, we again find
in περὶ Κόσμον (4, 395, 5, 2).
Also what is there said (c. 2,
391, b, 16; 392, a, 5) on the
stars and the ether, reminds
us of the description of the
ἄστρον, which Stobzus quotes
(Eel. i. 518) from Posidonius.
That the agreement of our
treatise with Posidonius in
these cases is not merely acci-
dental is manifest. As little
can we suppose that their har-
mony is the result of their
common dependence on a third
exposition, which in that case
could have been nothing less
than a complete meteorology ;
for in the first place Posidonius
in these matters enjoys great
reputation, and we cannot
ascribe such dependence to
him; and in the second, it
would be inexplicable that he
and not his predecessor should
always be named as the au-
thority, whom he must have
followed very closely if he
copied him word for word.
Still more untenable is Rose’s
theory (J. 6. Ὁ. 96) that Posi-
donius borrowed from the trea-
tise the passages in which he
resembles it. We know that
Posidonius wrote comprehen-
sive works on meteorology,
geography, and astronomy, the
result of his own investigations,
the contents of which went far

beyond those of the treatise περὲ
Κόσμου ; whereas the latter book
in all that it says concerning
those subjects bears the charac-
ter of a summary, not pursuing
enquiries, but only comparing
results ; how can we then think
it more credible that Posido-
nius should have taken his
opinions from this compendium
than that the author of the
compendium should have bor-
rowed his from the work of
Posidonius? And if this had
ever occurred, how is it ex-
plicable that later writers
should have referred them all
to Posidonius, without a syl-
lable of allusion to their
ancient and well-known source,
attested by the name of Aristo-
tle? But even if we disre-
gard all this, the theory will
not suffice to save the origi-
nality and higher authority
of our treatise unless, with
Rose, we assume that the
exposition of the Stoic cos-
mology (ap. Stob. Hel. i. 444)
was likewise taken from it.
That this exposition, however,
altogether contradicts such a
theory will be shown imme-
diately. Who can believe that
instead of the Stoic doctrines
being foisted upon Aristotle
out of Stoical writings by the
Peripatetic, the Stoic doctrines
have been taken out of Aris-
totle himself? I have, how-
ever, dwelt too long upon this
hypothesis, which is manifestly
only a device to escape from
a difficulty. The passages
quoted above place it beyond

ABOUT THE FIRST CENTURY B.C,

probably it is rather later ; but we cannot assign it
to a later date than the first century after the com-

a doubt that the author of
the treatise has made abundant
use of Posidonius, and even
copied from him. If this is
certain, we may with great
probability derive all his geo-
graphical and meteorological
dissertations (c. 38, 4) from
the Stoic philosopher whose
achievements in these depart-
ments are celebrated. To him
the detailed discussion on the
sea especially points; Posido-
nius had written a separate
work on the sea, and therein
had asserted, what our treatise
(c. 3, 392, ὁ, 20) also strongly
enforces, that the whole of the
inhabited earth is surrounded
by the sea (Strabo, ii. 2, 1, 5, Ὁ.
94, 100; 1. 1, 9, 8, 12, Ὁ. 6, 55).
There is another portion of the
treatise which I should sup-
pose, from its contents, to be
borrowed from Posidonius.
Osann (Ὁ. 211 8594.) has already
shown that the section from
the beginning of ὁ. 2 to ὁ. 3,
392, b, 34, is almost point for
᾿ point the same as the expo-
sition quoted ap. Stob. i. 144
sq. (which Stobeeus no doubt
borrowed from Arius Didymus)
even though there may be
slight differences in the ar-
rangement and the conceptions ;
and that our treatise here also
must be a copy and not an
original is evident from what
is quoted p.134,2. For as the
excerpt in Stobeus names
Chrysippus as the source for
the two first of its three defini-
tions of the κόσμος, this quota-
tion cannot have been taken

from our treatise : in it there is
also wanting the second of these
definitions, and the third (as is
shown ὦ. 6.) is conceived ina
manner which can only be ex-
plained by the design of the
Peripatetic to bring the defini-
tions ready to hand in the
Stoic authority into harmony
with his own standpoint. Now
the passage of Stobszeus only
claims to be an account of the
Stoic doctrine, and we clearly
see that it is not taken literally
from a Stoic work. But it is
equally clear (and its agree-
ment with our treatise places
it beyond a doubt) that it is
abstracted from such a work.
That this was Chrysippus’s περὶ
Κόσμου, as Osann supposes,
seems to me more than doubt-
ful. Stobzeus himself ascribes
the two first definitions of the
Κόσμος to Chrysippus. But
this statement he may also
owe to a third writer, and
that it is so, and that this
third writer was no other than
Posidonius, is probable for
three reasons: first, the same
definitions which Chrysippus,
according to Stobseus, set up,
are quoted in Diog. vii. 138,
from the μετεωρολογΎικἢ στοι-
χείωσις of Posidonius ; Posido-
nius must, therefore, have re-
peated them here; he would
no doubt have mentioned Chry-
sippus as their author. Thus
the section of our treatise
which coincides with the pas-
sage of Stobzeus is so closely
connected with the following,
in which the employment of

148

ECLECTICISM.

mencement of our éra: since it had already been
handed down to Apuleius as a work of Aristotle, and
Apuleius in his copy must have found some false
readings! which still exist, the probability is that it
was composed a longer or shorter time before the

end of the first century, B.C.’

However this may

be, it is, at any rate, a remarkable memorial of the
eclecticism which, about this time, had found en-
trance even into the Peripatetic school.

Posidonius can be proved, that
no break is perceptible between
what is borrowed from Posido-
nius and that which comes
from another source. Lastly,
the dissertation on the islands,
and the assertion that the
supposed mainland is also an
island (Stob. 446; περὶ Κόσμου,
c. 8, 392, ὃ, 20 994.) seems to
suit Posidonius (as we have
already observed) exactly. It
seems, therefore, probable that
it is the same work of Posido-
nius, his μετεωρολογικὴ στοιχεί-
wots, from the first section of
which Stobeeus (0.6. Arius Didy-
mus) gives an excerpt, and
which the author of the περὶ
Κόσμου has used in its whole
extent, in which case not much
of the knowledge which he
parades (c. 2-4) can be placed
to his own account.

1 As Goldbacher shows (p.
681 sq.) from Apul. Proem. p.
288, c. 7, Ὁ. 302 Oud.). In the
tirst of these passages Apuleius’
unnatural translation is ex-
plained by the supposition that
ἴῃ π. K. 1, 391, ὦ, 22 he may
have read with some of our
MSS. μέρους ods οἰκτίσειεν ; in
the second, the otherwise in-

comprehensible transformation
of the predicate λοξὴ into the
name of an island, Oxe or
Loxe, is accounted for by the
still existing variant, λοξὴ
καλουμένη, instead of λοξὴ πρὸς
τὴν οἰκουμένην (7. K. 3, 393, ὃ, 15).

2 To fix the date of its com-
position more exactly would
hardly be possible. That the
author wrote before Strabo
would seem probable, because
his description of the sea (c.
3, 393, a, 26) is less precise
than Strabo’s (ii. 5, 19 sq. p.
122 sq.). Meantime this infer-
ence is the more unsafe if the
author in the geographical part
of his work has simply followed
Posidonius. The φρόνησις is
apportioned to the λογιστικὸν ;
to the θυμοειδὲς the πρᾳότης
and ἀνδρεία, to the ἐπιθυμητικὸν
the σωφροσύνη and ἐγκράτεια,
to the whole soul the δικαιοσύνη,
ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοψυχία and
likewise the opposite failings.
Of these duties and faults
somewhat superficial definitions
are given; lastly, it is shown
by what conduct they are
manifested; and many other
sub-kinds of virtues and faults
are brought forward.

TREATISE ON VIRTUES. 145
Another remnant of that eclecticism we probably cy AP.
possess in the short treatise on virtues and vices, also Υ.
to be found in our Aristotelian collection. The doc- Treatise

trine of virtue is here based on the Platonic discrimi- on virtues
nation of the three faculties of the soul,and the four ?”@ *%¢s.
chief virtues; to these the author tries to reduce the

virtues treated of by Aristotle ; and the correspond-

ing vices to the evil nature of the parts of the soul

relating to them; while at the same time he passes

in review the tokens and manifestation of the dif-

ferent virtues and vices in the descriptive manner

of the later ethics, as seems to have been especi-

ally customary in the Peripatetic school after Theo-
phrastus. With Stoicism there are scarcely even

external points of harmony.! But this short treatise

is not of sufficient importance to detain us longer.?

i For instance, perhaps, the
remark that the whole treatise
from beginning to end is de-
voted to the opposition of the
ἐπαινετὰ and ψεκτά.

3 Even its origin is not quite
certain; but, from its admis-
Sion into the Aristotelian col-
lection, ancl its whole treat-
ment of the subject, it is pro-
bable that it emanated from
the Peripatetic school, and not
from the Academy; and if its
date cannot be precisely fixed,
we may assign it, generally
speaking, to the period of
Helecticism. An earlier Peripa-

tetic would hardly have allied
himself to Plato so unhesita-
tingly, as if it were a matter of
course, in the way that the
writer does in c. 1, 1249, a, 30:
τριμεροῦς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβανο-
μένης κατὰ TlAdrwva, &c. There
is also an indication of a later
period in the mention of dex-
mons between the gods and
parents in c. 4, 1250, ὁ, 20;
e. 7, 1251, a, 31, under the
head of piety and godlessness;
perhaps after the precedent of
the Pythagorean Golden Poem
(v. 3).

146

CHAP.
VI.

#.
Eelecti-
cism of the
jist
century
B.C.

Its practi-
cal cha-
racte?r,
exemypli-
jied in
Cieero.

ECLECTICISM.

CHAPTER VI.

CICERO. VARRO.

From the preceding chapters it will be seen how,
in the tirst century before Christ, the three scienti-
fically most important schools of philosophy had
coincided in a more or less strongly developed
eclecticism. This mode of thought must have com-
mended itself the more readily to those who, from
the outset, had concerned themselves rather with the
practically applicable fruits of philosophic studies than
with strict science. Such was the case with Cicero.!

Cicero’s youth falls in a period in which not only
the influence of Greek philosophy on Roman culture,
but also the approximation and partial blending of
the philosophic schools had already begun to develop
themselves strongly.2 He himself had become ac-
quainted with the most various systems, partly from
the writings of their founders and representatives and

1 Concerning Cicero as a Gruber’s Allg. Hneycl. sect. i.
philosopher, cf., besides Ritter 17, 226 sgqg.; Bernhardy, Rédm.

(iv. 106-176), Herbart, Werke,
xii. 167 sgg.; Kthner, A. 1.
Ciceronis in Philosophiam
Verita, Hamb. 1825 (this is
only to be regarded as a Jabor-
ious collection of materials);
concerning his philosophical
works, cf. Hand in 2£rsch. und

Litt. 769 sqq.; and the treatises
named in the passages quoted
mfra, pp. 148, δ; 149, 1.

* Cicero, as is well known,
was born on the 3rd January,
648 A.U.C. (2.6. 106 B.c.), and
therefore some years after the
death of Paneetius.

CICEROS EDUCATION.

partly from his teachers. In his earliest youth,
the Epicurean doctrine had commended itself to him
through the teaching of Phedrus;' after this
Philo of Larissa introduced him to the new Academy,?
among whose adherents he persistently reckoned
himself; at the same time he enjoyed the instruc-
tion of the Stoic Diodotus who also remained at a
later period in close proximity to him ;* before the
commencement of his public career* he visited
Greece, attended the instructions of his old teacher
Phedrus and those of Zeno, the Epicurean,’ but
with special eagerness those of Antiochus,® the chief
founder of Academic eclecticism, and he entered into
a connection with Posidonius, which continued till the
death of that philosopher.’ Also in philosophical lite-
rature he had taken such a wide survey that we cannot
withhold from him the praise of wide reading, though
at the same time his knowledge of that literature is
neither independent nor thorough enough to warrant
his being called a man of great erudition.* He him-
self based his fame not so much on his own enquiries

1 Bp. ad Fam. xiii. 1: af
Phedro, qui nobis, cum puerr
essemus, antequam Philonem
cognovimus, valde ut philosophus
... probabatur.

2 Vide supra, p. 76, 2, 3.

8 Vide supra, Ὁ. 70, 3.

4 In 78 and 77 B.c.; there-
fore in his 29th and 30th year ;
Plut. Cie. 3 sq.

5 Phil. d. Gr. 111. i. 373, 2;
374, 1.

6 Supra, Ὁ. 87, 1.
7 Supra, p. 58, 4.

85. The writers on philosophy
to whom he most commonly
refers and most frequently
quotes are Plato, Xenophon,
Aristotle (of whom, however,
he seems only to have known
some popular and rhetorical
works), then Theophrastus and
Dicearchus, with their political
writings, Crantor, Panzetius,
Hecato, Posidonius, Clitoma-
chus, Philo, Antiochus, Philo-
demus (or Zeno).

L 2

147

CHAP.
Vi.

148

CHAP.

ὦ

ECLECTICISM.

into philosophy as on the art with which he had-
clothed Greek philosophy in a Roman dress, and
made it accessible to his countrymen.’ He only
arrived, however, at this literary activity in his
more advanced age, when he had been compelled to
renounce public service,? and thus his manifold and
tolerably extensive philosophical works are com-
pressed into the space of a few years.® But our
astonishment at the rapidity of his work will be
considerably lessened when we look more closely at
his mode of procedure in the compilation of his
philosophical works. In one portion of these he
does not directly express his own views, but allows
each of the most important philosophic schools to
explain theirs through one of their adherents,‘
and for this purpose he seems almost throughout
to have made free use of the several expositions
which lay ready to hand, and to :have confined
himself mainly to the comparison, representa-
tion, and elucidation of their contents.° And even

1 Of the merit which he
claims for himself in this re-
spect Cicero often speaks while
defending his philosophical
works against censure, ¢.9.
Fin, i. 2, 4 sqq.; Acad. i. 3,10;
Tuse. il sqg.3 N. 2.1. 4; Off. 1.
1, 1 sq.

2 Acad. 1. α.; Tuse.i. 1,1; 4,
7: ND. Le.

8 The earliest of these (irre-
spective of his two political
works), the Consolatio, the
Hortensius, and the first version
of the Academica, fall in the
year 709 A.U.C,, ὧδ. 45 B.c. As
Cicero was murdered on Decem-

ber 3rd, 43 B.c., his activity as
a philosophical writer occupies
only about three years.

4 As in the Academica, De
Finibus, De Natura Deorwn,
De Divinatione.

5 ῬΑπόγραφα sunt, confesses
Cicero himself in a much-quoted
passage (φῶ Att. xii. 52), mtnore
labore fiunt: verba tantum
affero, quibus abundo ; and that
this, in spite of Fn. i. 2,4 (Won
anterpretum fungimaur mnere,
&c.), is no exaggerated modesty,
is sufficiently proved by the
recent Investigations into the
sources of his expositions. In

HIS OWN STANDPOINT.

where he speaks in his own name, he frequently
allies himself so closely to older writings that his
own works are scarcely more than reproductions
of these! Yet this is no great disadvantage in
regard to our knowledge of his standpoint, since he
can only bring forward the views of others as his
own when he agrees with them; and even in his
expository dialogues he, as a rule, sufficiently indi-
eates which of the theories under discussion he

approves.

His standpoint may be generally described as an

the Academica he had borrowed
from Antiochus that which, in
the first version, he placed in
the mouth of Lucullus, and
afterwardsin the mouth of Varro
(vide supra, Ὁ. 86, 3); the scep-
tical dissertations he had pro-
bably taken from Philo as well
as from Clitomachus (ride Phil.
ad. Gv. IIL. i. 501, 3). The source
of the fifth book in De F'inibus
is to be found in Antiochus
(vide supra, p. 86, 3), and that
the rest originated in the same
way, admits of no doubt. For
the first book on the gods two
Epicurean treatises (concerning
which cf. Phil. ἃ. Gr. IL. i.
373, 2; 374, 1) are employed;
for the second, probably one
of Posidonius and one of Panz-
tius (cf. supra, p. £1, 3); for
the third, and for the second
half of the first, Clitomachus
(Phil. d. Gr. TIL i. 505, 8). De
Divinatione is worked out from
Posidonius, Pansetius, and Cli-
tomachus (vide ibid. II. i. Ὁ.
337, 1; and supra, 41, 3).

1 For his Hortensius, Aris-
totle’s TIlporperrixds probably

served him asa model (ride Phil.
ad. Gr. ΤΙ. ii. 63); for the Conso-
latio, Crantor’s περὶ πένθους
(ibid. ΤΙ. i. 899, 3). The prin-
cipal source of the first book
of the TYuseulane seems to
have been the writings of
Posidonius and Crantor; of the
second, Panstius (vide supra,
p. 41,3; Heine, font. Tuse. Dis-
put. 11 sg.); of the fourth,
Posidonius (as Heine, f. ὃ. p.
13 sq¢., supposes), or Antiochus
(ride Phil. ἃ. Gr. T1L.i.517,1). In
the treatise De Fato he appears
to repeat the inferences of
Clitomachus. The books We
Officiis keep in substance to
Pansetius’ work of the same
name (vide supra, p. 41, 3);
the substance of the Topica has
probably been furnished by
Antiochus (vide supra, Ὁ. 86, 3).
It may reasonably be supposed
that it was the same with the
other works whose Greek pro-
totypes have not hitherto been
ascertained, though Cicero may
not in all of them have been
dependent on his predecessors
to the same extent.

His scepti-
cism,

150

CHAP.
Vi.

ECLECTICISM.

eclecticism founded upon scepticism. The very
habit we have already mentioned, of stating argu—
ments for and against, without drawing any con-
clusion, indicates a tendency to scepticism, for this
procedure cannot be compared with the indirect
development of thought in the Platonic dialogues,
or with the Socratic conversations, from which
Cicero himself derives it;! its true analogy is
with the colloquies of Carneades ;? and it can only
originate in the fact that the philosopher is not
satishied with any theory, but objects to something:
In every given system. Cicero, however, expressly
avows himself as belonging to the new Academy,?
and brings forward in his own name the argu-
ments with which it had denied the possibility of
knowledge.* For himself, one of the great reasons,
if not the greatest, for his doubt, seems to lie in the
disagreement of the philosophers concerning the
most important questions; at any rate, he not only
pursues this subject with predilection,® but ex-
pressly remarks that he attaches much greater
value to it than to all that has been said by the
Academy on the deception of the senses and the
impossibility of any fixed definition of ideas.®

1 Tuse. i. 4,8; v. 4, 11; MD.
1. 5, 11.

2 Cf. Tuse. v. 4, 11: Quem
morem cum Carneades aciutis-
sime coplosissimeque tenuisset,
Jecimus et alias sepe δὲ nuper
in Tusculano, ut ad eam con-
suetudinem disputaremus.

3 Acad. ii. 20; 22, 69; i. 4,
13; 12, 43, 46; WV. D.i. 5, 12;
Offic. iii. 4, 20.

* Acad. ii. 20 sqq. I think it
unnecessary to specify these
arguments further in this place,
as they are not to be considered
original, and have been quoted,
Phil. ὦ. Gr. TI. i. 500 sqq.

° Loc. cit. 33,107; ο. 36 57.;
N. D. 1.1,1; 6,13; iii. 15, 39.

§ Acad. ii. 48, 147: Posthac
tamen, cum hee queremus,.
potius de dissensionibus tantis

ACTION BASED ON PROBABILITY.

Scepticism with him, therefore, is not so much the
fruit of an independent enquiry as the consequence
of the uncertainty in which the strife of philosophic
theories has placed him; it is only the reverse side
of his eclecticism, only a sign of the same indepen-
dence of his Greek predecessors which that eclecti-
cism expresses: so far as the philosophers are to be
reconciled, the common elements from their sys-
tems are co-ordinated ; so far as they are at strife,
knowledge respecting the debated points is de-
spaired of, because the authorities neutralise one
another.

Thus it is that doubt in Cicero cannot have by
any means the importance or significance that it
had had in the new Academy; and we therefore
see him, in fact, limiting his scepticism in two re-
spects: for he attributes greater worth to the
knowledge derived from probability than the
Academy, and he makes hardly any use of certain
parts of the philosophy derived from his sceptical
principle. If he is within the principles of the
Academy in replying, like Carneades, to the objec-
tion that scepticism makes all action impossible
—that for action full certainty is not necessary,
but only greater probability ;! we cannot consider
him so in the explanation he gives concerning

summorum virorum disseramius,
de obscuritate nature deque
errore tot philosophorum, qui de
bonis contrariisque rebus tant-
opere discrepant, ut cum plus
wno wverum esse non possit,
jacere necesse sit tot tam nobiles

diseiplinas, quam de oculorum
sensuumque reliquorum men-
dactis et de sorite aut pseudn-
meno, guas plagas ipst contra se
Stotet texuerunt.

1 Acad. ti. 81: c. 33, 105,
108; WV. D.i. 5, 12.

151

CHAP.
VIL

tts limits
and signi-
Jicance.

152

CHAP.
VI.

ECLECTICISM.

the aim of his method of disputation. This method
was to enable him, by testing the various theories,
to find out the theory which had the most in its
favour.! Doubt is, therefore, only the preparation
for a positive conviction ; and even if this conviction
does not reach the full certainty of knowledge but
only an approximate certainty, it suffices, as we
already know, for practical life, the end and aim of
the Ciceronian philosophy. There is no mistaking
the fact: the two elements of the Academic philo-
sophy, the denial of knowledge, and the assertion
of a knowledge of probability, stand here in a dif-
ferent relation from that which they occupy with
Carneades; for him, doubt itself, the suspension of
judgment, had been the proper aim of philosophic
enquiry; the theory of probability was only in the
second rank, and resulted from the consideration
of that which remained over from doubt; but to
Cicero the discovery of the probable appears as the
original problem of philosophy, and doubt has value
only as a means and a condition of the solution of
this problem. Cicero himself therefore plainly de-
clares that his scepticism was properly only in regard
to the Stoic demand for an absolute knowledge ;
with the Peripatetics, on the other hand, who do not
claim so much in respect to knowledge, he is funda-

1 Tuse. 1, 4, 7: Ponere jube-
bam de quo quis audire vellet:

ad id aut sedens aut ambulans
disputabam . . . fiebat autem

disserendi. Nam ita facillime
quid vert simillimum esset tnve-
niri posse Socrates arbitrabatur.
Similarly (v. 4, 11) this proce-

ita, ut cumis qui audire vellet
divisset quid sibt videretur, tum
ego contra dicerem. Hee est
ENniMy Ut scis, vetus et Socratica
ratio contra alterius opinionem

dure claims the advantage, ut
nostram ist sententiam tegere-
mus, errovre atios levaremus, et
in omni disputatione quid esset
simillomum vert quereremus.

OBJECTION TO DIALECTIC.

mentally agreed.! But eventhis modified scepticism
receives still further limitations. Though our philo-
sopher expresses himself hesitatingly on the subject,
yet, all things considered, it is only as to purely
theoretical enquiries that he is in harmony with the
new Academy: practical principles on the contrary
and the philosophic and religious convictions directly
connected with them, he does not wish to question
in the same way. He objects to dialectic that it
guarantees not real knowledge but only formal
rules on the construction of propositions and infer-
ences;” his judgment on physics, exclusive of
theology, is that it is far easier for physics to say
what things are not, than what they are ; * it would be
presumptuous to arrogate to itself a knowledge, even
of its most universal principles ;* no human eye is
keen enough to penetrate the darkness with which
the nature of things is concealed : 5 and even if we
have to limit these expressions to the case of theo-
logy, we find no opposite declarations counter-
balancing them in regard to natural enquiries
proper. In ethics, on the contrary, though he finds
considerable discord among the philosophers on
the most important questions;® and he himself,

1 Fin. v. 26, 76. ista omnia, Lueulle, crassis

2 Acad. ii. 28, 91; cf. Pail.
a. Gr. TH, i. 508, ὃ.

3N. 2. i. 21, 60: Omnibus
fere in rebus et maxime in
physicis, quid non sit citius,
quam guid sit dimerim.

4 Acad. ii. 36, 116: stne
quisguam tanto inflatus errore,
ut sibi se illa scire persuaserit ?

5 Acad. li. 39, 122: Latent

occultata et circumfusa tenebris,
ut nulla acies humani tngenit
tanta sit, gue penetrare in
calum, terram intrare possit.
Corpora nostra non novimus, &c.
§ 124: Satisne tandem ea nota
sunt nobis, gue nercorum natura
sit, que venarum? Tenemusne
quid animus sit ? &c.
§ Acad, li. 42; c. 48, 147.

153

CHAP.
VI.

154

CHAP.
VI.

ECLECTICISM.

as we shall presently discover, cannot avoid fluctua-
tion in replying to them; yet we soon perceive
that here he is far from admitting the same justifica-
tion to doubt as in the purely theoretical sphere.
What he occasionally says in his discussions concern-
ing the Laws, that he does not intend to examine
further the doubt of the new Academy,! he seems
to have made a general rule in his moral philosophy;
for in none of his writings on this subject does he pay
any regard to the considerations which he himself
had previously raised ; but as soon as the doubt in
the enquiries of the Academy nas had space to express
itself, the highest good and duties? are treated of
in the moral discussions in a wholly dogmatic tone,
though at the same time without any fixed plan.
In connection therewith we also find our philo-
sopher bringing forward opinions about God and the
human soul, which are manifestly for him some-
thing more than uncertain conjectures, though even
here he despairs of absolute certainty of know-
ledge. He constantly says that he is merely fol-
lowing probability—and expressing his own per-
sonal opinion But that he was really a consistent

1 Legg. i. 18, 39: Perturba-
tricem autem harwn omniwm
verum Academiam hane ab
Arecesila et Carneade recentem
exoremus ut sileat. Nam s%
snvaserit in hee .. . nimias
edet ruinas. Quam quidem ego
placare cupio, submovere non
audeo.

2 Proof of this will presently
be given.

$80 M D. i. 1, 2: Quod

manime veri simile est δὲ quo
omnes duce natura venimus,
Deos esse; and at the conclu-
sion of the treatise, ili. 40, 95:
ita discessimus, ut Vellejo Cotte
disputatio verior, miht Balbi ad
veritatis similitudinem videre-
tur esse propensior. Tuse. iv. 4,
7: Sed defendat quod quisque
sentit ; sunt enim judicia tbera :
NOS... guid sit in quaqgue 76
maxime probabile semper re-

THEOLOGICAL OPINIONS.

adherent of Carneades! could only be inferred from
such utterances if his whole procedure corresponded
with them. This, however, is not the case. His
convictions are not so fixed and decided that he
trusts unconditionally to them, and he is never so
sure of them that he does not keep before him the
probability of having, at another time, another
opinion about the same subjects; indeed, he is
superficial enough to pride himself on his fickle-
ness.2 But even his doubt is too shallow to deter
him from statements which a member of the new
Academy would not have ventured to advance so
explicitly. Though he calls the existence of the
gods merely probable, he immediately adds that
were the belief in providence abolished, all piety,
and fear of God, all human community and justice,
would be destroyed ;? which he could not possibly
have said if that belief had had for him merely the
value of even a probable conjecture. Moreover, when
he founds an argument for the truth of a belief in
gods on its universality, he does so without any
limitation, in his own name.* This is also the case,
as we shall find, with his development of the teleo-
logical argument, his utterances concerning the unity
of God and the divine government of the universe,
on the dignity of man, and the immortality of the
soul. A logical scepticism is here not in question :

quiremus. V. 29, 82 sg¢.; dead. academiker. Oldenb. 1860
li. 20, 66: ζῶο vero ipse et (Gymn. progr.).

magnus guidem sum opinator, 2 Tuse. v.11, 33; vide infra,
non enim sum sapiens, &c. Vide p. 157, 1.
infra, p. 157, 1. 3 iN. δ. i. 2,3 8

. D. i. 2, 3 8.
1 Burmeister, Cic. als Neu- 4 Vide infra, p. 161, 1, 167.

156

CHAP.
VIL

Practical
end of
philo-
sophy.

ECLECTICISM.

the philosopher, no doubt, mistrusts human know
ledge, and holds greater or less probability to be the
highest thing attainable; but he reserves to himself
the power of making an exception to this rule in all
cases where a pressing moral or mental necessity
demands a more fixed conviction.

This more confident treatment of practical ques-
tions has, however, with Cicero so much the more
significance, because, according to his view, the
whole problem of philosophy is exclusively contained
in them. Though he admits that knowledge is a
good in and for itself, and further, that it secures
the purest and highest enjoyment;' and though he
expressly includes physics in this admission,’ yet
not knowledge itself, but its effects on life appear
to him the ultimate aim of philosophic enquiry.
Knowledge completes itself only in action; action
has, therefore, a higher value than knowledge ;? the
enquiry concerning the highest good is the most
important of all enquiries, and determines the whole of
philosophy :* the best philosophy is that of Socrates,
which does not trouble itself with things which lie
beyond our sphere of vision, and, being convinced
of the uncertainty of human knowledge, applies
itself entirely to moral problems.? The proper aim

1 Fin3.7, 25; Tuse.v.24 sg.; ὁ. 21, 71.
NV. D, ii, 1, 3; cf. the following 4 Fin. v. 6,15: Hoe (summo
note. bono) enim constituto in philo-
* Acad. ii. 41, 127; Tuse.v. sophia constituta sunt omnia,
3, 9; 24, 69; Hen. iv. δ, 12; &e.
vagm. from Hortensius, ap. 5 Acad. i. 4, 15; cf. Fin. ii.
Augustin. De Trin. xiv. 9. 1,1; Zuse. v. 4, 10.
3 Off. i. 43, 153; cf. ο. 9, 28;

PHILOSOPHICAL INCONSISTENCIES.

of philosophy, therefore, may be attained in spite of
the restriction of our knowledge: we know nothing
with absolute certainty; but we know that which is
most important with as much certainty as we require
to know it; scepticism is here merely the under-
lying base of a mode of thought, which is founded
upon the practically useful; and because this
tendency towards the practical best harmonised
with the disposition of the Roman and the states-
man, Cicero was more susceptible to the doctrine of
Carneades than he would otherwise have been; be-
cause purely theoretical enquiries already appeared
to him worthless and transcendental, he abandons
also the scientific proof of their impossibility ; but
as soon as his practical interests come in contact
with doubt he makes a retreat, and would rather
content himself with a bad expedient, than admit
the inevitable consequences of his own sceptical
statements.

If we ask, then, from whence we are to derive
our positive convictions, we have already been told
that the probable is best discovered by the com-
parison and testing of different views: the positive
element in Cicero’s scepticism is that eclecticism,
which we shall presently have an opportunity of
examining further.! But in order to decide be-

1 It will here suffice to recall
the characteristic observations
in Off. iii. 4, 20: Nobis autem
nostra Academia magnam lucen-
tiam dat, ut quodeunque maxrvme
probabile occurrat id nostro jure
liceat defendere. Tuse. v. 11,

33: Tu quidem tabellis obdsig-
natis agis mecum et testificaris
guid dizerim aliquando aut
seripserim. Cum altis isto modo,
qui legibus impositis disputant ;
nos in diem vivimus ; quodcun-
que nostros animos probabilitate

157

CHAP.
Vi.

His eclee-
ticism.

ECLECTICISM.

tween opposite opinions, we must have the standard
of decision in our hands, and as philosophic enquiry
consists in this very proving of different views, such a
standard must be already given before every scientific
investigation. Two things seem then to be directly
present : the evidence of the senses and the evidence
of consciousness. Even the first, in spite of his
many complaints of the deception of the senses, is

‘not despised by Cicero ; he says that it would be

contrary to nature, and must make all life and
action impossible, if we admitted no conviction
(probare, not assentiri) and that among those con-
victions which force themselves upon us with the
greatest probability, the assurance of the senses
occupies one of the foremost places ;' for this reason
he employs sensible evidence as an example of the
highest certainty ; 2 and he himself in all his writ-
ings appeals generally to experience and historical
matters of fact. In accordance with his whole
tendency, however, he is forced to lay the chief
stress on the other side, on the witness internal to
us; for his interest belongs not to the external but
to the moral world, and even in his ethical doctrine

pereussit, id dicimus; itaque ut sit wisum illud probabile

solt sumus liber.

1 Acad. ii. 31, 99: Tale viswm
nullum esse, ut perceptio con-
sequeretur, ut autem prabatio,
multa. Htenim contra naturam
esset, st probabile nihil esset, δὲ
sequitur onnis vite. . . EVETSLO.
Ttaque et sensibus probanda
multa sunt, &e. Quecungue res
eum [sapientem] sic attinget,

neque ulla re impeditum (ἀπερί-
σπαστον, οἵ. Part ITT. 1.515 s¢.)
movebitur. Non enim est 8 sano
sculptus aut e robore dolatus.
Habet corpus, habet animum :
moovetur mente, movetur sensi-
bus: ut et multa vera videantur,
&c. Weque nos contra sensus
aliter dicimus, ae Stoici, &e.
2 Loe. cit. c. 37, 119.

INNATE KNOWLEDGE.

he throughout allies himself with those philosophers
who have made independence of the external and
dominion over sensuality their watchword. All our
conviction, therefore, according to Cicero, depends
in the last resort upon direct internal certainty, upon
the natural feeling for truth, or innate knowledge;
and this theory which gained so important an in-
fluence in the later, especially the Christian philo-
sophy, he was the first to enunciate definitely ;! for
though Plato and Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus had
preceded him with similar doctrines, yet our previous
enquiries have shown that none of these taught
innate knowledge in the strict sense: the reminis-
cence of ideas, according to Plato, must be awakened
by methodical study, and their content fixed; we
attain to the principles that are beyond proof,
according to Aristotle, by the scientific road of in-
duction ; the πρόληψις of Epicurus and the κοιναὶ
ἔννοιαι of the Stoics are only abstracted from ex-
perience. Here on the contrary there is an asser-
tion of a knowledge antecedent to all experience
and science, and concerning the most important
truths. The germs of morality are inborn in us,
if they could develop themselves undisturbed,
science would be unnecessary; only through the
perversion of our natural disposition arises the need
of a technical training to virtue.? The conscious-

1 It is possible, indeed, that
he may herein have followed
Antiochus; but how far this is
the case cannot now be ascer-
tained.

2 Tuse. iii. 1, 2: Sunt enim

angeniis nostris semina innata
virtutum; que x adolescere
liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam.
natura perduceret; only the
obscuring of natural conscious-
ness through evil habits and

Doctrine
cf innate
kuorledge.

160

CHAP.
VI.

ECLECTICISM.

ness of right is implanted in man by nature;
subsequently a tendency to evil is formed which
obscures it.1 Nature has endowed our spirit not
only with a moral disposition, but also with the
fundamental notions of morality preceding any
instruction, as an original dowry; it is only the
development of these innate notions which is in-
cumbent on us:? with reason, those impulses are
directly given which prompt men to moral com-
munity with others and the investigation of truth.?
The essence of moral activity may, therefore, be
deduced not merely from the intuition of distin-
guished men, but also from the universal conscious-
ness, with greater certainty than from any definition
of ideas; the nearer the individual still stands to
nature, the more keenly will this be reflected in
him: we learn from children what is according to
nature.* Belief in the Deity rests upon the same

choarit, nihil amplius. Itaque

false opinions makes a doctrine
nostrum est (quod nostrum dico,

and science necessary.

1 Legg. i. 18, 33: Atgue hoe
in omni hac disputatione sic
intelligi volo, jus quod dicam
naturam esse, tantam autem essé
corruptelam male consuetudinis,
ut ab ea tanquam igniculs ex-
Stinguantur ὦ natura dati
exortanturque Θὲ confirmentur
WEA CONtTATIA,

2 Fin. v. 21, 59: (Natura ho-
mint) dedit talem mentem, gue
omnem virtutem accipere posset,
angenutitgue sine doctrina
NMOLULAS POTVAS TETUM
MALLMATUM et quasi instituit
docere et induxit in ea que
enerant tanguam elementa vir-
tutis. Sed virtutem ipsam in-

artis est), ad ea principia que
accepimus conseguentia exgui-
rere, quod sit id gquoad volunvus
effectum.

3 Fin. ii. 14, 46: Hademque
ratio fecit hominem hominum
appetentem, &c. eadem
natura cupiditatem ingenwuit
homint vert imveniendi, &c.
Further evidence for these pre-
positions is easily to be found.

* Loe. cit. 14, 45 : [Honestum]
quale sit non tam definitione
qua sum usus intelligt potest
~ ++. guam communi omnium
judicto atque optimi cujusque
studvis atque factis. On the
same subject, vide v. 22, 61:

*

CRITERION OF TRUTH.

basis: by virtue of the human spirit’s affinity with
God, the consciousness of God is immediately given
with self-consciousness: man has only to remember
his own origin in order to be led to his Creator.
Nature, therefore, herself instructs us concerning
the existence of God,? and the strongest argument
for this truth is its universal recognition; for that
in which all agree without previous persuasion,
must always be regarded as an utterance of nature.3
The immortality of the soul must likewise belong to
these innate truths, of which we are convinced
through universal consent ;* and in the same way
Cicero seems to presuppose the freedom of the will

Indicant puert in quibus ut in
speculis natura cernitur.

» Legg. i. 8, 24: Animum...
esse ingeneratum ὦ Deo: ex quo
vere vel agnatio nobis eum
celestibus vel genus rel stirps
appellaré potest. Itaque ex tot
generibus nullum est animal
preter hominem quod habeat
notitiam aliquam Dei. Ipsisgue
in hominibus nulla gens est neque
tam tmmansueta neque tam sera,
qué non, etiamst ignoret gualem
habere Deum deceat, tamen
habendum sciat. Exe quo effi-
citur tllud, ut is agnoseat Deum,
quiunde ortus sit guast recor-
detur ae noscat.

2 Tusc. i. 16, 36: Deos esse
natura opinamur. CE ἋΣ D. 1.
1, 2.

3 Tuse. 1. 18, 30: Firmissi-
mum hoe afferri ridetur, cur
Deos esse evedamus, quod nulla
gens tam fera, nemo omnimn
tam sit immanis, cujus mentem
non imbuerit Deorum opinie.
Multi de Diis praca sentiunt ;

id enim vitioso more fieri. solet
(observe here the distinction
between mos and natura):
omnes tamen esse vim et natu-
ram dirinam arbitrantur. Nec
vero 14 collocutio hominum aut
consensus effecit : non institutis
opini est conjirmata, non legibus.
Omni autem in re consensio
omnium gentium ler nature
putanda est (cf. § 85; omnium
consensus nature vox est). Vide
also sup.notel. If Cicero else-
where makes his Academic
philosopher claim this proof
(ὧς D. i. 23, 62; iii. 4,11) from
the consensus gentium which is
put in the mouth of the Epi-
curean as well as the Stoic
(-V. D. 1. 16, 43 sq.; 11. 2, 5)
he implies here (i. 23, 62; iii.
40, 95) what is placed beyond
a doubt by passages from his
other works, that Cotta did not
express his opinion on the sub-
ject.
* Tuse. 1. 12 sq.3 15, 35 sq.

M

161

CHAP.
VILL

CHAP.

Promin-
ence of
ethics in
his philo-
sophy.

ECLECTICISM.

simply as an internal matter of fact." In a word,
philosophy, as well as morality, is here founded on
direct consciousness: this is the fixed point from
which the testing of philosophic opinions sets out, and
to which it returns.

The material results of Cicero’s philosophy have
nothing distinctive, and can therefore be only
shortly discussed in this place. As to the chief
philosophic sciences, dialectic is regarded merely in
the sceptical manner already mentioned. In the
domain of physics, theological and psychological
enquiries alone have any value for Cicero; questions
of other kinds—for instance, concerning the number
of the elements, whether there are four or five ; con-
cerning the material and efficient principle and the like
—-are only touched upon in cursory historical notices,
or in a sceptical comparison of different doctrines. In
the estimation of this philosopher, the chief thing is
ethics. With ethics, therefore, I commence.

Cicero develops his ethical principles, as, indeed,
his whole philosophic doctrine, in the criticism of
the four contemporary theories, the Epicurean, Stoic,
Academic, and Peripatetic. Of these four systems,
he opposes himself definitely to the first alone.
The Epicurean doctrine of pleasure appears to him
so strikingly to contradict the natural destiny and
natural necessities of man,” the facts of moral con-
sciousness and of moral experience, that we have
no need to enter more particularly into the remarks
with which he opposes it in the second book of De

1 De Fato, c. 14. 2 Fin. i. 7, 23, sq. ii. 14, &e.

ETHICS,

Finibus, and elsewhere—generally speaking, rather
in the tone of a rhetorician than in the severer strain
of a philosopher. On the other hand, his judgments
on the three remaining systems are far from being
consistent. Even as to the reciprocal relation of
these systems, heis never quite clear. For though he
remains true to the assertion of his master Antio-
chus in regard to the Academy and the Peripatetics
—viz. that these two schools, as they agree generally,
especially coincide in their ethics, and that the
feebler morality of Theophrastus and of later Peri-
patetics is not further removed from the moral
doctrine of the Academy than from the original
doctrines of Aristotle '—yet he is uncertain whether
he shall explain the difference between the Stoics
and these two schools as essential, or unessential,
as a divergence in fact or in words. While, on the one
hand, he repeatedly maintains distinctly and in his
own name, that, Zeno is really at one with his pre-
decessors, and only changes their expressions ;? on
the other, he gives a tolerably long list of the points
in which the Stoic morality differs from that of the
Academy and Peripatetics,? and he speaks of the
opposition, as we shall presently find, with a full
acknowledgment of its importance. Cicero cer-
tainly makes use of a very poor expedient to justify
this contradiction, when he says that, as a member
of the Academy, he has a right to follow the pro-
1 Acad.i. 6, 22; Fin. v.38,7 263 v. 8, 225; 25, 74; 29, 88
sq.3; 5,12; cf. 25,75; Luse.iv. Off.i.2, δ: Luse. v. 11, 34.

8,6; v. 30, 85; Off. ili. 4, 20. 3. Acad. i. 10.
2 Fin, iii. 8, 10 ὃφ.; Iv. 20-

uM 2

183

CHAP.
VI.

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.

bability of that time without regard to conse-
quences. But even for himself he seems unable
in this discussion to find any fixed standpoint. So
far, indeed, as the statements of both sides agree—
in the universal principles of life according to
nature, and in the unconditional appreciation of
virtue, he is quite sure of himself;* but as soon as
the roads diverge he knows no longer which he shall
follow. The grandeur, consistency, and severity of
the Stoic ethics excite his admiration; it appears
to him nobler to regard virtue as sufficient for
happiness and not to distinguish between the good
and the useful, than to assent to the opposite view
of the Peripatetics;* he finds the Stoics’ admis-
sion of the affections weak, and their moral prin-
ciples hazardous, since that which is faulty in its
nature, like the affections, should not merely be
restricted, or, still less, regarded as a help to virtue,
but wholly eradicated. He reproaches them with
the inconsistency of assuming goods with which the
happy man may dispense, and evils which he may
endure ; and thus distinguishing from the happiness
of the virtuous as such, a supreme happiness, and
from the perfect and complete life, a life that is
more than complete.> He prefers, therefore, to follow
the nobler mode of thought, to call the wise man
happy under all circumstances, even in the bull of

1 Tuse. v. 11, 33; supra, p. Ritter, iv. 134 sgq., 157 δῷ.
157, 1. 4 Tuse. iv. 18 sqq.; Off. i. 25,

2 Acad.i, 6,22; Fin.iv.10,&c. 88; cf. Acad. i. 10, 35, 38.

3 Tuse. v.1, 1; 25, 71; Off. 5 Fin, v. 27 sq.3 Tuse. v. 8--
iii, 4,20; cf. with the following, 12,15 sq.

ETHICS OF THE STOICS.

Phalaris;! he desires to adopt, at any rate tenta-
tively, the famous Stoic Paradoxes.2 If, however,
we enquire more closely into this Stoicism, it is
clear that our philosopher is not so certain about it
as we might have supposed from these utterances.
A man of the world, like Cicero, cannot conceal
from himself that the Stoic demands are much tov
exalted for men as they are, that the Stoic wise man
is not found in reality,? that the Stoic morality does
not admit of being transferred to daily life;* he
cannot possibly allow that all the wise are alike
happy, and all‘the unwise absolutely wretched, and
that there is no difference in value between the most
hardened wickedness and the most trivial offence.°
But he believes he can show that the severity of the
Stoies is not scientifically justifiable, and, moreover,
that it contradicted their own presuppositions ; for
if the first principle is life according to nature,
among the things according to human nature are
also to be counted sensible well-being, health, free-
dom from pain, and an untroubled mind—even
pleasure is not to be wholly despised. To live
according to nature is not to separate oneself from
nature, but rather to encourage and sustain it.®
These arguments draw our eclectic philosopher so
strongly to the side of the Peripatetics, that he
declares himself to be of their number.‘ The truth,

1 Tuse. v. 26. 8 Fin. iv. 11-15; Cato, 14,
2 Paradoxra. 46; Yuse. ii. 13, 30.

3 Zel.5,18; οἵ, Off. iii. 4, 16. 7 In the fourth book of De
4 Fin. iv. 9, 21. Finibus, it is Cicero himself

5 Fin. iv. 9, 21; 19,55; 28, who brings forward the Peri-
17 sq. Ci. OF. 1. 8. 27. patetic view.

166

CHAP.
Vi.

ECLECTICISM.

however, is only finally expressed in his confession
that sometimes the consideration of his own weak-
nesses, and of human weaknesses generally, in-
clines him to the laxer doctrine, and, at other times,
the thought of the majesty of virtue inclines him to
the stricter ;! he comforts himself therefore for his
vacillation, by the conviction that it can exercise no
essential influence on practical conduct, since even
on the Peripatetic theory, a far higher value must
be assigned to virtue than to all else.’

It would be difficult to discover in these propo-
sitions any new principle, and in the Ciceronian
ethics generally any other characteristic than that
of an eclectic and popular philosopher ; for even the
trait on which Ritter lays stress,? viz. that with
Cicero, the honourable (honestum) takes the place of
the beautiful (καλὸν) and that in connection there-
with he ascribes greater value to glory than the
Greeks did, even this is partly a mere difference of
language, having no influence on the content of the
moral principle; and partly it is a concession to the
Roman spirit, which, being devoid of any scientific
foundation, can only be regarded as a further proof
of the uncertainty of Cicero’s manner of philosophis-
ing. All the less reason is there to enter further
into the details of Cicero’s ethical and political prin-
ciples than has already been done.* Striking as
many of his remarks on these subjects may be, they
show too little connection with definite philosophic

1 Tuse. v. 1, 3. 8 IV. 162 sgq.
2 Off. iii. 3, 11. 4 Phil. d. Gr. ΤΠ1.1. Ὁ. 276 sq.

THEOLOGY.

principles to allow us to attribute to them any
importance in the history of philosophy. His
theories concerning the Deity and the essential
nature of the soul must, however, be shortly men-
tioned.

The belief in a Deity, as already observed, ap-
pears to our philosopher to be required, not
merely by immediate consciousness, but also by
moral and political interest. Without religion, he
thinks, truth and justice, and all human social
life would be at an end.! But the other argu-
ments for the existence of God are not entirely
repudiated by him, and he brings forward the
teleological argument especially, in spite of the
criticism of the Academy which meets it in its
Stoic form,? with full conviction.* In regard to
the nature of God, Cicero is, no doubt, in earnest
in the remark which he places in the mouth of
his Academic philosopher, viz. that nothing can
be asserted with perfect certainty, about it;* but,
so far as the probable may be determined, he
thinks he may venture to presuppose not only the
unity of God® but also His spirituality ;° this, how-

1 N. 2.1. 2, 4; cf. 11.61, 153. 7, 22; Somn. Seip. (Rep. vi. 17)
Hence (NM. JD. iii. 2, δ; Legg. 3, 8 et pass.
ii. 7, 15) the observations on § Tuse. 1. 27, 66: Nee vero
the political necessity of relig- Deus ipse qui intelligitur a
jon. nobis alio modo intelligi potest,
2 N. D. iii. 10, 24; 11, 37. nist mens soluta quedam et
3 Dirin. 11. 72, 1485 Tuse.i. libera, segregata ab omni con-

28 sy. erettone mortali, omnia sentiens
4 N. D. i. 21, 60sg.; ch Li. et morens ipsaque predita motu
40, 95. sempiterno. ep. vi. 17, 8;

5 Tusc. 1. 23; 27; Legg. i. Legg. ii. 4, 10, &e.

CHAP,

ITig
theology.

168

CHAP.
VI.

ECLECTICISM.

ever, he does not apprehend in a very strict sense,
for he admits the possibility | that the Divine Spirit
may be conceived, according to the Stoic view, as
air or fire; or with Aristotle, so far as Cicero under-
stood him,? as ethereal essence: in the dream of
Scipio, the supreme heaven, in agreement with this
misconception of Aristotle is declared to be itself
the highest god. But this closer definition of the
conception of Deity had scarcely much value for
Cicero himself. For him the belief in Providence
is of far greater importance, though he allows even
this to be doubted by his Academic philosopher.*.
Since he chiefly regards religion from the practical
point of view, the whole significance of it is in his
opinion comprehended in a belief in a divine govern-
ment of the world:* the law of justice and morals
is for him the type of the divine world-ruling wisdom.®
From this standpoint only a negative or external
relation was possible to the popular religion, unless,
indeed, the violent methods of the Stoic orthodoxy
were to be followed ; when, therefore, Cicero desires
that the existing religion and even the existing

1 Tuse. i. 26, 65; cf. c. 29.

2 Tuse. 1.10, 22; M.D. i. 13,
33; Acad, i. 7, 22.

3 Rep. vi. 11, 4.

4 N. Ὁ. iii. 10; 25-39. Ritter
(iv. 147, 150) deduces from
these passages that Cicero dis-
believed in Providence, and
opposed the Natural to the
Divine, setting on the one side
God without Nature, and, on
the other, Nature without God;
but I cannot agree with this,

for we are not justified, in the
face of so many contradictory
explanations (vide WV. D. 111. 40),
in identifying Cicero’s own
opinion with that here brought
forward.

5 Many passages in which
Cicero treats of Providence are
quoted by Ktihner, 7. 6. p. 199.
I merely refer in this place to.
Tuse.i. 49,118; N. D. 1. 2, 8;
Legg.i. 1: 1.1, 8.

§ Legg. ii. 4, 8.

VIEWS OF HUMAN NATURE.

superstitions shall be maintained in the State, he is
speaking entirely from political considerations;
personally, he not only makes no attempt to justify
polytheism and its myths after the manner of the
Stoics, but he shows by many utterances, and,
above all, by the sharp criticism to which he subjects
the popular belief in gods in his third book De
Natura Deorwm; and soothsaying in his second
book De Divinatione, how far he himself stands
from the national religion. Reverence for the Deity,
which is consistent with a true view of nature, and
coincides with true morality, is to be required ; the
existing religion is to be maintained for the good
of the commonwealth; superstition, on the other
hand, is to be torn up by the roots ?—such, in a
word, is Cicero’s theological confession of faith.
With the belief in God, according to Cicero’s
view, as we have already seen, the conviction of
the dignity of human nature is intimately con-
nected. This conviction also depends far more
with him upon inner experience and moral self-
consciousness than on any philosophic theory con~
cerning the essential nature of the soul. If we
consider the number of our endowments, the lofti-
ness of our vocation, the high prerogative which
reason confers upon us, we shall become conscious
of our higher nature and descent.? Accordingly

1 WN. D. iii. 2,5; Legg.ii.7 sq.; ii. 28, Τὶ (Phil. ὦ. Gr. ΤΙ. i. τ.
18, 32; Divin. ii.12, 28; 33,70; 311, 1).
72, 148. 3 Legg. i. T sq., 22 8η.: Rep.
2 Divin. ii. 72,148 sq.3 VN. Ὁ. vi. 17, 8.

Anthro-
pology.

170

CHAP.

Vi.

ECLECTICISM.

Cicero, in agreement with the Stoic and Platonic
doctrine, regards the soul as an emanation of the
Deity, an essence of supernatural origin;' without
troubling himself to develop this notion more par-
ticularly, or to define the relation between this
supernatural origin of the soul, and the material
origin of the body. But, as he is uncertain about
the nature of God, so he expresses himself hesi-
tatingly about that of the soul, and though his
inclination unmistakably tends to explain it as an
immaterial substance, or, at any rate, asa substance
differing from terrestrial matter,? he will not alto-
gether exclude the possibility that it consists of air
or fire; it is only the coarser materiality of the
body that he unconditionally denies in respect to
the soul.2 The immortality of the soul he defends
at length, partly on the ground of direct conscious-
ness and universal agreement,* and partly by the
Platonic arguments;° if he also tries to silence
the fear of death, even supposing that souls perish
in death,§ this is merely the prudence of the
Academician and of the practical man who would

1 Tuse.i. 27 : Animorum nulla
in terris origo inveniri potest,
&e. Loe. cit. 25, 60; Legg. 1.
8, 24: Hastitisse quandam ma-
turitatem serendi generis ha-
mint, quod sparsum in terras
atque satum diving auetum sit
animorum maunere. Cumgue
alia quibus coherent honvines 6
mortali generé sumpserint, que
Sragilia essent et caduca, ani-
mum tamen esse ingeneratum &
Deo. Cf. Cato, 21, 77.

2 Tuse. 1. 27; 29, 70.

3 Tusc. 1. 25, 60: Mon est
Gerté NEC COTALS NEC SUMGUINAS NCC
cerebri nec atomorum. Anima
sit animus ignisve nescio ; néc meé
pudet, ut istos, fateri me nescire
guod NESCiaM 5 l. 4.26, 65; 29, 70.

4 Tuse.i. 12 sqq.; Lel.c. 4
Cato, c. 21 sqg.

5. Tse. i. 22 sqq.; Rep. vi.
17, 8; Cato, 21, 78.

6 Tuse. i. 84 sqq.; Lp. ad
Famil. v. 16.

VARRO,

make the moral effect of his discourses as far as
possible independent of all theoretic presuppositions.
He tries to prove free will as generally understood
in the same manner as immortality, but the treatise
which he devoted to the subject,' and which has been
transmitted to us full of lacune, contains no inde-
pendent psychological enquiry.

These traits will suffice to justify the position
which we have assigned to Cicero, and to prove him,
together with his teacher Antiochus, the truest re-
presentative of philosophic eclecticism m the last
century before our era. But that he was far from
standing alone in respect to this kind of philosophy
among his countrymen and contemporaries will be
clear from our previous examination of the school of
Antiochus.? Among the Roman adherents of thismode
of thought, M. Terentius Varro,® the learned friend of
Cicero was, after Cicero himself, the most important.
His principal achievements lie indeed in another
sphere ;* as a philosopher he did not exercise any-
thing like the widespread influence of Cicero,
though his historical knowledge of Greek philo-

sophy was perhaps more

1 De Fato. The principal
propositions of this treatise (c.
11) are taken from Carneades.

2 Supra, p. 99.

3 The life of Varro falls
between 116 and 27 B.c. For
‘the rest, vide concerning him
the histories of Roman litera-
ture—Bihr, in Pauly’s Real-
encyc. ὦ. Klass. <Alterth. vi.
1688 sqq., and the authori-

thorough and complete.

ties there quoted, Kritsche,
Gott. Stud. 1845, ii. 172 46.;
Ritschl, ‘Die Schriftstellerei des
WM. Ter. Varro, Rhein. Mus.
VV, #. vi. 481-560; Mommsen,
Rim. Gesch. iii, 602 sqq., 624 87.

* As Cicero (Acad. 1. 2, 4 844.)
represents him as saying of
himself, though he has pre-
viously praised his knowledge
of philosophy.

171

CHAP,
Vit

Varro,
also ῷ
Roman
eclectic
and a
triend of
Cicero.

His view
of phito-
sophy and
thé vari-
ous sects.

ECLECTICISM.

Yet the philosophical direction taken by so famous.
a, scholar! and so well known an author must neces-
sarily have been influential. This direction was,
Cicero assures us,? that of Antiochus, whose lec-
tures Varro had attended in Athens;? and Varro
in his treatise on philosophy, so far as we can
gather from Augustine,* expressed himself quite
in the sense of Antiochus.2 The sole aim of
philosophy, he here tells us, is the happiness of
man; consequently those distinctions of doctrine
among the schools of philosophy are alone to be
considered important which relate to the definition
of the highest good.® Great, therefore, as is the

1 Doctissimus Romanorum he
is called in Sen. Ad Helv. 8, 1;
and again very justly, vir fo-
manorum eruditissinus (Quintil.
x.1,95. Cicero(Acad. Fr. 36).
says of him (ap. Augustine, Civ.
D.vi. 2), Homine omnium facile
acutissimo et sine ulla dubita-
tione doctissimo ; and Augustine
(1. 6.) says he is doctrina atque
sententiis ita refertus that in
respect to matters of fact he
has achieved as much as Cicero
did as a stylist.

2 Ad Att. xiii.12: Ergo wllam
ἀκαδημικὴν . . . ad Varronem
transferamus. Htenim sunt ’Ar-
τιόχεια, gue iste valde probat ;
ὦ. ὁ. 19; ὦ, ὁ. 25. In Varro’s
mouth is placed, as we know,
the doctrine of Antiochus, in
the second edition of the Aca-
demica (Acad. i. 4 sqq.). Vide
what is quoted from Antiochus,
sup. Ὁ. 94, with which Acad. 1.
2, 6, agrees: Nostra tu physica
nosti: que cum contineantur
ex effectione et ex materia ea,
quam fingit et format effectio, Ke.

8 Cic. Acad. i.3,12; 1,1,3;
Ad Famil. ix. 8; August. Civ.
D. xix. 3,2: Varro asserit, aue-
tore Antiocho, magistro Ciceronis
et suo.

4 Civ. Ὁ. xix. 1-3.

5 Of. with what follows, the
account of Antiochus supra,
p. 94. In regard to this it is
to be observed that Varro’s
book, according to Cic. Acad.
i. 2, 4 sgq., is later than the
expositions of Cicero there
made use of, only one of which
is put into the mouth of Varro.

6 Loe ett. 1,3: Meque enim
existimat ullam philosophie sec-
tam esse dicendam, que non 60"
distet a ceteris, quod diversos-
habeat fines bonorum et malo-
yum. Quandoguidem nulla est
homini causa philosophandt,
nisi ut beatus sit: quod autem
beatum facit, tpse est finis boni:
nulla est igitur causa philoso-
phandi, nisi finis boni: quam-
obrem que nullum boni finem
sectatur, nulla philosophia secta.
dicenda est.

THE HIGHEST GOOD.

number of possible sects—Varro, sometimes indeed
adopting very superficial grounds of distinction,
enumerates no fewer than 288!—they may all
be reduced to a few chief classes, if putting aside
all that does not relate to the conception of the
highest good we confine ourselves to the main ques-
tion.2 But this concerns the relation of virtue to the
first thing according to nature,’ on which again de-
pends its relation to all included herein, and therefore
especially to pleasure and freedom from pain. Is
the first thing according to nature to be desired for
the sake of virtue, or virtue for the sake of the
thing according to nature, or both for their own
sakes? This, according to Varro, is the funda-

1 In their derivation, Varro
(2. 6.1, 2) proceeds thus: There
are, he says, four natural objects
of desire: sensual pleasure, ab-
sence of pain, the combina-
tion of these two, and, as
a fourth, the prima nature,
which beside these include all
other natural advantages of
soul and body. Each of the
four can be desired for the sake
of virtue (the excellence super-
added to nature by the instru-
mentality of teaching) or virtue
may be desired for its own
sake, or both may be desired
independently. Thus we obtain
four possible divisions. These
become twenty-four, so far as
a man desires each of them
merely for his own welfare or
for that of others. The twenty-
four are again divided into
forty-eight, of which the one
half pursue their end as true,

like all other dogmatic philoso-
phers; the other as merely
probable, like the new Academy.
Since, moreover, each of them
can adopt the ordinary, or the
Cynic, manner of life (habitus
et consuetudo) there result
ninety-six divisions instead of
forty-eight. Lastly, because in
each of these sections, regard
may be had to the theoretical
(otiosus), the practical (negotio-
gus), or to a life compounded of
both, we must treble this num-
ber, and thus we arrive at
288.)

Ξ That this is the case with
the majority of the divisions
named by him, Varro himself
shows, ὦ. δ. i. 3, ὦ, 2, begin-
ning.

3 The prima nature, primi-
genia nature τὸ τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ
φύσιν (cl. Phil. d. Gr. TI. i. p.
309, 1; 257, 2; 258, 1).

Fis
ethies.

174 ECLECTICISM.

mental question of all philosophy.’ For a reply to
it, he goes back to the conception of man, as it
is only on this basis we can decide what is the
highest good for man. But man is neither body
nor soul exclusively, but consists of both together.
His highest good must, therefore, consist of goods
of the body as well as goods of the soul; and he
consequently must desire for himself the first things
according to nature and virtue.? But the highest
of these goods is virtue, the art of life acquired by
instruction. As it includes in itself that which is
according to nature, which also was present before
the existence of virtue—virtue now desires all for
its own sake, and in considering itself as the princi-
pal good, it enjoys also all other goods, and ascribes
to each the value belonging to it according to its
relation to the others ; but equally does not hesitate,
on this account, to sacrifice the lesser, if so it must
be, to the greater. When virtue is wanting, no
matter how many other kinds of goods there may
be, they do not profit their possessor, they are
not his goods, because he makes a bad use of them.
In the possession of virtue and of the bodily and
mental advantages conditioning it, lies happiness ;
this increases when other goods with which virtue
in itself could dispense, are added; it is perfected

CHAP.
VI.

1 Loe. cit. ο. 2.

2 ©. 3, 1. That the prima
nature in which Varro has
previously included natural
advantages and dispositions of
mind, is here identified with
the totality of corporeal goods,

is an inaccuracy which we
must ascribe to Varro himself,
and not merely to Augustine.

8 Virtutem, quam doctrina
imserit velut artem vivendi—
virtus, ὦ. 6. ars agende vita,
l. 6.

HAPPINESS,

when all goods of soul and body are found together
and complete.' But to this happiness also belongs
sociability, and to virtue the disposition which
wishes for others for their sakes the same goods as
itself ; and this disposition must extend not only to
the family and state to which each man belongs,
but also to mankind and to the whole world, heaven
and earth, gods and men.? Its external realisation
is to be sought neither in the theoretical nor in the
practical life as such, but in the combination of the
two. But it must be absolutely sure of its principle:
the principles concerning goods and evils must not
be considered merely probable by us as by the philo-
sophers of the Academy, they must be unquestion-
able. This is the doctrine of the old Academy
which Varro, like his master Antiochus, professes.
In this discussion we find no remarkable philosophic
peculiarity: it contains no new thoughts, and what
belongs to Varro himself in the views of Antiochus
transmitted by him is characterised neither by
acuteness of judgment nor by vivacity of style.
But we can at least see that Varro had arrived at

these views by his own

1 Hee ergo vita hominis, que
eirtute et altis anim et corpo-
vis bonis, sine guibus virtus esse
non potest (to these belong, as
is afterwards explained, life,
reason, memory), fruitur, beata
esse dicitur: si vero et atiis,
sine quibus esse virtus potest,
vel ullis vel pluribus, beatior :
si autem prorsus omnibus, ut
nullum omnino bonum desit
rel animi vel corporis, beatis-

reflection, and that the

stma (c. 3, 1, 2. 8. further on).

* Varro is therefore quite at
one with the Stoiccosmopolitan-
ism; but he deduces from it the
proposition that man can feel
himself at home everywhere:
exile, he says, (ap. Sen. Ad
Helv. 8, 1) is not in itself an
evil, guod quocumque venimus
eadem rerum natura utendum
est.

3 Aug. ὦ, 8. 8. 2.

175

CHAP.
VI.

176

CHAP.
VI.

Anthropo-
logy and
theology.

ECLECTICISM.

whole tendency of Antiochus corresponded to his
way of thinking: that which must have recom-
mended it to him and to his countrymen, was
chiefly no doubt the practical aim of this philosophy,
and that regard to the necessities of life which is
prominent in its theories concerning the various
constituents of the highest good, and the relative
value of them.

But the greater the influence allowed by Antio-
chus to the Stoic doctrine,! the less can we wonder
if Varro approached it in regard to some other ques-
tion still more closely than in his ethics. If he
explained the soul to be air which is breathed in
through the mouth and warmed in the breast, in
order to spread itself thence through the body,’
by reducing it to the Pneuma he allied himself with
the Stoic materialism, to which Antiochus also is
no stranger.* He further discriminated with the
Stoics the well-known three gradations and forms
of soul-life.© But his connection with the Stoic
theology is of especial importance. In agreement
with it, he explained the universe or, more pre-
cisely, the soul of the universe as the Deity: only
the parts of this world-soul, the souls ruling in the

1 CE. sup. Ὁ. 92.

* He himself, according to
Cicero (Brut. 56, 205; Acad. i.
2, 8) had the disciple of Panz-
tius, L. Allius Stilo (sup. p.
11, 4), for his instructor.

* Lactant. Opif. D.17: Varro
ita definit : anima est aér con-
ceptus ore, defervefactus in pul-

mone, temperatus in corde, dif.
Susus in corpus. Of. Varro, Z.
Lat. v. 59: sive, ut Zeno Citius,
animalium semen ignis is que
anima ac mens.

* Vide sup. p. 95 sqq.

* Augustine, Civ. D. vii. 2,
see following note.

THEOLOGY.

different parts of the world, are they who are wor-
shipped in the gods of polytheism, down to the

genii and heroes.'

But, like Panetius and Scevola,

he drew a marked distinction between natural and

philosophical, mythical and civil theology,? and if

1 Augustin. Civ. D. iv. 31:
Varro says: Quod hi soli εἰ vide-
antur animadrertissée quid esser
Deus, gui erediderunt eum essé
animam motu ae ratione mun-
dum gubernantem. Loe. eit.
vii. 6 (c. 9 repeatedly): Dicit
ergo idem Varro... Deuin se
arbitrari esse animam mundi

..et hung ipsum mundum
esse Deum: sed sicut hominem
sapientem, cum sit ex corpore et
animo, tamen ab animo dict
sapientem ; ita mundum Deum
dici ab animo, cum sit ee animo
et corpore. Loc. cit. vil. 28:
(Varro in the book concerning
the Dii selecti) tres esse afirmat
anime gradusixn omni univer-
saque natura, those discussed in
Phil. d@. Gr. TIL.i. 192: Nature,
the irrational soul, and reason.
Hane partem anime mundi
(their rational part, their ἦγε-
μονικὸν) dicit Deum, in nobis
autem genium vocari. Lsseé au-
tem in mundo lapides acterram
... ut ossa, ut ungues Dei.
Solem vero, lunam, stellas, que
sentimus quibusyue ipse sentit,
sensus esse ejus. <Aithera porro
animum €8sé Ejus: e& cujus vt
que perrenit in astra ipsam
quoque facere Deos (it makes
into Gods); et per ea quod in
terram permeat, Deam Tel-
lurem, quod autem inde per-
meat tn mare atque oceanum,
Deum esse Neptunwum. Simi-
larly inc. 6, the world is divided

into heaven and earth, the
heavens into ether and air, the
earth into water and earth:
guam [guas| omnes quatuor
partes animurum esse plenas,in
@there et αὖγ immortalium, in
aqua et terra mortalium ; from
the outermost circle of heaven,
as far as to the sphere of the
moon, extend the heavenly
gods; between this and the
region of clouds aéreas esse
animas ... et rocari heroas et
lares et genios. Also in 1. e.
c. 9. he (for only Varro can be
intended) calls Jupiter, Deus
hahens potestatem causarum,
φεῖδι aliquid fit in mundo;
in c. ll, and c. 13, he appro-
priates to himself (for Augus-
tine must have taken this from
him) the verses of Soranus
(sup. Ὁ. 13, n. end), in which
Jupiter is called progenitor
genitrixque Detim; and in c.
28 he derives the male divini-
ties from heaven or Jupiter as
the active principle, and the
female divinities from the earth
or Juno as the passive principle,
while Minerva denotes the ideas
as prototypes. That all these
propositions are either directly
Stoic, or allied with Stoicism,
is evident from the proofs ad-
duced in Phil. d. Gr. ΤΠ1.1. Ὁ. 138
sqg.; 146, 6; 315 sgqg. 325.

2 Aug. d. δ. vi. 5: Tria genera
dicit esse (in the last books of
the Antiquities, cf. c. 3)...

N

178

CHAP.
Vi

ECLECTICISM.

he censured the mythology of the poets for relating
the most absurd and unworthy things about the
gods,' he did not conceal that he had also much to
blame in the public religion: for example, he de-
clared that the worship of images was a defilement
of the true worship of God ;? that, for his part, the
philosophic doctrine of the Deity would suffice,? and
that he regarded the religion of the State merely
as a civil institution, which, in the interest of the
commonwealth, must make the most important con-
cessions to the weakness of the masses. In all this
there is nothing which goes beyond the Stoic doc-
trine as taught by Panetius, but nothing on the

eorumgue unum mythicon ap-
pellari, alterum physicon, ter-
tium civile. The first includes
the poets, the second the philo-
sophers, the third states (o-
γι). In the first there is
much that is opposed (vide
following note) to the nature
and dignity of the Deity ; to the
second belong—Dit qui sint,
ubi, quod genus, quale, ὦ quo-
nam temporé an ὦ sempiterno
Juerint; an δ igne sint
ut credit Heraclitus, an ex
numeris ut Pythagoras, an ex
atomis ut ait Epicurus. Ste
alias, que facilius intra pa-
rietes in schola, quam extra in
Soro ferre possunt aures.

1 Loe. cit. (vide the previous
note) with the addition : Zn hoc
enim est, ut Deus alius ex ca-
pite alius ex femore sit alius ex
guttis sanguinis natus ; in hoe,
ut Dit furati sint, ut adultera-
verint, ut servierint homini:
denique in hoc omnia Diis at-

tribuuntur, gue non modo in
hominem sed etiam in contemp-
tissimum hominem cadere pos-
SUNT.

2 Loe. cit. iv. 81. ‘The an-
cient Romans,’ says Varro, wor-
shipped the gods for 170 years,
without images: Quod, si ad-
hue inquit, mansisset, castius
Dir observarentur (vi. 7). Fa
tetur sicut forma humana Deos
Jecerunt, tta eos delectari hu-
manis voluptatibus credidisse.

3 Loe. cit. iv. 81. Varro hime
self confesses that if he had to
found a State anew, ex nature
potius formula Deos nominaque
eorum 86 fuisse dedicaturum.

* That he regarded the re-
ligion of the State as a political
institution, is evident from J. 6.
vi. 4, where Varro says, if he
had to treat de omni natura
Deorum, he would first have to
speak of the gods, and then of
men; but as he has only to do
with the gods of the State he

THEOLOGY.

other hand that is incompatible with the Stoicising
eclecticism of an Antiochus.!

follows the contrary order.
For sicut prior est, inquit,
pictor quam tabula picta, prior
Jaber quam edificium, ita prio-
res sunt civitates quam ea que
Φ civitatibus sunt instituta.
How little the real philoso-
phical doctrine of the gods
was worth as a public religion,
we have already seen (sip.
p. 177, 2). A publie religion
must include in it much that
is mythological. <Ait enim, ea
que scribunt poéte@ minus esse
quam ut populi sequi debeant ;
que autem philosophi plus quam
ut ea vulgus scrutari expediat.
Que sie abhorrent, inquit, ut

‘A

tamen ex utroque genere ad
eiviles rationes assumpta sint
non pauca. The philosophers,
indeed, desire to teach by their
enquiries, and so far (ὦ. 6.) it
may be said, physicos utilitatis
causa scripsisse, pottas delecta-
tionis. But this teaching is
only for those who understand
it, not for the masses.

1 As Krische (ὦ, 6. 172 sq.)
rightly maintains, against Ὁ,
Miiller’s assertion (Varro, 7%.
Lat. 5. v.) that Cicero incor-
rectly makes Varro a follower
of Antiochus, whereas he went
over to the Stoics.

lV

CHAP,

180

CHAP.
Vil.

ἘΠ Sehoal

of the
Sextit.

the school.

ECLECTICISM.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SCHOOL OF THE SEXTII.

THE school of the Sextii occupies a peculiar position
among the Roman philosophers. But even this school
was not so independent of the contemporary Greek
philosophy, nor were its achievements so important,
as to obtain for it any extensive influence or long
History of Curation. Its founder, Quintus Sextius, wasa Roman,
of good family, a somewhat later contemporary of
Augustus,! who had rejected a political career in
order to devote himself wholly to philosophy.” After

1 Sen. Lp. 98, 13: Honores
reppulit pater Sextius, gui ita
natus, ut rempublicam deberet
capessere, latum clavum divo
Julio dante non recepit. As
this must have occurred at
latest in 43 B.c., and Sextius
must have been at least 25-27
years old (cf. Ott, Charakter
und Urspr. der Spriche des
Sextius, Ὁ. 1), his birth must be
placed in 70 B.c. or even some-
what earlier. When Eusebius,
Chron. zu Ol. 195, 1 (1 A.D.),
dates the prime ‘of Sextus
the Pythagorean philosopher’
at that period, he is too late
if our Sextius be meant. That
Seneca was personally ac-
quainted with the older Sextius
is not probable; the passages

quoted by Ott, p. 2, 10, rather
indicate the contrary. ip. 59,
7; 64, 2 sgq.; De Tra, li. 36, 1,
refer only to his treatise. De
Ira, iii. 36, 1, may either have
been taken from a written work
or from oral tradition. Zp.73,
12, may have been taken from
such a tradition. In tip. 108,
17, Seneca gives an account of
the doctrines of Sextius, after
Sotion, as he himself says.

* Vide the preceding note,
and Plat. Prof. in Virt. 5, p.
77: καθάπερ φασὶ Σέξτιον τὸν
Ῥωμαῖον ἀφεικότα τὰς ἐν τῇ πό-
λει τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς διὰ φιλοσοφίαν,
ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν αὖ πάλιν
δυσπαθοῦντα καὶ χρώμενον τῷ
λόγῳ χαλεπῷ τὸ πρῶτον, ὀλίγον
δεῆσαι καταβαλεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἔκ τινος

MEMBERS OF THE SCHOOL.

his death his son appears to have undertaken the

guidance of the school.'

Among its adherents we

find mention of Sotion of Alexandria, whose enthusi-
astic disciple Seneca had been in his early youth; ?
Cornelius Celsus, a prolific writer ;? Lucius Crassitius

of Tarentum,* and Fabianus Papirius.®

διήρους. This transition from
practical activity to philosophy
seems to be referred to in Plin.
fist. Nat. xviii. 28, 274. Pliny
here relates how Democritus
had enriched himself with his
traffic (this is also related of
Thales) in oil (vide Phil. ὦ. Gr.
I. 766) but had returned his
gains to those who had shared
in it; and he adds: Hoe postea
Sextius ¢ Romanis sapientie ad-
sectatoribus dthenis fecit eadem
ratione: which does not mean
that he carried on the same
traffic, but merely that he si-
lenced those who blamed him
for devoting himself to philo-
sophy, in asimilar manner, and
for his part renounced all
profits.

1 There is no express tradi-
tion of this ; but as the school
is universally described as the
school of the Sextii (see the
folowing note), and the elder
Sextius as a philosopher is dis-
tinguished from his son by the
addition of Pater (Sen. Ep.
98, 13; 64, 2), it is extremely
probable,

2 Sen. Hp. 108,17 sgq.; 49, 2.
The age at which he heard
Sotion, Seneca designated by
the word juvenis, in Hp. 108 ;
in Bp. 49, by puer. It may,
therefore, have occurred in 18-
20 A.D. This date is also in-
dicated by Zp. 108, 22; cf.

It became,

Tac. dun. ii. 85. For the dis-
tinction between this Sotion
and the Peripatetic of the same
name, ride Phil.d. Gr. II. ii. 3,
and infra ch. xi. note 2. In
support of the theory that the
teacher of Seneca, and not the
Peripatetic, was the author of
the treatise wep! ὀργῆς, Diels,
Doxogr. 255 sq., rightly appeals
to the similarity between a
fragment from Sotion’s περὶ
ὀργῆς (ap. Stob. Fleril. 20, 53)
and Seneca, De Ira, ii. 10, 5.
Also the repeated quotation of
utterances of Sextius, De Tra,
i. 36, 1, points to this source.

> Quintil. x. 1, 124: Scripsit
non parum multa Cornelius
Celsus, Sextioz secutus, non sine
cultu ae nitore. For further
details concerning this phy-
sician and polyhistor, vide Bern-
hardy, Rom. Litt. 848.

4 A grammarian, who had
already won for himself con-
siderable fame as a teacher,
especially in Smyrna, when he
dimissa repenté schola transtit
ad Quintt Septimii [Π. Sextii]
philusophi sectam. Sueton. De
Illustr. Gramm. 18.

5 This philosopher (of whom
Seneca, Brevit. Fit. 10,1; Zp.
11,4; 40,12; 100, 12, speaks
as Of a deceased contemporary
whom he had himself known
and heard) was, according to
these passages, a man of excel-.

181

CHAP.
VI.

182

CHAP.
VII.

ECLECTICISM.

however, extinct with these men: lively as was the
applause which at first greeted it, in Seneca’s later

years it had already long since died out.!

The

writings of this school, too, have all been lost, with
the exception of some scattered utterances of the
elder Sextius, of Sotion, and Fabianus.?

lent character, non ex his cathe-
drariis philosophis, sed ex veris
et antiquis (Brevit. Vit. 10). His
lectures and expositions are also
greatly praised by Seneca (ip.
40, 12; 58, 6; 100); and in
Ἐν. 100, 9, he is described as
an author to whom, in regard
to style, only Cicero, Pollio, and
Livius are to be preferred,
though certain deficiencies in
him are admitted. Seneca also
says in the same place that
he wrote nearly as much on
philosophy as Cicero; and he
mentions besides (ὦ. 6. 1) his
Libri Artium Civilium. The
ectures to the people which
are alluded to in Zp. 52, 11,
seem to have been of a philo-
sophical character. The older
Seneca, Controvers. ll. Pref,
says that he was a disciple of
Sextius (the elder) by whom he
was persuaded to devote him-
self to philosophy instead of
rhetoric. To his manner of
writing, Seneca is less partial.
Some utterances of his are
to be found ap. Sen. Cons. ad
Mare. 23,5; Brevit. Vit. 10,1;
13, 9; Wat. Qu. iii. 27, ἃ.

1 Sen. Vat. Qw. vii. 82, 2:
Sextiorum nova et Romani
roboris secta inter initia sua,
cum magne impetu cappisset, ex-
stincta est.

2 Of these three philosophers
something has been preserved

by Seneca, and of Sotion also,
by Stobeus in the Plorilegium.
Moreover, acollection of maxims
exists in the Latin translation
of Rufinus, which was first
quoted by Orig. e. Cels. xiii. 30,
with the designation Σέξτου
γνῶμαι, is often used by Por=
phyry, 4d Marcellam, without
mention of the writer, and of
which there is a Syrian edition,
ap. Lagarde, Analecta Syr. Liz.
1858. (On the two Latin re-
censions of this and the later
editions, cf. Gildemeister in
the preface to his edition from
which I now cite; Sezxti
Sententiarum recensiones Lati-
nam Grecam Syriacas conjunc-
tim exh. Bonn. 1873). This col-
lection, sometimes called γνῷμαι
or sententiea, sometimes enchi-
gidion, and, since the time of
Rufinus, also annulus, was
much in use among the Chris-
tians. Its author is sometimes
named Sextus, sometimes Sixtus,
or Xystus; and while most
writers describe himas a Pytha-
gorean philosopher, others see
in him the Roman bishop Sixtus
(or Xystus, about 120 a.p). Of
more recent writers, many (60.
Lasteyrie, Sentences de Sextius,
Par. 1842; and Mullach, Fragm.
Philos. li. 31 sg.) regarded the
maxims as the work of a
heathen philosopher, and more
especially of one of the two

DOCTRINES.

Whatever can be deduced from these utter-
ances respecting the doctrine of the school, serves

Sextii. (How Ott, ὦ. 4. 1. 10,
discovers this opinion in my
first edition, I do not under-
stand.) On the other hand,
Ritter (iv. 178) believes them
to be the Christian rehabilita-
tion of a work belonging to a
Sextus, and possibly to our
Sextius, but in which so much
that is Christian is interwoven
that it has become entirely use-
less as an historical authority.
Ewald (Gétt. Aug. 1859, 1, 261
sqq.; Gesch. ἃ. V. Isr. vii. 321
8gq.) on his side declares the
Syrian recension of the collec-
tion of sayings to be the true
translation of a Christian ori-
ginal, the value of which he
cannot sufficiently exalt, and
the authorship of which he
ascribes to the Roman Sixtus.
Meinrad Ott, lastly, in three
discourses (Charakter und Ur-
sprung der Spriiche des Philo-
sophen Seatius, Rottweil, 1861;
Die Syrische ‘ Auserlesenen
Spriche, &c., ibid. 1862; Die
Syrische ‘ Auserlesenen Spriiche,’
ibid. 1863), maintains that the
sentences were composed by
the younger Sextius, in whom
the original tendency of the
Sextian school is said to have
been essentially modified—
partly by Pythagorean, partly
and especially by Jewish in-
fluences—and placed on a purely
monotheistic basis. But com-
pletely as he has proved against
Ewald that the Syrian recen-
sion is a later réchaugfé, in
which the original, translated
by Rufinus, is watered down,
and its original character obli-

terated, his own hypothesis is
nevertheless untenable. Inthe
first place the presupposition
that one of the two Sextii was
the author of the collected sen-
tences, would be most uncertain
if this work itself claimed such
authorship, for it only made its
appearance in the third century.
But we have no reason to think
that the writer of the sentences
wished to appear as one of the
two Sexti. The most ancient
authorities always call him
Sextus; later writers, subse-
quent to Rutinus, as we have
seen, also Sixtus, or Kystus, but
never Sextius (cf. Gildemeister,
ἦ. ἃ. lil. sgq.); so likewise Latin
MSS. (2. δ. xiv. 59.) and the
Syrian revyisers (2. δ. Xxx. 8q.),
who both say Xystus. We can,
therefore, only suppose that
the author called himself Sex-
tus, and not Sextius. Ott’s
theory would oblige us to sup-
pose a radical difference to
have existed between the doc-
trine of the elder Sextins (who,
to quote only this one passage,
was so opposed to the strict
monotheism of the sentences,
infra, p. 186, 4, that he calls
the highest god Jupiter) and
that of his son, whereas all the
ancient authorities, without ex-
ception, speak only of one school
of the Sextil; and equal vio-
lence must be done tothe sense
and the expression of the pas-
sage in Seneca, Vat. Qu. vii.
32 (wide preceding note) in
order to find in the Nora Sez-
tiorum Schola the school of the
younger Sextins as distinct

188

CHAP
VII.
its char-

acter ana

184

CHAP.

VII.

philo-
sophie
stand-
point.

ECLECTICISM.

to confirm the judgment of Seneca that it possessed
indeed great ethical importance and the vigour

from that of his father, espe-
cially as the predicate Romant
roboris entirely harmonises
with what Seneca elsewhere
says of the elder Sextius (Zp.
59, 7): Seatium . . . virwmn
acrem, Grecis verbis, Romanis
moribus philosophantem), and
would, on the contrary, be little
applicable to a mixture of Stoic-
Pythagorean philosophy with
Jewish dogmas. Lastly, and
this makes further argument
unnecessary, the references to
Christian conceptions and to
New Testament passages are so
unmistakable in the sentences,
that we cannot suppose their
origin to have been either
purely Roman, or Judaic and
Roman. For though many
echoes of Christian expression
and modes of thought (as Gil-
demeister shows, Ὁ. Χ 111.) are
merely apparent, or intro-
duced by Christian translators
and revisers, yet in the case of
others, as the same writer ad-
mits, the reference to definite
expressions in the New Testa-
ment is undoubted. At p. 39
the prospect is held out to
those who live wickedly that
they shall be plagued after
their death by the evil spirit,
usque quo exigat ab eis etiam
novissimum quadrantem. This
can only be explained as a
reminiscence of Matt. v. 26;
Ῥ. 20 refers to Maté. xxii. 21;
Ῥ. 110 to Matt. xv.11; 16 sgq.;
p. 193 to Matt. xix. 23; p. 242
to Matt. x. 8; p. 336 to Matt. xx.
28, where the διακονηθῆναι cor-
responds to the ministrari ab

aliis; p. 60 (cf. p. 58) to John,
i. 12. Less certain, but never-
theless probable, is the connec-
tion between pp. 233 and Matt.
v. 28; pp. 13, 273, and Matt. v.29
85.; Xvili.8 sq7.; Ὁ. 80 and 1 John,
i.5. Also the home Dei, Ὁ. 2,
188 (Rufinus’ translation first
introduces him at p. 3) belongs
to the Christian nomenclature
(vide 1 Tim. vi. 11; 2 Zim. iii.
17); likewise filiws Dei (pp. 58,
60, 135, 221, 439); verdeem Des
(pp. 264, 277,396, 413); judicium
(pp.14, 847); s@culum (pp. 15, 19,
20); electt (Ὁ. 1); salvandi (Ὁ.
143). Note further, the angels
(p. 32); the prophet of truth
(p.441) ; the strong emphasising
of faith (p. 196 δέ pass.). In
many passages (cf. Gildemeis-
ter, ὦ. 6.) the Christian revisers _
have substituted fides and jfidelis

for other expressions. At pages
200, 349 sq., 387, the persecu-
tions of Christians, and at p. 331
the falling away from Chris-
tianity seems to be alluded to.
The book of sentences, as it
stands, therefore, can only have
been composed by a Christian ;
and as it refers to some of the
latest writings of our New Tes-
tament canon, and there is no
proof of its own existence until
about the middle of the third
century, it cannot in any case
have been written long before
the end of the second century,
and possibly not until the third.
If the doctrines peculiar to
Christianity are thoroughly ab-
sent from it, and the name of
Christ is not once mentioned,
this only proves that the author

PREDOMINANCE OF ETHICS.

of ancient Rome, but that it contained nothing
different from the doctrines uf Stoicism.! The only
thing that distinguishes the Sestians from the Stoies
is the exclusiveness with which they confined them-
selves to ethics; but even in this they agree with
the later Stoicism and with the Cynics of Imperial
times. Though they donot seem to have absolutely
condemned physical enquiry,” they sought and found
their strength elsewhere. A Sextius, a Sotion, a
Fabianus, were men who exercised a wide moral
influence by their personality ;? and to their per-

did not intend his work only for
Christians, but for non-Chris-
tians as well, and wishes by
means of it chiefly to recom-
mend the universal principles
of monotheism and of Christian
morality. Whether he himself
was called Sextus, or whether
he falsely prefixed the name of
an imaginary philosopher Sextus
(who in that case no doubt was
already described by himself as
a Pythagorean), cannot be as-
certained. As before observed,
the work does not seem to an-
nounce itself as the composi-
tion of one of the Sextii. Still,
it is certainly probable that the
author borrowed the greater
part of his sentences from
philosophers; but as he never
tells us whence he derived any
of them, his collection, as Ritter
rightly decides, is wholly use-
less as an authority for the
history of philosophy. The
attempt to separate from ita
genuine substratum, to be re-
garded as the work of the two
Sextii, would be spurposeless,
even if it were undertaken with

more ingenuity than is the case
with the attempt of J.R. Tobler
(Annulus Rufini, 1.; Sent. Sext.
Tiib. 1878).

1 Nat. Qu. vil. 32; Zp. 59,
7 (wide Ὁ. 677, 4; 679); Lp.
64,2: Liber Qu. Sextii patris,
magni, si guid mihi credis, viri,
et, licet neget, Stvici.

3 In regard to Fabianus at
any rate, we see from Sen. Wat.
Qu. Ul. 27, 8, that his opinion
about the dilurium (Phil.d. Gr.
Jil. ii. 156 sg.) was somewhat
different from that of Seneca.
He must, therefore, have held
the general Stoic theory on the
subject.

3. Cf. concerning Sextius, be-
sides the quotation supra, Ὁ. 182,
1 (Sen. “Lp. 64,3): Yuantus in
illo, Di bont, vigor est, quantum
animi! Other philosophers in-
stituunt, disputant, cavillantur,
non faciunt animum, guia non
habent: cum legeris Sextium,
dices : vivit, viget, liber est, supra
hominem est, dimittit me plenum
ingentis fiducieé; concerning
Fabianus sup. 181, 5; concern-
ing Sotion, Sen. Hp. 108, 17.

185

CHAP,
VIL.

CHAP.
VIL.

ECLECTICISM.

sonal influence they attached much greater value
than to scientific enquiry: we must fight against
the emotions, says Fabianus, not with subtleties
but with enthusiasm;! and concerning learned
labours which have no moral purpose in view, his
judgment is that it would perhaps be better to
pursue no science, than sciences of such a kind.?
The life of man, is, as Sextius argues,’ a constant
battle with folly; only he who perpetually stands
in readiness to strike can successfully encounter
the enemies who press round him on all sides. If
this reminds us of Stoicism and especially of the
Stoicism of the Roman period, the resemblance is
still more striking in the proposition of Sextius
that Jupiter could achieve nothing more than a
virtuous man.* With this Stoical character, two
other traits, which Sextius seems to have borrowed
from the Pythagorean school, are quite in harmony:
viz., the principle of rendering account to oneself
at the end of every day of the moral profit® and
results of it; and the renunciation of animal food.
Sotion, however, was the first who based the latter
precept upon the transmigration of souls: Sextius
inculcated it only on the ground that by the

1 Sen. Brevit. Vit. 10,1: Sole-
bat dicere Fabianus ... con-
tra adfectus impetu non sub-
tilitate pugnandum, nec ninutis
volneribus, sed tneursu aver-
tendam aciem non probam:
carillationes enim contundi de-
bere, non vellicart.

2 Tbid. 13, 9.

. 3. Ap. Sen. Zp. 59, 7.

* Sen. Hp. 73, 12: Solebat
Seatius dicere, Jovem plus
non posse, quam bonum viru,
which Seneca carries further in
the sense discussed, Phil. d. Gir.
ΠῚ. i. p. 252, 1, 2.

5 Vide Sen. De Tra, iii. 36, 1,
with which cf. the Pythagorean
Golden Poem, v. 40 sqq.

ARGUMENT AGAINST ANIMAL FOOD.

slaughter of animals we accustom ourselves to
cruelty, and by devouring their flesh to enjoyments
that are superfluous and incompatible with health.!
Nothing else that has been handed down respect-
ing the ethics of Sextius displays any important
individuality.2, It was a more remarkable devia-
tion from Stoicism if the Sextii, as has been
stated,* maintained the incorporeality of the soul ;
but this, after all, would only show that, while
following the eclectic tendency of their time, they
were able to combine, with the ethics of the Stoies,

1 Sen. Hp. 108, 17 825. The
discussions of Sotion, by which
Seneca for a time was per-
suaded to abstain from eating
meat, are here expounded more
at length. Of Sextius it is
said: Hic homini satis alimen-
torum citra sanguinem esse
credebat et ecrudelitatis con-
suetudinem fieri, ubi in rolup-
tatem esset adducta laceratio.
Adiciebat, contrahendam ma-
teriam esse lucurie. Colligebat,
bone valitudini contraria esse
alimenta varia et nostris aliena
corporibus. With this the pas-
sage in the sayings of Sextus,

109, agrees (ap. Orig. 6.
Cels. Vili. 30): ἐμψύχων χρῆσις
μὲν ἀδιάφορον, ἀποχὴ δὲ λογι-
κώτερον.

2 Jide the utterances of So-
tion in the Florilegium of
Stobszeus, which no doubt be-
long to our Sotion; the recom-
mendation of brotherly love
(84, 6-8; 17, 18); the say-
ings against flattery (14, 10),
anger (20, 53 sqg.), about grief
(108, 59), and on consolatory
exhortations (113, 15). None

of these contain anything by
which we can recognise the
school to which their author
belonged. Our collection of
sentences, however, it may be
incidentally remarked, brings
forward nothing which is not
equally to be found in many
other writers.

2 Claudian. Mamert. De Statu
Anim@, ii. 8: Incorporalis, in-
guiunt (the two Sextii), omnis
est anima et illocalis atque in-
deprehensa vis quedam; que
sine spatio capax corpus haurit
et continet.
reminds us of the Stoic doc-
trine, that the soul holds the
body together. Mamertus is
not, indeed, an altogether trust-
worthy witness; he also tries
to prove (i. c.) that Chrysippus
regarded the soul as immortal,
because he required the con-
quest of sensuality by reason.
But his utterances about the
Sextii are so definite that
we must necessarily refer them
to tradition rather than to any
inference of this kind.

The last clause .

188

CHAP.
VII.

ECLECTICISM.

definitions from the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine.
We therefore find nothing in their school that is
new and scientifically noticeable; it 1s a branch of
Stoicism, which doubtless is indebted merely to the
personality of its founder that it had an indepen-
dent existence for a time; but we can see in its
points of contact with Pythagoreanism and Plato-
nism how easily in that period systems which started
from entirely different speculative presuppositions,
could coalesce on the basis of morality, when once
men had begun to consider distinctive theoretical
doctrines of less consequence than similar prac-
tical aims; and that there was inherent in the
ethical dualism of the Stoa a natural tendency to
the views which were most strongly opposed to- the
materialistic monism of their metaphysics, and to
their anthropology.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE IMPERIAL ERA.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST CENTURIES AFTER CHRIST.
OF THE STOICS. SENECA.

THE SCHOOL

THE mode of thought which had become pre-
dominant during the first century before Christ in
the Greco-Roman philosophy, maintained
likewise in the succeeding centuries. By far the
greater part of its representatives, indeed, were ad-
herents of one or other of the four great schools
into which the domain of Greek science was divided
after the third century. The separation of these
schools had, indeed, been confirmed afresh by two
circumstances: on the one hand by the learned
study of the writings of their founders, to which the
Peripatetics especially had devoted themselves with
such zeal since the time of Andronicus; on the
other, by the institution of public chairs for the four
chief sects which took place in the second century
after the beginning of our era.! This learned
activity must have tended to make the special cha-
racteristics of the different systems more distinctly

1 Cf. O. Miiller, Quam curam
resp. ap. Gree. et Rom. literis
. . . Gmpenderit (Gott. in-
ladungsschrift, 1837), p. 13 sqq.;

Zumpt, Veb.d. Bestand ὦ. phitos.
Schulen in Athen. Abdh. ὦ. Berl.

Akad. 1842; Hist.-Phil. ΚΙ,
Schr. 44 sqgq.; Weber, De Aca-
demia Literaria Atheniensium
seculo secundo p. Chr. constituta
(Marb. 1858), and the quota-
tions at p. 1.

189

CHAP.
Vill.

itself Section 11.

Eeleeti-
cism in the
first centu-
ries after
Christ.

A. The
Stovics.
General
character
of phitoso-
phy in the
Imperial
Times.

Zeal for

the study
of the an-
cient phi-
losophers.

190

CHAP.
VIIL,

EH ndor-
ment of
public
chairs of
philo-
sophy.

ECLECTICISM.,

perceived, and to refute the idea upon which the
eclecticism of an Antiochus and Cicero had fallen
back, viz: that the divergences between them were
founded rather upon differences of words, than mat-
ters of fact; and it might form a counterpoise to the
eclectic tendencies of the time the more easily, since
it was directed as much to the defence, as to the
explanation, of the heads of the ancient schools and
of their doctrines. In Rome, where in the first cen-
tury not only Stoicism, but philosophy in general,
was regarded in many quarters with political mis-
trust, and had had to suffer repeated persecution,!
public teachers of philosophy were first established

1 The banishment of Attalus
the Stoic from Rome under
Tiberius (Sen. Suasor. 2), and
that of Seneca under Claudius,
were not the result of a dislike
upon principle to philosophy.
On the other hand, under Nero,
laws were multiplied against
men who had acquired or
strengthened their indepen-
dence of mind in the school of
Stoics. Thrasea Psetus, Seneca,
Lucanus, and Rubellius Plautus
were put to death; Musonius,
Cornutus, Helvidius Priscus
were banished (further details
later on); and though these
persecutions may have had in
the first instance political or
personal reasons, ἃ general dis-
érust had already manifested
itself against the Stoic philo-
sophy especially, which Stoi-
corum adrogantia sectaque qua
turbidos et negotiorum adpeten-
tes faciat (as Tigellinus, ap.
Tac, Ann. xiv. 57, whispers to

Nero); and Seneca (Hp. 5, 1
sqq.3; 14, 15; 103, 5) finds it
necessary to warn the disciple
of philosophy against coming
forward in any manner at all
conspicuous or calculated to
cause offence; and so much
the more as this had been
prejudicial to many, and philo-
sophy was regarded with mis-
trust. The political dissatis-
faction displayed by the Stoic
and Cynic philosophers after
the execution of Helvidius
Priscus occasioned Vespasian to
banish from Rome all teachers
of philosophy, with the excep-
tion of Musonius; two of them
he even caused to be trans-
ported (Dio Cass, Ixiv. 13);
and this precedent was after-
wards followed by Domitian.
Being irritated by the pane-
gyrics of Junius Rusticus on
Thrasea and Helvidius, he not
only caused Rusticus and the
son of Helvidius to be executed,

IMPERIAL PATRONAGE OF PHILOSOPHY.

as it seems by Hadrian ;' and in the provinces, by

9

Antoninus Pius:? rhetoric had already been simi-
larly provided for by some of their predecessors,?
and the ancient institution of the Alexandrian Wu-
seum, and its maintenances designed for the support
of learned men of the most various sorts, had also

continued to exist in the Roman period.t

but ordered all philosophers
out of Rome (Gell. Vid. xv. 11,
8; Sueton. Domit. 10; Plin.
#p.iii.11; Dio Cass. lxvii. 13).
But these isolated and tempo-
rary measures do not seem to
have done any lasting injury
to philosophic studies.

1 Cf. Spartian. Hadr. 16:
Doctores, qui professioni sue
wnkabiles videbantur, ditatos
honoratosque a professione dimi-
sit, which would only have
been possible if they had before
possessed them. Still less is
proved by the previous con-
text: Omnes professores et hone-
ravit et divites fecit. That these
statements relate not merely
to grammarians, rhetoricians,
&c., but also to philosophers,
is shown by the connection.

3 Capitolin. dnt. P. 11: Rhe-
toribus et philosophis per omnes
provincias δὲ honeres et salaria
detulit. Moreover, teachers of
sciences and physicians were
exempted from taxation. This
favour, however, in a reseript
of Antoninus to the Commune
Asie (quoted from Modestin.
Hocus. ii.; Digest. xxvii. 1,
6, 2) was restricted in regard
to the physicians to a certain
number according to the size
of the city; but in regard to
the philosophers it was to hold

Public

good absolutely διὰ τὸ σπανίους
εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας.

3. Thus we hear of Vespasian,
especially (Sueton. Tesp. 18),
that he primus e fisco latinis
qrecisque rhetoribus (perhaps
in the first place only to one
thetorician for each speech)
annua centena (100,000 sestert.)
constituit. The first Latin rhe-
torician so endowed, in the
year 69, was, according to
Hieron, Hus. Chron. 89 A.D,
Quintilian; a second under
Hadrian, Castricius (Gell. V4.
xiii. 22).

* Cf. Zumpt, J. δ. : Parther,
Das Alewandrin. Museum (Berl.
1838), p. 91 sgqg.; O. Miller, ἢ, δ.
p. 29 sg. From the statement
(Dio Cass. Ixxvii. 7) that Cara-
calla took from the Peripatetics
of Alexandria (ont of hatred to
Aristotle, on account of the
supposed poisoning of Alexan-
der) their Syssitia and other
privileges, Parthey (p. 52) in-
fers with probability that there
also (though perhaps only in
the time of Hadrian or one of
his successors) the philosophers
belonging to the museum had
been divided into schools. A
similar institution to the mu-
seum, the Athenzum, was
founded in Rome by Hadrian
(Aurel. Victor. Ces. 14; cf. Dio

19]

CHAP,
VOL

ECLECTICISM.

teachers from the four most important Schools of
philosophy! were settled by Marcus Aurelius in

Cass. Ixxiii. 17; Capitolin. Per-
tin. 11; Gord. 3; Lamprid.
Sever. 35), That maintenance
for the learned man admitted
was also attached to it, is not
expressly stated ; whether the
words of Tertullian (Apologet.
46), statuis δὲ salaribus remu-
nerantur (the philosophers),
relate to Rome or to the pro-
vinces, we do not know, but
they probably refer to the
western countries.

1 That Marcus Aurelius ap-
pointed alike for the fourschools
—the Stoic,Platonic,Peripatetic,
and Epicurean—teachers with a
salary of 10,000 drachmas each,
is plain from Philostr. v. Soph. ii.
2; Lucian, Hunuch. 3: accord-
ing to Dio Cass. lxxi. 3, it was
while he was in Athens, after
the suppression of the insurrec-
tion of Avidius Cassius (176
A.D.) that Marcus ‘gave all
mankind in Athens instructors,
whom he endowed with a yearly
stipend.’ At this time, or soon
after, Tatian may have written
the λόγος πρὸς “Ἕλληνας in which
(p. 19) he mentions philosophers
who receive from the Emperor
an annual salary of 600 χρυσοῖ.
According to Lucian, 7. ¢., each
of the schools mentioned seems
to have had two public instruc-
tors, for we are there told how,
after the death of ‘one of the
Peripatetics,’ two candidates
disputed before the electing as-
sembly for the vacant place
with its 10,000 drachmas.
Zumpt (ἷ. 6. p. 50) offers the
suggestion that only four im-
perial salaries had been given;

but that if the existing schol-
arch of a school was not in
need of such assistance, a
second teacher was named side
by side with him, so that a
school may have had two
simultaneously—one chosen by
the school, and one nominated
by the Emperor. The passage
in Lucian, however, is not
favourable to this view. As
the philosophers whom the
Emperor endowed with the
salary of 10,000 drachmas are
first spoken of, and we are then
told καὶ τινά φασιν αὐτῶν ἔναγ-
χος ἀποθανεῖν, τῶν ἸΤεριπατητικῶν
οἶμαι τὸν ἕτερον, this manifestly
presupposes that among those
who were paid by the Emperor
there were two Peripatetics, in
which’ case the other schools
must each have had two repre-
sentatives in this reign. The
choice of these salaried philo-
sophers, Marcus Aurelius, ac-
cording to Philostr., ὅ.6., gave
over to Herodes Atticus ; accord-
ing to Lucian, Hun. c. 2 80...
the candidates brought forward
their claims before the ἄριστοι
καὶ πρεσβύτατοι Kal σοφώτατοι
τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει (by which we
may understand either the
Areopagus, the βουλὴ, or a
separate elective council, per-
haps with the participation of
the schools concerned, and
under the presidency of an im-
perial official); but if an agree-
ment could not be arrived at,
the affair was sent to Rome to
be decided. The imperial ra-
tification was, doubtless, neces-
sary in all cases; and in par-

PAID TEACHERS OF PHILOSOPHY.

Athens,! which was thus declared anew the chief
seat of philosophic studies; and thus the division
of these schools was not merely acknowledged as an
existing fact, but a support was given to it for the
future which in the then condition of things was no
slight advantage. Inthe appointment of the office
of teacher, the express avowal of the system for
which he desired to be employed was required from
the candidate.? Externally, therefore, the schools
remained sharply separated in this period as hereto-
fore.

As this separation, however, had previously done
little to hinder the rise of eclectic tendencies, so was
it little in the way of their continuance. The dif
ferent schools, in spite of all divisions and feuds,
approximated internally to each other. Thev did
not actually abandon their distinctive doctrines, but
they propagated many of them, and these the most
striking, merely historically as a learned tradition,
without concerning themselves more deeply with
them ; or they postponed them to the essentially

ticular instances the teacher of the second century, cf. also

was probabiy directly named
by the Emperor; the words of
Alexander of Aphrodisias may
be taken in either sense, when,
in the dedication of his treatise
περὶ εἱμαρμένης. he thanks Sep-
timius Severus and his son,
Caracalla. ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας μαρ-
τυρίας διδάσκαλος αὐτῆς (the
Aristotelian philosophy) κεκη-
ρυγμένος.

1 On the repute and popu-
larity of Athens in the middle

Philostr. F. Soph. i. 1, 6, who
in the time of Herodes Atticus
speaks of the Θράκια καὶ Tov-
τικὰ μειράκια κἀξ ἄλλων ἐθνῶν
βαρβάρων ξυνερρυηκότα, whom the
Athenians received for money.

* Cf. Lucian, 2. ὁ, 4: τὰ μὲν
οὖν τῶν λόγων προηγώνιστο αὐτοῖς
καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἑκάτερος τῶν
δογμάτων ἔἐπεδέδεικτο καὶ ὅτι τοῦ
᾿Αριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν ἐκείνῳ
δοκούντων εἴχετο.

Continued
Eelecti-
cis.

194

CHAP,
VIII.

School of
the Stoiles
From the

ECLECTICISM.

practical aims and principles, in which the different
schools approached more nearly to each other; or
they readily admitted many changes and modifica-~
tions, and without renouncing on the whole their
distinctive character, they yet allowed entrance to
definitions, which, having originally grown up on
another soil, were, strictly speaking, not altogether
compatible with that character. The Epicurean
School alone persistently held aloof from this move-
ment; but it also refrained from all scientific activity
worthy of mention.| Among the three remaining
schools, on the contrary, there is none in which this
tendency of the time did not manifest itself in some
form or other. With the Peripatetics it is their
restriction to criticism and explanation of the Aris-
totelian writings, in which the want of independent
scientific creative activity is chiefly shown; with the
Stoics, it is the restriction to a morality in which
the asperities of the original system are for the most
part set aside and the former severity gradually
gives place to a gentler and milder spirit: in the
Academy, it is the adoption of Stoic and Peripatetic
elements, with which is combined an increasing in-
clination towards that belief in revelation which in
the third century through Plotinus became wholly
predominant. That none of these traits exclusively
belong to either of these schools will appear on a
more thorough investigation of them.

If we begin with the Stoics we find that from the
beginning of the first, till towards the middle of the

1 Cf. Phil. ad. Gr. IIT. i. p. 378, and sup. Ὁ. 24 δῷ.

STOICS OF THE

IMPERIAL ERA.

third century, we are acquainted with a considerable

number of men belonging to this school.

1 OF the Stoics that are known
to us, Heracleitus must
first be mentioned in connec-
tion with those named supra,
p. 71. This learned man (con-
cerning whose Homeric allego-
ries cf. Phil. ἃ. Gr. THI. i. 322
874.) seems to have lived at the
time of Augustus, as the latest
of the many authors whom he
mentions is Alexander of
Ephesus (Alleg. Hom. c. 12, Ὁ.
26) who is reckoned by Strabo
(xiv. 1, 25, p. 642) among the
vearepo.,isapparently alluded to
by Cicero, Ad Att. ii. 22, and
quoted by Aurel. Victor, De
Orig. Gent. Rom. 9, 1,as author
of a history of the Marsian
War (91 sqq. B.C.) and must
have flourished in the first half
or about the middle of the first
century before Christ. Unrier
Tiberius, Attalus taught in
Rome; he is mentioned by
Seneca (Zp. 108, 3, 13 s¢., 23)
as his Stoic teacher whom he
zealously employed and ad-
mired, and from whom he
quotes in this and other places
(vide Index) sayings which
especially insist, in the spirit of
the Stoic ethics, on simplicity
of life and independence of
character. With this moral
doctrine we shall also find his
declamations as to the faults
and follies of men and the ills
of life (1. c. 108, 13) reproduced
in his disciple Seneca; what
Seneca, however (δαί. Qu. iL
48; 2, 50, 1) imports to us
from his enquiries concerning
the portents of lightning, shows
that he plunged much more

ο

The

deeply than Seneca into the
superstition and sovthzaving of
the school. On the instigation
of Sejanus, he was forced to
leave Rome (Sen. Rhet. Suasur.
2). Somewhat lateris Chere»
mon, the teacher of Nero(Suid.
᾿Αλέξ. Aiy.), subsequently (as
We must suppose) head of a
school in Alexandria (hid,
Διονύσ. ᾿Αλέξ.) and an Egrptian
priest of the order of the iepo-
γραμματεῖς. That he was so,
and that the Stoic Cheremon,
mentioned by Suidas, Origen
(ec. Cels. i. 51), Porphyrv (De
Abstinen. iv. 6, 8) and Anpol-
lonius in Bekker’s Anecdota,
is not distinct from the fepo-
γραμματεὺς mentioned by Por-
phyry, ap. Bus. Pr. δε. νι τὸ;
iii. ἐς and Tzetz. Hist. v. 403;
in Iliad. p.123, Herm.,as Miil-
ler maintains (Mist. Gr. iil.
£95), but that they are one an‘
the same person as Bernays
considers (Lheoephr. von der
Lrommigheit, 21, 150), I have
explained in the Hermes, Xi.
403 sq. In his Egyptian history
(fragments of which are given
by Miiller, 1. 6.) he explains,
according to Fr. 2 (ap. Eus.
Pr, Er. iii. 4), the Egvptian
gods and their mythical histo-
ries in a Stoic manner with
reference to the sun, moon, and
stars, the sky, and the Nile,
καὶ ὅλως πάντα eis φυσικὰ: and
in his διδάγματα τῶν ἱερῶν γραμ-
μάτων (ap. Suid. Χαιρ. Ἱερογλυφ-
ia) he declares, in agreement
with this, thatthe hieroglyphics
were symbols in which the an-
cients laid down the φυσικὸς
9

ad

195

CHAP,
VIL

Jirst to the
third cen-
tury A.D.

196

CHAP.
VIII.

ECLECTICISM.

most important of them, and those who represent
to us most clearly the character of this later Stoicism

λόγος περὶ θεῶν (Tzetz. in 7]. p.
123 ; οἵ 2. 8.146; Hist. v. 408).
He is also in harmony with the
Stoic theology when in a trea-
tise on comets (according to
Origen, J. 6.) he explained how
it came about that these phe-
romena sometimes foretell
happy events. Porphyry, in
De Abst. iv. 8,end, calls him ἐν
τοῖς στωικοῖς πραγματικώτατα
φιλοσοφήσας. He was succeeded
in Alexandria by his disciple
Dionysius, who is called by
Suidas Διονύσ. "AA. γραμματικὸς,
and was probably, therefore,
more of a learned man thana
philosopher. Seneca will be
fully treated of later on. Other
members of the Stoic school
were the following :—Clara-
nus (Sen. #p. 66, 1,5; he has
been conjectured, though pro-
bably erroneously, to be identi-
cal with the Greek philo-
sopher Coranus, Tac. Ann.
xiv. 59; the latter was also a
Stoic), most likely Seneca’s re-
lativeAnneus Serenus (Sen.
Hip. 68,14; De Const. i.1; De
Trangu. An. 1; De Otio), his
friend Crispus Passienus
(Nat. Qu.iv.; Pref. 6; Benef.
i. 15,5; cf. Lpigr. Sup. Hevil. 6),
and his adherent Metronax
in Naples (Zp. 76, 1-4). He
tries to include Lucilius also
among the Stoics, in the letters
dedicated to him. Contempo-
rary with him is Serapio, from
the Syrian Hierapolis (Sen. Ep.
40, 2; Steph. Byz. De Urb.
ἽἹεράπ.); and Lucius An-
neus Cornutus of Leptis
(Suid. Kopy.) or the neigh-

bouring Thestis (Steph. Byz.
Ogoris) in Africa, who was
banished (according to the in-
correct statement of Suidas,
put to death) by Nero, on
account of an objection he made
to the poetical projects of the
Emperor, in 68 A.D., according
to Hieron. in Chron. (Cf., how-
ever, Reimarus on the passage
in Dio; he conjectures 66 A.D.)
In the epitome of Diogenes
(Part III. i. 33, 2) Cornutus
closes the series of the Stoics
mentioned by this writer. Of
the theoretical and philosoph-
ical works attributed to him
by Suidas, one on the gods has
been preserved (sup. Part III.
i. 301 sqq.); this is doubtless
his own treatise and not a
mere abstract of it. He is
described in the Vita Persii
Sueton. as tragicus, to which
Osann (on Corn. De Nat. Deor.
XXV.) rightly objects. Further
details concerning him and his
works will be found in Martini
(De L. Ann. Cormuto, Lugd. Bat.
1825, a work with which I am
only acquainted at third hand),
Villoison, and Osann, 2. «c.;
Pref. xvii. sgg.; O. Jahn on
Persius, Prolegg. viii. 87.
Among the disciples of Cornutus
were (vide Vita Persii) Clau-
dius Agathinus of Sparta
(Osann, J. ¢. xviii., differing from
Jahn, p. xxvii., writes the name
thus, following Galen, Definit.
14, vol. xix. 353 K), a celebrated
physician, and Petronius
Aristocrates of Magnesia,
‘duo doctissini et sanctissimi
viri,’ and the two Roman poets

SENECA, EPICTETUS.

are Seneca, lusonius,
Aurelius. Heracleitus, on

A, Persius Flaccus (born
in 34, died in 62 A.D., vide
Vita Persii, and Jahn, 7. 6. iii.
sqq.) and Marcus Annezwus
Lucanus the nephew of
Seneca, born 39 A.D., died 65
A.D., both put to death for
having joined in Piso’s con-
spiracy (vide concerning Lu-
canus the two lives which
Weber has edited, Marb. 1856
sq.; the Vita Persii, Tacit. dnp.
xv. 49, 56 sq. 70, and other
statements compared by We-
ber), of whom Flaccus espe-
cially, as he says himself in
Sat. v., regarded his master
with the highest veneration.
To the Stoic school belonged
further, besides the contemp-
tible P. Egnatius Celer
(Tac. Ann. xvi. 32; Hist. iv.
10, 40; Dio Cass. ἱπ|ϊ. 26;
Juvenal, ili, 118 sq.), the
two magnanimous Republicans
Thrasea Petus (Tac. Ann.
xvi. 21 sqq.; cf. xi. 49; xiv.
48 sqg.; xv. 23; Dio Cass. [5].
15, 20; Ixil. 26; Ixvi. 12;
Sueton. Vero, 37: Domit. 10;
Plin. Zp. vili. 22, 3; vi. 29,1;
vil. 19, 3; Plut. Prec. Ger.
Reip. 14,10, Ὁ. $10; Cato Min.
25, 37; Juvenal, v. 36; Epict.
Diss. i. 1, 26 et pass.; Jahn,
lo 6. xxxvili. eg.), and his
son-in-law Helvidius Pris-
cus (Tac. Amn. xvi. 28-25;
Hist. iv. 5 sg. 9, 53; Dial. de
Orat. 5; Sueton. Vesp. 15;
Dio Cass. Ixvi. 12; Ixv. 7), of
whom the first was executed
by Nero’s order, and the second
who had been already banished
by Nero, was put to death, not

Epictetus, and Marcus

the other hand, is rather a

Without some reason, br order
of Vespasian. Rubeliius
Plautus also (Tac. Any. xiv.
22, 57-59) who was also put to
death by Nero, is descrived as
a Stoic. Lastly, under Nero
and his successors, there lived
Musonius Rufus and his
disciple Epictetus, who, to-
gether with Musonius’ disciples,
Pollio and Artemidorus,
and Arrianus, the pupil of
Epictetus, will come before us
later on. Euphrates, the
teacher of the younger Pliny,
who equally admired him on
account of his discourses and
his character, was a contempo-
rary of Epictetus and lived
first in Syria and afterwards in
Rome (Plin. Zp. i. 10; Euseb.
8. Hierocl. c. 33). He is the
same person whom Philostratus,
in the life of Apollonius of
Tyana, and the author of the
letters of Apollonius, repre-
sents as the chief opponent of
this miracle-worker. Epictetus
quotes an expression of his
(Diss. iv. 8, 17 sgq.) and praises
his discourses (ὦ ὁ. lil. 15, 8;
E'nchir. 29, 4). Marcus Aure-
lius (x. 81) also mentions him.
His passionate hostility to Apol-

lonius is alluded to by Philostr, .

V. Soph. i. 7, 2. The same
writer calls him here and J. ¢.
i. 25, 5,a Tyrian, whereas, ac-
cording to Steph. Byz. De Urb.
Ἐπιφάν., he was a Syrian of
Epiphania, and according to
Eunap. VF. Philos. Ὁ. 6, an
Egyptian. Having fallen sick
in his old age, he took poison
118 A.D. (Dio Cass. lxix. 8).

LNT

CHAP.
VIII.

108

CHAP.
VIII.

ECLECTICISM.

collector and arranger of traditional material, and

the same holds good of Cleomedes.

One of his pupils was Timo-
crates of Heraclea in Pontus
(Philostr. V. Soph. i. 25, 5) ac-
cording to Lucian (Demon. 8,
Alex. 57, De Sailtat. 69), who
speaks with great respect of
him ; and was himself a teacher
of Demonax the cynic, and an
opponent of the famous con-
juror, Alexander of Abonutei-
chos. A disciple of Demonax,
Lesbonax, is mentioned by
him (De Sait. 69). Under
Domitian and Trajan we find
the folowing names given by
Plutarch (Qu. Cone. 1. 8, 1; vil.
7, 1): Themistocles, Phi-
lippus, and Diogenianus,
to whom we may add the two
philosophers called Crinis
(Epict. Diss. 11, 2, 15; Diog.
L. vil. 62, 68, 76). Also Junius
Rusticus, executed by Do-
mitian (Tacit. Agric. 2; Sueton.
Domit. 10; Dio Cass, lxvii. 13;
Plin. 2. 6.; Plut. Curiosit. 15,
p. 522), whose trial gave oc-
casion to the persecution of
the philosophers, was doubtless
a Stoic. The two Plinys, on
the other hand, cannot be
reckoned under this school,
though they have points of re-
semblance with the Stoics, and
the younger had Euphrates for
his teacher. Under Hadrian
Philopator probably lived
(Phit.d. Gr. TI. 1.166, 1), whose
disciple was Galen’s teacher
(Galen, Cogn. an Morb. 8, vol. v.
41K); in the same reign, or that
of Antoninus Pius, Hierocles
may have taught in Athens
(Gell. WV. A. ix. 5, 8), and Cleo-
medes may have written his

Concerning

Κυκλικὴ θεωρία μετεώρων ; for in
this treatise he mentions several
earlier astronomers, but not
Ptolemy; he follows in it chiefly,
as he says at the conclusion,
Posidonius. Within the same
period fall the Stoic instruc-
tors of Marcus Aurelius: Apol-
lonius (M. Aurel. i. 8, 17;
Dio Cass. lxxi. 35; Capitolin.
Ant, Philos. 2,3; Ant. Pi. 10;
Eutrop. vili.12; Lucian. Demon.
31; Hieron. Chron. 2% Οἵ. 232;
Syncell. Ὁ. 8351. Whether he
came from Chalcis or Chalcedon
or Nicomedia we need not here
enquire). Junius Rusticus,
to whom his imperial pupil
always gave his confidence (M.
Aur. i. 7. 17; Dio, ὁ. δ; Capitol.
Ant. Phil.3); Claudius Max-
imus (M. Aur. 1. 15, 17; viii.
25; Capitol. 2 ¢.); Cinna
Catulus (CM. Aur. i. 18; Capi-
tol. 2.¢.); among them was
probably also Diognetus (ac-
cording to Capitol, c. 4, where
the same man is most likely
meant, his teacher in painting ;
but according to M. Aur. i. 6,
the first who gave him an in-
clination to philosophy); Basi-
lides of Scythopolis (described
by Hieron. Chron. on Οἱ, 232,
and Sync. p. 351, as a teacher of
Marcus Aurelius and probably
the same who is quoted by Sext.
Math. viii. 258, vide Phil. ἃ. Gr.
ITI. i. 87, 1; but not the person
mentioned sup. Ὁ. 54), and some
others (Bacchius, Tandasis,
Marcianus; M. Aurelius
heard them, as he says, i. 6, at
the instance of Diognetus)
must be added. To these Mar-

CORNT

TCS,

Cornutus also, we know that his activity was
chiefly devoted to grammatical and_ historical

cus Aurelius Antoninus
subsequently allied himself
(vide infra). Under his reign
Lucius, the disciple of Mu-
sonius the Tyrian, is said to
have lived, whom Philostratus,
τι Soph. ii. 1, 8 s¢., describes as
the friend of Herodes Atticus,
and represents as meeting with
Marcus Aurelius in Rome when
the latter was already emperor;
he was the same person,
doubtless, from whom Stobeus
(floril. Jo. Damase. 7, 46, vol.
iv. 162, Mein.) quotes an account
of a conversation with Musonius
(his conversations with Mnu-
sonius are also mentioned by
Philostratus) ; for though he is
called Avxios in our text of
stobseus, that is of little con-
sequence, Here, as well as in
Philostratus, he appears as a
Stoic or Cynic, and he was no
doubt the same Lucius who is
mentioned Phil. ἃ. Gr. ITI. i. 48,
note, with Nicostratus. Brandis
(Ueber ὦ. Ausleger ὦ. Arist.
Org., Abh. ἃ. Berl. Ahad.1833;
Hist. Phil. Kil. Ὁ. 279) and
Prantl (Geseh. d. Log. i. 618)
consider both to have belonged
to the Academy, from the way
in which they are named by
Simplicius (Categ. 7, 6, 1, a)
together with Atticus and
Plotinus ; but it seems to me
that this cannot be proved on
that evidence; there is more
foundation for the statement,
in their objections quoted by
Prantl, 2. ¢., from Simplicius,
against the Aristotelian cate-
gories of the Stoic tyre, namely
in the assertions of Nicostratus

that no σπουδαῖος is a φαῦλος
(Simpl. 102, a), and that iJ. δ.
104, a) an ἀδιάφορον. ἀδιαφόρῳ
ἀντίκειται, and similarly an aya-
Boy ἀγαθῷ, e.g. the φρονίμη περι-
πάτησις is opposed to the Φρονίμη
στάσις (οἵ. Phil. d. Gr. Ul. i.
213, note); as also in the term
belongingtothe Stoic nomencla-
ture, λόγοι ὀμοτικοὶ, ἀπομοτικοὶ,
θαυμαστικοὶ, Ψεκτικοὶ (ἰ. 4. 108
a) vide ibid. IIL. i. 103, 4. But
the Musonius who is called
Lucius’ teacher must be either
distinct from Musonius Rufus,
or We must suppose, even irre
spectively of the Τύριος of
Philostratus, his narrative to
be inexact; for as Musonius
scarcely survived the first cen-
tury, it is not conceivable that
his disciple should have come
to Rome after 161 a.p. It
seems to me most probable
thatthe teacher of Lucius is no
other than Musonius Rufus, and
that the anecdote, ap. Gell. VA.
ix. 2, 8, refers to him: while the
predicate Τύριος arose through a
mistake from Τυρρηνὸς (suppos-
ing even that Philostratus him-
self made the mistake); and
that the meeting of Lucius
with Marcus Aurelius either
did not take place at all, or
occurred before he became em-
peror; partly because when we
hear of Musonius we naturally
think of the most celebrated
man of the name, and the only
Musonins known to us in that
period; partly and especially
because that which Lucius puts
into the mouth of his Musonius
entirely agrees with the quota-

CHAP.
VII.

ECLECTICISM.

works, and he therefore

seems to have occupied

himself with philosophy more as a scholar than an in-

dependent thinker.!

His work on the gods contents

itself with reproducing the doctrine of his school ;
and if, in a treatise on the categories, he has con-
tradicted ? not only Aristotle, but also his Stoic rival

tion from Musonius Rufus (ap.
Stob. Flail. 29, 78). In the
first half of the third century
we hear, through Longinus (ap.
Porph. V. Plot. 20, of a number
of philosophers, contemporary
with this writer, and somewhat
earlier, and among them are a
good many Stoics. He men-
tions as Stoics who were also
known for their literary activity
Themistocles (according to
Syncell. Chronogy. Ὁ. 361 B,
about 228 A.D.), Phebion,
and two who had not long
died (μέχρι πρῴην ἄκμάσαντες),
Annius and Medius (Por-
phyry, according to Proclus Jn
Plat. Remp. p. 415, note, in his
Σύμμικτα Προβλήματα, mentions
a conversation with Longinus,
in which he defended against
Longinus the Stoic doctrine of
the eight parts of the soul).
Among those who confined
themselves to giving instruction
are Herminus,Lysimachus,
(according to Porphyry, J. 6. 3,
probablyin Rome),Athenezus,
and Musonius. At the same
period as Plotinus, Trypho
(described by Porphyry, v.
Plat. 17, as Srwids τε καὶ Πλα-
τωνικὸς) was residing in Rome.
The Athenian Stoic,Callietes,
mentioned by Porph. ap Euseb.
Pr. Hv. x. 8, 1, came somewhat
earlier, about 260 ἀν. We

know nothing as to the dates
of the following men: Aris-
tocles of Lampsacus (Suidas,
sub voce, mentions an exposition
of his, of a logical treatise of
Chrysippus), thetwo namesakes
Theodorus (Diog. 11. 104), of
whom one probably composed
the abstract of the writings of
Teles, from which Stub. Floril.
Jo. Dam.i. 7,47, T. iv. 164 Mein.
gives a fragment; Prota-
goras (Diog. ix. 56); Anti-
bius and Eubius, of Ascalon ;
Publius of Hierapolis (Πόπ-
Aws) ap. Steph. Byz. De Urb.
"Ackod, ‘lepdr; the two name-
sakes, Proclus of Mallos in
Cilicia (ap. Suid. πρόκλ.--- ΟἹ 8
of these latter is mentioned hy
Proclus In Yim. 166 B, with
Philonides among the ἀρχαῖοι:
if the pupil of Zeno is here
intended (Part JIT. i. 39, 3),
Proclus himself may he placed
further hack; but he cannot
in any case be older than
Panstius,as Suidas mentionsan
ὑπόμνημα τῶν Διογένους σοφισ-
μάτων, πο doubt written by him.

1 Cf. the references to his
rhetorical writings, his expo-
sition of the Virgilian poems,
and a grammatical work in
Jahn's Prolegg. in Persium,
sili. sgq.; Osann. ἢ. 4. Xxlil. sgq.

2 Cf. Phil. d. Gr. IIT. 1. 520,
note.

CORNTTTS.

Athenodorus,' we can see from the fragments pre-
served, that this treatise regarded its object princip-
ally from the standpoint of the grammarian.? It is
an important divergence from the Stoic tradition, if
he really taught that the soul dies simultaneously
with the body;? this, however, is not certain,‘ though
it is possible that in his views of the subject he
allied himself with Panetius. If, lastly, his ethical
discourses are praised by Persius* on account of their
good influence on those who heard them, we can
hardly venture to ascribe to him in this sphere
any important individuality, or striking effect on

1 Simpl. Categ. 5, a; 15,6;
47 ¢; 91, a (Schol. in Arist. 30,
ὃ, note; 47, ὁ, 22; 57, a, 16;
80, ὦ, 22); Porph. in Categ.
4, ὁ (Schol. in Arist. 48. ὁ, 12);
l. c. 21; ef. Brandis, Ceber die
Griech, Aust. ἃ. Arist.Org. Abh.
a. Berl. Akad. 1883, Hist. Phil,
Kl. p. 275. In this treatise
was probably to be found the
statement quoted by Syrian in
Metaph. Schol.in Ar. 893, a. 9,
from Cornutus, that he, like
Boéthus the Peripatetic, re-
duced the ideas to general con-
ceptions.

2 Porph. 4, 0, says of him
and Athenodorus: τὰ ζγτούμενα
περὶ τῶν λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις, οἷα
τὰ κύρια καὶ τὰ τροπικὰ καὶ ὅσα
Towra... τὰ τοιαῦτα οὖν προ-
φέροντες καὶ ποίας ἐστὶ κατηγορίας
ἀποροῦντες καὶ μὴ εὑρίσκοντες
ἐλλιπῆ φασιν εἶναι τὴν διαίρεσιν.
Similarly Simpl. 5, α, οἴ. 91, a,
where Cornutus would separate
the place from ποῦ, and the
time from ποτὲ, because the

form of expression is different
in the one case from the other.

3 Tambl. ap. Stob. £e/. i. 922,
Does the cause of death lie
in the withholding of the ani-
mating air, the extinction of
the vital power (τόνος), or the
cessation cf vital warmth?
GAA’ εἰ οὕτως γίγνεται ὁ θάνατος,
προαναιρεῖται ἢ συναναιρεῖται 7
ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ Κουρ-
vouros οἴεται.

4 Fer though it is probably
this Cornutus to whom the
statement of Iamblichus refers,
it is nevertheless possible that
what he said may relate to the
animal soul and not to the
rational and human soul. The
theories from which Iamblichus
derives his assertion agree with
the doctrine of the Stoic school,
according to which death en-
sues ὅταν παντελῶς γένηται 7
ἄνεσις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος
(Plut. Plae. i. 23, 4).

5 Sat. v. 34 sqq., 62 844.

201

CHAP,
VIR.

Lome esas Hynes

Seneca.

0

CHAP,
VIII.

2

ECLECTICISM.

philosophy: had this been the case, he would have
_ left stronger traces of it behind him.

The case is different with Seneca.!

1 The extensive literature
concerning Senecais to be found
in Bahr, δ voce, in Pauly’s
Realencykht. ὦ. Klass. Alterth.
vi. ὦ, 1037 sqq. Cf. likewise,
respecting Seneca’s philosophy,
Ritter, iv. 189 sgq.; Baur,
Seneca und Paulus (1858, now
in Drei Abhandl. &c., Ὁ. 377
sqgq.); Dérgens, Senece Disci-
pling Moralis cum Antoniniana
Contentio et Comparatio: Leip-
zig, 1857; Holzherr, Der Phi-
losoph. L. A. Seneca: Rast und
Tiib. 1858, 1859 (Gymn. progr.).
Concerning Seneca’s life and
writings, besides the many
older works, Bihr, ὁ. ¢.; Bern-
hardy, Grundriss der Rom. Liter.
4, a, Ὁ. 8llsgq.; Teuffel, Gesch.
der Rim. Liter. 2, a, Ὁ. 616 sqq.
Born at Corduba, of the eques-
trian order, the second son of the
famous rhetorician, M. Annseus
Seneca (Sen. Hpigr, S. Hail. 8,
9; Fr.88; ad Helv. 18, 1 sqq.;
Tacit. Ann. xiv. 53 δὲ pass.),
Lucius Annus Seneca came as
a child with his parents to
Rome (ad Helv. 19, 2). His
birth must have occurred, ac-
cording to the statements in
Nat. Qu. i 1, 3; Hp. 108, 22,
in the first years of the Chris-
tian era. In his early years
and even afterwards he con-
stantly suffered from ill health
(ad Helv. 19, 2; Hp. 54,1; 65,
1; 78, 1 sgg.; 104, 1), and he
devoted himself with great ar-
dour to the sciences (Zp. 78, 3;

of. 58, 5), and especially to’

philosophy (Hp. 108, 7), to

This philo-

which Sotion, the disciple of
Sextius (vide supra, 181, 2), and
the Stoic Attalus (vide supra,
195, 1) introduced him. He
finally embraced the calling of
an advocate (Zp. 49, 2), attained
to the office of questor (ad
fTelv. 19, 2), married (cf. De
Ira, iii. 36,3 ; Hp. 50, 2; and
concerning a child, Marcus,
Eipigr.3; ad Helv.18, 4sqq.; and
another who had died shortly
before, 1. 6.2, 5; 18, 6), and was
happy in his external circum-
stances (4. ὁ. 5, 4; 14, 3).
Threatened by Caligula (Dio,
lix. 19), and banished to Cor-
sica under Claudius in 41 a.p.
in consequence of the affair of
Messalina (Dio, lx. 8; lxi. 10;
Sen. Zpigr. S. Hxilio ad Polyb.
13, 2; 18, 9; ad Helv. 15, 2 sq.),
he was only recalled after her
fall by Agrippina in 50 A.D.
He was immediately made
pretor, and the education of
Nero was confided to him (Tac.
Ann. xii. 8). After Nero’s ac-
cession to the throne, he, to-
gether with Burrhus, was for
a long time the guide of the
Roman empire and of the young
sovereign (Tac. xiii. 2), Further
details as to Seneca’s public life
and character will be found
infra, Ὁ. 2382, 3). With the
death of Burrhus, however,
his influence came to an
end; Nero discarded the coun-
sellor who had long become
burdensome to him (Tac. xiv.
52 sqq.), and seized the first
opportunity of ridding himself

SENECA.

sopher not only enjoys a high reputation! with his
contemporaries, and with posterity, and possesses for
us, considering that most of the Stoical writings
have been destroyed, an especial importance, but
he is in himself a really great representative of his
school, and one of the most influential leaders of the
tendency which this school took in the Roman
world, and especially in the times of the
Emperors. He is not, indeed, to be regarded as its
first founder: imperfectly as the history of Roman
Stoicism is known to us, we can clearly perceive that
from the time of Panetius, with the growing re-
striction to ethics, the tendency also to the soften-
ing of the Stoic severity and the approximation to
other systems is on the increase; and if the moral
doctrine of Stoicism on the other hand was again
rendered more stringent in the code of the Sextians,
and of the revived Cynicism (vide infra), the neg-
lect of school theories and the emphasising of all

many things as an author and
philosopher, bnt at the same

of the man whom he hated
(cf. xv. 45, 46) and, perhaps,

also feared. The conspiracy of
Piso in the year 65 A.D. fur-
nished a pretext for the bloody
mandate, to which the philo-
sopher submitted with manly
fortitude. His second wife
Paulina (Ep. 104, 1 sqqg.), who
wished to die with him, was
hindered in her purpose aiter
she had already opened her
arteries (Tac. Ann. xv. 56-64).

1 Concerning the favourable
verdicts of antiquity—of Quin-
tilian (who, indeed, censures
Seneca, Inst. x. 1, 125 sgq., for

time testifies to his great merits
—ingenium facile et copiosum,
plurimum studi, multa rerum
cognitio—and the extraordinary
reputation he enjoyed); Plinius
(H. Nat. xiv. 5, 51); Tacitus
(dan. xin. 3); Columella (RB.
R. πὶ. 3); Dio Cass. (lix. 19);
and the Christian writers (cf.
Holzherr, i. 1 sg.). Others, in-
deed, as Gell. NA. xii. 2, and
Fronto, ad Anton. 4,1 sg., 123
sqq., speak of him with very
little appreciation.

CHAP.
VII,

His repu-

tation and
influence.

ἘΘΙΕΟΤΙΟΙΘ,

that is universally human, based upon immediate

consciousness and important for moral life—the

universalistic development of ethics—the endeavour
after a system more generally comprehensible and
more practicably efficient was demanded from this
side also. These traits, however, are still more
thoroughly developed in Seneca and his followers,
and little as they wished to give up the doctrines of
their: school, boldly as they sometimes express the
Stoical doctrines, on the whole, Stoicism with them
takes the form more and more of universal moral
and religious conviction ; and in the matter of their
doctrines, side by side with the inner freedom of
the individual, the principles of universal love of
mankind, forbearance towards human weakness, sub-
mission to the Divine appointments have a promin-
ent place.

In Seneca, the freer position in regard to the
doctrine of his school which he claimed! for himself,

1 That Seneca is and professes
to be a Stoic requires no proof.
Cf. the use of nos and nost7i, Ep.
113, 1; 117, 6 et pass.; and the
panegyrics he bestows on Stoic-
ism, De Const. 1; Cons. ad Helv.
12,14; Clement, 11. 5, 3; Ep. 83, 9.
He expresses himself, however,
very decidedly on the right of
independent judgment, and on
the task of augmenting by our
own enquiries the inheritance
we havederived from our prede-
eessors (V. 8. 3,2; De Otio, 3,
1; Hp. 83, 11; 45, 4; 80, 1;
64,7 sqq.). He does not hesi-
tate, as we shall find, to oppose
tenets and customs of his

school, and unreservedly to ap-
propriate anything that he finds
serviceable, even beyond its
limits (Zp. 16,7; De Ira, i. 6,
5). He very frequently applies
in this manner sayings of Epi-
curus, whom he judges in regard.
to his personal merits with a
fairness that is most surprising
from aStoic (vide Phil. ἃ. Gr. III.
i. 446, δ); and if in this he may,
perhaps, be influenced, by the
predilectionof his friend Lucilius
for Epicurus, it is, nevertheless,
unmistakable that he wishes to
show his own impartiality by
this appreciative treatment of a
much-abused opponent.

SENECA.

is shown in his views concerning the end and problem
ot philosophy. If in the original tendencies of
Stoicism there already lay a preponderance of the
practical interest over the theoretical, with Seneca
this was so greatly increased that he regarded many
things considered by the older teachers of the school
to be essential constituents of philosophy, as un-
necessary and superfluous. Though he repeats in a
general manner the Stoic determinations respecting
the conception and parts of philosophy,! he lays even
greater stress than his predecessors on its moral end
and aim; the philosopher is a pedagogue of human-
ity,” philosophy is the art of life, the doctrine of
morals, the endeavour after virtue: in philosophy
we are concerned not with a game of quick-witted-
ness and skill, but with the cure of grave evils ; 4 it
teaches us not to talk, but to act,> and all that a
man learns is only useful when he applies it to his
moral condition. According to its relation to this
ultimate end the value of every scientific activity is
to be judged: that which does not effect our moral

1 Cf. in regard to the latter

Phil. d. Gr. Jil. i. 51, 2, and to
the former, ὁ. δ. 61, 1; 64, 1;
67,2; 207; and Ep. 94; 47 sq.;
95, 10.

2 Ep. 89, 18. Aristo main-
tained that the parenetic part
of Ethics is the affair of the
pedagogue, and not of the philo-
sopher: Zumguam quiequam
aliud 816 sapiens quam generis
humani pedagogus.

8 Phil. ἃ. Gr. TIL I, pp. 51,2;
54,1; Ap. 117,12; 94, 39.

4 Ep. 117, 33: ddice nune,
quod adsuescit animus delectare
se potius quam sanare et phil-
sophiam oblectamentum facere,
eum remedium sit.

5 Ep, 20, 2: Facere docet
philosophia, non dicere, &e., 24,
15.

6 Ep. 89, 18: Quieguid te-
geris ad mores statim referas.
Loe. cit. 23: Hee alits die...
omnia ad mores et ad sedan-
dam rabiem adfectuum referens.
Similarly 117, 33.

ΘΟ

CHAP.

VIL.
Εἰ. hue-
tries
Cer ening
the Prue
bein oF
baile
sopity.

Uselessness
of merely
theoretic
ENG Utes.

ECLECTICISM.

condition is useless, and the philosopher cannot find
adequate words to express his sense of the folly of
those who meddle with such things ; though even in
the warmth of his zeal he cannot help showing how
conversant he himself is with them. What are we
profited, he asks, by all the enquiries with which
the antiquarians occupy themselves? Who has ever
become the better and the juster for them?! How
small appears the value of the so-called liberal arts,
when we remember that it is virtue alone that is
important, that it claims our whole soul, and that
philosophy only leads to virtue!® But how much
that is superfluous has even philosophy admitted into
itself, how much trifling word-catching and unprofit-
able subtlety! Even in the Stoic School,? how many
things of this kind have found entrance! Seneca
for his part will have nothing to do with them, even
in cases where the subtleties of which he complains

1 Brevit. Vit. 18, where after
the citation of numerous ex-
amples of antiquarian and his-
torical enquiries he concludes
thus: Cujus ista errores minu-
ent, cujus cupiditates prement ?
Quem fortiorem, quem justiorem,
quem liberaliorem facient ?

2 This is discussed at length
in Hp. 88. Seneca here shows
that grammar, music, geometry,
arithmetic, and astronomy are
at most a preparation for the
higher instruction, but in them-
selves are of subordinate value
(p.20): Scis que recta sit linea:
quid tibt prodest, si quid in vita
rectum sit, ignoras ? &c.(p. 13).
Una re consummatur animus,

seientia bonorum ac matorum
immutabili, que soli philosophie
competit : nihil autem ulla ars

' alia de bonis ac malis querit

(p. 28). Magna et spatiosa res
est sapientia. Vacuo ill loco
opus est: de divinis humanisque
discendum est, de preteritis, de
Suturis, de caducis, de eternis,
&e. Hee tam multa, tam
magna ut habere possint tiberum
hospitium, supervacua ex animo
tollenda sunt. Non dabit se in
has angustias virtus: laxum
spatium res magna desiderat.
Hapellantur omnia. Totwm pec-
tus ili vacet (Ὁ. 33-35).
3 Of. Ep. 88, 42,

SENECA,

are evidently connected with the presuppositions
of the Stoic doctrine,! and in the same way he
easily disposes of the dialectical objections of their
opponents: he considers as trifling jugegleries not
worth the trouble of investigating, not only the
fallacies which so readily occupy the ingenuity of a
Chrysippus and his followers,? but also those compre-
hensive discussions of the sceptics, which gave the
ancient Stoa so much employment ; and the eclectic
arguments against the sensible phenomenon are
simply reckoned by him among the superfluous and
trifling enquiries which merely serve to divert us
from the things that are necessary for us to know?

* Ep. 117,138; Hp. 113, 1 sgq.
In both cases he embarks on
the exposition and refutation
of the Stoic definitions of the
long and the broad in order to
accuse their authors and himself
of having wasted their time
with such useless questions in-
stead of employing themselves
in something necessary and
profitable. Similarly in Zp. 106
et passim ; vide infra, p. 208, 1.

rance of which does not harm,
nor knowledge of them protit
us: Guid me detines in eo, quem
tu ipse wevdduevovadpellas. ..?
Lece tota mihi rita mentitur,
ke. Similarly Ep. 48: 49
ὅ, 877.

ὁ». 88, 18: Audi, quantum
mali Faciat nimia subtilitas et
quam tufesta veritati sit. Pro-
tagoras Says We can dispute for
and against everything; Nau-

* Ep. 45, 4 His predeces-
sors, the great men, have left
many problems: £t invenissent
Sorsitan necessaria, nisiet super-
tucua quesissent. Multum illis
temporis verborum cavillatio
eripuit et captiose disputationes,
que acumen inritum .. . exer-
cent. We should search out
not the meaning of words, but
things—the good and the evil;
and not fence with sophisms the
acetabula prestigiatorum (cf.
the ψηφοπαῖκται of Arcesilaus,
Phil. ἃ. Gr. ἘΠῚ. i. 495, 4) igno-

siphanes, that everything is
not, just as much asit is; Par-
menides, that nothing is except
the universe; Zeno, of Elea,
nihil esse. Circa eademfere Pyr-
rhonet versantur et Megarici et
Eretrict et Academici, qué no-
vam induxerunt scientiam, nihil
scire hee omnia in illum super
vacuum studiorum liberalium
gregem comice, &c. Non facile
dizerim, utris magis irascar,
ilfis qui non nihil seire volue-
runt, an illis, gui ne hoe quidem
nobis reliquerunt, nihil seire. ὁ

Supertiu-
παν Of
didteetic.

208

CHAP.
VITL

ECLECTICISM.

Wisdom, he says, is a simple thing and requires no
great learning: it is only our want of moderation
which so extends the sphere of philosophy ; for life,
the School questions are for the most part worthless ;!
they injure, indeed, rather than benefit, for they render
the mind small and weakly, instead of elevating it.?
We certainly cannot, as we have already seen and
shall see later on, take Seneca exactly at his word in
regard to such declarations; but it is undeniable
that he wishes to limit philosophy in principle to
moral problems, and only admits other things so far
as they stand in manifest connection with those
problems.

This principle must inevitably separate our phi-
losopher from that portion of philosophy to which
the older Stoics had originally paid great attention,
but which they had ultimately regarded as a mere
outwork of their system—viz., Logic. If, therefore,
Seneca includes it under the three chief divisions of
philosophy,’ the subject is only cursorily and occa-

Ep. 47, 4 8ῳ.; 87, 388 80. 88,

1 Hp. 106, 11. After a
36: Plus scire velle quam sit

thorough discussion of the pro-

position that the good is a body
(Part ITD. i. 120, 1, 3; 119, 1):
Latrunculis ludimus, in super-
vacaneis subtilitas teritur : non
Faciunt bonos δέω, sed doctos,
apertior res est sapere, imno
simplicior. Paucis est ad men-
tem benam uti literis: sed nos
ut cetera im supervacaneum
diffundimus, ita philosophiam
ipsam. Quemadmodum omnium
rerum, sic literarum quoque
intemperantia laboramus: non
vite sed schole discimus. Ct,

satis, intemperantie genus est.

2 In Hyp. 117, 18, after dis-
cussing the statement that sa-
pientia,and not sapere, is a good:
Omniaista circa sapientiam, non
in ipsa sunt: at nobis in ipsa
commorandum est ... hee vera,
de gquibus paulo ante dicebam,
minuunt et deprimunt, nec, ut
putatis, exacuunt, sed extenuant.
Similarly, Hyp. 82, 22.

8 Vide Phil. ἃ. Gr. 111.1.61,1;
64,1; 67,2. Hlsewhere, however
(Hp. 95, 10), philosophy is di-

LOGIC AND PHYSICS.

sionally touched upon in his writings. He expresses
himself at times in agreement with his school τος
specting the origin of conceptions, and the demon-
strative force of general opinion;! he speaks of
the highest conception and of the most univers:!
conceptions subordinated to it ;? he shows general.
that he is well acquainted with the logical dedni-
tions of his school ;3 but he himself has no inelin-
ation to enter into them more deeplv, because in
his opinion this whole region lies too far from that
which alone occupied him in the last resort—the
moral problem of man.

Far greater is the value which he ascribes to
Physics, as in his writings also he has devoted to it
greater space. He praises Physics for imparting to
the mind the elevation of the subjects with which
it occupies itself;* in the preface, indeed, to his
writings on Natural History,? he goes so far as to

vided, as with the Peripatetics,
into theoretical and practical
philosophy ; and in Ey. 94, £5,
virtue is similarly divided (as
with Pansetius. vide supra, Ὁ.
48). This division was all the
more obvious to a philosopher
who ascribed no independent
value to logic.

1 Phil. d.@r. TU... 74,3; 75,2.

2 Ep. 58, 8 sqq.; Phil. ἃ. Gr.
111.1. 92. The highest concep-
tion is that of Being ; this is
partly corporeal, partly Incor-
poreal; the corporeal is partly
living, and partly lifeless; the
living is partly animated with a
souland partly inanimate (ψυχὴ
and φύσις, vide ibid, OL 1. 192,

3): tae animate is partly mortal
and partly immortal (οἷ, Ey.
124, 14).

3 Besiies the quotations sy-
pra, pp. 207, 1; 208, 1, 2, cf. in
regard to this, Ep. 113, 4 «y.,
and Phil. d. Gr Ili. 97,2; Ep.
102, 6 eg.; Vat. Gu. ΤΙ. 2, 2, and
Pril. ἃ. Gr. 11. i. 96, 2; 118, 4.

4 Ep. LT, 19: De Deorum
natura queramus, de siderum
alimento, de his tam variis stel-
larum diseursibus, &e. Teta
jam ὦ formatione morum reces-
serunt: sed lerant animum et
ad ipsarum quas trartant rerum
magnitudinem adtollunt.

5 Nat. Qu. i. Prol. Cf. vi.
4, 2: ‘ Quod,’ inguis, ‘erit pre-

P

210

CHAP.
VITI.

LTis high
estimation

of Physics.

ECLECTICISM.

maintain that Physics are higher than Ethics, in
proportion as the Divine with which they are con-
cerned is higher than the Human; they alone lead
us from earthly darkness into the light of heaven,
show us the internal part of things, the Author and
arrangement of the world; it would not be worth
while to live, if physical investigations were forbidden
us. Where would be the greatness of combating
our passions, of freeing ourselves from evils, if the
spirit were not prepared by Physics for the know-
ledge of the heavenly, and brought into communica-
tion with God—if we were only raised above the
external, and not also above ourselves, &. Mean-
while, we soon perceive that these declamations
express rather a passing mood than the personal
opinion of the philosopher. Seneca elsewhere reckons
physical enquiries, to which we have just heard
him assign so high a position, among the things
which go beyond the essential and necessary, and are
rather an affair of recreation than of philosophical
work proper; though he does not overlook their
morally elevating effect on the mind ;! he declares

natura gueramus, de siderum
alimento, &e. Similarly in Hyp.

tium opere?? Quo nullum
magis est, nosse naturum. The

greatest gain of this enquiry
is, guod hominem magnificentia
sui detinet, nee mereede, sed
miraculo colitury (Ep. 95, 10,
&c.).

1 Hp. 117, 19 (cf. sup. Ὁ. 209,
4): Dialectic is only concerned
with the outworks of wisdom.
Etiam si quid evagart libet,
amplos habet illa [sapientia]
spatiososque secessus : de Deorwm

65, 15, a discussion on ultimate
causes is defended as follows:
figo quidem priora illa ago et
tracto, quibus pacatur animus,
et me prius serutor, deinde hune
mundum, Ne nune quidem
tempus, we extstinas, perdo.
Ista enim omnia, st non conei-
dantur nee in hane subtilitatem
anutilem distrahantur, adtollunt
δὲ levant animum, In the con-

PHYSICS, ETHICS,

the essential problem of man to be the moral
problem, and only admits natural enquiries as a
means and help to this; and he considers it a duty
to interrupt from time to time his expositions of
natural history by moral reflections and practical
applications, because all things must have reference
to our welfare.2. The interconnection between the
theoretical and practical doctrines of the Stoie
svstem is not abandoned by him, but it seems to be
laxer than with Chrysippus and his followers.

In those of his writings that have come down to
us, Seneca has treated in detail only that part of
Physics which the ancients were accustomed to call
Meteorology. To this in the last vears of his life?
he devoted seven books of enquiries Into natural

templation of the world and
its author, man raises himseif
above the burden of the flesh,
learns to know his high origin
and destiny, to despise the body
and the corporeal, and to free
himself from it. Lofty as is
the position here assigned to
speculative enquiries, Seneca
in the last resort can only
justify them by their moral
effect on men.

1 Nat. Qu. Ui. Pref. 10, 18:
Quid precipuum in rebus hu-
manis est? ... Vitia domuisse
J. erigere animum supra minas
et promissa fortune, &C. Lue
nobis proderit inspivere rerum
naturam, because we thereby
loose the spirit from the body
and from all that is base and
low, aud because the habit of
thought thus engendered is
favourable to moral convictions.

18: iv. 13;

: out espe-

2 CL Nat. Gt. HL
v.15, 18; vi. 2, 32
Clallv i. 59. After he has
treated of Uentring at length,
he remarks that it is much
rnore necessary to reraeve the
fear of it, and pwroceeds to do
so in these words: ΔΝ quo
φορᾷ: OTNLDUS enta@ rEebus μεν ἦς
busgue sermonihus aliquid salu-
tare miscendunme est. Cunt ἱμεμᾷ
per occulta nature, cum divina
tractamus, vinidiceandus est a
φαΐ suis animus ae subinde
Jirmandus, ὅκα,

3 This appears from 111. Pref,
and from the description of the
earthquake which in the year
63 4.D. destroyed Pompeii and
Herculaneum, vi.i. 26,5. Seneca
had already composed a treatise
on earthquakes in his earlier
years (.Yat. Yu, vi. 4, 2).

P2

11

CHAP,
Vill,

pentane tate! kt τεῦς μασνρν

CHAP,
VITL.

His meta- history which are attributed to Seneca.®

physical
and theo-
logical
doctrines.

ECLECTICISM.,

history.

Meanwhile the contents of the work

answer very impertectly! to the lofty promises with
which it opens ; it contains discussions concerning a
number of isolated natural phenomena, conducted
rather in the manner of learned pastime than of
independent and thorough physical investigation.
Seneca’s philosophical standpoint is little affected by
them, and would suffer no material alteration if even
the greater part of their results were totally different
from what they are. For us they are of the less im-
portance, since their subject-matter seems mostly to
have been taken from Posidonius and other prede-

9

cessors.*

It is the same with other writings on natural

The meta-

physical and theological opinions which he occasion-
ally enunciates, are of more value in regard to philo-
sophy. But even here, no important deviations from
the Stoic traditions are to be found. Like the Stoics,
Seneca presupposes the corporeality of all the Real ; 4

1 In proof of this let anyone
read the beginning of the trea-
tise, and he will scarcely be
able to resist the feeling of an
almost comic disappointment,
when the author, after the
above-mentioned declamations
on the dignity of natural en-
quiry, after the concluding sen-
tence: δὲ nihil aliud, hoe certe
Sciam, OMNIG aNgGUSta 6586,
mensus Deum, continues : WVWune
ad propositum veniam opus.
Audi quid de ignibus sentian,
Quos Ber TANSVETSOS . . .

2 Cf. on this subject, and the
content of Nat. Qu. Phil. ἃ. Gr.
III. i. 191, 2, ὃ.

3 According to Plin. H. M i,
9, 36; ix. 53, 167, he consulted
Seneca about his statements on
water - animals and_ stones.
Pliny, vi. 17, 60, and Servius on
/En, 1x. 31, mention a treatise,
De situ Indie; Serv. An, vi.
154, De sitw et sacris Agyp-
torwm. Cassiodorus, De Art.
Lib. c. 7, speaks of another
treatise, De forma mundi.

4 Cf. Hp. 117,2; 106,4; 106,
5; 113, 1 7. ; where Seneca,
indeed, opposes some conclu-
sions of Stoic materialism,
ae expressly teaches it him-
self.

GOD AND MATTER.

like them he discriminates matter from the force
working in it, and the Deity from matter ;! and he
does this in exactly the same sense as they do: the
active force is the spiritws, the breath, which forms
and holds together material substances. Even the
Deity is the Spirit, not asan incorporeal essence, but
as the πνεῦμα permeating the whole universe,’ cor-
poreally and in an extended manner. So also he
follows the Stoic doctrine of the relation between
God and the world: God is not merely the reason of
the world, but the world itself, the whole of the
visible, as of the invisible things Seneca, however,
brings forward much more emphatically the moral
and spiritual side of the Stoic idea of God; and in
accordance with this he prefers to place the efficient

1 Οὗ Phil. ὦ. Gr. TIT, i. 181,
4; 134, 1; also 177, 1. Proofs
of the existence of God, 134, 3;
161, 2; 135, 5.

2 Ibid. IIL 1.118, 4. Seneca’s
conception of spiritus will be
discussed infra, p. 219, in con-
nection with his psychology.

ὃ Seneca is not very explicit
here, but, from the fact that
everything efficient must be a
body (Hp. 117, 2), it follows
that what he says (Hp. 102,
7) must hold good even of the
world—viz., that the unity of
everything depends upon the
spiritus which holds 10 to-
gether ; that the soul which he
represents to be of the same
substance with Deity—in fact,
as a part of Deity—is, as we
shall presently find, conceived
by Seneca, in agreement with
the whole Stoic school, mate-

rialistically ; that even visible
things are described as parts of
the Deity (Pail. d. Gr. TILi.146,
6); that only a corporeal god
can take back into himself the
corporeal world by means of
the world’s conflagration (J. ὁ.
144,1). If, therefore, Seneca,
(ad Helv. 8, 3) places the Pla-
tonic conception of Deity as
incorporeal reason, and the
Stoic conception, according to
which the Deity is the univer-
sally diffused spiritus, side by
side without discriminating
them, the second only corre-
sponds with his own opinion.

4 Cf. Phil. d. Gir. IIL 1.146, 6;
148, 1 ;also #7. 16 (ap. Lact. Inst.
1. δ, 21): gquamvis ipse per totum
sé con pus (sc. mundi) intenderat ;
and also the Stoic doctrine of
Pneuma and τόνος.

213

CHAP.
VITIL.

ECLECTICISM.

activity of God in the world under the idea of Provi-
dence, and the order and arrangement of the world
under the teleological aspect. God is the highest
reason, the perfect Spirit, whose wisdom, omni-
science, holiness, and, above all, His beneficent good-
ness, are continually extolled.! He loves us as a
father, and desires to be loved by us, and not feared ; ?
and therefore the world, whose Creator and ruler ὅ He
is, is so perfect and beautiful, and the course of the
world so blameless; which Seneca proves in many
ways. Since his general theory of the universe has
its centre in the moral life of man, so in his con-
ception of God the physical element is less promi-
nent than the ethical: it is the care of the Deity
for men, His goodness and wisdom, in which His
perfection is principally revealed to Seneca; and
therefore it is inevitable that the personal aspect of
the Deity, in which, as reason forming and govern-
ing the world and working according to moral ends,
He is distinguished from the world itself, should
preponderate, as compared with the Pantheistic
aspect, in which the Deity is not only the soul, but
the substance of the world. It is going too far, how-
ever, to say® that Seneca abandoned the Stoic idea,
and thus gave to ethics a new direction; that
whereas in true Stoicism God and matter are in

1 Authorities are given in 4 Jr. 26; Ὁ. Lact. Jnesé. i. 6,
Phit. d. Gr. VW. i. 189, 1; 26; Τὴ Be. 8, 4.
148, 1. Others may easily be 4 Of Phil. ἃ. Gr. TIL i. Ὁ.
found: Cf. Holzherr,i.99 sg. 171, 8; 178, 2; 138, δ.

2 De Prov. 15 sq.3 2 6; 5 Holzherr, i. 33; 36; 91 sgq.;
Benef. ii, 29, 4-6; iv. 19, 1; il. 5 sqg.
De Ira, ti. 27,1; of. Ὁ. 818,1.

FORCE AND MATTER.

their essential nature one, in Seneca they appear as
essentially different; that God is to him the incor-
poreal nature, who has formed the world by His free-
will, and that his god is no longer the god of the
Stoics, but of the Platonists. Our previous argu-
ments will rather have shown that the conception of
God, which according to this exposition is peculiar
to Seneca, is in no way foreign to the elder Stoics;
that they, too, laid great stress on the goodness and
wisdom of God, and on His benevolence to man; they,
too, regarded Him as the Spirit that guides all
things, the reason that has ordered and adapted all
things for the wisest ends; by them also the belief
in Providence is regarded as of the highest value,
and is most vigorously defended; and the law of
the universe and of morality coincides with the will
of God.! They will also have shown that Seneca,
on the other hand, is far from abandoning those
definitions of his school according to which the
distinction between efficient force and matter is only
a derived distinction, and consequently is often an-
nulled in the course of the world’s development; 3
that he, too, seeks God in the πνεῦμα conceived as

1 Cf. Phil. ὦ. Gr. 111.1. 139, 1;
159, 1; 161; 168, 1; 171 sq.;
505 sq.

2 Hp. 6, 16, where Seneca says
exactly the same as is quoted
from Chrysippus, Phil. d. Gr.
ITI. i. 143, 2. Similarly Holz-
herr’s chief proof for the essen-
tial difference between God and
matter (Zp. 65), as will be seen
from Phil. ἃ. Gr. 111. i. 131, 4
sgq., entirely corresponds with

the doctrine of the Stoic school,
to which Seneca, indeed, ex-
pressly appeals; and when in
De Prov. 5,9 (the mere ques-
tions in Vat. Qu.i. Pref. 16, can
prove nothing) he brings forward
for the Theodicee the proposi-
tion that the Divine artist is
dependent on his material, he
follows herein not only Plato,
but also Chrysippus, as is shown
Phil. d. Gr, TIL. 1.177, 1.

215

CHAP.
VIII.

216

CHAP.
VII.

ECLECTICISM.

. corporeal, and not in the incorporeal Spirit ;! declares

the parts of the world to be parts of the Deity, and
God and the world to be the same;? identifies
nature, fate, and God,’ and reduces the will of God
to the law of the universe, and Providence to the
unalterable concatenation of natural causes.* If,
therefore, a certain difference exists between his
theology and that of the elder Stoics, this does not
consist in his giving up any essential definition of
theirs, or introducing any new definition; it is
merely that among the constituents of the Stoic
conception of God he lays greater emphasis on the
ethical aspects, and therefore brings that conception
nearer, sometimes to the ordinary presentation,
sometimes to the Socratic-Platonic doctrine. This
is primarily a consequence of the relation in which
the moral and speculative elements stand with him:
as the latter is subordinate to the former, so the
metaphysical and physical determinations of the
Stoic theology are in his exposition less prominent
than the ethical. But it was all the easier on this
account for the dualism of the Stoic ethics to react
upon his theology, and it is undeniable that the

1 Vide supra, 213, 3.

2 Phil. ἃ. Gr. Il. i. 146, 63
148,1;140m ; Lp. 92,30: Zotum
hoe, quo continemur, et UNUM est
οὐ Deus: et socti sumus ejus Θὲ
memora.

8 Phil. d. Gr. TI. ἃ, 140 m.;
143, 1; Benes. iv. 8, 2: Mee na-
tura sine Deo est nee Deus sine
natura, sed idem est utrumgue,
distat officio... naturam voed,

Satum, fortunam, omnia ejusdem
Det nomina sunt varie utentis
sua potestate.

4 Loa. eit. and Phil. d. Gr.
ΠῚ. 157, 2; 168, 2; cf. 168, 1,
2. The same results from Benes.
vi. 23, though Seneca at first ex-
presses himself as if the will
of the gods were the author
of the laws of the universe.

NATURE. THE WORLD.

opposition of God and matter, in direct connection .

with the ethical opposition of sense and reason, is
more strongly asserted by him than their original
unity.' If, however, on this side he has reached the
limits of the Stoic doctrine, he did not really over-
step them.

Nor do we find in Seneca’s theory of the world
and of nature anything that contradicts the prin-
ciples of the Stoics. His utterances concerning the
origin, the end, and the new formation of the world : 2
its form ; ὃ its unity establishing itself out of contra-
dictions,‘ and maintaining itself in the ceaseless
change of things; its beauty ὃ asserting itself in the
multiplicity of its productions; the perfect adapta-
tion of means to ends in its arrangement,® as to
which even the evil in it should not cause us any
doubt ; ‘“—all these serve to complete and verify the
accounts we have from other sources respecting the
doctrines of his school. To the littleness and super-

1 Vide Hp. 65, especially 2
and 23.

2 Phil. d. Gr. 171. i, 149, 38;
144, 1; 152,2; 154, 1; 155; 156,
3. In Seneca these doctrines
are connected with the theory
that mankind and the world in
general had been uncorrupted
in proportion as they were
nearer their first beginnings.
He opposes, however, the ex-
aggerated notions of Posiclo-
nius on this subject. Ci “Hp.
90, especially from s. 36, and
Phil. d. Gir, 111. i. 269, 6.

8 Fr. 13, and Phil. ὦ. Ge. 111,
1. 146, 6, end.

4M. Qu. iii, 10, 1, 8; vil.

27, 3 sq.; V. Be. 8, 4 sq.3 Ep.
107, 8; and Pit. ἃ. Ge. 111. 1.
179, 3; 188, 1.

5 Loc. cit. 171, 3; Benef. iv. 23.

§ Hp.113,16; De Provid.i.1,
2-4; Nat. Qu.i. Prowm. 14 sq.
Cf. with these passages Sen.
Benef. iv. 5; ad Mare. 18. The
conception of the world as an
uris Dis hominibusque com-
munis, in the latter passage
is eminently Stoic. Vide Phil.
da. Gr. TIL.1, 285, 1; 286, 2: 361 sg.

7 Concerning the Stoic Theo-
dicee, and Seneca’s participa-
tion in it (about which much
might be quoted) ride ibid, ITT.
i. 173 sqq.

Theories of
the world
ane
ΠΧ

ECLECTICISM.

ficiality into which the Stoic teleology had already
fallen at an early period, he opposes the propositions
that the world was not created merely for men: it
rather carries its purpose in itself and follows its
own laws;! it is an undue limitation when we place
it under the aspect of the useful, instead of ad-
miring its glory as such.2 He does not, however,
deny that in the arrangement of the world regard
was paid to the welfare of man, and that the gods
unceasingly show the greatest benevolence to men.3
What he says likewise concerning the system of the
universe and its parts—the elements, their qualities
and their transition into each other;* on the
heavenly bodies, their revolution, their divine
nature,® their influence on earthly things;°® the
earth, and the spirit that animates it;7 on the
regular interconnection of the universe,’ interrupted
by no empty spaces,——all this only deviates from the
Stoic tradition in regard to certain details which do
not affect his theory of the universe as a whole.

1 De Ira, 27,2; Nat. Qu.vii. Benef. 1. e.; Nat. Ou. ti. 11;

30, 3; Benef. vi. 20.

2 Benef. iv. 23 8.

8 Benef. 1. 6.3 vi. 23, 3 sq.3 1.
1,9; 11. 29, 4 5.; Iv. 53 Vat.
Qu. Vv. 18 et pass.

4 Phil. d. Gr. ITT. i. 179, 8
(Nat. Qu. tii. 10,15 3); ἐδίώ. TIL.
i. 183, 2; 184, 1 (Wat. Gu. i.
10); and idid. 185, 8 (Wat. Qu.
vi. 16); Mat. Qu. i. 6; Ap. 31, δ.

5 Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2; vil. 1, 6;
21,4; Benef. iv. 23,45 vi. 21-
23

6 In regard to this influence
Seneca alludes first to the natu-
ral intluence of the stars (¢g.

ili. 29, 2), but he couples with
it in the manner of his school
the theory of a natiwral pro-
gnostication through the stars,
which, as he believes, is as little
confined to the five plancts as
the influence above mentioned
(Nat. Qu. ii. 32,6 sq.3 ad Mare.
18, 3).

7 Nat. Qu. vi. 16; ti. δ. On
the repose of the earth, vide De
Provid. i. 1,2; Bp. 98, 9; Nat.
Gu. 1.4; cf. vil. 2, 3.

8. Wat. Qu. ti. 2-7 (cf. Phil.
d@. Gr. ΤΙ]. i. 187, 4).

® So in regard to the comets,

HUMAN NATURE.

He also adheres to that tradition in the few passages
to be found in his works mentioning terrestrial
natures exclusive of man.

In his views of human nature he is farther
removed from the doctrine of the elder Stoics. The
groundwork of these views is formed by the Stoic
psychology with its materialism; but the dualism
of the Stoic ethics, the reaction of which on his
theoretical view of the world had already made itself
felt in his theology, acquires a stronger and more
direct influence on his anthropology, in which con-
sequently two tendencies cross one another. On the
one hand, he wishes to derive, with his school, the
whole life of the soul from a simple principle con-
ceived materially ; on the other, the ethical oppo-
sition of the inner and the outer, which even in the
Stoic doctrine is so sharply accented, is transferred
by him to the essential nature of man, and based
upon it; and thus over against the ancient Stoic
movism a dualism is mtroduced, which approximates
to the Platonic anthropology, and depends upon it.
The soul, says Seneca (in general agreement with
the Stoies), is a body, for otherwise it could not
possibly have any effect upon the body.2 It must,
indeed, ascribes to the animals
a principale, but denies them
not only reason, but affections

(De Iva, i.3). With this coin-
cides what is remarked con-

which he considers to be wan-
dering stars with very distant
orbits (Nat. Qu. vil. 22 sqq.).

1 Seneca agrees with the dis-
crimination of ἕξις and φύσις,

ὅς, (Phil. ἃ. Gr. TTL 1. 192, 3)
by virtue of his classification
of essential natures mentioned
supra, Ὁ. 209, 2; like Chrysippus
(Phil. ἃ. Gr, 111. i. 193, 1) he,

cerning the soullife of animals
(fp. 121, 5 sgg.; 124, 16 sqq.).

2 He expresses himself quite
unequivocally on this point in
Hp. 106, 4, and it is not true

219

CHAP.
VIII.

Anthrop-
ology.

ECLECTICISM.,

however, certainly be the finest of all substances, finer
even than fire and air.! It consists, in a word, of
warm breath, or πνεῦμα.) This theory had not pre-
vented the elder Stoics from recognising the divine
nature and dignity of the human spirit to the fullest
extent, and Seneca is so completely possessed by it
that there is no other theorem which he reiterates
more frequently and more emphatically. Human
reason is to him an effluence of Deity, a part of the
Divine Spirit implanted in a human body, a god who
has taken up his abode there; and on this our
relationship to God he bases, on the one hand, his

(Holzherr, ii. 47) to say that he
is arguing from a Stoic premiss
which he did not himself share.
On the contrary, he is speaking
in his own name; and if he
ultimately declares the investi-
gation of the question whether
the good is a body to be worth-
less (supra, Ὁ. 207, 1), it does not
follow that he himself does not
regard the good as such, still less
that he was notin earnest as to
the proposition which is brought
forward to assist this enquiry,
but is quite independent of it—
viz., that the soul is a body.
The same holds gosd of the
further proposition (2. ¢.) that
the affections and the diseases
of the soul are bodies, and of
the reason given for it—that
they cause the changes of ex-
pression, blushing and turning
pile, &e., and that they cannot
be accounted for: Zam mani-
festas notes corport inprime
nisi corpore. This also Seneca
declares to be his own opinion.
Tf, however, the affections are
something corporeal, so is the

soul; for an affection is only
the animus quodam modo 86
habens (Phil. ὦ. Gr. TY. i. 120,
8); and if the corporeal alone
can work upon the body, the
soul must be something cor-
poreal, as Cleanthes had already
shown (¢béd. III. i. 194, 1).

1 Zp. 57,8. As the flame or
the air cannot be subjected to
pressure or a blow, sie animus,
qui ex tenuissimo constat, de-
prehendi non potest... anime,
qua athue tenutor est igne, per
omne corpus fuged est.

2 Hp. 50,6. If a man can
bend crooked wood, and make
it straight, quanto facilius
anémus aeci pit formam, fleatbilis
et omni humore obsequentior f
Quid enim est aliud animas
quam gquodam modo se habens
spiritus? Vides autem tanto
spiritum esse faciliorem omni
alia materta, quanto tenuior est.
Of Phil. d. Go. TIT. i. 195, 2, and
142, 2, where definitions entirely
similar are proved to be uni-
versal among the Stoics.

VIRTUES AND VICES.

Sot av

demand for the elevation of the soul above the
earthly, and for the recognition of the dignity of
mankind in every man; and, on the other, the
internal freedom of the man who is conscious of his
high origin and essential nature.! This thought,
however, takes a direction with Seneca which makes
him deviate from the ancient Stoie doctrine on the
side of Platonism. The Divinein man is his reason,
and that alone; but in opposition to reason stand
the irrational impulses, the affections; and in com-
bating the affections Seneca, as we shall find, in
accordance with the whole Stoic school, finds the
weightiest moral problem. The elder Stoics had
not allowed this to confuse them in their belief as to
the oneness of man’s essential nature. But already
Posidonius had discovered that the affections could not
be explained, unless, with Plato, irrational powers of
the soul were admitted as well as the reason.2 Similar
reflections must have had the more influence on
Neneca’s view of human nature. With all the greater
force, the more vividly he felt its moral weakness and
imperfection, the more absolutely he was convinced
that no human being was without fault; that all vices
were implanted in all men; that the superior power
of evil in human society as a whole would never be
broken, nor the complaints of the corruption of
manners cease ;* and that even after the renovation

1 Some of his utterances on 12; Zp. 41, 5; 44, 1; 65, 20 87.;
this subject are quoted, Pril.d. 120, 14, κα.
Gr. 171. i. 200, 2; 201, 1; and ? Cf. supra, p. 64.
supra, 216, 2; vide also ad Zelv. 3 Cf. Phil. ὦ. Gr, TIT. i. 253
6,73; 11, 6 sg.; Wat. Qu.i. Pref. sq.; Benef. vii. 27; Ep. 94, 54;

221

CHAP.
VIII.

CHAP.
VILLI.

ECLECTICISM.

of the world the ensuing time of innocence would
be only of short duration. Such a universal phe-
nomenon cannot possibly be regarded as accidental :
if a few only sustain the conflict with sin, none or
next to none are free from it ; and therefore in man,
side by side with the Divine, there must also be an
element not Divine; and side by side with reason,
from which error and sin cannot be derived, an
element which is irrational and strives against
reason.2 This irrational element of human nature
Seneca finds primarily in the body, the opposition of
which to the Spirit he emphasises much more
strongly than the ancient Stoics appear to have
done. The body, or, as he also contemptuously calls
it, the flesh, is something so worthless that we cannot
think meanly enough of it: it is a mere husk of
the soul: a tenement into which it has entered for
a short time, and can never feel itself at home: a
burden by which it is oppressed: a fetter, a prison,
for the loosing and opening of which it must neces-

natural destiny and vocation,

ancelsewhere. Expressions like
and are not inherent in us;

those in Zp. 11, 1-7; 57, 4, are

of less importance.

ι Wat. Qu. iii. 30,8; οὗ, Phil.
d. Gr. 111. i. Ὁ. 156, 3.

2 Seneca himself seems freely
to admit this. ‘Lrras,’ he says,
in Hp. 94, δῦ, st existimus
nobiscum wtiG nascis super
renerunt, ingesta sunt... nde
nos vitio natura coneiliat + ila
inteqros ac liberos genuit. But
this utterance must be judged
according to the standard of
the Stoic fatalism. Vices stand,
indeed, in opposition to our

they develop themselves gradu-
ally. But that does not exclude
the theory that they develop
themselves from natural causes.

8 tip, 65, 22: Numguam me
caro iste compellet ad metum
... nunguam tu honorem hajus
corpuseut mentiar., Cum visim
erit, distraham eum io socie-
tatem . . . contemptus corporis
sui certa libertas est. Concern-
ing the expression cf. ad Mare.
24,5; Hy. 74,165 92,10; and
Phil. d. αὐ. TID i, 4438, 8.

IMMORTALITY.

sarily long;! with its flesh it must do battle,
through its body it is exposed to attacks and suffer-
ings, but in itself it is pure and invulnerable,?
exalted above the body, even as God is exalted
above matter? The true life of the soul begins,
therefore, with the departure from the body, and
though Seneca is averse to exchanging the Platonic
belief in immortality* for the Stoic theory of a
limited continuance of existence after death, he
closely approximates to the latter® (as has already
been shown) in his idea of the close relationship
existing between the present and future life, and
also in respect to the duration of future existence
expressions involuntarily escape him which a Stoic
in the strictest sense of the term would not have
ventured to employ ;® even the pre-existence of the
soul, which as personal existence certainly had no
place in his system, finds countenance in passages

1 Hp. 92, 18, 33: The body
isa garment, a velamentum of
the soul, an onus necessarium.
102, 26: The day of death is
aterni natalis. Depone onus:
quid cunctaris ? 120, 14: Nee
domum. esse hoe corpus, sed hos-
pitium et quidem breve hospi-
tium. 65,16: Corpus hoe anima
pondus ac pena est: premente
illo urgetur, tn vinculis est, nisi
accessit philosophia, ὅς. Loe.
eit. 21: [will not be a slave to
my body, quod equidem non
atiter adspicio quam vinclum
aliquod libertati mee circumda-
tum... ὧν hoe obnoxio dumi-
cilio animus liber habitat.
Eyp.102, 22; ad Mare. 24,5; ad
Polyd. 9,3; Part IIT. i. 208, 3.

2 Ad Mare. 24,5: Omne illi
cum hae carne grave certamen
est, ne ahbhstrahatur et sidat.
Ad Helv. 11, 7: Corpusculum
hoc, custodia et vinculum animé,
hue. atque illue jactatur...
animus quidem ipse sacer et
@ternus est et cut non possit
anict manus.

3 Ep. 65, 24: Quem in hoe
mundo locum Deus obtinet, hune
in homine animus. Nat. Qu.
Pref. 14.

* Phil. ὦ. Gr. TI. 1. 154, 1;
202, 1.

5 Ibid. 203 sq.

6 Immortalis, eternus (Ep.
57, 9; and Phil. ἃ. Gr. TIT. i.
154, 1; 203, 3).

ECLECTICISM,

where the recollection of its high descent is en-
joined upon the soul, and its elevation to heaven is
represented as a return to its original home, when it
leaves the body behind, where the soul found it.!
But as with Plato the psychologically different parts
of the soul had been combined with the anthropo-
logical opposition of soul and body, so Seneca cannot
entirely escape this inference. With Posidonius?
he follows the Platonic discrimination of a rational
and irrational element in the soul, the irrational
element being again divided into courage and
desire ;3 and though he expressly includes them
all under the ἡγεμονικὸν, and so far adheres to the
doctrine of his school against Plato and Aristotle,
there still remains between his theory and that of
Chrysippus the important difference that Seneca

assumes in the very centre of personality a plurality

of original faculties, while Chrysippus makes one
and the same fundamental faculty, reason, generate
affections and desires through the changes that take
place in it.*

Though we cannot help recognising the period of

1 Ad Mare. 24, 5; Ep. 79,
12; 102, 22; 120, 14; Pail. ἃ.
Gr. IIT. i. 208, 2; 8; 2». 65, 16:
The soul will vererti ad illa
quorum Fuit (92, 30 s¢.).

2 Supra, p. 64 seq.

8 Tip. 94, 1: Puto inter me
teque conventet, externa corporr
adquirt, corpus ὧν honorem
animt coli, in animo esse partes
ministras, per quas moventur
alimargue, propter ipsum prin-
cipale nobis datas (the seven

derived powers of the soul [PAil.
ὦ. Ge. 111, i. 198, 1] or analo-
gous to them) tn hoe principals
est aliquid irrationale, est et
rationale: ἐμά hie servit.
Loe. cit. 8: Irvationalis pars
animd duas habet partes, alte-
rim animosam, ambitinsam, im
potentem, positam in adfectioni-
bus, alteram haanilem, languidam
voluptatibus deditam (Hp. 71,
27

1 Vide Phil. ἃ, Gr. TIL i. 199, 3.

OCCASIONAL SCEPTICISM.

eclecticism in these deviations from the older Stoic
doctrine, yet the sceptical side of this eclecticism
is also exhibited by Seneca in the occasional uncer-
tainty of his language respecting the same subjects of
which he elsewhere speaks in the tone of full dog-
matic conviction. We cannot perhaps, argue from
the fact that in his epistle to his mother concerning
the comfort afforded by the dependence of all things
on God, he secures himself against every attack by
not deciding what God is.! But it has an unde-
niably sceptical sound when he elsewhere, in dis-
cussing the question of the highest causes, declares
that a man must be content among conflicting
views to choose the most probable: to determine
the truest, exceeds our powers.?. In the same way
he says of the soul: ‘What and where it is, no
one can fathom. One sets up this definition and
another that; but how can the soul, which is not
clear about itself, attain to certainty about other
things?’? We should not be justified in calling

1 Of, 2. 4. 145, 1.

2 Hy. 65, 10 (cf. 65, 2, and
65, 23): Ler ergo judew senten-
tviam et pronuntia, quis δὶ
videatur verisimillimum dicere,
non guis verissimum dicat. Ld
enim tam supra nos est quam
ipsa veritas; and after he has
set forth the objections of the
Stoics against the Platonic
theories he proceeds thus: Aut
Ser sententiam aut, quod facilius
in ejusmodi rebus est, nega tidbit
liguere et nos reverti jube. In
estimating this passage we
must remember that it clearly

echoes the passage from Plato,
Tim. 29, ce, which Seneca has
quoted in the preceding con-
text.

8 Nat. Qu. vii. 25,1: Multa
sunt, Jue esse concedimus, qualia
sunt, ignoramus. Habere nos
animum... omnes Jatebuntur :
quid tamen sit animus ille rector
dominusque nostri, non magis
tibi guisguam expediet, quam
ubi sit: alius illum dicet spiri-
tum esse, alius concentum quen-
dam, alius vim diwinam et Det
parte, alius LENUWSSUMUM AETEN,
alius imcorporalem potentiam.

Q

225

CHAP.
VIII.

Assertion
of the un-
certainty
of all spe-
culation.

Lthies.

Essential
agreement
with the
principles
of the
Stoics,

ECLECTICISM.

Seneca a sceptic because of such isolated utterances,
to which the dogmatism of his whole method is
otherwise opposed, but they, at any rate, prove that
he is not free from severe attacks of scepticism, and
that, as with Cicero and other eclectics, it is, above
all things, the strife of philosophic theories which
causes the dogmatism of the Stoic to waver.

The Stoicism of Seneca is purer in the sphere to
which he himself attaches the greatest importance—
namely, ethics. The idealism of the Stoic moral
doctrine in its grandeur, and also in its asperities,
finds in him a zealous and eloquent representa-
tive. He declares with the Stoics that there is no
good but virtue, because virtue alone is, for man,
according to nature: he can paint the satisfaction
which it secures, the independence of all external
fortune, the invulnerability of the wise man, with
glowing and even glaring colours; he is convinced
that the virtuous man is in no way inferior to the
Deity,—in a certain respect, indeed, is even superior ;
he requires from us not merely moderation in
our emotions,! but their unconditional eradication ;
he reiterates the well-known remarkable state-
ments about the unity and equality of all virtues,
the perfect completeness of the wise man; the

Non deerit, qui sanguinem dicat,
gui calorem: adeo animo non
potest liquere de ceteris rebus,
ut adhuc ipse se querat. De
Clement. i. 3, 5, would prove
little, taken alone, and 4p. 121,
12, still less. In Zp. 102
(beginning) a belief in immor-
tality, which is based rather

upon wishes and authority than
on proofs is named a bellum
somnium ; but this is unimpor-
tant.

1 Vide Phil. d. Gr. TI. i. 252,
1 sq.,and Hp. 53.11: Est ali-
guid, quo sapiens antecedat
Deum: tile beneficio nature non
tamet suo sapiens.

MORALITY OF THE STOICS.

misery, defectiveness, and madness of the unwise ;
in fact, all the principles on which the peculiar
character of the Stoics had been most clearly
stamped—with the full decision of personal convic-
tion, and all the pathos of the orator.! But even
here we can perceive that the reasons which must
have recommended the Stoic doctrine to him are
opposed by reflections and inclinations of another
kind. The Stoic morality is intended for natures
capable of a pure and perfect virtue; how can it be
applied unaltered to us men, who one and all are so

1 The most definite utterances
of Seneca on all these ques-
tions have been already quoted.
I content myself, therefore.
with referring to these quota-
tions and completing them with
a few others, though many
might be added, since Seneca
declares in innumerable places
the leading thoughts of his
ethical doctrine. On the prin-
ciple of life according to nature,
and its derivation from the
impulse of self-preservation, cf.
Sen. fp. 121, 5 sgq.; 10, 11;
Vita Beat. 3,3; Hp. 118 sqq.:
Hp. 121, 14; 92, 1; 76, 8; 89,
15; Vita Beat. 8, 6; Hp. 120,
22; Benef. iv. 25, 1; Hp. 122,
5 sq. Concerning the Good
and goods, Benef. vii. 2,1; Zp.
66,5; 71,4; 74, 15 76 11;
85, 17; 120, 8; 118, 10, Con-
cerning the autarchy of virtue
and against the admission of ex-
ternal and corporeal things,
pleasure and pain, among goods
and evils, vide Phil. ἃ. Gr. ITI.
1.215-221 ; Benef. vil. 8 sqq.; Ep.
74, 76, 20 sgqg.; 71,17 sgg. On

peace of mind as the chief con-
stituent of happiness, De Con-
stant. 13, 5; 75,18; Ap. 29, 12.
On the nature and reprehensi-
bility of the emotions, De Tra, it.
2,1; Hp. 75,11; 85, 5; 116,1 sq.
On the nature and origin of
virtue, Hp. 113, 2; 117, 2; De
Otio, 1,4; Ep. 65,6; Bp. 108,
8; Hp. 94, 29. On wisdom and
the principal virtues, Hp. 89, 5;
95, 55; 120, 11; 115, 3 (the
division of the virtues, Vita
Beat. 25, 6 sq. is of less import-
ance) 67,6; 10; 88,29; Benef.
ii. 34, 3. On the disposition
and will as the seat of all
virtue; on the equality of all
virtues and vices and of all
goods and evils, Beref. vi. 11,
3; 1.5,2; 1.31,1; δ. 71, 18;
66, 5- s¢q.; 66, 32. On wise
men and fools, Benef. iv. 26,
27, 2; v. 12, 3; 15, 1; vii. 3,
23q.3 6,3; 8,1; 2p. 81, 11 4.:
738, 11,13; Prov.i. 5; 6, 4 sq¢.;
De Const. 8, 2; De Ira, ii. 8-10;
De Const. 2,15 7,1; Hp.9,14 δὲ
passim.

Q 2

227

CHAP.
VIL

which he
neverthe-
less softens
and quaili-

168.

228

CHAP.
VIII.

ECLECTICISM.

wicked and weak as Seneca maintains, and have
these evils, as he also says, so deeply rooted in our
nature?! The happiness of the wise man is con-
ditioned by his wisdom, the autarchy of the virtuous
by a virtue which corresponds to the Stoic demands.
What does it profit us if this virtue and wisdom are
never, or hardly ever, to be found in the actual
world ??2 By these arguments the older teachers of
the school had already, as we have seen, been in-
duced to modify their original demands by important
concessions, and Seneca was still more likely to
adopt the same procedure. Thus we see him not
only approving the concessions which his prede-
cessors had made to human weakness, but in
many of his utterances deviating still further from
the original severity of the system. Like the
older Stoics, he attributes a certain value to other
things besides virtue;* and reckons these things

among goods in the wider sense.‘
On the other hand, he is no longer

portant.°

1 Phil. ἃ. Gr, TI. 1. 252 sgq.,
and supra, Ὁ. 221. The utter-
ances of Seneca there quoted
often coincide almost word for
word with those of the Apostle
Paul on the universal sinfulness
of man, and this is one of the
most striking of the points of
contact between them which
have given rise to the legend of
their personal intercourse and
written correspondence; con-
cerning which cf. Baur, Drei
Abhandl. Ὁ. 377 sqq., and A.
Fleury, Senéque et St. Paul,
Paris, 1853; 1. 269 5924. His-
torically regarded, this coinci-

This is unim-

dence only shows that two
kinds of exposition were pro-
duced from similar circum-
stances, experiences, and tem-
peraments, and that two
writers need not stand in any
immediate connection in order
to agree, even as to their words,
in many propositions.

2 As Seneca admits, Tranqu.
An.7,4; Hp. 4,2; 90, 44. -

3 Lg, producta (προηγμένα,
concerning which cf. Hp. 74,17;
87, 29; Vita Beat. 22, 4).
Seneca calls them also potiora
and commoda.

* In Bene. v.13, 1, he agrees

EXTERNAL GOODS AND ILLS.

quite consistent when he sometimes extravagantly
praises the Cynic contempt for the necessaries of
life and at other times counsels compliance with
existing customs, and careful avoidance of all that
can attract notice! But we hear more of the Peri-
patetic language than the Stoic when Seneca, in
spite of all his declamation about the self-satisfying
nature of virtue, and indifference to things ex-
ternal,? is once more of opinion that Fortune can find
no better steward for her gifts than the wise man ;
since riches alone can give opportunity for the un-
folding of a number of virtues, and external goods
may add something to the cheerfulness which
springs from virtue.? It is the same thing with
what he says of external evil. It sounds magna-
nimous enough when the philosopher challenges
Fortune to an encounter, when he extols the subli-
mity of the spectacle which the wise man grap-
pling with misfortune affords to the gods;* but
this lofty tone changes only too completely into a
feeble and querulous sound, when Seneca (to pass

with the Academy and the Peri-
patetics in distinguishing bona
animi, corporis, fortune. Else-
where, however (Hp. 74, 17;
76, 8; 124, 18) he expressly
says that everything except
virtue is improperly (precario)
named a good. The former
view is to be found in Chrys-
ippus and others, Phil. d. Gr.
111. i. 262, 3,

1 Trangu. An. 8, 4 899.3
Benef. v. 4,3; 6,1; Zp. 29, 1;
90, 14; Benef. vii. 8 sq.; Ep.

20,9; 62,3. And,on the other
hand, Cic. Fin. 111. 20, 68; να».
14, 14.

2 Eg. Ep. 92, 5; De Vit.
Beat. 22, δ; Hy. 62, 2. Bre-
vissima ad divitias (to the trne
riches) per contemptum divi-
tiarwm via est. Further proofs
Phil. d. Gr. ITT. i. 215, and
supra, p. 227, 1.

8 Vit. Beat. 21 44.; Ep. 5.

4 Provid. 2, 6 sqq.; Ep. 64,
4: 85, 39; Phil. ὦ, Gr. 111. 1,
178, 2; 215, 2.

229

CHAP.
VIII.

ECLECTICISM.

over other unimportant examples),' though elsewhere
constantly assuring us that banishment is no evil,
and that every land is a home for the wise man,?
breaks forth into unmanly lamentations over his
own exile,’ or when he enforces the courtly principle
that we must put a good face upon the wrong doings
which those in high places permit themselves ; 4
when he argues with much earnestness that there
are no more peaceable citizens or more obedient sub-
jects than the philosophers ;*° and when even Cato,
who is elsewhere so idolised, is blamed for sacrificing
himself uselessly in the political struggles of his
time. Though we must allow that his observations
on this subject are partially true, yet it is another
question whether they harmonise with his general
utterances and with the principles of the Stoics. He
excuses himself in such cases, it is true, by avowing
that he is not a wise man, nor ever will be; he only
regards himself as on the road to wisdom, and is

1 As in 2p. 53, where the

incredible troubles (ineredibilia
sunt, que tulerim) of a short
sea voyage are described.
' 2Not only in his later
writings, as in Benes. vi. 27, 2;
ip. 24, 3; 85,4; but also and
especially during his own exile
in his consolatory letter to his
mother, cf. 4,2; 5,4; 6,1; 8,
3 sqq.; 10, 2; 12, 5 sqq.

8 Ad Polyd. 2,13 13, 3; 18,
9; and in the Epigrams from
exile. The dedication to Poly-
bius Seneca is said to have
subsequently tried to sup-
press on account of the flatter-
ies it contained of this freed-

man and his master (Dio, lxi.
10).

4 De Ira, ti. 88; Hy. 14, 7;
cf. also the admonitions to
prudence. Hyp. 103, 5; 14,14.
Elsewhere, indeed (as in De
Ira, iii. 14, 4), Seneca’s judg-
ment was quite different.

5 Hp. 73, where among other
things he assures us that the
rulers (the then ruler was Nero)
are honoured as fathers by the
philosophers who are indebted
to them for their leisure.

6 Kp. 14, 12 sqgq.; cf. for the
sake of the contrast, Hp. 95,
69 sqq.; De Const. 2, 2; De
Provid, 2, 9 sqq.

FREE WILL.

content if things with him are going somewhat
better ;! but his concessions to human weakness
expressly relate to the wise, and his avowal leads us
back to the question as to the real existence of the
Stoic wise man, which Seneca, as before remarked,
has scarcely the courage to answer in the affirmative.
But if he thus substitutes the man who is progress-
ing for the wise man,’ the requirements of the
system on man as he is in reality are thereby neces-
sarily lowered ; and whereas it at first seemed as if
through perfect wisdom and virtue he would and
could be like God, it ultimately appears that we
must. be satisfied to imitate the gods, so far as
human weakness allows of it. In other places,
again, Seneca speaks as though nothing were easier
than to lead a life according to nature and reason,
and as if such a life were solely and entirely a matter
of will and not of power;* but this homage which
the philosopher pays to his school and to himself
cannot conceal from us his deviation from the spirit
of the earlier Stoicism. The proud reliance on the
power of moral will and intelligence, from which the
Stoics’ ethics started, is with Seneca deeply shaken.
Were it otherwise he could not express himself so
strongly respecting the weakness and wickedness of
men, and the unavoidableness of these defects. We

1 Vit. Beat. 16 sg.; οἵ, Hp. imbecillitas patitur. Vit. Beat.

57,3; 89,2: ad Helw. 5, 2. 18,1: Cum potuero, vivam quo-
2 Of. Hp. 72, 6 sgq.; 75, 8 modo oportet.
sqq.; 42, 1, and Ὁ. 268-271. + Ep. 41,9; 116,8; De Lra,

9. Benef. i. 1, 9: Hos sequa- ii. 13,1 sqq.
mur duces, quantum humana

232

CHAP.
VIII.

ECLECTICISM.

perceive a similar deviation when Seneca, in spite of
his sublime utterances about the blessedness of the
wise man and Divine Providence, is forced by the
consideration of human sufferings to complain! that
all life is a torment, and that amidst its storms death
is the only place of refuge. It would assuredly be
wrong to conclude from this that he is not in earnest
with the principles which he so frequently and so
emphatically expresses; but as in his life he did not
keep sufficiently free from the influence of his
position and from the faults of a period (to the best
men of which he nevertheless belongs) to preserve
his character from vacillations and contradictions 2—

1 Ad Polyd. 9,6 89. : Omnis
vita supplicium est... in hoe
tam procelloso ... mari nari-
gantibus nullus portus nisi
mortis est. Loe. cit. 4, 2 sq.
The rhetorical nature of this
consolatory treatise makes this
testimony the less valuable.
But we find the same else-
where. Thus in the epistle ad
Mare. 11,1: Tota flebilis vita
est, &c. Hp. 108, 37; 102, 22:
Gravi terrenoque detineor car-
cere.

2 Seneca’s character, as is
well known, has been fre-
quently defamed in the
strongest manner, both in an-
cient and modern times; and,
on the other hand, it has been
often extravagantly glorified.
This is not the place for a com-
plete examination of this vexed
question, or for the enumera-
tion of its literature; but I will
shortly mention the most de-
cisive points. It would cer-
tainly be a mistake to regard

Seneca’s life as altogether
blameless. He himself made
no such claim; he speaks of
the anni inter vana studia con-
sumpti (Nat. Qu. iii. Pref. 1);
he acknowledges plainly that
he was still far from the per-
fection of the wise man, and
was clogged with many faults;
that his words were stricter than
hislife; that his possessions were
greater, and his household and
manner of life much more luxu-
rious than were properly com-
patible with his principles ( Vit.
Beat. 17; Hp. 6, 1 et pass.;
vide p.231,2),and though much
may be invented or exaggerated
in that which his deadly enemy
Suilius, ap. Tac. Anm. xiii. 42,
and Dio Cass. (if he is speaking
in his own name) Ἰχὶ. 10, fol-
lowing the same or an equally
hostile authority, says of his
colossal income (supposed to
be 300 millions of sesterces),
his avarice, and his luxury, we
must, nevertheless, suppose that

INCONSISTENCIES OF SENECA.

so, as a philosopher, he was not so alive to the ten-
dencies of his people and of his age, that we can

the ‘over-rich and over-power-
ful’? minister of Nero, ascribed
to external possessions a far
greater value, and perhaps
beyond what was unavoidable
in his position made a more
luxurious use of it, than might
have been expected from a
Stoic. Concerning his riches
*and the splendour of his
country houses and gardens,
οὗ. Nat. Qu. iii. Pref. 2; Ep.
77,3; but especially Tacit. xiv.
52 sqqg. According to Dio, Ixii.
2, the severity with which he
demanded repayment of a loan
of ten millions of sesterces was
one of the causes of the insur-
rection under Nero in favour of
Britannicus. Similarly, it may
be that he, as a courtier and
official of the empire, may have
been silent, or lent his aid in
regard to manya wrong. When
he had once committed himself
to this position it was hardly
possible to avoid it; to aban-
don his post, even if Seneca
had had the moral strength for
such a course, might have
seemed like a failure of duty
towards the commonwealth.
Meanwhile it is difficult to
form a judgment. If, for in-
stance, Seneca and Burrhus
favoured Nero’s inclination for
acting (Tac. xili. 12 sg.; οἷ, c.
2; xiv. 2), Tacitus avers that
this was the best thing they
could do according to the posi-
tion of things. When they
acquiesced in Nero’s admission
into the circus, Tacitus (xiv.
14) tells us that they had not
the power to hinder it. (An

unworthier part is ascribed to
them by Dio, lxi. 2, Meanwhile
Seneca is censured by Tacitus,
xiv. 52, for precisely the oppo-
site conduct.) Whether they
were accessory to the plan for
Agrippina’s murder (as Dio
maintains, lxi. 12) Tacitus can-
not say. When their counsel
was asked, little seems to have
been left to them except silent
acquiescence ; forthe saving of
Agrippina, even if it had been
effected, would seem to have
been synonymous with their
own certain destruction. Be-
fore his death Seneca speaks
(Tac. xv. 62) as if he had had
no complicity with the crime
wherewith to reproach himself;
but that he did not mean ex-
pressly to oppose it, and even
defended it (Tac. xiv. 11) re-
mains a dark spot on his life.
So also his unworthy flattery
of Claudius and his freedman
Polybius (in the Consolatio ad
Polybium) by which he sought
to effect his return from banish-
ment,and the despondency he
displays under this misfortune,
are justly considered blame-
able, especially when they are
contrasted with his equally
unworthy mockery of the de-
ceased despot (in the ludus
de morte Claudit) and his
valiant protestations to Helvia
(4 sqq. et pass.; sup. 230, 2). On
the other hand, the reproach of
immoral conduct cast upon him
by Suilius and Dio (2. 6.) are
not onl} without proof, but to
all appearance gratuitous inven-
tions. Tacitus describes the

CHAP.
VIII.

ECLECTICISM.

expect from him perfect logical consistency in

his views.

If in addition to this we consider how

easily the endeavour after rhetorical effect led him
into exaggerations on the one side or the other,.we
may well understand that even in questions as to
which he had a clear opinion he is not always con-

sistent in his utterances.

In the further development of his ethics, as we

influence of Seneca and Bur-
rhus on Nero (Tac. xiii. 2) as
very salutary. Seneca himself
appeals (2. 6. xv. 61) to his
independent bearing towards
Nero, of which Tacitus gives
an example (Tac. xv. 23), and
likewise Plutarch, Coh. Ira, 13,
p. 461. Dio, Ixi. 18, also re-
lates an instance in which he
restrained Nero’s cruelty by a
bold word. The same author
says of him (notwithstanding
all his hatred elsewhere), lix.
19: πάντας μὲν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν Ῥω-
μαίους πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ἄλλους σοφία
ὑπεράρας; and the judgment of
Tacitus far outweighs even this.
Tacitus (xv. 23) calls him a vir
egregius ; in xiii. 2, praises his
comitas honesta; in xv. 62, he
says he bequeathed to his
friends before his death quod
unum jam et puleherrimum
habebat, imaginem vite sue;
and in c. 65 he relates that
many in the conspiracy of Piso
had destined him for the
throne, guasi in sontibus clari-
tudine virtutum ad summum
Sastigium delecto. Seneca him-
self, in his writings, despite
much that is declamatory,
not only gives us the impres-
sion of a man to whom his

moral principles and endeavours
are matters of earnest convic-
tion, but likewise displays par-
ticular traits which throw a
favourable light on his charac-
ter. We know that in the
school of Sextius he adopted
the habit of daily minute self-
examination (De Tra, iti. 36
sg.); that in his youth, from
enthusiasm for philosophy, he
abstained from meat during
many years, according to So-
tion’s precept; and in many
respects carried out the simple
mode of life enjoined on him
by the Stoic Attalus, even at a
ripe age (Hp. 108, 18-28). Taci-
tus (xv. 63) bears witness to
his moderation (corpus senile et
parrco victu tentatum); the
passage J. 6. xv. 45, where he
follows prudential considera-
tions, as in the contemplated
transfer of his property to Nero
(xiv. 53 sq.; Sueton. Mero, 35)
cannot be adduced as contra-
dictory evidence. One of the
most pleasing features of his
life is finally his beautiful re-
lation with his admirable wife
Paulina, cf. Hp. 104, 2, 4 84.5
Tac. xv. 63 sq.

ETHICS OF THE LATER STOICS.

should expect, the same principles are prominent
which characterise Stoicism as a whole. It has,
however, been already pointed out that Seneca and
the. younger Stoics generally, differ somewhat from
the older in their closer acceptation of these prin-
ciples. Without abandoning or altering the ethics
‘of their school in any important point, they yet lay
greater stress on such determinations as chiefly
correspond with the conditions and necessities of
their times. The most important of these deter-
minations are three. In a period of such terrible
moral corruption and despotic tyranny, it must have
been of the first consequence for the earnest
thinker to gain a fixed basis in himself, and to
found for himself in his own mind an impregnable
refuge against the corruption of his surroundings
and the power of Fate. If he turned his atten-
tion to others, all external distinctions among men
must have lost their significance, when each day
beheld the most abrupt. vicissitudes of fortune,!
when all national and historical oppositions dis-
appeared in the general degradation, when the most
abject were often endowed with the highest favours
of fortune, and the best succumbed to wrong; and
thus far the principle that all men as such are to be
held equal, and worth is only to be attached to their
moral inequality, must have gained fresh support.
But on the other hand the moral as well as the

1 Seneca from this experience cially in regard to each man’s
(Trangu. An. 11, 8 sgq.; 16,1; own conduct, that he dares not

Hip. 74, 4, et passim) deduces attach any value to things ex-
the moral application, espe- ternal.

235

CHAP.
ΨΙ11.

Spirit and
applica-
tion of his
moral doc-
tranes.

CHAP.
VIII.

Indepen-
dence of
things ex-
ternal.

ECLECTICISM.

social conditions of the time must have evoked a
lively feeling of human weakness and need of help;
Stoic severity must have given place in some degree
to sympathy with the failures of humanity, and
Stoic self-sufficiency to the claims of philanthropic
sympathy and assistance; the cosmopolitanism of
the school must chiefly have been developed on the
side of feeling, in the form of universal love of
mankind. Finally, the less that circumstances
afforded opportunity to individuals in the way of
effectual interference with the course of the world,
the more heavily the common fate pressed upon all,
and the more relentlessly it fulfilled itself—the
more must the inclination for public life have been
lost, and the predilection for the repose of private
life have gained ground, but the more strongly also
must the necessity for submission to fate, and for
the interdependence of moral conduct with religious
conviction, which the Stoics had never denied, have
made itself felt.

All this may be perceived in Seneca’s moral
writings. The independence of external things,
which is assured to us by wisdom and virtue, is by
no one more energetically commended than by him.
No one requires us more pressingly to seek our
happiness purely and entirely in ourselves, and to

1 Numerous authorities for Bene. iv. 2, 2, 4; Vita Beat.
this will be found in Mp. 82,2; 11,2; 18,5; 14,1; De tra, 1,
30, 4 sgq.; 77,11 sg.3 8sgqg.; 9,2 sq.; cf. Bp. 85, 10; Phil. d.
Cons. ad Mare. 19, 3 sgq.; Vita Gr. III. i. 234, 252, supra 226, 1.
Beat. 4,3; Hp. 66,14; 71, 18, To the more decided declara-

21; 85,18; 39; 87; ll sqg.; 44; tionsonthis subject belong: De
120, 3; 92, 14 δφῳ.: 72, 7; Provid. 2, 9 sqq.; De Const. 3,

ETHICS OF SENECA.

encounter bravely what fate may send us. But since
it is his moral constitution alone which gives to man
this freedom, he insists most emphatically on the
conscientious fulfilment of the conditions to which
it is attached, and he becomes the more earnest on
the subject the more he is convinced that the
victory is only to be won over man’s inclination to
evil by the most severe conflict.’ All are, as he
believes, sick and in need of healing; the com-
bating of our faults is the chief problem of philo-
sophy ; the recognition of this, the first condition of
improvement ;? and even in his old age he says of
himself that he is visibly another man, as he now

sees what his defects are.

δ: 4, 2; 5, 4; 8,2 sq.; 19, 4;
Vita Beat. 4, 2 sq.; Brevit. v.
2; ad Helv.5; Benef. iii. 20,
1; Hp. 58, 11; 59, 8; 64, 4;
74,19; 75,18; 85, 39.

1 Of. Baur, Dret Abhandl. Ὁ.
40 sqq.

2 Besides the quotations in
Phil. d. Gr. ΤΙ]. 1. p. 253 ¢.,
and supra, cf. Hp. 50, 4: Quid
mos decipimus ? Non est extrin-
secus malum nostrum: intra
nos est, in visceribus ipis sedet,
et ideo difficulter ad sanitatem
pervenimus, quia nos egrotare
nescimus. Lp. 28, 9: Initium
est salutis notitia peccatt (ac-
cording to Epicurus) .. . ideo
quantum potes te ipse coargue,
inquire inte, &c. Vita Beat. 1,
4: One infects another: Sana-
bimur, si modo separemur ὦ cate.
Similarly, Hp. 49,9; 7, 1; 94,
52 sqq.; 95, 29 sq.

3 In the remarkable passage
which is so strikingly sugges-

He, therefore, cannot

tive of Christian conceptions,
Ep. 6,1: Intellego, Lucili, non
emendart me tantum, sed trans-
jiguran. Much, indeed, is al-
ways in need of improvement :
Ht hoc ipsum argumentum est in
melius translatt animi, quod
vitia sua, que adhue ignorabat,
videt. Quibusdam egris gratu-
latio fit, cum tpst @gros 86 esse
senserunt. Concerning the ex-
pression transfigurart (pmera-
μορφοῦσθαι cf. Hp. 94, 48, where
these words are quoted from
Aristo: Qui didictt et facienda
ac vitanda percepit, nondum
sapiens est, nisi in ea que didicit
animus ejus transfiguratus est.
The expression therefore signi-
fies the inner transformation of
the whole will and disposition,
as distinguished from the
merely theoretical conviction
on the one hand, and merely
temporary and occasional im-
provement on the other.

237

CHAP,
VIII.

Strictness
of Seneca’s
moral
demands.

CHAP.
VIIL.

ECLECTICISM.

too strongly impress upon us the necessity of a
severe self-examination and a ceaseless labour within
ourselves ;! he recommends to us what he himself

made a duty, to take precise account every evening

of the day past;? he refers us to our conscience,
from which nothing that we do can remain hidden ; 3
he reminds us of the gods, the ever present
witnesses of our words and deeds,‘ of the day of
death, that great judgment day when it will be
shown how much in man is genuine or false;* in
a word, he desires that we should regard the happi-
ness of the wise as the reward of the most unceasing
moral activity, and he consequently finds necessary,§
side by side with the universal principles of virtue,
all those enquiries into individual circumstances of
life, and those counsels designed for special cases,
to which he himself has devoted so great a part of
his writings.’

But the more completely the individual corre-

' Cf. also Hy. 50, 5 sqq., 51,
6, 18 (nobis quoque militandum
est... proice quecungque cor
tuum laniant).

2 De Ira, 111. 36; cf. p. 186, δ,

3 Hp. 28,9; 41,2; sup. Ὁ. 237,
2; Ep. 48, 4: Men live in
such a manner that scarcely
anyone could bear his whole
conduct to be made public.
Quid autem prodest recondere
se et oculos hominum auresque
vitare? Bona conscientia tur-
bam advocat, mala etiam in soli-
tudine ὡραῖα atque sollicita est

. 0 te miserum, si contemnis
hune testem !

4 Vita Beat. 20,5; Bp. 83, 1.

5 Ep. 26, 4 sgq.; Phil. ad. Gr.
IIT. i. 204, 3.

§ He goes very minutely
into this in his 94th and 95th
letters, in the former proving
the indispensability of special
precepts for practical life, and
in the latter that of universal
ethical principles (decreta). In
both he maintains that, con-
sidering the greatness of human
corruption, and the overwhelm-
ing influence of society, no
counteracting means should be
left unemployed; 94, 52 sq.;
68 sgq.; 95, 14 sgg.; 29 sqq.

* Especially in the treatise
De Beneficiis and in the letters.

LOVE OF MANKIND.

sponds to his moral destination, the more closely
will he find himself connected with others, the more
purely will he apprehend this relationship, and the
more entirely will he extend it to all men. The
Stoic principles respecting the natural kinship of
mankind, and the disinterested help which we owe
to all without exception, have found in Seneca one
of their most eloquent assertors ;! in his conception
of this relation, however, the political element
throughout recedes before the universally human
element, and the severity of the moral judge before
a loving gentleness which bears witness not only to
the benevolent disposition of the philosopher but
also to his accurate knowledge and impartial judg-
ment-of human nature. In political life Seneca
can feel no confidence, which is not surprising con-
sidering the age in which he lived, and his personal
experiences: he finds the mass of mankind so evil
that we cannot without moral injury make ourselves
dependent on their favours, and the condition of the
Commonwealth too hopeless for us to waste our
strength upon it; the individual state seems to him
too small beside the great polity of mankind and of
the world, and the activity of the statesman beside
that of a teacher of the human race to allow of his con-
fining himself tothem. Those connections have for
him a far greater charm? which are based upon free

1 As is shown in Phil. d. Gr. Clement.1. 3, 4 sqq., where we
Til. i. 286, 1; 287, 2; 299, 3. cannot suppose that what
2 Of. ibid. TIL. i, 295 sqg.; Seneca says of the importance
Ep. 14, 4 444. (cf. supra, 230, 7), of the ruler of the common-
and, concerning politics also, De wealth, apart from some ex-

Oniversal
love af
mankind.

240

CHAP.
VIII.

ECLECTICISM.

choice and are regulated according to the needs and
peculiar character of the individual. To marriage
he has devoted an entire treatise,! and we have every
reason to suppose, from what we are told on the
subject that Seneca held married life, of which he
himself had full experience, in the highest estima-
tion. A-taste for friendship also appears in him in
a very marked degree, and we have already seen
that he has difficulty in reconciling his need of
friendship and his noble conception of this relation
with the wise man’s sufficiency for himself.2 But
the real crown of his moral doctrine les in the
universal love of man, the purely human interest
which bestows itself on all without distinction, even
the meanest and most despised, which even in the
slave does not forget the man ;? in that gentleness of
disposition which is so especially antagonistic to
anger and hatred, tyranny and cruelty,* and which

travagances of expression, is
merely the language of a cour-
tier ; it was not only quite true
according to the existing state
of things, but doubtless his
own perscnal conviction that in
the Roman empire as it was then
constituted, the emperor (as
he says in ὁ. 4) was the uniting
bond ofthe state; and that the
pase Romana, the dominatio
urbis, was linked with his pre-
servation: Olim enim ita se
induit reipublice Cesar, ut se-

duct alterum non possit, sine "

utriusque pernicie; nam ut ili
viribus opus est, ita et here
capite. But if the republic
was abandoned, public service

must have lost its charm for
the best of them.

1 For the fragments of this
treatise which, however, consist
for the most part of quotations
from other authors and exam-
ples of good and wicked women,
cf. Haase, 111. 428 sqqg. On the
view of marriage there enun-
ciated, cf. Phil. d. Gr. III. i. 298,
4; concerning Seneca’s second
wife (of the first we do not
know even her name) vide sup.
p. 234, m.

2 Vide Phil. ἄ. Gr. TIT. i. 289
Sqq.
3 Ample authority for this is
quoted, 2did. ITT. 1.299 sq. 286, 1.

4A mode of thought which

FORGIVENESS OF INJURIES.

considers nothing worthier of man and more accord-
ing to nature, than forgiving mercy, and benevolence
that is unselfish and disseminates happiness in secret,
imitating the divine goodness towards the evil and
the good; which, mindful of human weakness, would
rather spare than punish, does not exclude even
enemies from its goodwill, and will not return even
injury with injury.! Seneca’s dissertations on these
subjects are among the most beautiful testimonies
to the purity of moral conceptions arrived at by
classical antiquity. In their content, as has already
been shown, they entirely harmonise with the Stoic
principles ; but they have manifestly arisen from a
somewhat different idea of life and a milder temper

also expresses itself in the de-
cided repudiation of the in-
human gladiatorial shows and
in censure of the Roman lust
for war. For the same reason,
and also on account of his
passionate disposition and want
of self-control, those severe
sentences were passed upon
Alexander the Great which fur-
nished such welcome material
for Seneca’s rhetoric, Benes. 1.
13,3; Clement. 1.25; De Ira,
111. 17, 1, 23, 1; Wat. Qu. vi.
23, 2, et passim.

1 Of, Hp 95, 52; Vit. Beat.
24,3; De Clem.i.1, 3; DeTra,
j.5; De Otio, 1.4; 'De Ira, ii.
32, 1; Benef. iii. 18-28; De
Clem. i. 18, 2; il. 4; Εν. 31,
11; Vit. Beat. 24, 3. In De
Clem. ii. 4, he speaks of the
possibility of uniting mildness
with justice and the distinc-
tion between this and culpable
neglect; the one does not

punish where it ought, the
other in punishing has regard
to all really available grounds
of extenuation; it desires only
to carry out complete justice,
De Clem.i.6; De Tra, ii. 9, 4;
10, 1 sg. 28; ili. 27, 3 (on the
weakness of man—we should
not be angry with error, but
pardon it); Benef. iv. 25 sqq.
Chow far, according to the
example of the Gods, should
favours be bestowed on the
ungrateful ?); vil. 31 sg. (vineit
malos pertinax bonitas). As the
eods, in spite of all unthank-
fulness, continue unweariedly
to send rain upon the worthy
and the unworthy, and patiently
bear with the error of those
who misconceive them, so also
should we act, and conquer in-
gratitude by benefits, as the
husbandman conquers unfruit-
ful ground by tillage; ὦ. e. ii.
9 sq. Chidden benefits).

R

His reli-
gious tem-
perament.

ECLECTICISM.

than were found among the elder Stoics. The need
of community is stronger with Seneca than with
them, and though the social nature and vocation of
man is in both cases recognised with equal decision,
in the older Stoics it appears more as the fulfilment
of a duty, in Seneca more as an affair of inclination,
of human affection, and of benevolence; and hence
he lays the chief stress on the virtues of the philan-
thropic disposition. How closely this softening of
the Stoic severity is connected with Seneca’s deeper
sense of human imperfection has already been in-
dicated.

From the same source we must also derive the
religious cast of his ethics. Here, too, he follows
throughout the common tendency of his school.!
The will of God is to him the highest law; to obey
and to imitate that will, is the most universal com-
mand,” synonymous? with the claim of life accord-
ing to nature; he perceives in reason and conscience
the divine spirit dwelling in us;* he bases the
equality of all men on the proposition that God can
take up his abode as well in the soul of a slave as
in that of a nobleman; and the union of the in-
dividual with humanity on the thought of the gods
who, with us, belong to the universe and govern it ;°

1 Phil. d. Gr. TIL. i. p. 180. emplum sequi. LZ. 4. vii. 31, 2;

* The Deity here coincides
with Nature, and, therefore,
also the will of God with the
laws of nature.

ἢ Benef. iv. 25, 1: Proposi-
tum est nobis secundum rerum

V. Be. 15, 4-7; Hy. 16,5; cf.
Benef. vi. 28,13; Provid. δ, 8.

* Phil. d. Gr. 111.1. Ὁ. 319, 2;
320, 1.

5 Ἔν. 31, 11; ΤΊ Be. 20, 5;
De Otio, 4,1; Phil. ad. Gr. III.

naturam vivere et Deorum ex- i. Ὁ, 802, 2; 296, 8.

SENECA'S RELIGIOUS TEMPERAMENT.

he pressingly insists on a willing and joyful ac-
quiescence in the decrees of Providence, and sees in
this disposition the most secure foundation for the
freedom and peace of mind of the wise man ;! but,
at the same time, he would leave open to us asa
last refuge the voluntary departure from life,? and
would have us accustom ourselves above all to a
contempt for death, without which, he says, no
happiness is possible.? In all these utterances there
is nothing which does not fiow from the true spirit
of the Stoic doctrine. Even the proposition that
no one can be good without the assistance of the
deity is to be understood with Seneca wholly in the
sense of that system; the divine assistance which
he claims is no supernatural aid, but coincides with
the use of our reason and its natural powers.‘ If,

1 CE ibid. TIT. i. p. 804,1; test aliquis supra fortunam nisi
305, 1. ab thlo adjutus exsurgere ? Ille

® Ibid. 171. i. p. 306, 1. dat consilia magnifica et erecta.

3 Nat. Qu. vi. 32, 5: Sivo- In unoquoque virorum bonorum
lumus esse felices, si nec ho- (quis Deus incertum est) habitat
minum nee Deorum nee rerum Deus. Similarly, Hp. 73, 15:
timore vexari, si despicere for- Non sunt Di fastidiosi non in-
tunam supervacua promittentem, vidi: admittunt et adscendent-
levia minitantem, si volumus ibus manum porrigunt. Miraris
tranqguille degere et ipsis Dis de hominem ad Deos tre (through
felicitate controversiam agere, the elevation of the mind and
anima in expedito est habendu, will)? Deus ad homines renit,
το. immo, quod est propius, in ho-

4 This plainly results froma mines venit: nulla sine Deo
comparison of the passagesin mens bona est. Semina in cor-
which this proposition is ad- portbushumanis divina dispersa
vanced. In Hp. 41, 2, after he sunt, que si bonus cultor ex-
has said that there dwells in cipit, similia origint prodeunt
us a divine spirit (by which et paria his, ex quibus orta sunt,
nothing else is meant but surgunt,&c. Thehelp of God
reason and man’s conscience), must, therefore, consist in this:
he thus proceeds: Bonus vero that an effluence of the Deity
vir sine Deo nemo est: an po- aS λόγος σπερματικὸς is combined

R 2

243

CHAP.
VIII.

244

CHAP.
VItl.

ECLECTICISM.

therefore, Seneca’s doctrine is distinguished from
the elder Stoicism by its religious character, this must
on no account be understood to mean that he was
thereby carried into radical deviations from the Stoic
system, but only that the importance assumed by
the religious element in relation to the philosophical
is peculiarly characteristic of him; his distinction
from the earlier Stoics is merely quantitative. That
the religious point of view, however, acquired with
him such great preponderance, we must attribute
partly to the practical and popular cast of his philo-
sophy and partly to his lively sense of human weak-
ness and imperfection, which must naturally have
disposed him to point more frequently and more
emphatically to the support which the moral life of
man finds in the belief in God and his guiding
power in the world, and in the human spirit. How
pure, moreover, is Seneca’s conception of religion ;
how he keeps clear, not only of the belief of the
people, but of the fallacies of Stoic orthodoxy; how
the plurality of gods is cancelled in the unity
of the divine nature, and external worship in the
spiritual cultus of the knowledge of God, and the
imitation of his moral perfection, have already been
shown.! Here also Seneca appears as a worthy re-
presentative of Roman Stoicism, in which a purer

with a human body in the the power of atonements are
spiritual nature of man. only defended very condition-

1 Phil.d. Gr. JIL.ip.312sqq.; ally; and Seneca elsewhere
315, 5; 324, 1; 326,1; 337, 3; treats such things simply as
340 2. Even in the passages absurdities (Wat. Qu. iv. 4, 6).
last quoted, soothsaying and

SENECA AND PANATIUS.

and freer view of religion had been implanted by
Panetius in its very commencement, and which it
had constantly maintained, as is seen by the example
of a Sceevola, a Varro, and a Cicero! To Panetius,
Seneca bears great resemblance in his whole mode
of thought. Both postpone the theoretical doc-
trines of their school to the practical, and seek to
make the latter as fruitful as possible by a treat-
ment generally comprehensible and an application
to individual details: and in this endeavour they
have no scruple about recurring to other than Stoic
predecessors, or departing from the Stoic tradition
on certain points. But these departures are far
more considerable with Panstius than with Seneca;
and on the other hand, with Seneca the ethical
base of the earlier Stoicism, confidence in the
moral power of man, is much more deeply shaken,
and the feeling of human weakness and defec-
tiveness more vivid than seems to have been
the case with Panetius; and while the healing
of the morally diseased human race is regarded as
the chief task of philosophy, there arises the fusion
of philosophy with religion and the reaction of
ethical dualism on metaphysics, by which the later
Stoicism approximated more and more to Platonism.

245

CHAP.
VIII.

1 Cf. Phil. ἃ. Gr. TI. i. Ὁ. 340,
1, and sup. Ὁ. 49,2; 170 sq.; 176
sqq. If in the above sentences I
name Cicero beside Sceevola and
Varro, this is justified partly
by his particular connection
with the Stoic school, and

partly by his exposition of the
Stoic theology in the second
book of the treatise De Natura
Deorum, from which some strik-
ing passages are quoted, Phil,
ὦ. Gr. ITI. i. 811, 1; 314, 2.

CHAP.
IX.

The Stotc
school con-
tinued.

Masonius.

ECLECTICISM.

CHAPTER IX.

THE STOICS CONTINUED : MUSONIUS, EPICTETUS, MARCUS
AURELIUS.

STOICISM maintained on the whole the same charac-
ter during the entire course of its further history,
except that the traits by which Seneca had already
diverged from the original direction of his school,
ultimately asserted themselves more strongly. The
rest of the Stoic philosophy known to us may there-
fore, be discussed more concisely.

A younger contemporary of Seneca’s, Musonius
Rufus,' who resided in Rome in the reigns of Nero
and Vespasian,” was a distinguished teacher of philo-
sophy,? and was held in the highest estimation on

1 C0. Musonii Ruft Reliquie
etApophthegmata c.Annot. Edid.
J. Venhuizen Peerlkamp (Har-
lem, 1822); the first 137 pages
are taken from Petri Nieuw-
landii Dissertatio de Musonio
Rufo (which appeared in 1783) ;
also, Moser, in Studien von
Daub und Creuzer, vi. T4 sqq.

2 Tac. Ann. xiv. 59; xv. 71,
and elsewhere. Vide the fol-
lowing note.

3 Musonius Rufus, son of
Capito (Suidas), is apparently
identical with the Cajus Mu-

sonius of whom Pliny (Zp. iii.
11, 5, 7) makes honourable
mention. He was of good
family, originally from Etruria
(Tac. Ann. xiv. 59; Hist. iii.
81; Philostr. Apollon. vii. 16),
and more especially Volsinii
(Suid. cf. the epigram Anthol.
Lat. 1. 79; vol 1. 57, Burm).
The year of his birth is un-
known, but as he had already
in 65 A.D. aroused the jealousy
of Nero by his fame as a
teacher of philosophy (Tac.
nn. xv. 71) and according to

MUSONIUS RUFUS.

account of his personal character.

This philosopher

confined himself even more decidedly than Seneca

Julian, ap. Suid. then filled a
public office, it can hardly be
supposed later than 20-30 A.D.
An adherent of the Stoicschool,
the friend of Rubellius Plautus,
with whom we find him in Asia
Minor in the year 53 A.D.
Thrasea Petus and Soranus,
whose death he afterwards
revenged by the judicial prose-
cution of his accuser, the
miserable Egnatius Celer (Tac.
Ann, xiv. 59; Hist. ili. 81; iv.
10, 40; Epict. Diss. i. 1, 26)
was banished by Nero, 65 (Tac.
Ann. XV. 71; Dio Cass, lxii: 27;
Muson. ap Stob. #loril. 10, 9,
p. 75; Themist. Or, vi. 72, d.;
vil. 94, ὦ; Suid., Movody and
Kopvovros, instead of this, re-
presents him as put to death,
but this is a palpable error,
arising perhaps from Justin.
(Apol. li. 8); according to
Philostratus, 2. ¢., his place of
banishment was Gyara, which
was visited from all sides on
his account. The same author
(Apel. v. 19) and the pseudo-
Lucian in his Vero, mention
that one Musonius was em-
ployed in penal labour in the
proposed cutting of the isthmus.
Philostratus also ( ¢. iv. 35,
46) mentions a Babylonian
Musonius, a wonderful philo-
sopher, whom Nero threw into
prison. But whether our Mu-
sonius is here meant, and
the Βαβυλώνιος of Philostratus
should be altered to Βουλσίνιος,
or discarded (wide Nieuwland,
p. 30 594.) seems the more im-
material since these statements
are as valueless as the absurd

letters which Musonius is said
to have exchanged with Apol-
lonius. How the ‘Tyrian’ Mu-
sonius is related to our philo-
sopher cannot be clearly ascer-
tained, as we have seen (sup.
p. 199); but they seem to be
identical. He was probably
recalled from exile by Galba
(cf. Epict. Diss, iii. 15,14; Tac.
Hist. ili. 81); and when the
philosophers were ordered to
leave Rome by Vespasian he
alone was excepted (Dio Cass.
lxvi. 16); according to Themist.
(Or. xiii. 173 2.) he had per-
sonal relations with Titus. How
long he lived we do not know;
but if he is really the person
mentioned by Pliny he must
have survived the reign of
Trajan. Nothing is related as
to any writings by him; that
which Stobzeus communicates
from him seems like an account
given of his lectures by a dis-
ciple, and indicates the exis-
tence of Memorabilia, such as
those of Xenophon, or Arrian
concerning Epictetus. Suidas
(IlwAiwy) ascribes such ἀπομνη-
μονεύματα Μουσωνίου to Asi-
nius Pollio,a contemporary of
Pompey. Ridiculous as this is,
itis probable that one Pollio
had composed them ; but he is
not to be identified (as has
been done by ancient and mo-
dern writers) with Claudius
Pollio, who according to Pliny
(Hp. vii. 31, 5) had written a
Liber de Vita Anni (older read-
ing Musonii) Bassi, but rather
with the grammarian Valerius
Pollio, who (Suid. 7. 4.) lived

218

CHAP.
IX.

Practical
standpoint
of his phi-
. dusophy.

ECLECTICISM.

to moral problems. He too starts from the general
bases of the Stoic system, and even its theoretic por-
tions were not neglected by him. Epictetus relates
that he practised his scholars in the use of logical
forms, and demanded scrupulous accuracy with
regard to them ;! a remark as to the origin of moral
conceptions points to the Stoic theory of knowledge
and its empiricism.2 He mentions in a similar
manner certain physical doctrines; speaks of the
unchangeable necessity of the universe, of the
ceaseless change of all things to which everything,
both in heaven and earth, is subject ; of the regular
transition of the four elements one into another,?
fulfilling itself through the same stages upward and
downward ; of the divine nature of the heavenly

under Hadrian, and was called
a philosopher. According to
the description of the younger
Pliny (£p. iii. 11) his son-in-
law, the Artemidorus whom
Pliny so enthusiastically praises,
is to be considered his disciple.

1 Diss. i. 7, 32. When Rufus
blamed him for not knowing
how to find what was wanting
in a syllogism, he excused him-
self thus: μὴ γὰρ τὸ Καπιτώλιον
ἐνέπρησα, to which the other
replied, ἀνδράποδον, ἐνθάδε τὸ
παραλειπόμενον Καπιτώλιόν ἐστιν
(‘here is what you have over-
looked, the chief thing ’).

2 Ap. Stob. #loril. 117, 8, 89
(Mein.): Man can attain to
virtue: od γὰρ ἑτέρωθέν ποθεν
ταύτας ἐπινοῆσαι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχο-
μεν (εἴχ.), ἢ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀν-
θρωπείας φύσεως, ἐντυχόντες ἂν-
θρώποις τοιοῖσδέ τισιν, οἵους ὄντας

αὐτοὺς θείους καὶ θεοειδεῖς ὠνό-
μαζον. There is a similar de-
claration of Seneca, Hp, 120, 4;
cf. Hp. 120, 11.

$ δοῦν. Fleril. 108, 60. This
fragment bears with some others
(Flortil. 19, 13; 20, 60, 61;
Hei. ii. 356) the inscription:
Ῥούφου ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου περὶ
φιλίας. That nothing more,
however, is meant by this than
an account taken from Epic-
tetus (ὦ, e. from a lost porticn
of Arrian’s dissertations) con-
cerning an utterance of Mu-
sonius (cf. Schweighauser on
Kpictet. 111, 195) is the less
open to doubt, since Musonius
is always Rufus in Epictetus;
and a comparison of Diss. iii.
23, 29, with Gell. WV. A. v. 1,
shows that he is the person
intended.

HIS PRACTICAL CHARACTER.

bodies; and as these are nourished by vapours, so
(in agreement with the Stoics and Heracleitus) the
soul, he says, is nourished by the evaporation of the
blood; the lighter and purer, therefore, our food is,
the drier and purer will be the soul.2 Some other
definitions, standing in close connection with ethics
—such as those respecting the goodness and moral
perfection of God, the natural kinship of man with
God,’ the divine omniscience,* the divine law, the
effluence of which is moral duty,® or virtue as an
imitation of God ®—we should necessarily have pre-
supposed to belong to him, even had no decided
utterances on these subjects been handed down
to us. To the popular religion he also accorded
the recognition allowed by the Stoic principles,

1 These are the gods for
whose nourishment the evapo-
ration from the earth and from
the waters is sufficient.

* Stob. ὦ. 6. Concerning the
corresponding Stoic doctrines
vide Phil. ἃ. Gr TII.i. 189.4 and
196, 2. The observation (Floril.
79, 51, p. 94) that God has as-
signed the faculty of thought ta
the best protected place in the
body, is of little importance; this
may mean either the head or the
breast (cf. ibid. 171.1. p. 197, 2).

8 Flortl. 117, 8, Ὁ. 88. Man
alone is a μίμημα θεοῦ upon the
earth (similarly 17, 43, p. 286); as
there is nothing higher in God
than virtue (Musonius expressly
enumerates the four funda-
mental virtues) as virtue alone
makes him the perfect being,
beneficent, friendly to man, and
exalted above all weaknesses,

such as we conceive Him (Phil.
ὦ. Gr. 111. 1. Ὁ. 140), so also for
man, virtuous conduct alone is
according to nature.

* Stob. Floril. Hac. Jo. Dam.
ii. 18, 125; Bd. iv. 218 (Mein).
Musonius here infers from the
omniscience of the gods that
they require no demonstrative
proof; and he applies this in
the manner discussed infra,
p. 252; but the thought of
the omniscience of God admits
of very forcible application in
the way of ethical admonition.

5 Loe. cit. 79, 51, p. 94.

6 Cf. note 1 and Plut. De
Aere Alieno, 7, 1, Ὁ. 830, where
a capitalist says ta Musonius,
who wishes to borrow money:
ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ σωτὴρ, ὃν σὺ μιμῇ καὶ
ζγλοῖς, οὔ δανείζεται, and the
other laughingly replied, οὐδὲ

δανείζει.

ECLECTICISM.

without apparently troubling himself with any
speculative justification or interpretation of it.! But
with scientific enquiry as such, with a knowledge
that carries its end and purpose in itself, Musonius
has no concern. We see this already from the fact
that among the many sayings and discussions of his
that have been preserved to us,” the theoretical doc-
trines of his school are only mentioned in a casual
and superficial manner. But he has himself spoken
most definitely on this subject. Men are to be
regarded as sick, from a moral point of view; in
order to be cured they require continual medical

treatment.2 Philosophy

1 In this respect, however,
there is little to be quoted
from these fragments. The
deity is called Zeus, and the
divine law the law of Zeus
(Floriil. 79, 51, p. 94); the
stars are treated as gods (sup.
p. 249, 1); andasChrysippus had
blamed the unmarried state as
an offence against Zeus Game-
lios (Phil. d. Gr. ITI. i. 298, 2) so
Musonius urges, among other
things, against the exposure of
children, that it is a crime
against the πατρῷοι θεοὶ and
Ζεὺς ὁμόγνιος (Mloril. 75, 15);
and in favour of marriage he
says that Hera, Eros, and
Aphrodite have it under their
protection ; while the observa-
tion : θεοὶ γὰρ ἐπιτροπεύουσιν av-
τὸν, καθὸ νομίζονται παρ᾽ ἀνθρώ-
ποις, μεγάλοι, even if we sub-
stitute νομίζεται and thus render
the assertion less startling, still
points the distinction between
the popular and the philoso-
phical notion of the gods. In

must supply this need.

the same way Musonius (fori.
85, 20, end) argues against
luxury that it hinders the ful-
filment of our duties; among
others, the duties connected
with service to the gods.

2 There are in all, more than
fifty of them and among these
many of considerable length ;
in Venhuizen Peerlkamp’s work
they occupy 135 pages.

8 Plut. Coh. Ira, 2, Ὁ. 453:
καὶ μὴν ὧν γε μεμνήμεθα Μουσω-
νίου καλῶν ἕν ἐστιν, ὦ Σύλλα, τὸ
δεῖν ἀεὶ θεραπευυμένους βιοῦν τοὺς
σώζεσθαι μέλλοντας. Gell. WV.
A.v.1, 2, and injra p. 252, 3.
This point of view, under which
the Cynics first represented.
philosophy (vide Phil. ἃ. Gr. 11.
1. 285, 3) becomes strikingly
prominent everywhere after the
beginning of the tirst century
A.D.; examples have already
come before us (sap. Ὁ. 77, 3; 237,
2) and we shall meet with others
among Stoics, Platonists, and
Neo-Pythagoreans.

ETHICS OF MUSONITS.

Philosophy is the only way to virtue,! and there-
fore occupation with it is necessary for every one,
even for women;” but conversely virtue is the
only end and content of philosophy; to philo-
sophise means to learn and to practise the principles
of conduct according to duty. A philosopher and
a righteous man are therefore synonymous;‘ virtue
and philosophy are only different designations for
the same thing. But whereas Socrates and Plato
understood this proposition in the sense that virtue
is merely the fruit of a real and fundamental know-
ledge, Musonius, on the contrary, agrees with the
Cynics that true wisdom can be attained without
much knowledge by means of moral endeavour.
Philosophy requires few doctrines, and may dispense
with theorems in which the Sophists take such de-
light ; what is necessary may well be learned even in
the occupations of the spade and the plough? Virtue
is far more a thing of custom than of instruction, for
the vicious habits of men are only to be overcome by

1 Stob. Floril. 48, 67, where
we read: δίκαιος δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη
τις μὴ ἐπιστάμενος δικαιοσύνην
ὅποϊόν τί ἐστι; but this is im-
possible without philosophy.
Likewise inregard to σωφροσύνη
and the other virtues. There-
fore: πῶς kal τίνα τρόπον δύ.
ναιτὸ ἄν τις βασιλεῦσαι ἢ βιῶναι
καλῶς, εἶ μὴ φιλοσοφήσειεν.

* Floril. Jo. Damase. ii. 18,
123, 126 (iv. 212 sqq. 220 sqq.
Alein).

3 Loe. eit. ii. 18, 128, end,
Ῥ. 216: φιλοσοφία καλοκἀγαθίας
ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευσις καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον
(thus “ϊοριῖ. 48, 67); 1, 6. ii
18, 126, p. 221: ζητεῖν καὶ σκο-

πεῖν ὅπως βιώσονται καλῶς, ὅπερ
τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστι; Floril. 67, 20,
end: οὐ γὰρ δὴ φιλοσοφεῖν Ere-
ρον τι φαίνεται ὃν ἢ τὸ ἃ πρέπει
καὶ ἃ προσήκει λόγῳ μὲν ἀναζητεῖν
ἔργῳ δὲ πράττειν.

4 Floril. 19. 61 : τὸ δέ γε εἶναι
ἀγαθὸν τῷ φιλόσοφον εἶναι ταῦτόν
ἐστι. Similarly 48, 67: the
good prince is necessarily a
philosopher, and the philoso-
pher is necessarily fit to bea
prince (?), (cf. sup. note 1).

* Loe. cit. 56, 18, p. 838 sg.
Musonius here shows that the
calling of a husbandman is
best fitted for a philosopher.

CHAP.
IX.

ECLECTICISM.

opposite habits. The disposition to virtue, the germ
of virtue, is implanted in all men by nature : 5 if we
have before us an unspoiled pupil of a good dispo-
sition, it needs no lengthy argument to convey to
him right moral principles and the right estimation
of goods and evils; a few convincing proofs, indeed,
are better than many; the main point is that the
conduct of the teacher should correspond with his
principles, and that similarly the disciple should live
according to his conviction.2 To this practical end,
then, according to Musonius, all instruction should
work. The teacher of philosophy should not pro-
duce applause but improvement; he should ad-
minister to his hearers the moral medicine that they
require; if he does this in the right way, they will
not have time to admire his discourse, they will be
completely occupied with themselves and their con-_
science, with feelings of shame, repentance, and
exaltation. In this manner Musonius himself tried
to work upon his disciples; he spoke so forcibly to
their hearts that each individual felt as if per-
sonally struck ;> he made the entrance to his school

1 Loe. ctt. 29, 78, with which
the statement of Lucius (sup.
p. 199) in the Hzxe. e. Jo. Dam.
i. 7, 46 (vol. iv. 169 sg. Mein.)
entirely agrees.

2 Πάντες φύσει πεφύκαμεν ov-
τῶς ὥστε (hv ἀνὰμαρτήτως καὶ
καλῶς. .. φυσικὴν εἶναι ὕποβο-
λὴν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψνχῇ πρὸς
καλοκἀγαθίαν καὶ σπέρμα ἀρετῆς
ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐνεῖναι, where this
is proved (ap. Stob. Hel. ii. 426
sg.) by the argument that the
laws demand moral conduct

from all, and all lay claim to
the honour of it (cf. Phil. d. Ga.
111. i. 224, 2).

3 Stob. Floril, Hac. e Jo.
ie ii. 18, 125 (iv. 217 sqq.
4 Gell. M A. v. 1; Epict.
Diss. ii. 23, 29.

5 Hpict. 2. ¢.: τοιγαροῦν οὕτως
ἔλεγεν, ὥσθ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν κα-
θήμενον οἴεσθαι ὅτι τίς ποτε αὐτὸν
διαβέβληκεν: οὕτως ἥπτετο τῶν
γινομένων, οὕτω πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν
ἐτίθει τὰ ἑκάστου κακά,

PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

more difficult, in order to separate the stronger
natures from the weaker and more effeminate ;! he
sought to brace their force of will by the thought of
the difficulties life would bring to them;? and we
may well believe that the influence of such instruc-
tion must have been very important and lasting on
the character of those who enjoyed it. But we cannot
expect that a philosopher who so decidedly subor-
dinated scientific problems to practical influence,
should distinguish himself by originating new
thoughts or even by the firmer establishment and
logical development of a doctrine already existing.
If, therefore, in most of the fragments of Musonius
we must acknowledge the purity of mind and cor-
rectness of moral judgment which they exhibit, we
cannot estimate their scientific value very highly.
What we mostly find in them is merely an application
of the recognised Stoical principles which sometimes
becomes so minute that the philosopher, after the
example of Chrysippus, does not even disdain to
give precepts on the growth of the hair and beard.
On certain points the Stoic principles are exaggerated;
Musonius exceeds the bounds of Stoicism and ap-
proximates partly to the simplicity of the Cynics and
partly to the asceticism of the Neo-Pythagoreans; at
other times he deduces, even from thence, such pure

1 Loe. cit. ui. 6, 10.

2 Loc. cit. 1.9, 29: οὕτω καὶ
Ῥοῦφος πειράζων με εἰώθει λέγειν"
συμβήσεταί σοι τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο
ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου. κἀμοῦ πρὸς
αὐτὸν ἀποκριναμένου, ὅτι ἀνθρώ-
mia τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον παρα-

καλῶ (to treat this better) παρὰ
σοῦ αὐτὰ λαβεῖν δυνάμενος.

3. Floril. 6, 62, where Muso-
nius, like Chrysippus before him
(Athen. xili. 565, @), expresses
himself strongly against the
cutting of the hair and beard.

CHAP,
IX.

254

CHAP.
IX.

ECLECTICISM.

and yet humane precepts as were not universal in
the Stoic school itself. His leading thought is the
inner freedom of man. But this is linked to two con-
ditions, (1) the right treatment of that which is in
our power, and (27 submission to that which is not
in our power. In our power is the use we make
of our ideas, and on this depends all virtue and
happiness. All the rest is out of our power; that we
must, therefore, leave to the course of the universe,
and must be satisfied and happy with whatever it
brings us.! From this standpoint Musonius judges
the value of things; in harmony with his school he
declares virtue to be the only good, and wickedness
the only evil; everything else, riches and poverty,
pleasure and pain, life and death, are indifferent ; ?
he requires that we should defend ourselves against
the troubles of life, not by external means but by
elevation above the external, and indifference towards
it; that, for example, we should regard exile as no
evil, but should feel ourselves at home in the whole

1 Stob. Hel. ii. 356: τῶν ὄν-
τῶν τὰ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἔθετο ὁ θεὸς
τὰ δ᾽ οὔ. ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ κάλλισ-
τον καὶ σπουδαιότατον, ᾧ δὴ καὶ
αὐτὸς εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ, τὴν χρῆσιν
τῶν φαντασιῶν. τοῦτο γὰρ ὀρθῶς
γιγνόμενον ἐλευθερία ἐστὶν εὔροια
εὐθυμία εὐστάθεια, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ
δίκη ἐστὶ καὶ νόμος καὶ σωφρο-
σύνη καὶ ξύμπασα ἀρετή. τὰ δ᾽
ἄλλα πάντα οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐποιῆ-
σατο. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμᾶς συμψή-
φους χρὴ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι καὶ
ταύτῃ διελόντας τὰ πράγματα τῶν
μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν πάντα τρόπον ἂντι-
ποιεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν

ἐπιτρέψαι τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ εἴτε
τῶν παίδων δέοιτο εἴτε τῆς πα-
τρίδος εἴτε τοῦ σώματος εἴτε
ὁτουοῦν, ἀσμένους παραχωρεῖν.
Cf. Flortl. 7, 23 (μὴ δνσχέραινε
ταῖς περιστάσεσιν) ; 1. 4. 108, 60,
where from the thought of the
necessity of the course of the
world and of the change of all
things, is deduced the moral
application that the condition
of a harmonious life is the
éxdyra δέχεσθαι τἀναγκαῖα.

2 Floril. 29, 78, p. 153 cf.
Gell. VW. A. xvi. 1.

3 Sup. Ὁ. 2538, 2.

GENERAL PRECEPTS.

world,! that we should neither seek death nor shun
it.” In order to attain this strength of mind, how-

255

CHAP.
ΤᾺ,

ever, man needs not only the most continual mora] is ethics.

practice and the most unremitting attention to
himself,’ but also bodily hardening.‘ Musonius,
therefore, admonishes us to learn to endure bodily
exertions, deprivaticns, and hardships ;* he desires
to lead us back as much as possible, in regard to
food, clothing, and domestic arrangements, to a
state of nature; he goes further, and with Sextius
and the Neo-Pythagoreans, counsels us to avoid the
eating of flesh, because this is not according to
nature for man, and because, as he thinks, it en-
genders thick and cloudy evaporations which darken
the soul and weaken the power of thought.? On
the other hand he cannot agree with many of the

1 Cf. the lengthy discussion
ap. Stob. Floril. 40, 9, which
finally comes to the conclusion
that as banishment robs a man
of neither of the four principal
virtues, it robs him of no real
good; it cannot injure the good
man, and the bad man is in-
jured by his wickedness and
not by banishment.

2 Cf. Phid. ἃ. Gr. 111. 1. 806,4.
5. It isin entire agreement with
this that Musonius (ap. Hpict.
Diss. 1. 26 sq.) blames Thrasea
because he desired death rather
than exile; for we should nei-
ther, he says, choose the harder
instead of the easier, nor the
easier instead of the harder,
but regard it as a duty ἀρκεῖσ-
θαι τῷ δεδομένῳ.: The story
which Tacitus (Ann. xiv. 59)
relates with a qualifying ‘fe-

runt’is also quite in accord-
ance with his spirit—that he
prevented Rubellius Plautus
from escaping, by means of an
insurrection, the death with
which Nero threatened him.

3. Cf. Stob. Mloril. 29, 78, and
the expression (ap. Gell. W. A.
Evili. 2, 1), remittere animum
quast amittere est.

* For the body, he says (ap.
Stob. 2. c.), must be made the
serviceable tool of the mind,
and with it the soul also will
be strengthened.

* Stob. 2 6.; Pliny, Zp. iii.
11, 6, praises in Artemidorus
(sup. p. 246, 3, end),besides other
excellences, his hardiness, mo-
deration, and abstemiousness.

° Stob. Floril. 1, 84; 18, 38;
8, 20; 94, 23.

7 Loe. cit. 17, 43, sup. 249, 2.

Lipictetus.

ECLECTICISM.

Stoics who carry the self-dependence of the wise
man to the point of dissuading even from marriage ;
he is himself a warm advocate of a connection so
natural, and, in a moral point of view, so beneficial ;
and gives very good and wholesome precepts on the
subject. He sets himself still more decidedly
against the immoral courses which the elder Stoics
had not unconditionally excluded, for he condemned
all unchastity in or out of marriage,’ as also the
custom of the repudiation and exposure of children,?
so common in antiquity, and justified even by Plato
and Aristotle. The gentle disposition which guides
him in all this is also shown in the proposition that
it is unworthy of man to revenge injuries, partly
because such faults as a rule arise from ignorance,
partly because the wise man cannot really be injured,
and not the suffering but the doing of wrong is to
be regarded as an evil anda disgrace. When, how-
ever, he condemns on this principle the judicial
indictment of offences, we recognise the onesided-
ness of a standpoint where elevation above external
things has become indifference to them, and has
degenerated into a denial of their interconnection
with things within.

With Musonius is connected his famous disciple

1 Zoe. cit. 67, 20; 69, 23; 70, himself JMusont soboles, lare
14; cf. Phil. d. Gor. TIT. i. 293, 2, cretus Volsiniensi.
and sup. p. 246, 3. He himself 2 Loe. cit. 6, 61.
was married, for Artemidorus 3 Loe. cit. 75, 15; 84, 21;
was his son-in-law (sup. Ὁ. 246, cf. sup. Ὁ. 250, 1.
8, end), and in the Program. * Loe. cit. 19, 16; 40,9; Schl.
Anthol. Lat. 1. 79 (vol. i. 57, 20, 61.
Burm.) Testus Avienus calls

DATE OF EPICTETUS.

Epictetus, a Phrygian who lived in Rome under
Nero and his successors, went in the reign of
Domitian to Nicopolis, and seems to have died in

that of Trajan.!

1 Hpictetus’ native city was
Hierapolis in Phrygia (Suid.
Ἐπίκτ. He himself was a
slave of EHpaphroditus, the
freedman of Nero (Suid., Epict.
Diss. i. 19, 19: cf. i 1, 20;
j. 26, 11; Gellius, W. 4. ii. 18,
10; Macrob. Sat. i. 11, 45;
Simpl. in Hpiet. Hnechirid. c. 9,
Ὁ. 102, Heins.), weak in body
and lame (Simpl. 2. e.; ef.
Epict. £Znchir. 9; Celsus, ap.
Orig. 6. Cels. vii. 7; Suid. and
others: according to Simplicius
he was lame from his youth;
according to Suidas he became
so through sickness; according
to Celsus, through the ill-
treatment of his master, who
may indeed have used him
harshly, judging from the quo-
tation sup. Ὁ. 258, 2), and lived
in great poverty (Simpl. ὦ. δ. θᾶ
on c. 33, 7, Ὁ. 272; Macrob. l.c.).
While he was yet a slave he
heard Musonius (Epict. Diss.
i. 7, 32; 9, 29; li. 6, 10; 23,
_29). In the sequel he must
have beeome free. Under Do-
mitian he must have left Rome
(sup. p. 190, 1, end) with the
other philosophers (Gell. 7. A.
xv. 11,5; Lucian, Peregr. 18):
he betook himself to Nicopolis
in Epirus (Gell. ὦ. 6. Suidas),
where Arrian heard him (Epict.
Diss. i. 6, 20; 1, Pref.; cf. ii.
22,52). According to Snidas
and Themistocles (Or. v. 63,
he lived until the reign of
Marcus Aurelius: this, how-
ever, Is chronologically impos-

In the discourses? of this philo-

sible. Even Spartian’s state-
ment (Hadr. 16), that Hadrian
associated with him tn summa
Familiaritate is somewhat sus-
picious, as Hadrian’s accession
to the throne (117 A.D.) is more
than 50 years removed from
the time when Epictetus seems
to have heard Musonius in
Rome; but the last years of
his life may nevertheless have
extended to the reign of Ha-
drian, or this emperor may have
become acquainted with him
before he came to the throne.
He himself makes mention of
Trajan (Diss. iv. 5, 17; cf. iil.
13, 9). The consideration in
which Epictetus was held by
his contemporaries and later
authorities is attested, among
others, by Gellius, who calls
him (ii. 18, 10) phitlosophus
nobilis, and (in xviii. 194) mazxi-
mus philesophorum ; alsoby Mar-
cus Aurelius (mp. ἕαυτ. 1.7), who
thanks his teacher, Rusticus,
even in mature age, for having
made him acquainted with
the Memorabilia of Epictetus;
cf. likewise Lucian, Adv. Ind.
13 (who relates that an ad-
mirer of Epictetus bought his
earthenware candlestick for
3,000 drachmas); Simpl. in
Enchir. Pref. Ὁ. 6 sq. and many
others.

2 These are the Διατριβαὶ and
the Ἐγχειρίδιον. Arrian wrote
down the former, as he says in
the preface, after Hpictetus as
faithfully as possible, in the

257

CHAP.
TX.

ATS DOCTRINES.

The philosopher is a physician to whom the sick come,
and not the healthy;! he must not only instruct
his scholars, but help and cure them; of what use
is it to display his learning before them, to develop
dogmas, however true they may be, or to provoke
their applause by proofs of his cleverness? The
most necessary and important thing is rather that
he should speak to their consciences, that he should
bring them to the feeling of their wretchedness and
ignorance; that he should call forth in them the
first resolve of amendment; that he should make
them philosophers, not in their opinions, but in
their behaviour; 2 in a word, that he should produce

ἁπτομένοις αὐτῆς συναίσθησις τῆ only in order to applaud thy
αὐτοῦ ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀδυναμίας fine oratory? (Similarly ili. 21,
περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Fr. 3 (Stob. 8.) τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἐποίει; τοῦτο
Floril. 1,48): εἰ βούλει ἀγαθὺς Ζήνων; τοῦτο Κλεάνθης. And also
εἶναι, πίστευσον ὅτι κακὸς ef, Cf. (passing over other utterances),
Seneca, sup. p. 273, 2. 11.19. Epictetus is here asked

1 Diss. iii. 23,30: ἰατρεῖόν ἐστιν, what he thinks of the κυριεύων
ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχο- (Phil. ὦ. ἐγ. IL.i. 230, 4), and he
λεῖον" οὗ δεῖ ἡσθέντας ἐξελθεῖν, replies that he has as yet come
ἀλλ᾽ ἀλγήσαντας. ἔρχεσθε yap to noopinionthereupon ; buthe
οὔχ ὑγιεῖς, το. Cf. 2». 17 (Stob. knows that very much has been
Flor. iv. 94), and Musonius, written about it. Has he read
sup. Ὁ. 733, 2; T34, 5 sq. the treatise of Antipater on

2 Diss. iii. 23, 31, Epictetus the subject? No; and he does
continues: You come, not as not wish to do so: what does
healthy people, ἀλλ᾽ 6 μὲν ὦμον the reader gain from it? φλυα-
ἐκβεβληκὼς, ὃ δ᾽ ἀπόστημα ἔχων, pdrepos ἔσται καὶ aKaipdrepos,
ὃ δὲ σύριγγα ἔχων, ὃ δὲ κεφαλαλ- ἢ νῦν ἐστι. Such things are
γῶν. εἶτ᾽ ἐγὼ καθίσας ὑμῖν λέγω worth just as much as the
νοημάτια καὶ ἐπιφωνημάτια, ἵν᾽ learning of the grammarians
ὑμεῖς ἐπαινέσαντές με ἐξέλθητε, 6 about Helen and the island of
μὲν τὸν ὦμον ἐκφέρων οἷον εἰσή- Calypso. But even with ethical
yeyrev, ὃ δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὡσαύτως doctrines it is generally the
ἔχουσαν, &c. And shall the same thing. Men relate to one
young men make long journeys, another the principles of a
leave their parents and belong- Chrysippus and a Cleanthes, as
ings, and spend their property, they relate a history from Hel-

s 2

Inferior
value of
theoretical
know-
ledge.

ECLECTICISM.

on them the deep moral impression which Epictetus
himself had received from Musonius, and his
scholars in like manner received from Epictetus.!
From this point of view Epictetus could of
course ascribe to theoretical knowledge, as such, only
a, very subordinate value; and this must especially
hold good of that part of philosophy which mani-
festly stood in the most distant connection with
ethics, namely logic. The chief thing in philosophy is
the application of its doctrines ; next to this stands
the proof of them; only in the third rank comes

lanicus ; but if somebody were
to remind one of these disciples
of the philosophers during a
shipwreck or a trial before the
emperor, that death and ban-
ishment are not evils, he would
regard it as an outrageous
mockery. Of what use, then, is
such a philosophy ? Deeds must
show to what school a man
belongs. But most of those
who call themselves Stoics
prove themselves to be rather
Epicureans, or, at the most,
Peripatetics of the laxest sort.
Στωϊκὸν δὲ δείξατέ μοι, ef τινα
ἔχετε... δείξατέ μοι τινὰ νο-
σοῦντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, κινδυ-
νεύοντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, &c.
ψυχὴν δειξάτω τις ὑμῶν ἀνθρώπου
θέλοντος ὁμογνωμονῆσαι τῷ θεῷ
«ον μὴ δργισθῆναι, μὴ φθονῆσαι
νὸς θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιθυ-
μοῦντα γενέσθαι. . . δείξατε.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔχετε, τί οὖν αὑτοῖς
ἐμπαίζετε; Ke. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν
παιδευτής εἶμι ὑμέτερος" ὑμεῖς δὲ
παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ παιδεύεσθε. My pur-
pose is, ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκωλύ-
τους, ἀναναγκάστους, ἀπαραποδίσ-

τους, ἐλευθέρους, εὐροοῦντας, εὺ-
δαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφο-
ρῶντας ἐν παντὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ.
Your purpose is to learn this.
διὰ τί οὖν οὔκ ἀνύεται; εἴπατέ
μοι τὴν αἰτίαν. It can only lie
in you, or in me, or in both.
τί οὖν; θέλετε ἀρξώμεθά ποτε
τοιαύτην ἐπιβολὴν κομίζειν ἐν-
ταῦθα: τὰ μέχρι νῦν ἀφῶμεν."
ἀρξώμεθα μόνον, πιστεύσατέ μοι
καὶ ὄψεσθε. A further example
of the manner in which Epic-
tetus admonished his pupils is
given in Diss. i. 9, 10-21.

1 Concerning Musonius, vide
sup. Ὁ. 252; concerning Hpic-
tetus, Arrian, Diss. Pref. 8 sq.:
ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἄλ-
λου δῆλος ἦν ἐφιέμενος, ὅτι μὴ
κινῆσαι τὰς γνώμας τῶν ἀκουόντων
πρὸς τὰ βέλτιστα. If his dis-
courses, 85 reported by Arrian,
did not accomplish this, ἀλλ᾽
ἐκεῖνο ἴστωσαν of ἐντυγχάνοντες,
ὅτι, αὐτὸς ὁπότε ἔλεγεν αὐτοὺς,
ἀνάγκη ἦν τοῦτο πάσχειν τὸν
ἀκροώμενον αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ ἐκεῖνος
αὐτὸν παθεῖν ἠβούλετο.

LOGIC.

the doctrine of proof, the scientific method, for that
is only necessary on account of the proof, and proots
are only necessary on account of their application.!
However useful and indispensable, therefore, logic
may be in order to protect us from fallacies, and
though aceuracy and thoroughness are undoubtedly
necessary in its pursuit,? yet logic cannot be an end
in itself; the question is not that we should be able
to explain Chrysippus and solve dialectic difficulties,
but that we should know and follow the will of
nature, that we should attain the right in what we
do and avoid;? the only unconditioned end is
virtue ; dialectic is a tool in its service,* the art of
speech is merely a subordinate help, which has
nothing to do with philosophy as such.’ In accord-
ance with these principles, Epictetus seems to have
occupied himself very little with dialectic questions ;
at any rate the written records of his doctrine con-
tain not a single logical or dialectical discussion.
Even the refutation of scepticism gives him little
concern; he declares it to be the greatest stubborn-
ness to deny self-evident things; he says he has not

1 Man. c. 52. Epictetus else-
where (Diss. ili, 2; i. 17; 16
sq. 29 sq.) distinguishes three
problems of philosophy: the
first and most necessary is that
it should set us free from
our passions ; the second, that
it should make us acquainted
with our duties; the third that
it should strengthen our convic-
tions with irrefragable proofs ;
and he insiststhat we should not

trouble ourselves about this last
point unless we are clear about
the two first.

2 Diss. i. 7: c 17; Ue. 25;
wide sup. p. 248, 1.

8 Diss. 1, 4, 5 sqg.; 0.17, 27
sqq.; ti. 2; ο. 21, 1 sgg.3 . 19
sqq. (vide previous note); ὁ. 18,
17 sq.; Man. 46.

4 Diss. i. 1.1; Man. 52.

5 Diss. i. 8, 4 sqq.; 11. 23.

261

CHAP,
ΙΧ.

CHAP,

ECLECTICISM.

time to contend with such objections; for his
part he has never taken hold of a broom when he
wished to take up a loaf of bread; he finds that
the sceptics themselves act in the same way,
and put food into the mouth and not into the eye;!
finally he encounters them with the old reproach
that they cannot deny the possibility of know-
ledge without maintaining its impossibility.2 Of
the proper signification of scepticism and of the
necessity of its scientific refutation he has no idea.
He is just as little concerned about the investiga-
tions of natural philosophy; indeed, he expressly
agrees with the saying of Socrates, that enquiry
into the ultimate constituents and causes of things
passes our understanding, and could have no value
in any case.’ If, therefore, he generally presup-
poses the Stoic theory of the universe, he not only
institutes no independent inquiries in that sphere,
but even in the doctrines of his school there are
very few points—only the universal bases of the
Stoic conception of the world, and especially the
theological definitions—which attract his attention.
He is full of the thought of God, who knows our

1 Diss. 1. 5; 27, 15 sqq.; ii.
20, 28.

2 Diss. ii. 20, 1 δῷ.

8 Fr. 75 (Stob. Flor. 80, 14):
τί μοι μέλει, φησὶ, πότερον ἐξ
ἀτόμων, ἢ ἐξ ὁμοιομερῶν, ἢ ἐκ
πυρὸς καὶ γῆς συνέστηκε τὰ ὄντα;
‘ob γὰρ ἀρκεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, ὅζο. τὰ δ᾽
ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς χαίρειν ἐξν; ἅτινα
τυχὺν μὲν ἀκατάληπτά ἐστιν ἂν-

θρωπίνῃ γνώμῃ" εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ μά-
λιστα θείη τις εἶναι καταληπτὰ,
ἀλλ᾽ οὖν τί ὄφελος καταληφθέν-
τῶν, &c. This discussion pro-
fesses to be a commentary on
the Socratic theory, as we see
by the word 970i, which is
afterwards repeated; but it is
nevertheless unmistakable that
EHpictetus adopts the same
standpoint himself,

GOD AND THE WORLD.

words and intentions, from whom comes all good,
in whose service the philosopher stands, without
whose commission he may not go to his work, whom
he should have always before his eyes.1_ He proves
the guidance of Providence by the unity, order, and
interconnection of the universe;? he praises the
paternal care of God for men, the moral perfection
which makes Him a pattern for us.? He recognises
in the world the work of God, who has ordered all
for the best: has made the whole perfect and fault-
less and formed all its parts to correspond with the
necessity of the whole, has destined all men to happi-~
ness and furnished them with the conditions of it; *
he extols, in the spirit of his school, the adaptation
of means to ends in the universe, which he says
meets us so clearly at every step that our whole life
should be an unceasing song of praise to the Deity ;°
and, like his school, he condescends to point out
this adaptation even in the smallest and most ex-
ternal things ;® he does not allow himself to be dis-
turbed in his faith even by the apparent evils and
injustices in the world, having learned from the
Stoa to reconcile these also with the perfection of
God and his works.7 This belief in Providence,
however, Epictetus, in the true fashion of the
Stoics, always refers primarily to the umiverse,

1 TI shall recur to this later 4 Diss. iv. 7, 63 ii. 24, 2 sq.

on. Meanwhile, cf. Diss. 22, 5 Diss. i. 16.
9: 28, 53; 21, 18; i 14, 11, 6 Cf. Diss. 1. 16,9 sqq. and
18, 19; 19, 29; 1. 16. Phil. d. Gr. TIL i. 172, end.

2 Diss. i. 14, 16; Man. 31, 1. 7 Tbid. III. i. 175, 4; 178, 2;

8 Diss.i. 6, 40; 9,7; il. 14, and infra, Ὁ. 211,1.
11 sqq.

263

CHAP,
IX.

Religious
view of the
wort?

OHAP,
IX.

ECLECTICISM.

and to the individual only so far as is determined
by the interdependence of the whole; when he
counsels submission to the will of God, this coin-
cides, in his sense with the demand that man
should conform to the order of nature.’ Things, he
says, with Musonius, cannot happen otherwise than
as they do happen; we cannot withdraw ourselves
from under the law of change to which the heavenly
bodies and the elements are subject;? against the
universal order which all things serve and obey we
ought not to rebel. So also he expressly mentions
the doctrine which most strongly asserts that
nothing individual is more than a transient moment
in the flux of the whole—the doctrine of the con-
flagration of the world.* And as the religious
conviction of Epictetus allies itself on this side
to physics, so on the other side it allies itself,
like Stoicism, to the popular religion. Stoic
pantheism with him also includes polytheism ;
the derived divine natures are to be distinguished
from the primal divine nature;° and if all things

1 Diss. i, 12, 15 sq. 28 8g.;
ii. 5, 24 sqg.3 6,9 egg.

2 Inthe fragment mentioned
sup. Ὁ. 248, 3, which begins thus:
ὅτι τοιαύτη ἢ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις
καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐχ οἷόν
τε ἄλλως γίγνεσθαι τὰ γιγνόμενα,
ἢ ὧς νῦν ἔχει,

3 Fr. 186 (Stob. Floril. 108,
66: πάντα ὑπακούει τῷ κόσμῳ
καὶ twrnperet—earth, sea, stars,
plants, animals, our own bodies.
Our judgment alone cannot
be set up in opposition to it.
καὶ γὰρ ἰσχυρός ἐστι καὶ κρείσσων,

καὶ ἄμεινον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν βεβούλευ-
ται, μετὰ τῶν ὅλων καὶ ἡμᾶς συν-
διοικῶν. With Epictetus also,
as with his whole school, God
coincides with the universe.

4 Diss. iii. 13, 4 sqq., where,
as in Sen. Hp. 9, 16, the con-
dition of Zeus after the
universal conflagration is de-
scribed.

5 Hence he says in Diss. ἵν."
12,11: ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἔχω τίνι με δεῖ
ἀρέσκειν, τίνει ὑποτετάχθαι, τίνι
πείθεσθαι" τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς μετ᾽
ἐκεῖνον (11. 17, 25): τῷ Δι, ,

SOOTHSAYVING.

are full of divine powers, so are they full of gods
and demons.! The beneficence of these gods we con-
tinually enjoy in all that we receive from nature and
from other men; to deny them is the more unjusti-
fiable, the. greater is the injury that we thereby
cause to so many.” Yet the relation of Epictetus
to the popular religion is, on the whole, very in-
dependent ; accordingly he seldom mentions the
popular gods, and then only casually, without further
committing himself to the allegorical interpretations
of his school, but prefers to speak in a general
manner of the gods or the deity, or even of Zeus ;
he retains indeed, with Socrates, the principle of
honouring the gods according to our power, after
the manner of antiquity,? but he also knows very
well that the true service of God consists in know-
ledge and virtue ;* the fables about the underworld,
the worship of hostile beings he blames;° and if
he does not attack the belief in soothsaying, he
demands that men should be able to dispense with
prophecy, that they should make use of it without
fear and desire, being previously in harmony
with the result, and should not first enquire of the

rots ἄλλοις θεοῖς, and iii. 13, 4
8... besides Zeus, Here, Athene,

Pluto are named; but the Stoic
unmistakably reserves to him-

Apollo, and, generally speaking,
the gods, who do not survive
the conflagration of the world.

1 Diss. tii. 13, 15: πάντα θεῶν
μεστὰ καὶ δαιμόνων.

2 Loc. cit. li. 20, 32 s¢q.,
where, as examples of gods the
denial of whom is censured by
Euripides, Demeter, Kore, and

self the traditional interpreta-
tion of these gods in the φυ-
σικὸς λόγος.

3 Man. 31, 5.

* Man. 31,1; cf. Diss. ii. 18,
19; Phil. ὦ. Gr, ἘΠῚ. ἃ, 811,1.

5 Diss. iii. 18, 153 1. 19, 6;
22, 16.

CHAP.
IX.

906

CHAP
IX.

Man an
emanation
Srom God.

ECLECTICISM,

soothsayer, where the fulfilment of a duty is in
question.}

To Epictetus the belief in the kinship of the
human spirit to God is of the highest value; man
should be aware of his higher nature; he should
regard himself as a son of God, as a part and
emanation of the deity, in order to gain from this
thought the feeling of his dignity, of his moral
responsibility, his independence of all things ex-
ternal, brotherly love to his fellow men, and the
consciousness of his citizenship in the universe ;?
and in the same sense Epictetus, after the manner
of his school, elso employs the conception of demons,
understanding by them merely the divine in man.
On the other hand we vainly seek in him for more
minute anthropological enquiries; even the question
of immortality is only mentioned casually, and if
from his utterances on the subject we gather that
(departing from the Stoic dogma) he disbelieved
in a personal existence after death, utterances of
his are also to be found which logically lead to
the opposite theory. Nor is the question of the

1 Diss. ti. 7; Man. 32.

2 Diss. i. 8: 6. 93 Gc. 12, 26
sqq.; 6. 18,3; ὁ, 14, 5 sgq.; ii.
8, 11 sgg.; iv.7,7 sq.; cf. PAil.
d. Gr. 111. i. p. 200, 2.

8 Diss.i.14,12 sqq.; cf. Paxil.
ad. Gr. 17]. i. p. 819, 2.

4 Epictetus’ view of the des-
tiny of the soul after death is
not easy to state. On the one
hand he treats the soul (this
aspect will be spoken of again
later on) as an essence which is,

from the commencement, alien
to the body, longs to leave it
and to return to its original
state. Thus in fr. 176 (ap M.
Aurel. iv. 41): ψυχάριον εἶ, Ba-
στάζον νεκρόν; cf. Diss. ii. 19,
27: ἐν τῷ σωματίῳ τούτῳ τῷ
νεκρῷ, J. 6. i. 19, 9; but espe-
cially Diss. i. 9, 10 sgq. He
thought that they (he here says
to his disciples) ἐπιγνόντες τὴν
πρὸς τοῦς θεοὺς συγγένειαν, καὶ ὅτι
δεσμά τινα ταῦτα προσηρτήμεθα

FREE WILL.

freedom of the will discussed with any exactitude ;
it seems, however, probable that Epictetus did not
depart from the fatalism of his school! since he
constantly insists that all faults are involuntary
and merely a consequence of incorrect notions, for
it is impossible not to desire what a man holds

τὸ σῶμα Kal Thy κτῆσιν αὐτοῦ
... would wish to shake off
this burden, καὶ ἀπελθεῖν πρὸς
τοὺς συγγενεῖς, that they would
say to him, οὐκέτι ἀνεχόμεθα μετὰ
τοῦ σωματίου τούτου δεδεμένοι
«οὔκ... σνγγενεῖς τινες τοῦ
θεοῦ ἐσμεν κακεῖθεν ἐληλύθαμεν,
ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἀπελθεῖν ὅθεν ἐληλύ-
σαμεν" ἄφες λυθῆναί ποτε τῶν δεσ-
μῶν τούτων, that he, for his
part, would have to remind
them that they must await the
call of God, and when that
came to them, he should have
to 58}, τότ᾽ ἀπολύεσθε πρὸς αὐτόν.
According to these utterances
we should have supposed that
Epictetus believed with Plato
and the majority of the Stoics,
that the soul after death was
transferred to a better life
with God. Other passages, how-
ever, render it doubtful whether
he meant by this a personal
existence. He says (Diss. iil.
13, 14), when God no longer
grants to a man his subsistence
in life, we should regard this
as if He opened the door and
called to him to come; and to
the question ‘whither ?’ this is
the answer : εἰς οὐδὲν δεινόν. GAN
ὅθεν ἐγένου, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγγε-
νῇ, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. ὅσον ἦν ἐν σοὶ
πυρὸς, εἰς πῦρ ἄπεισιν" ὅσον ἦν γη-
δίου, εἰς γήδιον᾽ ὅσον πνευματίου,
εἰς πνευμάτιον. ὅσον ὑδατίου, εἰς

ὑδάτιον. What becomes of the
soul we do not learn; but as, on
the supposition of its personal
continuance, this was to be
said before all things, we can
only conclude that Epictetus
made the soul also pass into
the elements, fire and air;
among the Stoics the soul was
universally described as Pneu-
ma or as fire, and Epictetus
would not herein have diverged
from his school; the faculty of
sight, according to the Stoic
doctrine an emanation of the
ἡγεμονικὸν, is expressly de-
scribed in Diss. ii. 23, 3, asa
Pneuma inherent in the eye.
The same theory results from
Diss. tii. 24,93: τοῦτο θάνατος,
μεταβολὴ μείζων, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ νῦν
ὄντος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὃν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ
νῦν ph bv. οὐκέτι οὖν ἔσομαι;

οὔκ ἔσῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο τι, οὗ νῦν δ,

κόσμος χρείαν ἔχει. Here the
continued existence of man is
certainly asserted, but it is
not a personal existence; it is
merely a continuance of his
substance ; he becomes ἄλλο τι,
another individual.

1 It is also plain from this
that Epictetus places the su-
periority of man over the
animals not in free will but in
consciousness (the δύναμις παρα-
κολουθητικήν); Diss. 1.6, 12 sqq.;
ii. 8, 4 δῷ.

268

CHAP,

a

Ethics
based on
immediate
CONSCIOUS
NESS.

ECLECTICISM.

to be a good.! How this fatalism is to be combined
with moral precepts and exigencies is nowhere
indicated by our philosopher.

But even in ethics we must not expect from
Epictetus any more searching investigation. He
who confines himself in philosophy to the practically
useful, and carries on theoretic enquiry only as an
accessory and means to this, is necessarily, even in
his moral doctrine, devoid of any proper scientific
foundation and mode of treatment; it only remains
for him, therefore, to found that doctrine, in the
last resort, upon immediate consciousness. Thus
Epictetus, like his teacher Musonius, assures us that
the universal moral conceptions and principles are
innate in all men, and that all are agreed about them;
the strife relates merely to their application in
given cases. Philosophy has only to develop
these natural conceptions and teach us to include
the individual rightly under them: for instance,
under the idea of good we are not to place pleasure
or riches, and so forth. Here it is indeed acknow-
ledged that the innate ideas do not suffice for
themselves alone; and that in their application
deceptive opinion is intermingled ;? but since, as
Epictetus believes, there is no strife concerning
the universal conceptions, he hopes to put an end

1 Diss. i. 18, 1-7; 28, 1-10; of our free will; for the Stoics,
li. 26; iii. 3, 2; iii. 7, 15. It notwithstanding their fatalism,
forms no contradiction to the maintained the same.
above when Epictetus says * Diss. i. 22, 1 sg. 9; 11, 11;
again (47. 180; ap. Gell. xix. ο, 17, 1-13.

7) that acquiescence is an affair

TRUE WISDOM.

to the discord of moral presentations in the simple
Socratic manner, starting from that which is
universally acknowledged, by means of short dia-
lectic discussions ;} the scholastic argumentations,
the systematic treatment of ethics, seem to him,
not, indeed, worthless, so far as they serve to
confirm our conviction, but at the same time not
indispensable.

If we would enter somewhat more closely into
the content of Epictetus’ ethical doctrine, we may
point out, as its fundamental feature, the endeavour
to make man free and happy by restriction to his
moral nature; from which proceeds the double
demand to bear all external events with unconditional
submission, and to renounce all appetites and wishes
directed towards the external. This, according to
Epictetus, is the commencement and sum of all
wisdom—that we should know how to discriminate
what is in our power and what is not in our
power;? he is a born philosopher who desires
absolutely nothing but to live free and not to be
afraid of any event that may happen? Only one
thing is in our power—namely, our will, or what
is the same, the employment of our notions and
ideas ; everything else, whatever it may be called,
is for us an external, a thing that is not in our
power. Only this should. have, therefore, any

1 Loe. cit. especially 11. 11, quoted by Musonius from the
and ii. 12, 5 sg. mouth of Epictetus, sep. p.

2 Of. sup. p. 261, 1. 254, 1.

3 Man. i. 1; 48, 1) Diss. 1. 4 Diss. i. 17, 29; cf. 1, 4, 18.
1; 21, 22, 9 95.; ch what is Cf sup. note 3, and Man.

Inde-

pendence
of things
external.

CHAP.
IX.

ECLECTICISM,

value for us, only in it should we seek goods and
evils, happiness and unhappiness ;! and this we can
do, for things external do not concern ourselves ;2 our
will, our proper essential nature, nothing in the
world, not even the deity, can coerce;* only on the
will depends our happiness ; it is not external things
as such that make us happy, but only our concep-
tions of things; and the question is not how our
external circumstances are shaped, but whether we
know how to govern and employ our notions.4 So
long as we desire or avoid anything external to our-
selves we depend upon fortune; if we have per-
ceived what is ours and what is not, we restrict
ourselves with our wishes to our own rational nature,
we direct our efforts and counter efforts,® to nothing
which does not depend on ourselves: then we are
free and happy, and no fate can have any hold upon
us; happen what will, it can never affect us and
that on which our well-being depends. And the
more completely we have made ourselves thus
independent in our minds of the external, the

6; Diss. i. 25,1; 12, 34; ii. 5,

sq.; ill. 3,1; 14 sgq.; iv. 1,
100, &c.

1 Vide preceding note and
Man. 19; Diss. iii. 22, 38 sqq. ;
li. 1, 4; i. 20, 7 &e.

2 Diss. 1.1, 21 sqq.3 ¢. 18,17;
29, 24; ii. 5,4; Man. c. 9, and
elsewhere.

8 Diss. i. 1, 28; 17, 27; ii.
23,19; ili. 3, 10.

4 Man. 5, 16, 20; Diss. i. 1,
7 sqqg.; ti. 1, 45 0. 16, 24: iii,
3, 18; 26, 34 sg. and elsewhere.

Phit. d. Gr. TIT. i. p. 224, 1.

° Man. 1, 2,19; Diss. i.1,7
sqq.; 21 sqg.; ο. 18,17; 19,7;
22, 10 δι; 25,1 sgg.; ti. 1, 4;
5, £5 23, 16 sgg.; iii. 22, 38;
iv. 4, 23 δὲ pass.; Gell. Δ Α΄.
Kvli. 19, 5, where there is a
quotation from Epictetus to the
effect that the worst vices are
impatience towards the faults

_of others, and intemperance in

enjoyments and in all things;
the art of living happily and
without faults is contained in
two words, ἀνέχου and ἀπέχου.

COURSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

clearer it will become that all that happens is
necessary in the interdependence of things, and so
far according to nature we shall acknowledge that
to each event a moral activity may be linked,
and that even misfortune may be used as a means
of training; we shall for this reason submit un-
conditionally to our destiny and hold what God
wills to be better than what we will, and feel
ourselves free precisely herein, that we are satisfied
with all as it is and happens; the course of the
universe will correspond with our wishes, because we
have received it unaltered into our wills! Even
the hardest experiences will not disturb the wise
man in this temper; not only his property, his
person, his health, and life, but even his friends, his
belongings, his fatherland, he will consider as some-
thing that is merely lent, and not given, to him,
and the loss of which does not affect his inner
nature ;* and as little will he permit himself to be
troubled by the faults of others in his peace of
mind ; he will not expect that those belonging to
him should be free from faults ; he will not require

1 Phil. d. Gr. TT. i. p. 303, 1;
304,1; Alan. 8, 10, 53; Diss. 1. 6,
37 sqq.; 12, 4 sqq.; 24,1; 11. 5,
24 sqq-; 6,10; 10, 4 sg.; 16, 42
sqq.; 111. 20; IV.i.99, 131; 7, 20,
and elsewhere. Itis consistent
with this principle that Epic-
tetus, who with his school re-
garded suicide as the refuge
kept open in the last resort,
only allows it when circum-
stances unequivocally demand
it (wide Diss. i. 24, 20; 9, 16;

11. 15, 4 sqq.; 6, 22; lil. 24, 95
$qq.

* Man. 1. 1; ¢. 8: 6. 11; α.
14; Diss. 1. 15; 22,10; iii. 3,
5, and elsewhere.

8 Man.12; 1, 14. Still Iess
can natural compassion as to the
external misfortunes of other
men be permitted, though Epic-
tetus is human and incon-
sistent enough to allow the ex-
pression of sympathy (Man.
16).

272

CHAP,
IX.

Inelina-
tion of
Lipictetus
to Cyni-
cism,

ECLECTICISM.

that no wrong should be committed against himself:
he holds the greatest criminal to be merely an
unhappy and deluded man with whom he dares not
be angry,! for he finds that all about which most men
excite themselves,is grounded inthe nature of things.
Thus does man win freedom here by withdrawing
with his will and endeavour absolutely into himself,
while he accepts on the contrary all external events
with perfect resignation as an unavoidable destiny.
We cannot deny that these principles on the
whole are Stoic, but at the same time we cannot
help feeling that the spirit which pervades the
morality of Epictetus is not quite the same as that
of the earlier Stoicism. On the one hand our
philosopher inclines to Cynicism, when, as we have
seen, he speaks disparagingly of theoretic science ;
when he carries his indifference to the external and
submission to the course of the world so far that
the distinction of that which is according to nature
and contrary to it, that which is desirable and ob-
jectionable—which was the doctrine chiefly dis-
tinguishing the Stoic morality from the Cynic—for
him almost entirely loses its meaning ;? when he

1 Diss. i. 18; c. 28.

2 That distinction, he says in
Diss. ii. δ, 24 sq., only holds
good so far as man is regarded
for himself irrespective of his
place in the interconnection of
nature; τί el; ἄνθρωπος. εἰ μὲν
ὡς ἀπόλυτον σκοπεῖς, κατὰ φύσιν
ἐστὶ ζῆσαι μέχρι γήρως, πλουτεῖν,
ὑγιαίνειν" εἰ δ' ὡς ἄνθρωπον σκο-
πεῖς καὶ μέρος ὅλον τινὺς, δι

ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον νῦν μέν σοι νοσῆσαι
καθήκει, νῦν δὲ πλεῦσαι καὶ κινδυ-
νεῦσαι, νῦν δ' ἀπορηθῆναι, πρὸ
ὥρας δ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποθανεῖν. τί
οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς: . . . ἀδύνατον
γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ σώματι, ἐν τούτῳ
τῷ περιέχοντι, τούτοις τοῖς av-
ζῶσι, μὴ συμπίπτειν ἄλλοις ἄλλα
τοιαῦτα. σὸν οὖν ἔργον, ἐλ-
θόντα εἰπεῖν ἃ δεῖ, διαθέσθαι ταῦτα
ὧς ἐπιβάλλει. What falls to a

CYNIC TENDENCIES.

finds it dignified to disdain even those external
goods which fate offers us without our co-operation ;}
when in his exaltation above mental emotions he
advances to insensibility ;? when he forbids us to
feel compassion and sympathy for our fellow-crea-
tures, at any rate in regard to their outward con-
dition ;3 when he believes that the perfected wise
man will keep himself from marriage and the
begetting of children in the ordinary condition of
human society, because they withdraw him from
his higher vocation, make him dependent on other
men and their necessities, and have no value for

a teacher of humanity, as compared with his

man as his lot (as was said in
c. 3; cf. c. 6, 1) is immaterial:
τῷ πεσόντι δ᾽ ἐπιμελῶς καὶ τεχ-
ViK@S χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο ἤδη ἐμὸν
ἔργον ἐστίν. Insuch observations
Epictetus to a certain extent is
anticipated by Chrysippus, from
whom he quotes these words
(Diss. ii. 6, 9): μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά
μοι ἢ τὰ ἑξῆς, del τῶν εὐφυεστέ-
pov ἔχομαι πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν
τῶν κατὰ φύσιν" αὐτὸς γάρ μὴ ὅ
θεὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐκλεκτικὸν

ἐποίησεν. εἰ δέ ye Hoe ὅτι νο-
σεῖν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ

ὥρμων ἂν ἐπὶ αὐτό. καὶ yap 6
ποὺς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν
ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι. In a system
so strictly fatalistic as that of
the Stoics, only a relative value
could be allowed to the oppo-
sition of ‘contrary to nature’
and ‘according to nature’; from
the standpoint of the whole, all
that happens appears according
to nature, because necessary.
But as the ancient Stoics were

not deterred from action by
their fatalism, neither did they
allow it to interfere with their
conviction of the different rela-
tive values of things ; without
which no choice among them,
and consequently no action,
would be possible (Cic. Pin. iii.
15, 50). ΤῈ that conclusion is
more prominentin Epictetus, so
that he approximates to the
complete indifference of Aristo
and the Cynics, this only shows
the whole character of his ethi-
cal theory of life, in which the
Stoic withdrawal from the ex-
ternal world becomes total in-
difference to that world, and
submission to destiny becomes
inactive sufferance, or tends toit.

1 Man. 15.

2 Miss. iti. 12,10. Accustom
thyself to bear injuries: «i?
οὕτω προβήσῃ, ἵνα κἂν πλήξῃ σέ
τις εἴπης αὐτὸς πρὸς αὗτόν ὅτι
δόξον ἀνδριάντας περιειληφέναι.

3. Vide sup. Ὁ. 371, 3.

974 ECLECTICISM.

ΟΗΔΡ, spiritual posterity;! when he dissuades us from
ΠΝ taking part in political life, because for him every
His gentle human community in comparison with the great
Capos state ofthe universe is too small ;? when, finally, he

develops his philosophic ideal under the name and
in the form of Cynicism.3 But, on the other hand,
there unquestionably reigns in Epictetus a milder
and gentler temper than in the older Stoa: the
philosopher does not oppose himself to the unphilo-
sophical world with that haughty self-confidence
which challenges it to battle; resignation to the un-
avoidable is his first principle. He comes forward
not as the angry preacher of morals who reproves
the perversity of men in the bitter tone of the
well-known Stoic propositions about fools, but as
the loving physician who desires indeed to heal
their diseases, but rather sympathises with than

1 Diss. ili. 22, 67 sqq.; cf. Phil.
a. Gr. IIL.i.296. Epictetus him-
self was unmarried (Lucian,
Demon. 55; cf. Simpl. in pict.
Enehir. ¢.33,7,p.272). In iii. 7,
19 ; 1, 23, 4 sy. he reproaches the
Epicureans that their repudia-
tion of marriage and of po-
litical life undermines human
society, and in Lucian (7. 8.) he
admonishes Demonax the Cynic
to found a family, πρέπειν yap
kal τοῦτο φιλοσόφῳ ἀνδρὶ ἕτερον
ἀνθ αὑτοῦ καταλιπεῖν τῇ φύσει
(to which Demonax replied:
‘Very good ! Giveme then one
of your daughters !’). But this
is only the same contradiction
which we might everywhere
find in the Stoic treatment of
these questions. The principle

of life according to nature and
the necessity of human society
demand family life; the inde-
pendence and self-sufficingness
of the wise man forbid it.
With Epictetus, however, the
latter point of view manifestly
predominates, and thus there
results a doctrine similar to
that which prevailed at this
time, and subsquently in the
Catholic Church: marriage is
recommended, but celibacy is
considered better and higher,
and is advised forall those who
profess to be teachers in the
service of God.

2 Phil. ἃ. Gr. 111. i. 296, 3.

° Vide Diss. iii. 22 ; iv. 8, 30;
i. 24, 6.

DUTIES TO GODS AND MEN.

accuses them, who is not irritated even by the
greatest wrong, but prefers to excuse it as an invo-
luntary error! When our connection with other
men and the duties arising from it is in question,
Epictetus represents these relations chiefly from
the emotional side, as an affair of the affectionate
temperament: we should fulfil our duties to the
gods, to those belonging to us, and to our fellow-
citizens, for we ought not to be without feeling,
as if we were made of stone ;? we should treat all
men, even if they are our slaves, as brothers, for
they all descend equally from God;? even to those
who ill-treat us we ought not to refuse the love of

1 Vide, besides the passages
quoted sup. p. 259, 1, the quota-
tions p. 268, 1; for example
(i. 18, 8): τί ἔτι πολλοῖς χαλε-
παίνομεν ; κλέπται, φησὶν, εἰσὶ καὶ
λωποδύται. τί ἔστι τὸ κλέπται
καὶ λοποδύται; πεπλάνηνται περὶ
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. χαλεπαίνειν
οὖν δεῖ αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐλεεῖν αὐτούς:
There is no greater unhappiness
than to be in error concerning
the most important questions,
and not to have a rightly con-
stituted will; why be angry
with those who have this un-
happiness? We should rather
compassionate them. And
finally, we are only angry with
them because we cannot free
ourselves from dependence
on the things of which they
deprive us: μὴ θαύμαζε cov τὰ
ἱμάτια καὶ τῷ κλέπτῃ ov χαλεπα-
vers’ μὴ θαύμαζε τὸ κάλλος τῆς
γυναικὸς καὶ τῷ μοιχῷ οὐ χαλε-
waves... μέχρι © ἂν ταῦτα

θαυμάζῃς, σεαυτῷ χαλέπαινε μᾶλ-
λον ἢ ἐκείνοις.

2 Diss. ili. 2,4. The first is
being without passions or affec-
tions; the second is the fulfil-
ment of duty: od δεῖ γάρ με
εἶναι ἀπαθῇ ὡς ἀνδριάντα, Ke.

8. Diss. i. 18, where Epictetus
exclaims to the master who is
violent towards his slaves: ἀν-
δράποδον., οὐκ ἀνέξῃ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ
τοῦ σαὐτοῦ ὃς ἔχει τὸν Δία πρό-
Ὕονον, ὥσπερ υἱὸς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν
σπερμάτων γέγονε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς
ἄνωθεν καταβολῆς; . . . οὗ μεμ-
νήσῃ τίς εἶ καὶ τίνων ἄρχεις; ὅτι
συγγενῶν, ὅτι ἀδελφῶν φύσει, ὅτι
τοῦ Διὸς ἀπογόνων; . . . ὁρᾷς
ποῦ βλέπεις ; ὅτι εἷς τοῦς ταλαι-
πώρους τούτους νόμους τοὺς τῶν
νεκρῶν; εἰς δὲ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν οὐ
βλέπεις ; cf. Sen. Benef. iii. 18--
28; De Clement. i. 18,2; Zp.
31,11; Vit. Beat. 24, 3; Mu-
sonius ap. Stob. Mloril. 40,9;
Ep. 44; Diss. iii. 22, 83; i. 9.

r 2

Universat
love of

mankind.

Mareus
Aurelius
Antoninus

ECLECTICISM.

a father or a brother.!

How this disposition is con-

nected with the religious temperament of Epictetus
and how from this starting-point a divergence from
the older Stoicism is inevitable, even in the theo-
retical part of philosophy, will be discussed further

on.

The greatest admirer of Epictetus was Marcus
Aurelius Antoninus,? and in his apprehension of

1 Diss. tii. 22, 54: δαίρεσθαι
δεῖ αὐτὸν (the Cynic, the truly
wise man) os ὄνον καὶ δαιρό-
μενον φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς τοὺς δαίρον-
τας, ὡς πατέρα πάντων, ὡς ἀδελφόν;
cf. Fr. 70; ap. Stob. #lored. 20,
61; and concerning other Cy-
nics who express themselves in
the same manner, Phil. d. G.
111. i. 299, 4.

2 M. Annius Verus (for so he
was originally called) was born
on the 25th of April, 121 A.D.,
in Rome (Capitolin. Ant. Philos.
1), where his family, which had
emigrated with his great grand-
father out of Spain, had at-
tained a high rank (ὦ. ¢.).
His careful education was for-
warded by his own anxiety to
learn; philosophy very early
attracted him, and already in
his twelth year he assumed the
garb of a philosopher and pre-
scribed to himself abstinences
which he only curtailed at the
entreaties of his mother (J. 6.
c. 2). His teachers he loaded
with proofs of his gratitude
and respect, even when he
became Emperor (J. ¢.¢.3; cf,
Ant. Pi. 10; Philostr. V. Soph.
ii.9; and Dio Cass. lxxi. 1,
who relate the same of Sextus
as Capitolinus relates of Apol-

lonius; cf. sug. Ὁ. 197, note).
The philosophers whose in-
structions he attended were,
besides the above mentioned,
Stoies (ώ. ¢.); Sextus, the Pla-
tonist, of Chaeronea, nephew of
Plutarch (M. Aurel.i.9; Capitol.
3; Dio and Philostr. 7. ¢.; Eu-
trop. villi. 12; Suid. Mdpr.);
Alexander (M. Aurel. i. 12;
Philostr. V. Soph. ii. 5, 2 sq.),
but this last only at a later
period; and Claudius Severus,
the Peripatetic (Capitol. 3).
Among the earlier philosophers
none made a deeper impression
upon him than Epictetus, as
we have already seen (sup. Ὁ.
738, 1; according to M. Aur. i.
7. Adopted by order of Hadrian
(concerning his predilection for
him, vide Capitol. i. 4; Dio
Cass. Ixix. 15) by Antoninus
Pius, he took the name of Mar-
cus Aurelius after he had borne
that of his maternal grand-
father Catilius for a while. On
his accession to the throne the
surname of Antoninus was also
added (Capitol. i. 5, 7; Dio
Cass. ὦ, ¢.). His later life be-
longs to Roman imperial his-
tory, which exhibits to us on
the throne of the Cesars many
more powerful princes, but

MARCUS AURELIUS.

Stoicism, as well as in his whole mode of thought,
he approximates very closely to him. Like Epic-
tetus he generally presupposes the Stoic doctrine,
but only those determinations of it which stand in
close relation to the moral and religious life possess

any interest for him.

He does not feel called upon

to be a dialectician or a physicist;! and though he
admits the value of these sciences in general,” he is

none of nobler and purer cha-
racter, no man of gentler dis-
position, stricter conscientious-
ness, and faithfulness to duty.
I refer, therefore, to Dio Cassius
(B. lxxi.), Capitolinus (Ant.
Philos.; Ant. Pius. Ver. Imp.),
Vulcatius(Avid. Cass.), and the
well-known authorities for that
part of Roman history; and in
this place will only shortly
mention the rare and peculiar
relation in which Marcus Aure-
lius as Cesar and actual co-
regent stood to his equally
excellent father-inlaw and
adopted father (136-161), to
whom he himself (i. 16; vi. 30)
in his meditations has raised so
beautiful a monument. His
own reign was disturbed by
ereat public misfortunes (fa-
mine and plague in Rome, 165,
6 A.D.), difficult wars (with the
Parthians in 162 A.D., the Mar-
comanni, 166 sgqg. and 178 sgq.),
dangerous insurrections (the
Bucoliin Egypt in 170; Avidius
Cassius in Syria, 175) ; and em-
bittered by the indolence of his
colleague Verus(died 172 4.D.),
the immorality of his wife
Faustina, and the wickedness
and excesses of his son Com-
modus. On the 17th of March

180 4.D. Marcus Aurelius died
at Vienna during the expedi-
tion against the Marcomanni;
according to Dio Cass. c. 33, of
poison, which his son had
caused to be administered to
him. A monument of his cha-
racter and his philosophy re-
mains in the aphoristic memo-
randa, chiefly written in his
later years, which in the MSS.
bear the title εἰς ἑαυτὸν or καθ᾽
ἑαυτὸν, but are also quoted
under other designations (Bach,
p. 6). More recent monographs
concerning him are the follow-
ing: N. Bach, De Mare. Aur.
Anton. Leipzig, 1826; Doérgens,
vide sup. p. 202,1; Zeller, Vortr.
und Abhandl. i. 89 sqq.; Cless
M. Aurelius Selbstyesprache
tibers. und erléut. Stuttgard,
1866. And others in Ueberweg,
Grundy. i, 223.

1 vii. 67: καὶ μὴ, ὅτι ἀπήλπι-
Kas διαλεκτικὸς καὶ φυσικὸς ἔσεσ-
Oat, διὰ τοῦτο ἀπογνῷς, καὶ ἐλεύ-
θερος καὶ αἰδήμων καὶ κοινωνικὸς
καὶ εὐπειθὴς θεῷ.

3 So he says in vill. 13, in
agreement with the Stoic triple
division of philosophy: διη-
νεκῶς Kal ἐπί πάσης, εἰ οἷόν τε,
φαντασίας φυσιολογεῖν, παθολο-
γεῖν, διαλεκτικεύεσθαι.

resembles
Epictetus
in his
practical
vier of
philo-
sophy.

278

CHAP.
IX.

ECLECTICISM.

nevertheless of opinion that a man may attain his
proper destination without much knowledge.! The
important thing is not that he should search out all
things above and beneath the earth, but that he
should commune with the demon within him and
serve him in sincerity ;? the greater are the diffi-
culties which oppose themselves to the investigation
of the Real, the more should a man hold to that
which in the changefulness of things and of opinions
can alone give us calm—to the conviction that
nothing can happen to us which is not according to
the nature of the universe, and that none can oblige
us to act against our conscience. It is only with
these practical convictions, therefore, that he is
concerned in his study of philosophy. Philosophy
must give us a fixed support in the flux of pheno-

1 Vide 277, 1; οἵ, 1. 17, where
he reckons among the bene-
fits of the gods that he did
not make greater progress in
oratory and poetry and such
studies which otherwise might
have exclusively occupied him,
and that when he applied him-
self to philosophy he refrained
from ἀποκαθίσαι ἐπὶ τοὺς συγ-
γραφεῖς, ἢ συλλογισμοὺς ἄνα-
λύειν, ἢ περὶ τὰ μετεωρολογικὰ
καταγίνεσθαι.

5.11. 18 ; ef. li. 2,3: ἄφες τὰ
βιβλία... τὴν δὲ τῶν βιβλίων
δόξαν ῥίψον.

ὅν. 10: τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐν
τοιαύτῃ τρόπον τινὰ ἐγκαλύψει
ἐστὶν, ὥστε φιλοσόφοις οὐκ ὅλί-
γοις, οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν, ἔδοξε
παντάπασιν ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι.
πλὴν αὐτοῖς ye τοῖς Srwikots

δυσκατάληπτα Soret καὶ πᾶσα ἡ
ἡμετέρα συγκατάθεσις μεταπτωτή:"
ποῦ γὰρ ὃ ἀμετάπτωτος; If we
go further with external things,
they are all transitory and
worthless; if we consider men,
even the best are scarcely en-
durable: ἐν τοιούτῳ οὖν ζόφῳ
kal ῥύπῳ καὶ τοσαύτῃ ῥύσει...
τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκτιμηθῆναι, ἢ τὸ
ὅλως σπουδασθῆναι δυνάμενον ἐπι-
νοῶ, It only remains to await
in peace his natural dissolu-
tion, but until then τούτοις
μόνοις προσαναπαύεσθαι: ἑνὶ μὲν
τῷ, ὅτι οὐδὲν συμβήσεταί μοι, ὃ
οὐχὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν
ἐστίν: ἑτέρῳ δὲ, ὅτι ἔξεστί μοι
μηδὲν πράσσειν παρὰ τὸν ἐμὸν
θεὸν καὶ δαίμονα. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅ
ἀναγκάσων τοῦτον παραβῆναι.

LROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

mena, and supply a defence against the vanity of
all finite things. ‘What is human life?’ he asks.
A dream and an exhalation, a strife and a wandering
In a strange land. Only one thing can guide us
through it—namely, philosophy. This consists in
our keeping the demon within us pure and clear,
exalted above pleasure and pain, independent of the
conduct of others; in our receiving all that happens
to us as sent by God, and awaiting the natural end
of our existence with cheerfulness and courage.!
The problem of philosophy lies, therefore, in the
forming of a man’s character and the calming of
his mind ; only according to their relation to this
problem is the value of scientific enquiries and
dogmas to be estimated.

For this purpose there are three points in the
theoretical portion of the Stoic system which are
chiefly important in the eyes of our philosopher.
First, the doctrine of the flux of all things, of the
decay of all existence, of the rotation of becoming
and passing away, in which nothing individual has

11.17: τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου
6 μὲν χρόνος στιγμή" ἡ δὲ οὐσία
ῥέουσα, Ke. συνελόντι δὲ εἰπεῖν,
πάντα, τὰ μὲν τοῦ σώματος πο-
ταμὸς, τὰ δὲ τῆς φυχῆς ὄνειρος
καὶ τῦφος. 6- δὲ βίος πόλεμος
καὶ ξένου ἐπιδημία: ἡ ὑστεροφημία
δὲ λήθη. τί οὖν τὸ παραπέμψαι
δυνάμενον ; ἕν καὶ μόνον, φιλοσο-
φία. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ τηρεῖν τὸν
ἔνδον δαίμονα ἀνύβριστον καὶ
ἀσινῆ, ὅτο. ἔτι δὲ τὰ συμβαί-
vovTa καὶ ἀπονεμόμενα δεχόμενον,

ὡς ἐκεῖθέν ποθεν ἐρχόμενα, ὅθεν
αὐτὸς ἦλθεν: ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τὸν θά-
νατον ἵλεῳ τῇ γνώμῃ περιμένοντα,
ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ λύσιν τῶν
στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον (gov
σνγκρίνεται. Similar utterances
concerning the vanity and
transitoriness of life and
the worthlessness of every-
thing external are to found in
11. 12, 15; iv. 8 (6 κόσμος ἀλ--
λοίωσις. ὃ βίος ὑπόληψις); iv.
48; ν. 88; vi. 86 εὖ pass.

279

CHAP,
IX.

His theo-
retic con-
victions.
Flux of
all things.

280 LECLECTICISM.

CHAP. permanence,' but all returus in course of time ;? of
IX. the ceaseless transmutation to which even the ele-
ments are subject;* of the change which conducts
even the universe to its future dissolution. With
these doctrines he couples these reflections: what an
unimportant part of the whole, what a transitory
phenomenon in the stream of universal life, is each
individual : 5 how wrong it is to set our hearts upon
the perishable, to desire it as a good, or to fear it
as an evil ;® how little we ought to disturb ourselves
if we form no exception to the law which holds
good, and must hold good, for all parts of the
world, if we too are hastening to our dissolution.’
But the more lively is his consciousness of the
changeableness of all the finite, the greater is
the importance he attaches to the conviction that
this change is governed by a higher law and sub-
serves the end of the highest reason; and this is
the conclusion of those propositions on the deity
and providence, and on the unity and perfection of
the world, to which Marcus Aurelius so often recurs.
The belief in the gods is so indispensable to man
that it would not be worth while to live in a world
without gods;*® and just as little can we doubt that

1 iv. 36, 43; v. 18, 23; viii. know of the existence of the

6 ; ix. 19, 28 δὲ pass. gods whom we do not see,
2 ii. 14; viii. 6. Marcus Aurelius answers (xii.
3 11. 17, end; iv. 46. 28): We believe in them be-
4 v.13, 32. cause we experience the effects
5 vy, 23; ix. 82, of their power; but that we
᾿ iv, 42; v.23; vi. 15; ix. 28, do not see them is not quite

il. 17, end; viii, 18; x. 7, true, for they (2.6. a portion
31; xii. 21. of them, the stars) are visible ;
8. ii. 11. If we ask how we and we believe in our souls

ORDER OF THE WORLD.

the Divine Providence embraces all things and has
ordered all things in the most perfect and beneficent
manner ;! whether this care extends to the indi-
vidual immediately as such, or is related to him by
means of the general interdependence of nature.?
The same divine spirit permeates all things; as the
substance of the world is one, so is its soul ;? it is
one rational and efficient force which goes through all
things, bears in itself the germs of all things, and
brings forth all things in fixed and regular succes-
sion.t The world, therefore, forms a well-ordered
living whole, the parts of which are maintained in
harmony and interconnection by an internal bond,?
and all in it is regulated for the best, the fairest
and the most appropriate ends; the worse is made
for the sake of the better, and the irrational for the

without seeing them (cf.
Xenoph. Mem. 3, 14).

1 ii. 8: τὰ τῶν θεῶν προνοίας
μεστά (ΣΙϊ. δ); πάντα καλῶς καὶ
φιλανθρώπως διατάξαντες οἱ θεοί
(ii. 4,11; vi. 44, &.).

? Marcus Aurelius allows us
to choose between these two
theories, whereas he repudiates
the third—that the gods do
not trouble themselves about
anything—as wicked and sub-
versive of all religion; though
even were it the case he holds
that man could still take care
of himself and his true welfare
(vi. 44; vide Phil. ἃ. Gr. TIL. 1.
1638, 8. Similarly ix. 28: ἤτοι
ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον δρμᾷ ἢ τοῦ ὅλου διά-
voia, then be satisfied with it:
ἢ ἅπαξ ὅρμησε, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ κατ᾽

ἐπακολούθησιν. .. τὸ δὲ ὅλον,
εἴτε θεὸς, εὖ ἔχει πάντα εἴτε τὸ
εἰκῆ, μὴ καὶ σὺ εἰκῆ. Therefore,
Li, 11, διὸ δεῖ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου λέ-
yew τοῦτο μὲν παρὰ θεοῦ ἥκει.
τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ τὴν σύλληξιν καὶ
τὴν συμμηρυομένην σύγκλωσιν,
&c. The same distinction be-
tween indirect and direct di-
vine causation, between God
and destiny, we find Phil. ἃ, Gr.
IIT. i. 148, 2; 339, 1.

3 xii. 30; ix. 8; iv. 40; Phil.
ad. Gr. TIL. i. 200, 2; 140.

ὁ Ibid. ITT. 1.159, 2, 3; v.32:
τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον
καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος κατὰ
περιόδους τεταγμένας οἰκονομοῦντα
τὸ πᾶν.

5 iv. 40; Phil. d. Gr. IIL. i.
p. 140; 169, 1, 2.

281

CHAP,
TX.

Belief in
God.
Divine
order of
the uni-
VETSE.

ECLECTICISM.

sake of the rational.! Even that which seems to us

_ burdensome and purposeless has its good end for

the economy of the whole; even the evils which
seem to conflict with the divine goodness and
wisdom are in part merely the inevitable reverse side
of the good, and in part things by which the inner
nature and true happiness of man are untouched.?
And not content with recognising in the usual
course of things the traces of Divine Providence, An-
toninus, in the spirit of his school, does not deny
even the extraordinary revelations of God in dreamg
and auguries,? of which he believes himself to have
had experience ;# on the relation of these revela-
tions to the course and connection of nature® he
says, however, little as concerning the relation of
his gods to the popular deities ;® and in other pas-

1 Loe. cit. 170, 1; v. 16, 80
and elsewhere.

2 Phil. ἃ, Gr JIL i. p.174, 2;
175, 2; 176,3; 177,13; 178, 1,2;
li. 11: τοῖς μὲν κατ ἀλήθειαν
κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περιπίπτῃ ὃ ἄνθρω-
πος, ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο" τῶν
δὲ λοιπῶν εἴ τι κακὸν ἦν καὶ
τοῦτο ἂν προΐδοντο, ἵνα ἐπῇ
πάντη τὸ μὴ περιπίπτειν αὐτῷ" ὃ
δὲ χείρω μὴ ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπον, πῶς
ἂν τοῦτο βίον ἀνθρώπου χείρω
ποιήσειεν ; xii, 5, and elsewhere.

8 ix, 27. Even to the wicked
we must be friendly: καὶ of
θεοὶ δὲ παντοίως αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦσι,
δι’ ὀνείρων, διὰ μαντειῶν.

41, 17, where the βοηθήματα
δι’ ὀνείρων are mentioned which
were imparted to himself,
among other things, against
blood-spitting and giddiness.

5 Which had occupied the

old Stoics so greatly (Phil. ὦ.
Gy, 11. 1. 889 sg.). °

6 Marcus Aurelius always
speaks ina general manner of
the θεοὶ or the θεὸς, for whom
he often substitutes ‘Zeus’;
in regard to the popular deities
he doubtless followed, as Epic-
tetus did, the universal theories
of his school, but held to the
existing public worship the
more steadily, since for him as
head of the Roman state it was
a political necessity ; and thus
we can understand how Chris-
tianity appeared to him as re-
bellion against the laws of the
State, and the constancy of
the Christian martyrs as a
wanton defiance (@iA} παρά-
ταξις, ΧΙ. 3), which must be
crushed by severity. Under his
reign, as is well known, great

FUTURE EXISTENCE.

sages he altogether repudiates the superstition of
his age! The primal revelation of God he con-
siders to be the human spirit itself, as a part and
emanation of the Deity,—the demon within us,
on which alone our happiness and unhappiness
depends ; and this doctrine of the kinship of man
to God is the third of the points which determine
his view of the universe.2 He diverges, however,
from the Stoic doctrine of man’s existence after death
by the theory that the souls, some time after the se-
paration from the body, return into the world soul or

the Deity, as the body returns into the elements.®
The central point, however, of the philosophy of

persecutions of the Christians
took place (Zeller, Vort?. und
Abhandl. i. 106 sq¢q.)

1 ΤῊ i. 6, he says in praise of
Diognetus that he owes to him
τὸ ἀπιστητικὸν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Te-
ρατευομένων καὶ “γοήτων περὶ
ἐπῳδῶν καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων ἂπο-
πομπῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λεγομέ-
γοις.

2 Cf. on this subject, to
which he often recurs, the
quotations, Phil. ἃ. Gr. TIL. i.
p. 200, 2; 319, 2.

3 Marc. Aur. 11.17; ili. 3;1v.14,
21;v. 4, 18 ; vii. 32 ; vill. 25, 58.
The most striking of these pas-
sages isiv.21. As bodies which
are buried last for a time, but
then decay, οὕτως ai eis τὸν
αἰθέρα μεθιστάμεναι ψυχαὶ, ἐπὶ
ποσὸν συμμείνασαι, μεταβάλλουσι
καὶ χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται, eis
τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν Adyor
ἀναλαμβανόμεναι, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν
τρόπον χώραν ταῖς προσσυνοικιζο-
μέναις παρέχουσι. The same is

referred to in iv. 14: évuréorns
(Ξ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπέστηΞ) ὡς μέρος.
ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι
μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφήσῃ εἰς τὸν
λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν
κατὰ μεταβολήν; v. 13: ἐξ ai-
τιώδους καὶ ὑλικοῦ συνέστηκα:
οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὃν
φθαρήσεται ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
ὔντος ὑπέστη, &c. Cf. further
xii. 5; how is it consistent
with the divine justice that
even the most pious persons
die, in order not to return
(ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ ἀποθάνωσι μηκέτι
αὖθις γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ παν-
τελὲς ἀπεσβηκέναι)} to which
the answer is not that the pre-
supposition is false, but rather
τοῦτο δὲ εἴπερ καὶ οὕτως ἔχει, εὖ
ἴσθε ὅτι, εἰ ὡς (this is to be
omitted, or else to be replaced
by mws) ἑτέρως ἔχειν ἔδει, ἐποίη--
σαν ἄν. Also il. 17, end; v. 33;
villi. 18; ix. 32; x. 7, 31; xi.
3; xii. 1, 21, 31.

283

CHAP.
IX.

Kinship
of man to
God.

284

CHAP.
IX.

Lithies.

Man’s
nith-
drawal
into
himself.

ECLECTICISH.

Antoninus lies, as has been said, in the moral life of
mau, and here his likeness to Epictetus comes out most
strongly ; but the difference of their nationality and
social position made it inevitable that the Roman
emperor should display in his theory of the world a
stronger character and maintain the duties of the
individual towards society more emphatically than
the Phrygian freedman. For the rest, we find with
him also that the fundamental determinations of
his ethics are the dependence of man upon himself,
resignation to the will of God, and the warmest and
most boundless love of man.! ‘ Why dost thou dis-
turb thyself about others?’ he says to man; retire
into thyself; only within dost thou find rest and
wellbeing; reflect upon thyself; be careful of the
deemon within thee; loose thy true self from all
that clings to it in a merely external fashion ; con-
sider that nothing external can affect’ thy soul,
that it is merely thy presentations which trouble
thee, that nothing can injure thee if thou dost
not think it injures thee; consider that all is
changeable and futile, that only within thee streams

1 Mareus Aurelius himself
often brings forward these
virtues, sometimes all three,
sometimes only two of them, as
the chief point. So in the pas-
sage quoted sup. p.278,3; 270,1,
he mentions purity and freedom
of the inner life, and submis-
sion to the course of the uni-
verse, ili. 4; and together with
these a recollection of the kin-
ship of all men and the duty
of caring forall. The same is

in effect asserted in v. 33; the
essential thing is θεοὺς μὲν oé-
Bev καὶ εὐφημεῖν, ἀνθρώπους δὲ
εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι αὐτῶν
καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι (cf. p. 270, 6).
doa δὲ ἐκτὸς ὅρων τοῦ κρεαδίου
καὶ τοῦ πνευματίου, ταῦτα μεμ-
νῆσθαι μήτε σὰ ὄντα, μήτε ἐπὶ
σοί, But as he does not at-
tempt any systematic enume-
ration, we cannot expect any
consistency from him in this
respect.

PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.

an inexhaustible fountain of happiness, that the
passionless reason is the only citadel in which man
must take refuge if he would be invincible! His
rational activity is the only thing in which a being
endowed with reason has to seek his happiness and
his goods ;? everything else, all that does not stand
in connection with the moral constitution of man,
is neither a good nor an evil. He who confines
himself to his internal nature, and has freed him-
self from all things external, in him every wish and
every appetite is extinguished, he is every moment
satisfied with the present, he accommodates himself
with unconditional submission to the course of the
universe ; he believes that nothing happens except
the will of God; that that which advantages the
whole and lies in its nature must be the best for
him also; that nothing can happen to a man
which he cannot make into material for a rational
activity. For himself he knows no higher task
than to follow the law of the whole, to honour the
god in his bosom by strict morality, to fill his place®
at every moment as a man (and as a Roman, adds
the imperial philosopher), and to look forward to the
end of his life, be it sooner or later, with the serene

1 ἢ, 18; iii. 4, 12; iv. 3, 7, ip.177,2;178,1. Hence the
8, 18; v. 19, 34; vil. 28, 59; principle (x. 40; cf. v. 7) that

vili. 48 ; xii. 3 δέ passim. men should not ask external
2 Phil. d. Gr. 111. 1. p. 210, prosperity from God, but only
2,3; 212, 4. the disposition which neither
3 70. TI. i. 216,15; 218, 1; desires nor fears what is ex-
viii. 10; iv. 39. ternal.

4 χ 1; iii. 12; 11. 8,16; iv. 5 ii. 5, 6, 18, 16, 17; 111. 5,
23,49; vi. 45; x.6; vill. 7,35 16, &c.
et passim. Cf. Phil. d. Gr. 111,

Resigna-
tion to the
nill of
God.

Love to

aul men.

ECLECTICISM.

cheerfulness which is simply content with the
thought of that which is according to nature. But
how can man feel himself part of the world, and
subordinate himself to the law of the universe
without at the same time regarding himself as a
member of humanity and finding in work for hu-
manity his worthiest task ?? and how can he do this
if he does not bestow upon his more immediate
fatherland all the attention which his position
demands of him?* Not even the unworthy mem-
bers of human society are excluded by Antoninus
from his love. He reminds us that it befits man to
love even the weak and erring, to take interest even
in the ungrateful and hostile; he bids us consider
that all men are our kindred, that in all the same
divine spirit dwells; that we cannot expect to find
no wickedness in the world, but that even the
sinning sin only involuntarily and because they do
not perceive what is really best for them; that he
who does wrong harms only himself; our own
essential nature can be harmed by no action of
another’s wrongdoing; he requires, therefore, that
we should be hindered by nothing in doing good,
that we should either teach men or bear with them,
and instead of being angry or surprised at their
faults, should only compassionate and forgive them.+
We know how consistently Antoninus himself acted

1 For further details cf. Phil. φιλεῖν καὶ robs πταίοντας, &c.;

ὦ. Gr, III. i. Ὁ. 286, p. 801 sg. 1. 8. ο. 26; ἢ. 1, 16; 11. 11,
2 Ib. Ὁ. 297, 2, 3. &c.; lv. 3; v. 25; viii. 8, 14,
3. 7b. III. i. 297, 2, 3. 59; ix. 4, 42; xi. 18; xii. 12,
4 vil, 22: ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου τὸ et passim.

CHARACTER OF LATER STOICISM.

up to these precepts.! From his life, as from his
words, there comes to us a nobility of soul, a purity
of mind, a conscientiousness, a loyalty to duty,? a
mildness, a piety, and love of man which in that cen-
tury, and on the Roman imperial throne, we must
doubly admire. That the Stoic philosophy in times
of the deepest degradation of morals could form a
Musonius, an Epictetus, a Marcus Aurelius, will
always redound to its imperishable glory. But it
made no scientific progress through these men ; and
though the severity of the Stoic moral doctrine was
modified by them, though the feelings of benevo-
lence and self-sacrificing love to man attained with
them a strength and reality which we do not find in
the ancient Stoicism, yet this gain, great as it is in
itself, cannot compensate for the want of a more
methodical and exhaustive philosophic enquiry.

1 Zeller, Vorir. und Abhandl. mand for strict self-examina-

1. 96 90. ; 98 sg.; 101 sq.

2 As is seen, for example, in
his repeated expressions of dis-
satisfaction with himself (iv.
37; v.5; x. 8) and in his de-

tion.

8 In regard to the anthropo-
logy and theology of Marcus
Aurelius, something further
will be said later on.

CHAP,
xX.

B. The
Cynics.

ECLECTICISM,

CHAPTER X.
THE CYNICS OF THE IMPERIAL ERA.

From this later Stoicism the contemporary Cynicism
is only distinguished by the onesidedness and
thoroughness with which it followed the same
direction. Stoicism had originally formed itself out
of Cynicism, for the Cynic doctrine of the independ-
ence of the virtuous will had furnished the basis
of a more comprehensive and scientific view of
the world, and in consequence of this was itself
placed in a truer relation with the claims of
nature and of human life. If this theoretic basis
of morality were neglected, Stoicism reverted to
the standpoint of Cynicism, the individual was
restricted for his moral activity to himself and his
personal endeavour after virtue: instead of creating
the rules of his conduct from his knowledge of the
nature of things and of men, he was obliged to resort
to his immediate consciousness, his personal tact
and moral impulse; philosophy, instead of a science,
and a rule of life founded upon science, became a
mere determination of character, if not an entirely
external form, and it was inevitable that in this one-
sided subjective acceptation it should not seldom be

LATER CYNICS.

at strife with general custom and even with legiti-
mate moral claims. We may observe this tendency
of Stoicism towards Cynicism in the later Stoics,
especially in Musonius and Epictetus; indeed, the
latter expressly designates and describes the true
philosopher as a Cynic. On the same road we also
encounter the school of the Sextii, though these,
so far as we know, did not call themselves Cynics;
and it is undeniable. that the conditions which dis-
tinguish the last century of the Roman Republic
and the first of the Imperial Government—the
universal immorality and luxury, and the pressure
weighing upon all—gave a sufficient opening for
meeting the distress and corruption of the time in
the same way as had been done under analogous but
much more mitigated circumstances by Diogenes
and Crates.’ Soon after the beginning of the
Christian era we again hear of the Cynics, and
under that. name is united a numerous host, partly
of genuine, partly of merely nominal philosophers,
who, with open contempt for all purely scientific
activity, set before them as their only task the
liberation of man from unnecessary wants, idle
endeavours, and disturbing mental emotions; who
herein far more than the Stoics set themselves
definitely in opposition, even by their dress and
mode of life, to the mass of men and their customs,
and came forward as professed preachers of morals
and moral overseers over the rest. That under this
mask a number of impure elements were hidden,
1 Cf. Bernays, Lucian und die Kyniker, 27 sq.
U

Rerival of
Cynicism
soon after
the be-
ginning of
the Chris-
tian era.

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.

that a great part, perhaps the greater part, of these
ancient mendicant monks, through their obtrusive-
ness, shamelessness, and charlatanism, through their
coarse and rude behaviour, through their extortions
and impositions, and, despite their beggarly life, even
through their covetousness, brought the name of
philosophy into contempt, is undeniable, and may be

Tis adhe- yyroved from Lucian alone;! but we shall find that the
new Cynical school, like its predecessor, had never-

φ θη 28.

theless a nucleus worthy of esteem.

But even the

better Cynics are of little importance in a scientific

point of view.

1 Hg. De morte Peregrini;
Piscat. 44 sq. 48; Symp.11 sq.;
Fugit. 16; also Migr. 24. Simi-
lar complaints had been raised
by others. Seneca warns his
Lucilius ὗν. 5, 1) against the
strange manner of life of those
gui non proficere sed conspict
cupiunt, against the cultus as-
per, the intonsum caput, the
negligentior barba, the indictum
argento odium, the cubile humi
positum, et quicquid aliud am-
bitio perversa via sequitur, all
traits of the new Cynicism;
and there is also reference to
it, no doubt, in Hy. 14, 14 (cf.
103, 5): non conturbabit sapiens
publicos mores nec populum in
se vite novitate convertet. Hpic-
tetus also (ill. 22, 50) sharply
discriminates between the in-
ner freedom and the outer
moral qualities of the true
Cynic; and that which many
substitute for these: πηρίδιον
καὶ ξύλον καὶ γνάθοι μεγάλαι:
καταφαγεῖν πᾶν ὃ ἐὰν δῷς, ἢ ἀπο-
θησαυρίσαι, ἢ τοῖς ἀπαντῶσι λοι-

δορεῖν ἀκαίρως, ἢ καλὸν τὸν ὦμον
δεικνύειν, ὅχε.; and about the
same period Dio Chrysost. (Or.
34, Ὁ. 33 RB.) says, with refe-

. rence to the philosophic dress,

he knows well that those who
are seen in it call themselves
Cynics and regard themselves
as μαινομένους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους
καὶ ταλαιπώρους, The com-
plaints of Lucian are echoed
by his contemporary Aristides,
the rhetorician (De Quatuore.
p- 397 sgqg.; Dind. cf. Bernays,
Lucian und die ἄγη. p. 38,

100 sgq.). From these passages,

to which may be added Lucian,
Dial. Mort. 1, 1, 2; Galen,
Dign. An. Peee. 8, vol. v. 71,
wesee also wherein the external
tokens of the Cynic life con-
sisted: in the mantle, often very
ragged, worn by these philoso-
phers, the uncut beard and
hair, the staff and wallet, and
the whole rough mendicant
life, the ideals of which were
a Crates and a Diogenes.

DEMETRIUS.

The first philosophers who assumed the Cynics’
name and mode of life are to be met with about the
middle, and before the middle, of the first Christian Deme-
century,' and the most prominent man of the school
at this date appears to have been Demetrius, the friend

of Seneca and of Thrasea Petus.?

1 Cicero always treats Cynic-
ism as a phenomenon belonging
to the past; yet the passage in
Off. i. 41, 148 (Cynicorum vero
ratio tota est ejiciendu; est
enim inimica verecunadie) seems
to be aimed against panegy-
rists of the Cynic life. Some-
what later Brutus (Plut. Brut.
34) names M. Favonius (who
is mentioned, sup. p. 74, foot,
among the Stoics) with expres-
sions descriptive of the Cynics
(ἁπλοκύων and ψευδοκύων), but
we cannot certainly infer from
this that there was a Cynic
school. Under Augustus is said
to have lived that Menippus
who plays so great a part in
Lucian (Schol. in Luc. Piscat.
26; iv. 97 Jac.), and he is also
said to have been identical
with Menippus the Lycian,
whose adventures witha Lamia
are related by Philostratus
(Apoill. iv. 25), while at the
same time he calls him a dis-
ciple of Demetrius the Cynic
(Ibid. iv. 39; v. 43). Of these
‘statements not only is the
second manifestly false (irre-
spective of the Lamia); for
Demetrius did not live in the
reign of Augustus, even sup-
posing that he had a disciple
called Demetrius; but the first
is also untrue, though it was
formerly universally accepted.

Greatly, how-

The Menippus to whom Lucian
in the Icaromenippus and a
great portion of the Dialogues
of the Dead has given the chief
roles, is unmistakably the
Cynic of the third century
B.c., famous for his Satires,
who had already written a
Νέκυια (Diog. vi. 101); Lucian
(Aceus. 33) also calls him Μεν-
ἱππός TIS τῶν παλαιῶν κυνῶν
μάλα ὑλακτικὸς ; treats him as
a contemporary of the events
of the third century (learomen.
15), and mentions his having
killed himself (Dial. Mort. 10,
11), cf. Part Il. a; 246, 3.
The supposed contemporary of
Augustus seems to have arisen
out of an arbitrary combina-
tion of this Menippus with
the Menippus of Philostratus,
who was, moreover, assigned
much too early a date. The
first Cynics capable of histori-
cal proof will be named in the
following note.

2 This contemporary of Se-
neca, who often mentions him,
was, according to Benef. vii.
11, already in Rome under
Caligula, and was offered by
the Emperor a gift of 200,000
sesterces, which, however, he

declined. We find him in Rome

under Nero (Sen. Benef. vii.
1,3; 8,2; &p. 67,14; 91, 19).
The utterances of Seneca on

v2

291

CHAP,
X.

EVEUE.

ECLECTICISM.

ever, as this philosopher is admired by Seneca,’ and
advantageously as his freedom from wants contrasts

his poverty and his manner of
life ( Vit. Beat. 183) date from
this time (hoc pauperiorem
guam ceteros Cynicos, quod, cum
οὐδὲ interdixerit habere, inter-
dixit et poscere), Ep. 20, 9 (ego
certe aliter audio, que dictt
Demetrius noster, cum tllum
vidi nudum, quanto minus,
guam in stramentis, incuban-
tem), Hp. 62, 8 (he lives, non
tamquam contempserit omnia,
sed tamquam aliis habenda per-
miserit), also the word of Epic-
tetus (Diss. i. 25, 22), and the
anecdote in Lucian, Saltator,
63. When Thrasea Peetus was
put to death (67 A.D.), whose
intimate friend he was, he
raised his voice in opposition
(Tac. Ann. xvi. 34 sg.), and
still more to his own disadvan-
tage, after the accession of
Vespasian undertook the de-
fence of Egnatius Celer (Tac.
Hist. iv. 40; cf. Asn. xvi. 32).
On account of his injurious
expressions concerning Ves-
pasian he was banished (71
A.D.) to an island, but his con-
tinued insults were not further
punished (Dio Cass. Ixvi. 13;
Sueton. Vesy. 13). In Lucian,
Adv. Ind. 19, he appears in
Corinth ; in Philostratus, Apoll.
iv. 25; v. 19, we meet with
him in the reign of Nero at
Athens and Corinth; subse-
quently he was recommended
by Apollonius of Tyana to
Titus (vi. 31), and in the reign
of Domitian was still in the
company of that necromancer
(vii. 42; vili.10 sgq.); but these
statements are untrustworthy.
Heis described by most of those

who mention him, as a Cynic.
Nothing is known as to any
writings left by him. Accord-
ing to Eunap. V. Soph. Procm.
p. 6, Musonius and Carneades
were, aS well as Menippus,
contemporary with Demetrius.
Two of these names, however
(Menippus and Musonius), he
doubtless merely takes from
Philostratus (vide sup. pp. 291,
1; 246, 3), and we know not
how much of what Philostratus
says has any historical founda-
tion; as to Carneades we can
form no judgment, as he is
mentioned nowhere else. But
that there were other Cynics
in Rome at the time of De-
metrius is plain from the fore-
going statements, and the
quotations (p. 290, 1) from
Seneca. One of these Cynics,
by name Isodorus, who on ac-
count of his biting words had
been exiled by Nero from
Italy, is mentioned by Sueton.
(Nero, 39).

1 Benef. vii. 1, 3, he calls
him: Vir meo judicio magnus
etiamsi maximis comparetur ;
and in J. ¢. 8, 2, hesays of him:
Quem miht videtur rerum na-
tura nostris tulisse temporibus,
ut ostenderet, nec illum a nobis
corrumpi nec nos ab illo corrigt
posse, virum exacte, licet neget
ipse, sapientia, &c. Cf. Hp. 62.
According to Philostr. poll. iv.
25, Favorinus had also greatly
praised him. He appears in a
less brilliant light in what
has just been quoted from
Tacitus, Dio Cassius, and Sue-
tonius.

DEMETRIUS.

with the luxury of the Roman world, his philosophic
value cannot be estimated very highly. At any
rate, there have come down to us no remarkable
thoughts of his, and the meagreness of the tradition
renders it probable that none of any importance
were known. He recommends his scholars not to
trouble themselves with much knowledge, but to
exercise themselves in a few rulesof life for practical
use ;! he appeals with impressive eloquence to their
moral consciousness ;? he expresses with cynical
rudeness his contemptuous opinion of others;? he
opposes himself with bitter scorn to the threats of
the despot ;* he welcomes outward misfortunes as
a means of moral training, and resigns himself
willingly and joyfully to the will of God.’ In all
this there is nothing that a Stoic might not also
have said ; and even his light estimation of learning
and knowledge Demetrius shares, at any rate, with
the Stoicism of his time. The peculiarity of his
Cynicism therefore lies only in the severity with
which he stamps his principles on his life.

1 Sen. Benef. vii. 1, 3 s¢.
What follows, however, from
§ 5 onwards, is, as well as c. 9,
10, Seneca’s own dissertation.

2 In J. 6. 8, 2: He was elo-
gquentia ejus, que res fortissimas
deceat, non concinnate nec in
werba sollicite@, sed wmgenti
animo, prow: inpetus tulit, res
suas prosequentis.

8 Cf. Lucian, Adv. Indoct. 19,
where he takes the book out of
the hand of a bad reader, and
tears it in pieces. Further, his

previously mentioned utter-

ances concerning Vespasian,
and Sen. Hp. 91, 9, who quotes
from him: Lodem loco sibi esse
voces imperizorum, quo ventre
redditos crepitus. ‘ Quid enim,
inguit, mea refert, sursum isti
an deorsum sonent ?’ If Seneca
applies the word eleganter to
these words, this is a matter
of taste.

4 In Epikt. Diss. 1, 25, 22, he
says to Nero: ἄπειλεῖς μοι θάνα-
τον, σοὶ 8 ἢ φύσις.

5 Sen. Provid. 3, 3; 5; 5;
Lip. 67, 14.

294

CHAP.
X.

(Enomaus
of Ga-

dara.

ECLECTICISM.

Of the Cynics of the period immediately follow-
ing,'! some details have come down to us respecting
(Enomaus of Gadara, who is said to have lived under

1 Besides the Cynics men-
tioned supra, p. 291, 2, the fol-
lowing names are connected
with this school, of which, how-
ever, our knowledge is very im-
perfect. Under Vespasian lived
Diogenes and Heras, of
whom, on account of their
abuse of the imperial family,
the former was scourged and
the latter beheaded (Dio Cass.
Ixvi. 15); and probably also
Hostilius (ὦ. 6. 13), who was
banished with Demetrius.
Under Domitian or Trajan we
must place Didymus with
the surname of Planetiades (if
he was an historical person), in
whose mouth Plutarch, De Def.
Orac. c. 7, 418, puts a sarcasm
against the oracle; under Ha-
drian, besides Hnomaus (vide
infra), perhaps that Deme-
trius of whom it is related
(Lucian, Tox, 27 sqq.) that he
came to Alexandria to devote
himself under the guidance of
a certain Rhodius (or of a
Rhodian ?) to the Cynic philo-
sophy, that he tended his
unjustly-accused friend Anti-
philus with the greatest self-
denial in prison, and finally ac-
cused himself in order to share
his fate. When their inno-
cence was brought to light he
gave over tohis friend the con-
siderable compensation which
he received, and himself went
to India to the Brahmans. The
historical truth of this occur-
rence, however, is as little cer-
tain as the authenticity of the
treatise which affirms it; and

even were it otherwise, the
time when Demetrius lived
can only be approximately con-
cluded from c. 34. Agatho-
bulus in Egypt (Lucian, De-
mon. 3; Peregrin. 17) must
also be counted among the
Cynics of this period. Under
Antoninus Pius and his suc.
cessor lived Demonax, Pere-
grinus, and his pupil Thea-
genes, of whom we = shall
speak later on; also Honora-
tus (Luc. Demon. 19, where it
is related of him that he was
clothed in a bearskin, and that
Demonax, therefore, called him
᾿Αρκεσίλαος) and Herophilus
(Learomen. 16) seem to be his-
torical persons, Crato, on the
contrary (Luc. De Saltat.i.sqq.)
imaginary. To the period of
Antoninus likewise belongs
Pancratius, who lived in
Athens and in Corinth (Phi-
lostr. V. Soph. i. 23, 1), and
Crescens, the accuser of Jus-
tin the Martyr (Justin. Apol.
ii. 3; Tatian, Adv. Gent. 19;
Kus. Hist. Heel. iv. 16, &c.);
to the period of Severus, An-
tiochus, the: Cilician, whom
that emperor esteemed because
he set his soldiers an example
of endurance (Dio Cass. lxxvii.
19; cf. Bernays, Lucian und
die Kyn. 30). After this time
there is a gap in our knowledge
of the Cynic philosophers ex-
tending over a hundred and
fifty years, but the continuance
of the school is beyond question.
When Asclepiades lived,
who, according to Tertullian,

GNOMA US.

the reign of Hadrian.! Julian reproaches him for

destroying in his writings the fear of the gods, for _

despising human reason, and trampling under foot?
all laws, human and divine ; his tragedies, he says,
are beyond all description shameful and prepos-
terous;% and if in this verdict the horror of the
“pious emperor for the despiser of the popular
religion has perhaps no small share, we must still
suppose that Ginomaus must have departed in a
striking manner from the prevailing customs and
mode of thought. In the lengthy fragments from
his treatise against the ‘ Jugglers,’* which Eusebius
has preserved for us,° we find a polemic as violent as
it is outspoken against the heathen oracles, in the

295

CHAP.
X.

Ad Nat. ii. 14, travelled through
distant lands with a cow; or
Sphodrias, who is quoted by
Athen. iv. 162 ὁ, with a τέχνη
ἐρωτική ; or the Cynics named
ap. Phot. Cod. 167, Ὁ. 114, 6 23,
among the authorities of Sto-
beus—viz., Hegesianax, Po-
lyzelus, Xanthippus,
Theomnestus—we do not
know.

1 He is placed in that period
by Syncellus, p. 349 B. The
statement of Suidas, Οἰνόμ. that
he was a little older than Por-
phyry, is perhaps inferred from
the circumstance that Eusebius
(with whose more definite ac-
count, however, Syncellus was
acquainted) Prep. Hv. v. 19
sqq., discusses him immediately
before Porphyry, and calls him
(c. 18, 3) τὶς τῶν νέων.

2 Orat. vii. Ὁ. 209 B. Spanh.
ef. vi. 199 A.

3 Loc. cit. Ὁ. 210 Ὁ. When
Suidas, Διογένης ἢ Οἰνόμ. calls
GEnomaus a writer of tragedies,
whose name was also Diogenes,
and who lived in Athens after
the fall of the Thirty Tyrants,
this statement seems to be
founded on a confused recol-
lection of this passage, where
tragedies are mentioned, dedi-
cated to Diogenes or to his
disciple Philistus (Philiscus,
ef. vol. li. a, 244, 2), and
then tragedies of Ginomaus are
spoken of.

4 The title of this book runs
thus, according to Eus. Prep.
Ew. v. 18, 3; 21, 4; vi 6, 52;
Theod. Cur. Gree. Affect. (par.
1642) vi. p. 561: γοήτων φωρὰ,
named less accurately by Julian
vii. 209, B: τὸ κατὰ χρηστηρίων.

5 Prep. Evang. v. c. 19-36,
vi. 6.

“Demonax.

ECLECTICISM.

spirit of cynical freethinking ;' but it is based on no
properly philosophic arguments; and in connection
with it G@nomaus likewise turns against the fatalism
of the Stoics, and exalts in its stead free-will as the
rudder and foundation of human life, declaring it to
be as much an incontrovertible fact of consciousness
as our existence itself, and expounding the irrecon-
cilability of foreknowledge with freedom, and of
fatality with moral responsibility.2 In these utter-
ances we recognise the self-dependence of the man
who, in spite of his Cynicism, would be a follower
neither of Antisthenes nor of Diogenes;* but he
was doubtless neither inclined nor adapted for any

deeper study of philosophic questions.
The famous Demonax‘ also, who was highly
esteemed in Athens, and extolled in a treatise

1 Expressions entirely similar
are put into the mouth of the
representative of Cynicism by
Plutarch, Def. Orac. 7, Ὁ. 418.
Moreover, cf.in7ra, p. 298, 3,and
Phil. ἃ. Gr. TI. i. 280 sqq.; Ber-
nays, 2. 6. 30 507.

2 Loe. cit. vi. 7, 11 sq. (The-
doret, 1, ¢.) with the proposi-
tion: ἰδοὺ yap, ᾧ τρόπῳ ἡμῶν
αὐτῶν ἀντειλήμμεθα, τούτῳ καὶ
τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐθαιρέτων καὶ βιαίων.
But of self-consciousness it was
previously said: οὐκ ἄλλο ἱκανὸν
οὕτως ὡς ἢ συναίσθησίς re καὶ
ἀντίληψις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

8. Julian, Orat. vi. Ὁ. 187 C:
ὃ κυνισμὸς οὔτε ᾿Αντισθενισμός
ἐστιν οὔτε Διογενισμός,

* Born in Cyprus οὗ a good
family, Demonax (according to

c. 8) had enjoyed the instruc-
tions of the Cynics Agathobulus
and Demetrius (supra, p. 291 ;
294,1) and of the Stoics Epic-
tetus and Timocrates (supra, pp.
197, 256); he afterwards lived
in Athens, and died there when
almost a century old, having
starved himself to death on
account of the advancing weak-
ness of old age (2, 6. c. 63 8qq.),
but as he still had intercourse
with Herodes Atticus (c. 24, 33)
in this latter period, he may,
perhaps, have lived till160 a.p.,
or even longer. The treatise
said to be by Lucian shows (as
Bernays, 2. ¢., remarks), by the
way in which Herodes is alluded
to, that it was not written till
after his death 176 A.D.

DEMONAX.

bearing Lucian’s name,! is much more distinguished
by his character than by his science.2 From (E£no-
maus he differs chiefly in that he tried to mitigate
the severities of the Cynic mode of thought, and to
reconcile it with life and its necessities; in other
respects he is considerably in harmony with it. As
GEnomaus had neither held strictly to a definite
system nor troubled himself at all about any scien-
tific knowledge, so Demonax, according to the
assurance of his biographer,’ carried his eclecticism
to such an extent that it is difficult to say which
of his philosophical predecessors he preferred.
He himself, to all outward appearance, proclaimed
himself a Cynic, without, however, approving of the
exaggerations of the party; but in his own charac-
ter he chose for a model the mild, benevolent,
and moderate temper of Socrates,‘ and was large-
hearted enough to esteem Aristippus side by side
with Socrates and Diogenes.® His principal efforts
were directed to the liberation of mankind from
all things external: for the man who is free, said

he, alone is happy; and

1 Bekker has denied that it
is Lucian’s, and Bernays (Lu-
cian und die Kyn. 104 sg.) has
defended this opinion with very
importantarguments. But that
its author, who nowhere gives
himself out to be Lucian, was
really a contemporary of his
hero, and had intercourse with
him for many years (ἐπὶ μήκισ-
Tov συνεγενόμην, c. 1), we have
no reason to doubt, nor is there
any internal reason in his work

he only is free who hopes

for suspicion as to its credi-
bility.

3 Concerning his gentle, hu-
mane, and amiable character,
his imperturbable cheerfulness,
his efforts for the moral welfare
of those around him, and the
extraordinary veneration he
thereby acquired, cf. Lucian,
ὦ, ¢. 6. 5-11; 57; 63; 67.

= Demon. 5.

* Loe, ctt. 5-9; cf. 19; 21;
48; 52. 5 Loe. cit. 62.

297

CHAP.

ECLECTICISM.

nothing and fears nothing, being convinced of the
transitoriness and paltriness of all men.’ In order
to resign nothing of this independence he abstained
from marriage ;? but he seems to have specially
included in it, in the true spirit of Cynicism, freedom
from the prejudices of the popular religion ; he him-
self was indicted because he never offered sacrifices,
and despised the Eleusinian mysteries, and he con-
ceals neither in his defence nor elsewhere his low
opinion of the existing worship.? In his suicide and
his indifference to burial,* we recognise the disciple
of Antisthenes and Zeno; and though the departure
from this life, according to the Stoic doctrine, must
open an entrance to a higher life, Demonax, like
Panztius and Epictetus, disclaimed this view.® As
to any scientific enquiry, however, we hear as little
on this point as on any other. The philosopher
considers his task to be solely the exercise of

1 Lucian, Demon. 20 ; cf.c.4:
τὸ ὅλον ἐμεμελήκει αὑτῷ μηδενὸς
ἄλλου προσδεᾷᾶ εἶναι. ;

2 Cf. the anecdote quoted
supra, Ὁ. 274, 1.

8 Loe. cit. 11. To the com-
plaint that he did not sacrifice
to Athena he replied he had
hitherto refrained, οὐδὲ γὰρ
δεῖσθαι αὐτὴν τῶν παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ
θυσιῶν ὕπελάμβανον ; and when
censured in respect to the
mysteries, he said that he did
not get himself initiated, be-
cause it would be impossible
for him not to speak to the
uninitiated about them; in
order, if the mysteries were
bad, to warn them against
them, and if they were good, to

make them acquainted with
them. In c. 27 he refused to
enter a temple to pray; for
God, he said, could hear him
just as well in any other place ;
and in ὁ. 37 he confounded a
soothsayer with the dilemma:
either he must believe himself
to have the power of altering
the decrees of fate, or his art
was worthless.

4 Loe. cit. 65 sq.

5 Loc. cit. α. 82: ἄλλου δέ ποτε
ἐρομένου, εἰ ἀθάνατος αὐτῷ 7
ψυχὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι; ἀθάνατος, ἔφη,
ἀλλ᾽ as πάντα, ΟἿ, ο. 8, where
he says that in a word, λήθη τις
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἐλευθερία
μακρὰ πάντας ἐν ὀλίγῳ κατα-
λήψεται.

PEREGRINTS.

practical influence on those around him, and the
means to this end is with him, as with Diogenes,
not so much instruction as counsel, and before all
things, ready and trenchant wit, the old weapon of
the Cynics, which he in most cases employed very
skilfully. Cynicism appears, indeed, in his person
in its most interesting and attractive shape, but
still with essentially the same features which have
already been long familiar to us.

In contradistinction to this ideal picture we find
a caricature in Lucian’s description of Peregrinus,!
who bears the cognomen of Proteus.? According to
him, this Cynic escaped from a reckless and profli-
gate youth first to Christianity and then to Cyni-
cism, the most absurd and disgusting excesses of
which he adopted, until at last the wish of making
himself talked about induced him, half against his
will and in constant struggle with the fear of death,
to throw himself into the flames of a funeral pyre

1 ΤΙ, τῆς Περεγρίνου τελευτῆς.
Of modern writers concerning
Peregrinus and the literature
relating to him, cf. Eckstein,
Eneyklop. v. Ersch. u. Gruber,
sect. ili. vol. xvi. sub voce;
Zeller, Vortr. u. Abhandl. ii.
173 sq.; Bernays, Lue. u. a.
Kyniker, 21, and 2, ¢., Ὁ. 65, the
translation and commentary of
the treatise bearing the name
of Lucian.

2 He first received this name,
according to Gellius, Δ A. xi.
11, 1, after the time when that
author made his acquaintance ;
what it means we are not told.
_ 5 Further details will be

found in the treatise of Zelle
already quoted. In that of
Lucian, vide, concerning the
excesses imputed to hin, c. 9;
the murder of his father, of
which he is accused, c. 10, 14
sq.; his relation to the Chris-
tians, and the imprisonment
which he suffered in conse-
quence, c. 11-14; his intro-
duction through Agathobulus
to the Cynic philosophy (supra,
p. 294, 1); his arrival in Italy,
c. 18; his burning himself to
death (which is also mentioned
in Athenay. Suppl. 23; Tert.
Ad Mart. 4; Philostr. V. Sopa.
ii. 1, 33), 6. 20 sgg. Some few

Peregri-
nus.

ἘΟΓΕΟΤΙΟΙΘΗ.

at the Olympic games in the year 165 4.0. But
the most serious of these charges are too insuffi-
ciently attested! by Lucian’s testimony, the uncer-
tainty of which he himself cannot entirely conceal,
to allow of our unconditionally endorsing his judg-
ment of Peregrinus. If we separate from his
account all that is internally improbable, this Cynic
appears as a man who was sincere in his endeavours
after virtue and austerity, but was, at the same
time, always exaggerating and pushing forward his
principles to an absurd extreme,’ finally investing
even suicide—in regard to which he has so manyallies
in the Stoic and Cynic school—with theatrical pomp,
in order to produce the most striking effect possible.*
There is other evidence to show that he asserted the
claims of his school with some exaggeration ;* but
Gellius praises the earnestness and steadiness of his
character,> and the value and usefulness of his

years after his death, previous
to the year 180 8.¢., Athenagoras
(1. c.), in agreement with Luc.
c. 27 sqq. 41, speaks of an oracu-
lar statue of Peregrinus which
stood in the market-place of
his native city.

1 Cf. Zeller, Vortr. ii. 175 sg.;
Bernays, 52 sqq.

2 Tf he was thrown as a
Christian into prison while his
fellow-Christians remained un-
molested, he must have given
occasion to this by his beha-
viour; he was banished from
Ttaly on account of his abuse
of the Emperor; in Greece,
besides his quarrels with the
Hleans and his attacks (also

‘mentioned by Philostratus, V.

Soph. ii. 1, 33) on Herodes

Atticus, he is said to have tried
to raise an insurrection against
the Romans (Luc. 18 sq¢.).

8 The fact of this suicide
(which has been disputed by
A. Planck, Theol. Stud. in Krit.
1811, 834 sg., 843; and Baur,
Kirchengesch, ii. 412), accord-
ing to all the above quotations,
is beyond a doubt.

4 Luc. Demon. When Pere-
grinus said to Demonax, on
account of his cheerfulness :
ov xuvés, the latter replied, Περε-
ypive, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίζεις.

5 He calls him (ὦ. 4.) vir
gravis et constans, whom he
often visited in his hut before
the city, and whose lectures he
attended.

THEAGENES.

doctrines,! and quotes a discourse of his, in which he
says that a man should not avoid wickedness through
fear of punishment, but from love to the good; and
the wise man would do this even though his action
remained hidden from gods and men; but he who
has not made so much progress in morals may still
be restrained from wickedness by the thought that
all wrong-doing comes to light in the end. We are
acquainted, however, with no scientific achievement
either of Peregrinus or his scholar Theagenes,? or,
indeed, of any of these later Cynics.

But for the very reason that this Cynicism was
far more a mode of life than a scientific conviction,
it was able to outlast the vicissitudes of the philo-
sophic systems, and to maintain itself down to the
latest periods of Greek philosophy. Even in the
second half of the fourth century the Emperor
Julian found occasion for those two discourses
against the Cynics, which give us a picture so un-
favourable, but at the same time probably not
essentially untrue, of this school at that time.3

1 Loc. cit.: Multa hercle di-
cere ewm utiliter et honeste au-
divimus. Of.the same authority
for what follows.

2 This Cynic, whom Lucian
(c. 8 sqq.3 7; 24; 30 8g.; 36)
treats with the greatest ma-
lignity, is described by Galen,
Meth. Med. xiii. 15, vol. x. 909
K. (as Bernays, Ὁ. 14 sgg., has
shown) as a philosopher of
repute (διὰ τὴν δόξαν τἀνθρώπου)
who gave lectures daily in Rome
in the Gymnasium of Trajan.

3 Or. vi.: εἰς τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους

κύνας. Or. vii. : πρὸς Ἡράκλειον
Κυνικὸν, πῶς κυνιστέον. For
example, cf. Or. vii. 204, C. 47.,
223 Bsgqg. Julian (p. 224 C.)
mentions, besides Heraclins, as
Cynics of his time, Asclepiades,
Serenianus; and Chytron. In
Or. vii. 198 a, he mentions
Iphicles of Epirus, whose free-
spoken notions expressed before
the Emperor Valentinian in the
year 375 are related by Am-
mian. Marc. xxx. 5,8. A Cynic
named Demetrius Chytras, who,
in extreme old age, was tor-

Theagenes.

The later
Cynics.

ECLECTICISM.

Further traces of the recognition which Cynicism
still found in this period are to be met with both in

heathen and Christian authors.!

About the begin-

ning of the fifth century, Augustine tells us that all
the schools of philosophy, except the Cynic, Peripa-
tetic, and Platonic, had died out ;? and even in the
first decade of the sixth century we find in Athens
a Cynic ascetic, Sallustius.2 With the overthrow of
heathenism this school, as such, naturally came to

tured under Constantius on a
political and religious charge,
but was finally set free, is men-
tioned by Ammian. xix. 12, 12;
another in Julian’s time is
spoken of anonymously by
David, Schol. in Ar. 14 a, 18.

1 Bernays, J. δ. p. 37, 99 s¢.,
alludes in this connection to
the panegyric which Themis-
tius pronounced on Cynicism
and its founders in his dis-
course on Virtue, especially pp.
444, 417 (preserved in the
Syrian language, and translated
into German by Gildemeister
and Bticheler in the Rhein.
Mus. vol. xxvii.); also the
Violent attack of Chrysostom
(Homil.17,¢c.2; Chrys. Opp. ed.
Migne, ii. 173) upon the phi-
losophers (clearly described as
Cynics) who left Antioch on
the approach of danger, but
who enjoyed, it would appear,
a certain degree of reputation
among the inhabitants of that
city.

2 Cicero, Acad. ili. 19, 42:
dtague nune philosophos non
Sere videmus, nisi aut Cynicos

aut Peripateticos aut Platoni-
cos. Et Cynicos quidem, quia
6058 vite quedam delectat liber-
tas atque licentia. Later on,
Civ. D. xix. 19, he remarks that
if a philosopher goes over to
Christianity it is not required
that he should change his dress;
the Church does not trouble
itself about the Cynic garb. An
example of an Egyptian Cynic,
Maximus by name, who be-
came a Christian in 370 A.D.,
and retained his dress a long
time, is quoted by Bernays,
i. ¢., from Tillemont, ALémoires,
ix. 2, 796 sqq.

8 Damase. V. Lsidori, 89-92,
250; and at greater length
Suidas (swb voce), who has
taken the first of his articles,
and probably also the second,
from Damascius. That Sallus-
tius, as is here observed, ex-
aggerated the Cynic severity as
well as the παίζειν ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιότε-
ρον, is confirmed by Simplicius,
in Lpict. Man. p. 90 H; accord-
ing to whom he laid burning
coals upon his leg to see how
long he could endure it.

DISAPPEARANCE OF CYNICISM.

an end; the only element which was peculiar to it,
the Cynic mode of life, the Christian Church had
long since appropriated in Monachism.!

1 Julian, Ζ. 6. 224 A, already ἀποτακτισταὶ (= qui seculo re-
compares the Cynics with the »yxnriareranty af the Chrictians

303

CHAP.

804

CHAP.
XL.

C. The

Peripa-
tetics of

ECLECTICISM,

CHAPTER XI.

THE PERIPATETICS OF THE FIRST CENTURIES AFTER
CHRIST.

Tur direction taken by the Peripatetic school in

-the first century before Christ was maintained by it
during the whole of its further existence.’

Those

members of it with whom we are acquainted,?

1 In regard to what follows,
ef. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. 111. 458 s¢q.;
Harl.; Brandis and Zumpt in
the treatises mentioned supra,
p. 112, 1; Prantl, Gesch. der
Logik, 545 sqq.

2 Our knowledge of the Peri-
patetic school in this period is
very imperfect. According to
the writers named supra, pp. 113
sgq., we find, about the middle
of the first Christian century,
Alexander of Aigx, the in-
structor of Nero (Suid. ᾿Αλεξ.
Aly.), from whom Simplicius,
Categ. 3, a (Schol. in Arist. 29,
a, 40) quotes observations out
of a commentary on the Cate-
gories, and Alex. Aphr. ap.
Simpl. De Calo, Schol. 494, ὃ,
28, from a commentary on the
Books of the Heavens. (Kars-
ten, 194, a, 6, here substitutes
Aspasius for Alexander, whether
by his own conjecture, or ac-
cording to manuscripts, does
not appear.) Ideler, Arist. Me-

teorol, i. Xvi. sqq., believes we
should perhaps attribute to
Alexander the commentary on
the Meteorology, which has been
handed down under the name of
Alexander of Aphrodisias; and
he seems to suppose that the
Sosigenes whom Alexander men-
tions as his teacher is the
famous astronomer of the time
of Cesar. We shall, however,
find that Alexander the Aphro-
disian had a Sosigenes for his
teacher. Towards the end of
the same century we encounter
(ap. Plut. Qu. Conviv. ix. 6;
14, 5) a Peripatetic named
Menephylus, perhaps the
head of the school in Athens,
and ibid. Frat. Am. 16, Ὁ. 487,
Apollonius the Peripatetic,
one of the ‘later philosophers,’
who was praised for having as-
sisted his brother Sotion to
attain greater honour than
himself. This may, perhaps,
be Apollonius the Alexandrian,

PERIPATETICS OF THE EMPIRE. 305
so far as we have any details concerning their Cap.
writings, are mostly mentioned in connection with a

the first

from whom Simplicius,in Categ. taught, as Galen (De Cogn. an. centuries

Sehol. in Arist. 68, ὃ, 3, quotes
a treatise on the Categories.
Sotion, another Peripatetic,
has already come before us in
Phil. d. Gr ΤΙ.1ϊ. 931, 3 (vide sup,
181, 2), as author of the Κέρας
᾿Αμαλθείας. This man I have
there conjectured to be the
same from whom Alex. Aphr.
Top. 213, apparently out of a
commentary on the Zopica, and
Simpl. Categ. 41, y, Sehol. in
Ar. 61, a, 22, from a commentary
on the Categories, quotes one or
two unimportant and erroneous
observations. His compila-
tion seems to be referred to
by Pliny, Hist. Nat. Pref. 24.
In this case Sotion must pro-
bably have lived in the middle
of the first century, which
would harmonise well with the
theory that he was the author
of the Διόκλειοι ἔλεγχοι, and
the brother of Apollonius men-
tioned by Plutarch. His own
brother Lamprias is also
described by Plutarch, Qu. Conv.
ii. 2,2; cf. i. 8, 3, as a Peripa-
tetic; he likewise describes his
friend the grammarian from
Egypt (Qu.Cone. i. 9, 1,15 vill.
8, 2,1), Theo (wide, concerning
him, De Fac. Lune, 25,13 sq.) De
Hi. 6; Pyth. γα. 3 8., as a
man of Peripatetic tendencies.
On the other hand, Favonius,
who is spoken of ὦ. 6. vili. 10, 2,
1, as δαιμονιώτατος ᾿Αριστοτέλους
ἐραστὴς is probably only the
well-known Platonist, whom
we shall discuss later on. In
the second half of the second
century Aspasius must have

-Uord. 8, vol. v. £2), in his four-
teenth or fifteenth year, there-
fore in 145-6, B.c. had for his
teacher a pupil of this philoso-
pher, who apparently was still
alive; and Herminus(ap. Simpl.
De Colo, Schot. 494, 6, 31 sqq.)
quotes from him. Adrastus of
Aphrodisias (David, Schol. in
alr. 30, ὦ, 9; Anon. 1. ¢.32, 6, 36;
Simpl. Categ. 4, γ. 1. ¢.45; Ach.
Tat. Isag.c. 16, 19, Ὁ. 186, 139),
who is named together with him
(Galen, De Libr. Propr.c. 11;
vol xix. 42 s¢.; Porph. V. Plot.
1£)-was probably not far re-
moved in point of time; this
appears partly from the above
juxtaposition, but more espe-
cially from the use made of
him by Theo Smyrneeus (infra,
p. 809, 4); for Theo was a con-
temporary of Hadrian (infra,
Ῥ. 335). If, however, he is
the author of a commentary on
the Ethics of Aristotle and
Theophrastus (Phil. d@ Gr. ΤΙ. ii.
855) mentioned ap. Athen. xv.
673, ¢ (where our text has
“Adpacrovy) he may have been
still alive in the time of Anto-
ninus Pius. Aristocles, the
rhetorician of Pergamus, is
placed by Suidas (sub voce)
under Trajan and Hadrian:
according to Philostratus, Τῇ
Soph. ii. 3, he was a contempo-
rary of Herodes Atticus, there-
fore somewhat earlier, but had
only occupied himself with the
Peripatetic philosophy in his
youth. What Synes. Dio, p.12
R, says of Aristocles’ desertion
of philosophy for Rhetoric must

x

B.C,

PERIPATETICS OF THE FIRST CENTURY.

the attention of these commentators.

But what we

are told in this respect about the Peripatetics of the

Cat. Schol, 28, a, 21, Alexander
was named Aristotle, οἷον Sev-
τερον ὄντα ᾿Αριστοτέλην. Be-
sides these Peripatetics, whose
dates may be at least approxi-
mately fixed, a good many
others are named, of whom we
can scarcely say more than that
they must belong to the first
two centuries after Christ.
Among these is Archaicus
(erroneously regarded by Fa-
bric. Btblioth. Gr. ii. 536, Harl.
as a Stoic), from whom Stobeeus
(Cat. Schol. 61, a, 22; 66, a,
42; b, 35; 73, Ὁ, 20; 74, Ὁ, 31)
quotes observations on the
Categories, doubtless from a
commentary on that work; in
the first of these passages he
distinguishes Archaicus and
Sotion as disciples of the an-
cient commentators—Androni-
cus, Boéthus, &c. Perhaps Ar-
chaicus is the same person
mentioned as the author of a
work on ethics in Diog. vi. 99.
Also the following: Deme-
trius of Byzantium (Diog. v.
83), if he is not the other De-
metrius named supra, p. 124, 1;
Diogenianus, from whom
Eusebius (Pr. Hv. iv. 3; vi. 8)
quotes long fragments directed
against Chrysippus’ doctrines of
Prophecy and Destiny, perhaps
from a treatise περὶ εἱμαρμένης ;
he may be the same person as
Diogenianus of Pergamos, who
appears as one of the speakers
in Plutarch, De Pyth. Oraculis.
Qu. Conw. vii. 7, 8; vill. 1, 2;
at any rate, what is put into
his mouth has nothing to con-
tradict this theory, and Pyth.

Or. 5, 17, would indeed agree
With his sceptical bearing te-
ward soothsaying. More defi-
nite signs are wanting, how-
ever, that Diogenianus was
described by Plutarch as a
Peripatetic. Enarmostus,
whom <Aspasius blames (ap.
Alex. in Vetaph. 44, 23; Bon.
552, 6, 29, Bekk.) because
Eudorus and he had altered a
reading in the Metaphysics,
was also probably living in the
first century. The philosophers
quoted by Alex. Aphr. De An.
154, ὃ, 0; Socrates (prob-
ably the Bithynian Peripatetic
named in Diog. ii. 47); Vir-
ginius Rufus, and perhaps
also Polyzelus (2. 4. 162, 2,
note); Ptolemy, concerning
whom cf. Phil. d. Gr. IL ii. 54;
Artemon,thecollectorof Aris-
totelian Letters (Zbid. IT. ii.
562), who is probably older than
Andronicus; Nicander, who,
according to Suidas (Αἰσχρίων),
wrote about the disciples of
Aristotle; Strato, the Alex-
andrian Peripatetic (Diog. v.
61; in Tertullian, De An. 15,
it is not this Strato, but the
pupil of Erasistratus, also
named by Diogenes, who is in-
tended). Concerning the two
last-named philosophers, it is
not certain whether they lived
before or after the Christian
era; Julianus, of Tralles,
whose theory of the movement
of the heavens by the Platonic
world-soul is discussed by Alex.
Aphr. ap. Simpl. De Calo, 169,
b, 42; Schal. 491, b,43. Whether
he was a Peripatetic or a Pla

x 2

807

CHAP.
XI.

908

CHAP.
XI.

Aspasius.

Adrastus,

ECLECTICISM.

first century! is very unimportant. In the second
century we hear of several works of Aspasius : ‘ Com-
mentaries on the Categories,? on the treatise περὶ
épunvelas,? on the “ Physics,’ * the Books about the
Heavens,® and the ‘ Metaphysics ;’° but though he
seems 7 to have carefully expounded the writings of
Aristotle, and especially to have paid attention to the
various readings, nothing has been handed down of
his that indicates any independent investigation of
philosophic questions. We have more precise infor-
mation concerning Adrastus. From his treatise on
the arrangement of the Aristotelian works,® there
are quoted observations on their order, titles,
and genuineness.!? A commentary on the Categories

tonist, and whether this quota-
tion refers to a commentary on
the Books on the Heavens, or to
a commentary on the Zimeits,
cannot be discovered from the
passage.

1 Alexander of Algae and
Sotion, vide supra, Ὁ, 804, 2.

2 Galen, De Libr. Propr. 6.
11; vol. xix, 42 sq.

8 Bost. De Interpret. cf. Dn-
dex to the edition of Meister.
Boéthus repeatedly expresses
much dissatisfaction (il. p. 41,
14; 87, 17 Meis.) with his inter-
pretations.

4 Simpl. Phys. 28, δ: 96, a,
δ; 99, δ; 127, a, ὃ; 180, a;
1382, ὃ; 188, a; 185, ὦ; 138, Ὁ ;
151, a; 168, 6; 172, a; 178, a;
192, 6; 199, a; 214, @; 219, a;
222, αἱ; 223, 6; 280, a, d.

8 Simpl. De Calo, 194, a, 6;
23; 240, a, 44; Karst. Sehol, tn
Arist. 494, b, 31; 5138, ὃ, 10.

6 Alex. Metaph. 31, 23; 44,

23; 340,10; Bon. 543, @, 31;
552, ὁ, 29; 704, ὃ, 11 Bekk.

7 The Scholia on the four
first books and parts of the
seventh and ninth books of the
Nicomachean Ithias,which Hase
has published in the German
Classical Journal, vols. xxviii.
and xxix., claim to be extracted
from a commentary of Aspasius ;
but they are otherwise of no
great value,

§ Concerning him eide Martin
on Theo. Smyrn. <Lstronomia,
p. 14. aq,

*Tlepl τῇς τάξεως τῶν ᾿Αριστοτέ-
Aous συγγραμμάτων (Simpl. Phys.
1,0; Categ. 4, ¢ The designa-
tion is less specific of Categ. 4,
γ π΄ τάξ, ris’ Apior. φιλοσοφίας).

Ὁ According to Simpl. Categ.
4, y, he wished to place the
Categories (of which ὦ. σ, 4, ὦ
ef. Sehol. in Avist. 38, ὃ, 30;
39, a, 19; 142, Ὁ, 38, he mentions
a second recension) before all

ADRASTUS.

is also mentioned,' and from a commentary on the
Physics, Simplicius? gives us a detailed statement
concerning the conceptions of substance and of
essential and accidental quality, which well ex-
plains the Aristotelian definitions and expressions.
He also perhaps wrote on the ethics of Aristotle
and Theophrastus.’ If we add to this all that we
are told concerning his mathematical knowledge,
his writings on harmony and astronomy, and his
Commentary on the Timeus, and what has been
preserved of these writings, we must allow that

the other writings of Aristotle,
and nexttothem theZopica; and
he, therefore, like some others,
entitled the Categories: πρὸ
τῶν τόπων (Anon. Schol. 32, ὃ,
36, whose account is to be pre-
ferred to that of David, l. ¢. 30,
a, 8, as David, or perhaps his
transcriber, evidently confuses
the statements of Adrastus
and the pseudo-Archytus). In
the same treatise he had men-
tioned forty books of the
Analytics, of which only four
are genuine (Phil ὦ. Gr. 11. 1.70,
1), and expressed his opinion
on the title of the Physics and
its principal divisions (Simpl.
Phys.1, b; 2, a; cf Phil. ἃ. Gir.
II. ii. 86).

1 Galen, Libr. Propr.11; xix.
42 4.
2 Phys. 26,0. That this dis-
cussion is taken from a com-
mentary on the Physics is clear
from the words with which
Simplicius introduces it: 6 δὲ
Αδραστος βουλόμενος δηλῶσαι
τὸ “ὅπερ ὃν᾽ (ap. Arist. Phys. i.
3; 186, a, 32) παρεξῆλθεν μὲν
ὀλίγον τῶν προκειμένων, &c. Sim-

plicius, however, does not seern
to have had the commentary
itself, which he never quotes,
in his possession, but to have
borrowed the passage from Por-
phyry, who, as he observes,
had mentioned it. The extract
from Adrastus probably refers
to the words: οὐδὲ λέγεται ὅπερ
τὸ συμβεβηκός.

3 Cf. supra, Ὁ. 306 sg. and
Phil. ἃ. Gr. ΤΙ. ii. 855.

4 He is described as a mathe-
matician by Claudian Mamert.
De Statu An. i. 25, if the
Adrastus he mentions is the
same person. From his com-
mentary on the Zimeus, Por-
phyry (in Ptol. Harm.; Wallis,
Opp. iii. 270) quotes a defini-
tion on Consonance. His Har-
mony, in three books, still exists
in MS. (Fabr. Bibl. Gr. iii.
459, 653). From the first of
these books, the quotation ap.
Procl. in Tim. 192, C; 127, C;
198, E; and probably also ap.
Ach. Tat. c. 19, p. 136 (80), are
doubtless taken; a treatise on
the Sun is mentioned by Ach.
Tat. c. 19, Ὁ. 189 (82). Lastly,

810
CHAP.
ΧΙ,

ECLECTICISM.

the praise accorded by Simplicius to this Peri-
patetic! is entirely justified. But he nevertheless
seems to have deserved it rather for his faithful
transmission and intelligent elucidation of Aristotle’s
doctrines than for any new and original enquiries.
As in ‘the isolated definitions which have been
handed down as his he almost entirely follows
Aristotle, so in his general view of the universe and
of God, he is allied with him. The universe, the
construction of which he describes according to the
pattern of Aristotle? is formed by the highest,
essential nature for the best, and is moved thereby
in the manner belonging to it, namely, in a circle.
A consequence of the contrast between the terres-
trial elements and the various influences which the
planetary spheres in the multiplicity of their move-
ments exercise upon them, is the change in our
world; but in saying this, Adrastus expressly
guards himself against the opinion that the heavenly
bodies are created for the sake of that which is
meaner and perishable ; they have, on the contrary,
their end in themselves, and their influence on the
earth is only an effect of natural necessity.4 All

Martin has shown (i. 4.) that
the greatest part of Theo’s
astronomy is borrowed from a
treatise of Adrastus; and that
this is the commentary on the
Timeus is proved by Hiller,
Rhein. Mus. ΟΝ. Α΄. xxvi. 582
sqgq. The same writer shows
that Chalcidius has adopted a
great deal fram this commentary
into his own.

1 Cat. 4, y: “Adp. ὁ ᾿Αφρο-

δισιεὺς, ἀνὴρ τῶν yynolwyTMepira-
τητικῶν γεγονώς.

* Videthe dissertations on the
spherical form of the universe
and of the earth, the place of
the earth in the centre of the
whole, the smallness of the
earth in comparison with the
whole, in Theo Smyrn. Astron.
c. 1-4.

8 DL. 6.0. 22,

4 Z. ¢ Beneath the moon

HERMINTS.

this is Aristotelian. Adrastus sought likewise to
maintain in principle the Aristotelian theory of the
spheres, which he connected by means of ingenious
modifications with the theories of later astronomers.!
He therefore seems, irrespective of his mathematical
and other learning, to have been merely a skilful
expounder and defender of the Aristotelian theories.

Not even as much as this

reions change, generation, and
desiruction: τούτων δὲ, φησὶν
(Adrastus), αἴτια τὰ πλανώμενα
τῶν ἄστρων. ταῦτα δὲ λέγοι τις
ἂν, οὐχ ὡς τῶν τιμιωτέρων καὶ
θείων καὶ ἀϊδίων ἀγεννήτων τε
καὶ ἀφθάρτων ἕνεκα τῶν ἐλατ-
τόνων καὶ θνητῶν καὶ ἐπικήρων
πεφυκότων, GAN ὡς ἐκείνων μὲν
διὰ τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον καὶ
μακαριώτατον ἀεὶ οὕτως ἐχόντων,
τῶν δὲ ἐνταῦθα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
ἐκείνοις ἑπομένων, The circular
movement of the universe pre-
supposed a central point at
rest, and therefore an element
the natural motion of which
was towards the centre; but
then there must also be one
the motion of which was to-
wards the circumference, and
also elements lying between
the two. These elements are
in their nature changeable ;
their variation is really occa-
sioned by that of the seasons,
which is, on the other hand,
conditioned by the changing
position of the planets, espe-
cially of the sun and moon (cf.
Phil. @.G@r. 11. ii. 440, 468 sq.

1 In Theo, c. 32, with which
cf. c. 18, and Martin, p. 117 sq.
Adrastus here assumes that
each planet is fastened to the
surface of a globe, which ex-

ean be said of Herminus.

tends from the upper to the
lower limit of a hollow sphere,
concentric with that of the fixed
stars. This sphere turns from
east to west in the direction of
the ecliptic, but more slowly
than the sphere of the fixed
stars (or perhaps also, says
Adrastus, it is drawn round in
this direction by the sphere of
fixed stars, while its own motion
is from west to east); at the
same time the sphere which
holds the planet, corresponding
with the Epicycles of Hippar-
chus, moves itself within the
hollow sphere, so that the
planet describes a circle the
diameter of which extends
from a point on the outer
boundary of the hollow plane-
tary sphere to the opposite
point on its inner boundary,
the centre of which, therefore,
is distant from that of the con-
centric spheres as far as the
radius of the sphere bearing
the planet. Adrastus had, there-
fore, in his theory taken ac-
count of the hypothesis of
eccentrics. The theory, apart
from its other deficiencies,
would only explain the ap-
parent revolution of the sun
and moon, as Martin observes,
p. 119.

dll

CFAP.,
ΧΙ.

312

CHAP.
ΧΙ,

Herminus.

ECLECTICISM.

What we are told of his commentaries on the logical
writings of Aristotle! is sometimes unimportant,
and sometimes displays an external and formalistic
treatment of logical questions, with much misunder-

standing of the Aristotelian propositions.?

He de-

rives the infinity of the motion of the heavens

1 Among these the commen-
tary on the Cutegories is most
commonly quoted; ede the
following note and Simpl. in
Categ. Schot. in Arist. 40, a, 17;
42, a, 13; 46, a, 80; ὃ, 15 (14,
ὃ Basil.) 47, ὃ, 1; 56, ὃ, 39,
and Ὁ. 8, ε Bas.; Porph. ἐξήγ.
33, a, Schol. 58, b, 16. Also
the commentary on the treatise
aw. ‘Epunvetas; Boét. De Inter-
pret. (cf the Index of the
edition of Meiser); Ammon.
De Interpret. 48, a, Schol. 106,
ὁ, δ. Also the following note,
i. 6. and ap. Alex. Anal. Pr%.
28, b, concerning his commen-
tary on the Analytics; and
Alex. Top. 271, 274, m, in the
Topica.

2 Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 545
ὅσῳ. tThe substance of the quo-
tations from Herminus’s Logie
isas follows. The treatise on
the Categories, which he con-
sidered as the foundation of
Dialectic, and, therefore, with
Adrastus entitled πρὸ τῶν τόπων
(David, Sehol. tm Arist. 81, ὃ,
25, according to whom he thus
explained the precedence of the
doctrine of opposites, Categ.
c 10), treats neither in an onto-
logical manner of the highest
kinds of the Real, nor merely
of the parts of discourse, but
of the designations proper for
each class of the Real (Porph.
ἐξήγ. 4, ὃ; Schol. 31, ὃ; cf. 1, ὁ.

Ζ. 22; David, Scehol. 28, ὃ, 14).
He leaves itundecided whether
there are only so many highest
kinds as Aristotelian Categories
(Simpl. Sehol. 47, ὃ, 11 sqq.).
It is observed De Interpret. 1
that the psychic processes desig-
nated by words are the same in
all; but Herminus would not
admit this, because in that case
it would not be possible to
take the same expression in
different senses. He, therefore,
i. 4. 16, a, 6, instead of ταὐτὰ
πᾶσι παθήματα, ψυχῆς, reads
‘ravra’ (Boét. De Interpret.
ii. Ὁ. 39, 25 sgg.; Meis. Sehol.
101, 6; Ammon. De IJnter-
pret. 91, ὦ; Schol. 101, ὁ, 6). In
regard to the so-called infinite
propositions, he distinguished
three cases: the predicate or
the subject, or both, might be
infinite notions (negatively ex-
pressed) ; but he erroneously
compared not merely the first
class, but also the second and
third, with the corresponding.
negative judgments (Boét. p.
275 M). He instituted a fruit-
less enquiry concerning Anal.
Pri. 26, ὃ, 37, as to which con-
ception in syllogisms of the
second figure was the primary
and which the subordinate
conception (Alex. Anal. Pri.
23, ὃ, m; Schol. 153, b, 27;
Prantl, 555 sq.).

SOSIGENES.,

not from the operation of the first moving principle
but from the soul inherent in them;! a devia-
tion from Aristotle and an approximation to the
Platonic dectrine which Alexander had already
contradicted.? From the commentary of Achaicus
on the Categories very little has been handed
down to us, and that little is unimportant. Nor
has much been preserved of Sosigenes’ logical
writings ;* but we get a very favourable idea® of
his mathematical knowledge and the care with
which he applied it to the elucidation of Aristotle,
from his commentary and criticism of the Aristo-
telian theory of the spheres.© In regard to philo-
sophy, however, the most considerable of these

1 Simpl. De Cato, Sehol. 491,
ὁ, 45 (169, ὃ, 45 K.), according
to a statement of Alexander,
which, however, seems to have
referred not to a commentary,
but to the discourses of Her-
minus; as in ὦ. δ. Ὁ. 494, ὁ, 31
sqg., an utterance of Herminus
concerning a reading of As-
pasius is also quoted from his
discourses.

2 We shall find, however, that
this opposition did not extend
to the theory of a particular
soul in the heaven of fixed
stars.

8 The passages relating to
this are given infra, p. 327.

* From a commentary on
the Categories, Porphyry, ἐξήγ.
2, ὁ (Sehol. 31, δ), and after
him Dexipp. in Categ. p. 7, 20
sqq. Speng. gives his reflections
on the question whether the
λεγόμενον is a φωνὴ OF ἃ πρᾶγμα
ora νόημα, on which, however, he

could not decide. An observa-
tion on Analyt. Pri. 9 is given
by Philop. Anal. Pr. xxxii. ὁ,
Schol. 158, 6 28, after Alexander.

5 Ap. Simpl. De Colo, Schol.
498, a, 45; 500, a, 40; 504, ὃ,
41 (219, a, 39; 223, a, 29; 228,
ὃ, 15 K.), where Simplicius
seems to follow Sosigenes, not
merely in that wherein he ex-
pressly appeals to him, but
throughout. Cf. ps.-Alex. Me-
taph. 677, 25 sqq.; Bon. (807, a,
29 Br.), who also names Sosi-
genes at the conclusion of his
discussion.

6 Such enquiries concerning
mathematics and natural science
were contained in the trea-
tise of Sosigenes, περὶ ὄψεως,
from the third book of which
Themistius (Phys. 79, a) takes
something concerning the
shining of many bodies in the
dark; and Alexander (Meteorol.
116, a) quotes some observations

CHAP.

Achaicus.

Sosigenes.

314

CHAP.
ΧΙ.

Avristocles
of Messene.

LCLECTICISM,

younger Peripatetics are Aristocles and Alexander
of Aphrodisias ; for they alone have left us discus-
sions which, starting from the details of logic and
physics, proceed to enquiries affecting the whole.

theory of the universe.

Aristocles of Messene, in Sicily,! the teacher of
Alexander of Aphrodisias,? is chiefly known to us
from the fragments of an historical work of his

from the eighth book concern-
ing the halo round the sun and
moon.

1 Suid. ᾿Αριστοκλ.

2 That he was so, is asserted
in the older texts of Simplicius
(that retranslated from the
Latin), De Celo, Ὁ. 34, ὃ; and
Karsten, Ὁ. 69, 0, 25, has fol-
lowed it. But in the collection
of Academic Scholia, 477, a, 30,
we read, on the contrary: 6
"ArAtavdpos, ὡς φησὶ, κατὰ τὸν
αὐτοῦ διδάσκαλον ᾿Αριστοτέλην,
alsoap. Cyrill. δ. Juliun. ii. 61, :
γράφει τοίνυν "᾿Αλέξανδρος ὁ ᾽᾿Αρισ-
τοτέλους μαθητὴς, and similarly
in Alex. De An. 144, a, sq. (vide
infra, p.315,4), according to the
printed text Aristotle is named
as the teacher of Alexander.
Nevertheless, there is every
reason to suppose that the older
text of Simplicius is right, and
not that of the Academy; and
that even in the two other pas-
sages ᾿Δριστοκλέους 15 to be read,
and not ᾿Αριστοτέλους. For (1)
there is no trace of any Peripa-
tetic called Aristotle, who, ac-
cording to the dates, could have
been the teacher of Alexander of
Aphrodisias ; that the supposed
mention of him in Syrian comes
to nothing, has been observed

supra, Ὁ. 3807; and (2) it is
highly improbable that a tran-
scriber should have changed the
universally known name of Aris-
totle for the unknown name of
Aristocles, whereas the converse
might very easily happen, and
has often happened. For ex~
ample, Miller, #ragm. Hist. Gr.
li. 179; iv. 330, shows that, ap.
ps.-Plut. Parallel, 29, p. 312;
and Apostol. xiv. 70, we find
᾿Αριστοτέλης ; whereas Stobzeus,
loril. 64, 37, and Arsen. Ὁ. 385,
give correctly ᾿Αριστοκλῆς (the
historian of Rhodes). Simi-
larly, the Scholiasts on Pindar,
Olymp. vii. 66, fluctuate be-
tween the two names, of which
that of Aristocles only is cor-
rect. According to Hoche,
Pref. ii. two manuscripts have
᾿Αριστοτέλης instead of ᾽Αριστο-
κλῆς, and in Boét. De Intenpr.
ii. Meiser (p. 56, 2) was the
first to correct the statement
of the Basel edition (p. 309, m)
that Plato was at first called
Aristotle. On the other hand,
in the various cases where
Rose, Arist. Pseudepigr. 615 sq.,
assumes the same mistake, the
matter is very questionable, as
Heitz shows (Verlor. Sehr. ὦ,
Arist. 295).

ARISTOCLES OF MESSENE.

preserved by Eusebius;! and these contain, as
might be expected in a work of the kind, no original
enquiries into philosophy. Aristocles criticises and
combats the doctrines of other schools—the Eleatics
and the Sceptics, the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans,
and even the materialism of the Stoics; while, on
the other hand, he defends Aristotle against many
charges ;? the whole work must have contained a
complete critical review of the systems of the Greek
philosophers. The language of this Peripatetic con-
cerning Plato is nevertheless remarkable. He calls
him a genuine and perfect philosopher, and, as well
as we can judge from the scanty excerpts in our
possession, in expounding his doctrine, himself
agrees with it. He seems to assume that the
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy in the main
coincide, a statement at that period more fre-
quently to be met with in the Platonic school.
But Aristocles also combines the Peripatetic doc-
trine with the Stoic, in a manner which shows
that the author of the treatise on the universe was
not alone in this tendency. In a remarkable pas-
sage from Alexander of Aphrodisias,* we are told
l. ¢., and Sehol. 15. Suidas

further names a work on Ethics
by him In nine books. What

1 Prep. Hv. xi. 3; xiv. 17-
21; xv. 2,14. The title of this
work is, according to Eus. xi.

2,5: περὶ φυσιολογίας, accord-
ing to Jd. xiv. 17, 1; xv. 2;
14; Suid. ᾿Αριστοκλ. : περὶ φιλο-
σοφίας. In Eusebius (J. 6.) there
are quotations from the seventh
and eighth books of this work ;
in Suid. Swrddas from the sixth
book. The δέκα βιβλία π. φιλο-
σοφίας are mentioned by Philop.

he elsewhere ascribes to him
seems to belong partly to Aris-
tocles of Pergamos and partly
to the Rhodian.

2 Of. Phil. d. Gr, U.31.8 ; 37,
2; 48, 3.

3 Hus. xi. 3, 1: on the other
hand, § 2 relates to Socrates.

4 This passage is found in the

315

CHAP.
ΧΙ.

ECLECTICISM.

that in order to escape from the difficulties of the
Aristotelian doctrine respecting the reason which
comes to man from without, Aristotle set up the
following theory. The divine reason, he says, is in
all things, even in terrestrial bodies, and is con-
stantly working in the manner proper toit. From
its operation in things arises not only the rational
capacity in man, but also all union and division of
substances, and therefore the whole conformation of
the universe whether it affects this immediately,
for itself alone, or in combination with the in-
fluences of the heavenly bodies, or whether nature
originates primarily from those influences, and de-
termines all things in combination with vods. If,
then, this activity of νοῦς, in itself universal, finds
in any particular body an organ adapted to it, νοῦς

works in this body as its

second book περὶ ψυχῆς, Ὁ. 144,
a; 145, a, and, in my opinion,
must have been derived from
Alexander even if Torstrik
(Arist. De Ann. p. 186) is right
in asserting that the second
book, περὶ ψυχῆς, was not writ-
ten by him; for even in that
case it could only be the γό-
chauffée of the second half of
Alexander’s work. , Torstrik,
however, has given no reasons
for his judgment, and it does
not seem to me justified. After
Alexander has here treated of
the passive and active intelli-
gence in the sense of Aristotle,
he thus continues, according to
our printed text: ἤκουσα δὲ περὶ
νοῦ θύραθεν παρὰ ᾿Αριστοτέλους
ἃ διεσωσάμην. If these words

inherent intelligence, and

seem strange in themselves,
our doubts are increased by
what follows, and especially by
Ὁ. 145 a, whether the exposi-
tion which they introduce
should be ascribed to Aristotle
and not to a teacher of Alexan-
der, who took them from his
mouth, though not himself
agreeing with them, That this
teacher can be no other than
Aristocles, and that conse-
quently ᾿Αριστοκλέους should be
substituted for ᾿Αριστοτέλους
has already been shown (p. 314,
2). Brandis (Gesch. der En-
wwichelung der Griechischen
Philos. ii. 268) declares himself
in agreement with the observa-
tions on this subject in my first
edition.

ARISTOCLES.

there arises an individual intellectual activity. This
capability for the reception of νοῦς is, as Aristotle
believes, conditioned by the material constitution of
bodies, and depends especially on the question
whether they have in them more or less fire. The
corporeal mixture which affords an organ for active
intelligence is named potential intelligence, and
the operation of the active divine intelligence upon
the potential human intelligence, whereby the latter
is raised to actuality, and individual thought is
realised, consists only in this: that the all-pervad-
ing activity of the divine νοῦς manifests itself in a
special manner in particular bodies.' Alexander
himself observes respecting these theories of his
master, which he seeks to reconcile with the Aristo-
telian text,? that they have considerable affinity
with the Stoic doctrine ;* nor can we conceal from
ourselves that vods working in the whole corporeal
world, and especially in the fiery element, closely
approximates to the Stoic reason of the world, which
isat the same time the primeval fire and, as such, the
artistic and shaping force of nature. As the Hera-
clitean hylozoism was rendered more fruitful at the
appearance of the Stoic system by the doctrine of
Aristotle concerning νοῦς, so now we see that doc-
trine in the Peripatetic school itself, even in so
distinguished a representative as Aristocles, entering

1 Loe. cit. 144, b, Med. 3. Loe. cit. 143, a: ἀντιπίπ-

2 Loc. cit.: καὶ τὴν λέξιν δὲ τειν ἐδόκει μοι τότε τούτοις, τὸν
τὴν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ ψυχῆς τού- νοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις εἶναι
τοις προσοικοῦν (-ειοῦν) ἔλεγε θεῖον ὄντα, ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς
δεῖν. ἔδοξεν, &c.

ale

818

CHAP.
XI.

Alewander

of Aphro-
disias,

called the
Comme n-
tater and

ECLECTICISM.,

into a combination with the Stoic theory of the
universe, which prepares the way for the later
union of these systems in Neo-Platonism.!

The Aristotelian doctrine of Alexander of Aphro-
disias is purer and stricter.? This vigorous Peripa-
tetic, celebrated by posterity under the distinguished
names of the Commentator and the Second Aristotle,?

1 Of. sup. Ὁ. 137 sq. How
far Aristocles was from being
the only philosopher of that
period who intermingled Aris-
totelian with Stoic theology is
also shown by an utterance of
his contemporary Athenagoras.
This apologist, who was so well
acquainted with Greek philo-
sophy, says (Supplie. c. δ, p.
22 P.) of Aristotle and the
Peripatetics : ἕνα ἄγοντες οἱονεὶ
ζῷον σύνθετον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώ-
ματος συνεστηκότα λέγουσι τὸν
θεὸν, σῶμα μὲν αὐτοῦ τὸ αἰθέριον
νομίζοντες, τούς τε πλανωμένους
ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν σφαῖραν τῶν
ἀπλανῶν κινούμενα κυκλοφορητι-
κῷς, ψυχὴν δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει
τοῦ σώματος λόγον, αὐτὸν μὲν οὐ
κινούμενον αἴτιον δὲ τῆς τούτου
κινῇσεως γινόμενον. If this does
not precisely correspond with
the conception of Aristocles,
the Deity is here treated ina
Stoic manner, as the world-
soul; only that the body of the
world-soul is formed not by all
parts of the world, but merely
by the heavenly spheres. But
Alexander himself did not
(with Aristotle) place the seat
of Deity outside the furthest
sphere, but in it (vide infra,
p. 329, 1).

* Concerning Alexander’s per-
sonal history nothing has come

down tous. His date can be
fixed by the statement in De
Hato, mentioned sup. Ὁ. 304, 2.
From his native city, Aphro-
disias (not Aphrodisium, cf.
Ammon. De Interpret. 12, ὃ;
S81, @; 161, 0; Simpl. De Celo.
168, ὃ; 28 K), his invariable
surname is ᾿Αφροδισιεὺς, (he de-
scribes himself in Metaph. 501,
8; Bon. 768, ὦ; 20, Br. 132, by
the predicates ἰσχνὸς φιλόσοφος
λευκὸς “Adpodicreds) ; but which
Aphrodisias is thereby meant
does not appear. Concerning
his writings, vide Fabric. ibd.
Gr. v. 650 sgg. and the passages
there quoted.

8 Cf. Syrian and David in the
passages quoted p. 307,7.; Simpl.
De An. 18, 8: ὁ τοῦ ᾿Αριστοτέ-
Aous ἐξηγητὴς ᾿Αλέξ. ; Themist.
De An. 94, α: ὃ ἐξηγητὴς ᾿Αλεξ, ;
Philop. Gen. δὲ Corr. 15, a;
48, ὦ; 50, 2; Ammon. De Zn-
terpr. 32, ὃ: δ᾽ Ἀφροδισιεὺς ἐξη-
γητής. Fe is also called 6 ἐξη-
γητὴς simply ; 6.7...) as Olympio-
dor. Aleteorol. 59, a; ii. 157, Id.
On the other hand, by the ἐξη-
γητὴς spoken of (ibid. 12, a;
i, 185 Id.), who makes some
remark on Alexander’s com-
mentary, a far earlier man is
meant, a teacher of the author,
as we see from the mode of
quotation, ἔφη (not φησὶν). We

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS.

has unquestionably won for himself great merit by
his commentary on the Aristotelian works, a great
portion of which he has furnished with detailed ex-
planations,' carefully entering into the words as

cannot, therefore, infer from
this passage that the commen-
tator on the Meteorology is dis-
tinct from the philosopher of
Aphrodisias. Alexander’s com-
mentaries were read by Plo-
tinus together with those of
Aspasius, Adrastus, &c., to his
pupils (Porph. V. Plot. 14).

1 The still existing commen-
taries of Alexander, which are
now collected in the Academy
edition of the commentaries
on Aristotle, and have appeared.
in a new and improved form of
text. embrace the following
works: (1) Book I. of the First
Analyties; (2) on the Topica
(partly revised, wide Brandis,
Ῥ. 297, of the treatise alluded to
sup. Ὁ. 112, 1); (8) on the Jle-
teorolagy. That this commen-
tary was not written by another
Alexander has been alreacy
stated (sup. p.304,2,and 31 8,3).
Also the citations of Olympio-
dorus from the Aphrodisian har-
monise almost exactly with our
Alexandrian commentary; cf.
Olymp. i. 183, Id.; Alex. 126,
a; Ol. i. 202, where Ideler
finds a difference that is quite
groundless, between the cita-
tion of Olympiodorus and our
commentator (Alex. 82 a; OI.
i, 298 eg.; Alex. 100, ὃ; Ol. ii.
157; Alex. 124, 0; Ol. il, 200;
Alex. 182, a). If, therefore,
something is here and there ate
tributed to the latter which is
not to be found in our com-
mentary (Ideler, 1. ὁ. I. xvii),

this would rather point to a
later revision or to gaps in our
text. Meantime it is a ques-
tion whether by the ἐξηγη-
τὴς in ΟἹ, 1. 187 Alexander
is meant, and whether the
passage which Olympiodorus
quotes from him (evidently at
third hancl) really stood in his
Meteorology ; at any rate Simpl.
(De Calo, 95, a; Sehol. 492, 6,
1), on which Ideler also de-
pends, certainly refers to the
commentary on the books of
the heavens ; (4) περὶ ducOjcews,
quoted by Alexander himself
(De An. 133, a; Qu. Nat. i.
2, end, p. 19, edition of
Thurot, 1875). On the Aeta-
physies, the commentary on
Books i.-v. has been preserved
entire; the rest in a shortened
form; the first part, and ex-
tracts from the second, are
printed in the Schotia of Bran-
dis, and both at length in the
separate edition of Bonitz. An
explanation of the σοφιστικοὶ
ἔλεγχοι, which likewise bears
the name of Alexander, is cer-
tainly spurious (cf. Brandis, /.¢.

298). Lost commentaries
on the following works are
quoted: (1) The Categories, by
Simpl. (Categ. 1, a; 8, a ε.;
23, y, and often; De Calo, 76,
b, 26 Κα; Dexipp. Categ. 6,15;
40, 23; 55, 18 Speng.; David,
Schol. 51, ὃς 8; 54, ὁ, 15, 26;
65,6; 47, 81, 6, 33. (2) περὶ
ἑρμηνείας (Ammon. De Jnterpret.
12,0; ld, @; 23,0; 32,6; 46,

319

CHAP.
XI.

the Seé-
cond Aris-
totle.

820.

CHAP.
ΧΙ,

ECLECTICISM.

well as the thoughts of the author.!

His own

writings,” however, are no more than explanations

b; 54, ὃ; 81, a; 161, 4; 194, ;
Bott. De Intenpret. {very fre-
quently]; cf. the Meiser Index.
Mich. Ephes. Sehol. in Arist.
100, @). (3) The second book
of the First Analytics (Philop.
Schel. in Ar. 188, 6, 3; 191, a,
47; Anon. Paris [a commentary
under Alexander’s name, but
much later, concerning which
ef. Brandis, 7. ¢. Ὁ. 290]; Sehol.
188, a, 19; 191, a, 10, ὃ, 28 e¢
passim. (4) The Second Ana-
éytics (Ps.-Alex. in Metaph. 442,
9 Bon. 745, 6, 7 Br.; Philop. in
Post Anatyt. Schot.196, a, 33 3200,
ὁ, 30; 203, , 18; 211, ὁ, 81 et
passim; Hustrat. in Libr. 11.:
Anal. Post. 1,a@; 5,@,0; 11, ὦ,
o; ef. Fabric. δ. 6. 666; Prantl
Gesch. ἃ. Log. i. 621, 18). (5)
On the Physies (Simpl. Phys.
8, δ; 4, a; δ, δι 6, a, and
many other passages, especially
the three first books; Philop.
Phys, B, 16; M, 28; N, 13;
T, 1; 4; 9. This commen-
tary seems to have been the
principal source from which
that of Simplicius is taken;
and the fragments of the pre-
Socratic philosophy, especially,
which give such great value to
the work of Simplicius, would
appear to have been altogether,
or chiefly, borrowed from it).
(6) The treatise on the heavens
(Alex. Meteorol. 76, a; Ps.-
Alex. Metaph. 677, 27; 678, 7
Bon, [807, a; 36, δ, 11 Ἐπ};
Simpl. De Celo. Sehol. 468, a;
11 sqq.|Damase. ἢ. 6. 454, 0,11];
470, b, 15-473, a; 485, a; 28
sqq. et passim. (7) De Genera~
tine et Corruptione (Ps.-Alex.

é. 6. 645, 12 Bon. 799, δ 11 Er, ;
title to Alex. Qu. Nut. ii. 22;
Philop. Genw. ct Corr. 14, a;
15, a; 18, ὁ, δὲ passim). (8)
De Anima (Simpl. De An. 13,
a, ὃ; 25, ὃ; 27, ὃ, et passim;
Themist. De An. 94, ὦ; Philop.
De An. A 10; 16, B, I.; Ps.-
Alex. Metaph. 473, 6; 405, 28 ;
410, 20; 560, 25 Bon. [734, a,
28; 735, ὦ, 32; 783, ὁ, 23 Fr.;
the first passage is wanting
with him}; cf. Bonitz, Alex.
Comm. in Metaph. xxii. Com-
mentaries on the smaller an-
thropological writings are not
mentioned with the exception
of the still existing commentary
De Sensu. Concerning some
supposed commentaries on the
Rhetoric and Poetics, vide Fa-:
bric. 665, 667. That Alexander
expounded other writings be-
sides those of Aristotle we
cannot infer from the absurd
statement of David (Sehol. in
Ar. 28, a, 24), that he com-
mented, not only the works of
Aristotle the Stagirite, but
those of the other men of that
name; also the discussion con-
cerning the harmonic numbers
of the Zimeus mentioned by
Philop. (De An. D 6) must have
been found in the commentary
on the Treatise of the Soul.

1 Cf.on this point and against
Ritter’s (iv. 264) depreciatory
judgment of Alexander, Bran-
dis, 4 δ. Ὁ. 278; Schwegler,
Metaphysik des Arist.i.; Vorr.
5. Vill. ; Bonitz, Alea. Comm. in
Metaph. Pref.i.; Prantl, Gesch.
der Log. i. 621.

7 We possess four of these

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISTIAS.

and apologies for Aristotle’s doctrines.

In this

manner, in his still existing commentaries, he has
treated of logic,! meteorology, and metaphysics ; in

besides the commentaries περὶ
ψυχῆς, 2, B. (ap. Themist. Opp.
Venet. 1534, p. 123 8η7.}} =.
εἱμαρμένης (4bid.163 s¢q. et pass. ;
latest ed. Orelli, Zur. 1824) ;
φυσικῶν καὶ ἠθικῶν ἀποριῶν καὶ
λύσεων, 4, B. (questiones natu-
rales, &C., edition of Spengel,
Munich, 1842, who in the pre-
face, together with Fabricius,
l. 6. 661 sq., gives all informa-
tion respecting the title and
earlier editions); περὶ μίξεως
(attached to the Aldine edition
of the Meteorology, and imper-
fect in the commencement).
On the otherhand the Problems,
ἰατρικῶν καὶ φυσικῶν mpoBAnud-
των, 2 B (cf. also Fabric. 662
874. and, in respect to Buse-
maker’s edition in the fourth
volume of Didot’s Aristotle,
Prantl, ποῖ. Gel. Ans. 1858,
No. 25) and atreatise on Fevers
(Fabric. 664), certainly do not
belong to Alexander. Among
lost writings are mentioned : A
treatise on the difference be-
tween Aristotle and his dis-
ciples in regard to syllogisms
with premisses of unequal mo-
dality (Alex. Anal. Pr. 40, ὃ, 83,
a; cf. Phil. d.Gr. IL ii, 224) ; this
is no doubt the work referred
to by Philop. Anal. Pr. xxxil.
δ: Sehol. 158, ὃ, 28 (ἔν τινι μο-
voBlBAw), on the other hand the
σχόλια λογικὰ (Alex. Anal. Pr.
83, a; Sehol. 169, a, 14) must
be something distinct from it;
the words ἐπὶ πλέον εἴρηταί μοι
ἐν τοῖς σχολίοις τοῖς λογικοῖς
seem to me to be agloss. Also

a treatise περὶ δαιμόνων (Michaél
or whoever may be the author
of this commentary, printed
with Simpl. De Anima, on the
treatise περὶ τῆς καθ᾽ ὕπνον μαν-
τικῆς, Ὁ. 148, δ): another trea-
tise against Zenobius the Epi-
curean (Phil. d. Go. III. i. 877)
in which, according to Simpl.
Phy. 113, 6, he had sought to
prove the distinction of the
Above, Below, &c., to be a
natural distinction. The trea-
tise, however, on the seat of the
ἡγεμονικὸν, alluded to in the
commentary on the work περὶ
ζῴων κινήσεως, 154, ὃ, 155, a, is
doubtless not distinct from
Alexander’s dissertation, De
An. i. p. 140 sqq.; and the
μονοβιβλίον, quoted by Hustrat.
in Hth. N. 179, a, in which it
is proved as against the Stoics
that virtue does not suffice for
happiness, is the same as the
portion of the work bearing
the same independent title, p.
156 sgq. Concerning an essay
on the virtues, which still exists
in MS., a very doubtful treatise
on the powers of stones quoted.
by Psellus; the allegorical inter-
pretations of myths (Ps. Alex.
Probl. i. 87) which are cer-
tainly spurious, and some
Arabic treatises mentioned by
Casiri, all, erroncously no doubt,
attributed to Alexander (vide
Fabric. v. 667 sq. 658).

1 Concerning his logic, vide
Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, i. 622
sgq. But, except his definitions
on the relation of the individual

3821
CHAP.
XI.

Writings

925

CHAP.
ΧΙ.

consist
wholly of
apologies
Sor Aris-
totde’s and
commen-
TALES ON
them.

ECLECTICISM.

two books concerning the soul, and in many passages
of enquiries into natural science, he has developed
the anthropology and psychology of his master; in
the first three books of the last mentioned work he
has discussed many physical questions, and in the
fourth many definitions of the Peripatetic ethics, in
opposition to the cavils of the Stoics ; in Book i. 18,
he defends the necessity and eternity of the world
against the Platonists; in the treatise περὶ μίξεως
he combats the Stoic doctrine of the mutual inter-
penetration of bodies ; in the treatise on destiny,' he
defends the freedom of the will against the Stoic
fatalism. The weaknesses of his adversaries are
pointed out in this treatise with acuteness and skill,
but we cannot expect to find in it a thorough and
searching enquiry into the human will. Alexander
lays chief stress on the practical results of fatalism,?
among which he does not forget the theological
arguments which for himself are not exactly fitting,
namely, that fatalism does away with Providence
and the hearing of prayer ;* he also repeatedly and

and the universal, to be spoken
of, infra; there is not much of
importance to be derived from
it. The most noteworthy por-
tion (though in fact this is to
be found already in Aristotle)
is the distinction of the analytic
and synthetic methods (Ana.
Pr. ὃ, ὃ; of. Nat. Qu. i. 45 Ὁ.
18 sq. Speng.); the discussion
on the subcontrary opposi-
tion (Boet. De Interpr. ii. p.
158 sy. Meis.); and the asser-
tion that only the categorical
syllogisms are pure and legiti-
mate (Yop. 6).

1 περὶ εἱμαρμένης, cf. De An.
i Ῥ. 159 sg.5 Qu. Mat. i 45 Δ.

4 sgq.; 1. 18, Tennemann (v.
186 "77. and, more concisely,
Ritter (iv. 265 $q.), give extracts
from the former treatise. It ig
unnecessary to enlarge further
upon it in this place, as the trea-
tise contains no thoughts es-
sentially new; and moreover
has been made generally acces-
sible through the edition of
Orelli.

2 De Fato, ο. 16 sqq.

8 De ato, 17; De An. 162, a.

THEORIES OF ALEXANDER,

emphatically insists on the principle that the uni-
versal opinion of mankind, and the innate ideas
which express themselves especially in language, are
a sufficient and irresistible proof of truth.! The
Peripatetic bere falls back upon immediate con-
sciousness in the same way that we have so often
noticed in the popular philosophy since the time of
Cicero. More original theories are brought forward
by Alexander in the discussions of some other meta-
physical, psychological, and theological questions.
The doctrine of Aristotle, of mind, divine and
human, as we have seen, has much obscurity, and
his sayings about the relation of the deity to the
world, as well as those on the relation of human
reason to the divine reason, and to the inferior parts
of the soul, labour under a mystic vagueness. But
this itself is connected with the fundamental deter-
minations of the system concerning form and matter,
and can hardly be removed without a recasting of
these. Therefore, while Alexander is intent upon
a conception of the Peripatetic doctrine, which shall
set aside the mystic element as much as possible
and establish an altogether natural interconnection
of phenomena, he cannot avoid considerable devia-
tions from the doctrine of his master, however little
he may confess it to himself. Aristotle had indeed
declared individual essences to be the truly Sub-

1 De Fato, 0.2; 0. 7; 0. 8; 82, p. 35 s¢g.; 98, M). The
of. c. 6, 12, end; 11, beginning; contradictory statement of Am-
De An, 161, a. Speech, how- monius (De Lntempr. 32, ὃ;
ever, is not itself inborn; only Sehol. in Av. 108, ὃ, 28) is
the faculty of speech isso( Qu. rightly rejected by Prantl (ὦ, ὁ.
Nat. tii. 11; Boét. De Intempo. 624, 27),

τὰ

323

CHAP.
XI.

924

CHAP.
XI.

Aristotle's
doctrine
of the par-
ticular
and uni-
versal ;
form, and
matter.

How
treated by
Alex-
ander.

ECLECTICISM.

stantial, but at the same time he had declared the
Universal to be the proper object of knowledge; he
had conceded that forms, with the exception of
pure reason and the deity, are not separated from
matter, but he had nevertheless sought the proper
essence of things in them alone. Alexander goes a
step further. Of the two conflicting definitions that
the higher reality belongs to the individual and the
higher truth to the universal, he gives up the second
to save the first. The individual, he maintains
(herein departing from Aristotle!), is not only for us
but in itself, prior to the universal, for if the indi-
vidual were not, the universal could not be ; 3 and
consequently he not only includes incorporeal natures,
such as the Deity, under the conception of indi-
vidual substance,’ but also holds the individual to
be the proper object of universal conceptions ; yet
in these universal conceptions, only those determina-

1 Cf. Phil. ἃ. Gr. 11, ii. 197,
2.
7 Simp. Cat. 21, B: ὃ μέντοι
᾿Αλέξανδρος ἐνταῦθα καὶ τῇ φύσει
ὕστερα τὰ καθόλου τῶν καθέκαστα
εἶναι φιλονεικεῖ, ἀπόδειξιν μὲν
οὐδεμίαν κομίζων σχεδὸν, τὸ δὲ ἐν
ἀρχῇ λαμβάνων, ὅταν λέγῃ, τὸ
εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ κοινὰ παρὰ
τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα λαμβάνειν.
κοινοῦ γὰρ ὄντος, φησὶν, ἀνάγκη
καὶ τὸ ἄτομον εἶναι, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
κοινοῖς τὰ ἄτομα περιέχεται"
ἀτόμου δὲ ὕντος, οὐ πάντως τὸ
κοινὸν, εἴγε τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς.
Loe. cit. (: ΟΑλέξ.) καὶ τῇ φύσει
προτέρας βουλόμενος εἶναι τὰς ἀτό-
μους οὐσίας τῶν κοινῶν. μὴ οὐσῶν
γὰρ τῶν ἀτόμων, οὐδὲν εἶναι δύναται,
φησὶ, τῶν ἄλλων. In agreement

with this, cf. Dexipp. Cut. ο.
12; 54, 22 sag. Sp. (Schol. in
Ar. 50, 6, 15 sqgqg.) who com-
pares Alexander in this respect
with Botthus (sup. 119, 2); and
David, in Cat. Schol. 51, ὃ. 10.
We have no right to refuse
credit to these utterances (as
Prantl does i. 623) because
Alexander also maintains the
incorporeality of the concept
(οὗ. Bott. in Porph. a se Transt.
p. 55, m); for the ἄτομον is not
necessarily something corporeal
(vide next note), and as Boé-
thus (2. ¢.) says, quoting from
Alexander, even from the cor-
poreal the conception of incor-
poreal form can he abstracted.

ὃ Simpl. Cat. 21, B: ὃ μέντοι

FORM AND MATTER.

tions of the individual are brought under considera-
tion which are equally present in several individuals
or may be present.! The universal conceptions are
therefore, as he observes, universal only in the in-
telligence which abstracts them from individuals; as
soon as this ceases to think them, they cease to
exist : itis only our thought which releases the forms
bound up with matter from matter, and gives to
them reality in their absolute existence (fiirsich-

sein).? This

᾿Αλέξανδρος Kal τὸ νοητὸν καὶ

χωριστὸν εἶδος ἄτομον οὐσίαν
λέγεσθαί φησιι Hbd. 23, y: ὡς
δὲ ᾿Αλέξ. ἐξηγεῖται τὴν ἄτομον

οὐσίαν, φιλοτιμούμενος τὸ πρώτως
κινοῦν ἐν αὐτῇ τιθέναι, χαλεπώ-
Tepat αἱ ἀπορίαι.

1 Alexander shows this, Ο
Nat. i. 3. The generic con-
ceptions, he here says, relate
neither to individuals, nor to
an absolute self-subsistent
universal, ἀλλ᾽ εἰσὶν of δρισμοὶ
τῶν ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα κοινῶν,
ἢ τῶν καθέκαστα κατὰ τὰ ἐν
αὐτοῖς κοινά. . . λέγονται δὲ τῶν
νοημάτων καὶ τῶν κοινῶν οἷ δρισ-
μοὶ, ὅτι νοῦ τὸ χωρίσαι τὸν ἄνθρω-
mov (the essential nature of
man) ἀπὸ τῶν σὺν οἷς ὑφέστηκεν
ἄλλων καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν λαβεῖν" 6
δὲ τοῦ ὑφεστῶτος μὲν μετ᾽ ἄλλων,
νοουμένον δὲ χωρὶς ἐκείνων καὶ
ἄλλων, no doubt, should be
omitted], καὶ οὐχ ὡς ὑφέστηκεν,
δρισμὸς νοήματος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ
κοινοῦ, Of. Simpl. Phys. 10, ὃ.

2 De An. 189, ὃ: τῶν γὰρ
ἐνύλων εἰδῶν οὐδὲν χωριστὸν ἢ
λόγῳ μόνον, τῷ φθορὰν αὐτῶν
εἶναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης χωρισμόν
.. . ὅταν μὴ νοῇται τὰ τοιαῦτα

indivisibility of form from matter

εἴδη οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτῶν τι νοῦς,
εἴγε ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦ
νοητοῖς εἶναι ὑπόστασις. τὰ γὰρ
καθόλου καὶ κοινὰ τὴν μὲν ὕπαρξιν
ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστά τε καὶ ἐνύλοις
ἔχει, νοούμενα δὲ χωρὶς ὕλης
κοινά τε καὶ καθόλον γίνεται, καὶ
τότε ἔστι νοῦς ὅταν νοῇται, εἶ
δὲ μὴ νοοῖτο οὐδὲ ἔστιν
ἔτι. ὥστε χωρισθέντα τοῦ
νουοῦντος αὐτὰ νοῦ φθεί-
ρέται, εἴγε ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τὸ
εἶναι αὐτοῖς. ὅμοια δὲ τούτοις καὶ
τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, droid ἐστι τὰ
μαθηματικά, Loe. cit. 143, δὲ
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔνυλα εἴδη ὑπὸ τοῦ
νοῦ νοητὰ γίνεται ὄντα δυνάμει
νοητά, χωρίζων γὰρ αὐτὰ τῆς
ὕλης ὃ νοῦς, μεθ᾽ ἧς ἔστιν αὐτῆς
(1. αὐτοῖς) τὸ εἶναι, ἐνεργείᾳ
νοητὰ avros: αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, ο. Of.
also Metaph. 763, b, 37; Br.
493, 830 Bon. The discussions
in Nat. Yu. i. 17, 26, refer to
this relation of the εἴδη ἔνυλα
to their substance. Alexander
here shows that Form is in sub-
stance, not ws ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ----
ae, not as if in something
which existed without it, and
to which it is superadded, there-
fore not κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς (cf.

32

CHAP.
XI.

5

wy)
ko

com)

CHAP.

XI.

ECLECTICISM.

must hold good also of the soul, the more decidedly
Alexander maintains the Aristotelian definition that
the soul is nothing else than the form of the

organic body.!

As the form of the body, it is so

closely bound up with it that it cannot exist without
it, its origin and constitution is conditioned by the
body, and no activity of the soul is possible without

a corporeal motion.”

as to the meaning of this ex-
pression, Phil. d.G'7. IT 11.308, 1)
for matter became this definite
substance first through the in-
strumentality of Form; and
Form, on the other hand, is
only that which it is, as the
form of this body. Similarly
Alexander explained Time, in
partial agreement with Aris-
totle (Phil. ὦ. Go. IT. 11. £01)
as something existing only in
our idea, and he called man
ποιητὴς τοῦ χρόνου (Themist. De
An. 220, 26 Sp.)

1 De An. 123, a; 124, 0, εἰ
pass; cf. Qu. Nat. i. 17, Ὁ. 61;
1. 26, p. 83.

2 De An. 126, @ The con-
tinuation of the proposition ὅτι
ἀχώριστος ἧ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος,
οὗ ἐστι ψυχή. Tbid. 125, a:
that the soul is not a self-sub-
sistent substance, but the form
of the body, is plain from its
activity ; οὐ yap οἷόν re ἐνέργειάν
τινα ψυχικὴν γενέσθαι χωρὶς
σωματικῆς κινήσεως, This is
then proved in detail, and the
inference drawn ὡς τοῦ σώματος
ἐστι τὶ (namely its form) καὶ
ἀχώριστος αὐτοῦ. μάτην yap
εἴη χωριστὴ μηδεμίαν τῶν οἰκείων
ἐνεργειῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐνεργῆσαι
δυναμένη. Loe. cit. 148, a: The
soul is δύναμίς τις καὶ οὐσία ἐπὶ

Even the highest activities of

τούτοις (the parts of the body)
γινομένη. καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ
ἢ τούτου κρᾶσις αἰτία τῇ ψυχῇ
τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενέσεως, AS We Can
sce from the fact that the
constitution of our souls corre-
sponds to that of our bodies:
ἃς δέφαμεν τὴς ψυχῆς ἐνεργείας
εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ τῆς φυχῆς αὐτῆς
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἔχοντος
αὐτὴν “... πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ τῆς
ψυχῆς κινήσεις τοῦ συναμφοτέρου
τοῦ (ῶντος εἰσίν. Of. Qu. Nu

; Simpl. Phys. 225, a; and
sonpernine the Aristotelian
doctrine which Alexander here
follows, cf. vol. ii. 4, 597, 6.
On account of this indivisibility
of soul and body Alexander will
not allow their relation to be
apprehended according to the
analogy of that between the ar-
tist and his tool (Pid. (. Gr. ΤΙ.
ii. 487), for the artist is separate
from his tool; but the soul is
in the body, ‘and especially in
the central organ, as its form
and the force inherent in it; the
other parts of the body can only
be regarded as organs: De An.
127, a, 6; οἵ, Simpl. De An.
13, δ: Alex. ἀξιοῖ μὴ ws ὀργάνῳ
χρῆσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ" μὴ γὰρ γίνεσ-
θαι ἕν τι ἐκ τοῦ χρωμένου καὶ τοῦ
ὀργάνου.

THE SOUL.

the soul form no exception to this. The Aristotelian

doctrine of the parts of the soul is also defended

by Alexander;! but he insists the more strongly
that the higher faculties of the soul cannot exist
without the lower, and that the unity of the soul
depends upon this;? and whereas Aristotle had dis-
tinguished νοῦς as to its origin and its essence very
decidedly from all other faculties, Alexander co-
ordinates it in one series with the rest. Intellect
in man exists primarily only as a disposition—vovs
ὑλικὸς καὶ gvowds—merely potential thought.’
Through the development of this disposition, there
arises the real activity of thought—intelligence as
an operative quality, as an active power, the νοῦς
ἐπίκτητος or νοῦς καθ᾽ ἕξιν. But that which effects
the development of potential intelligence and
brings it to actuality as the light brings colours, the
νοῦς ποιητικὸς, is, according to Alexander, not a
part of our souls, but only the divine reason operat-
ing upon it, and in consequence of this operation
conceived ὅ by it. Thus the mystic unity of human

1 De An. 128 sqq.; 146, ὦ.

2 Loe. ett. 128, a, ὃ; 141, ὦ.

3. Perhaps it may be in con-
nection with this, that Alex-
ander, according to Simpl. De
An, 64, ὃ, would admit no pure
self-consciousness, related to
yous as such; for he taught
that νοῦς conceived directly the
εἴδη alone; and itself only κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς, SO far as it is one
with the εἴδη.

4 Loo. ett. 138, a, sq.; 143, Ὁ.
In these definitions of Alexan-
der lie the source from which

the Arabian and Scholastic phi-
losophers derived their well-
known doctrine of the tntedlec-
tus acquisitus.

5 Loe. cit. 139, ὃ; 143, ὃ, sq.;
180, ὃ: ἀπαθὴς δὲ ὧν (ὁ ποιητι-
Kos vots) καὶ μὴ μεμιγμένος ὕλῃ
τινὶ καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν, ἐνέργεια
ὧν καὶ εἶδος χωρὶς δυνάμεώς τε καὶ
ὕλης. τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃν δέδεικται
ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αριστοτέλους τὸ πρῶτον

αἴτιον ὃ καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ νοῦς, &c.,

p- 114, ὦ: τοῦτο δὴ τὸ νοητόν
τε τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει καὶ κατ᾽ ἐνέρ-
γείαν νοῦς, αἴτιον γινόμενον τῷ

The soul
Und νοῦς.

328

CHAP.
ΧΙ.

ECLECTICISM.

reason with the divine is here broken; on the one
side is man, and on the other the deity operating
upon him. The human soul is therefore an abso-
lutely finite essence; the souls of the gods (4.e. no
doubt the heavenly bodies) could only be called!
souls in an improper sense (ὁμωνύμως). In accor-
dance with this our philosopher places the seat of
reason, to which Aristotle had denied any corporeal
organ,” in the heart,’ like the Stoics, and says, uni-
versally and unconditionally of the human soul,
what Aristotle had said only of one part of it, that

it passes away with the body.‘

ὑλικῷ νῷ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ
τοιοῦτον εἶδος ἀναφορὰν χωρίζειν
τε καὶ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ νοεῖν καὶ τῶν
ἐνύλων εἰδῶν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν
νοητὸν αὐτὸ, θύραθέν ἐστι λεγό-
μενος νοῦς ὃ ποιητικὸς, οὐκ ὧν
μόριον καὶ δύναμίς τις τῆς ἡμετέ-
pas ψυχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἔξωθεν γινόμενος
ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅταν αὐτὸ νοῶμεν. ..
χωριστὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡμῶν τοιοῦτος
dy εἰκότως. On account of this
assertion, Alexander was fre-
quently attacked by later com-
mentators, cf. Themist. De An.
89, ὁ (where, though not
named, he is evidently alluded
to); Simpl. Phys. 1, a; 59, a;
Philop. De An. F, 11; G,
7; H, 8; Q, 2 3 (quotation
from Ammonius); 10, s¢.
Alexander’s general view of
νοῦς is thus summed up by
Philop. 2. ὁ. O, Q, 2: πρῶτον
σημαινόμενον λέγει τοῦ νοῦ τὸν
δυνάμει νοῦν, ὅςπερ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν
παίδων, .. δεύτερον σημαινό-
μενον τοῦ δυνάμει [leg. τοῦ νοῦ] ὃ
καθ᾽ ἕξιν νοῦς, ὅςπερ 6 ἐπὶ τῶν
τελείων ἀνθοώπων . . . τρίτον

The attempt which

σημαινόμενόν ἐστι τοῦ νοῦ ὃ ἐνερ-
γείᾳ νοῦς, ὅ ἐστιν ὃ θύραθεν, ὃ
παντέλειος . .. 6 κυβερνῶν τὸ
πᾶν. Concerning his explana-
tion of the particular in the
Aristotelian passages concerned,
cf. ἐδῶ. Q. 4, 5, 8; also Simpl.
De An. 64, Ὁ.

1 De An. 128, a.

2 Of. Phil. d. Go. IT. 1. 568, 3.

38. De An. 141, a Observe
here also the Stoic ἡγεμονικὸν
and the Platonic λογιστικὸν in-
stead of the Aristotelian νοῦς.

4 Loe. cit. 127, a,0: οὖσα δὲ
ἢ ψυχὴ εἶδος τοῦ σώματος...
τῷ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τοῦ σώματος
τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος καὶ συμφθείροιτο
ἂν τῷ σώματι, ὅση γε αὐτῆς φθαρ-
τοῦ σώματος εἶδός ἐστιν. Qu.
Nat. 11.10: ἡ ψυχὴ οὖν ἔνυλον
εἶδος ὃν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ
εἶναι. ὃ γὰρ ὕλης δεῖται πρὸς τὸ
εἶναι, ταύτης τὶ ὃν (namely its
form) ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ
εἶναι. Alexander here infers
that the soul cannot move
itself, in and for itself; but it
also follows that it cannot exist

GOD AND THE WORLD.

is seen in these definitions to refer phenomena to
natural causes by rejecting everything superna-
tural may be also perceived in the doctrine of the
Aphrodisian on the relation of God and the world.
All that happens in the world he derives, like
Aristotle,
from the Deity first into the heavens, and from
thence into the elementary bodies ;! but this whole
process is conceived entirely as a process of nature ;
in each of the elements there is more or less
animate force, according as its higher or lower

position in the universe,
nature, places it nearer or

without the body. This denial
of immortality, which Alexan-
der in his commentary on De
An. also tried to prove in Aris-
totle, is often mentioned by later
writers, cf. David, Sehol. in
Arist. 24, ὃ, 41; 26, d, 13;
Philop. De An. A, 5, 0; H, 8,
Q, 4.

1 The motion of the heavens
itself, Alexander explained,
like Aristotle, by supposing
that the σῶμα κυκλοφορητικὸν
had a longing to become as
like as possible to the highest,
eternal, and unmoved substance
(which, however, according to
Simpl. Phys. 319, δ, he did not,
like Aristotle, conceive as out-
side the heavens, but as in-
herent in the outermost sphere
as a whole); and since a long-
ing presupposes a soul, he says
that the θεῖον σῶμα ἔμψυχον καὶ
κατὰ ψυχὴν κινούμενον. Simi-
larly each of the seven plane-
tary spheres (to which accord-

and its coarser or finer
further to the first bearer

ingly Alexander again refers
the 55 Aristotelian) ἐφέσει καὶ
ὀρέξει τινὸς οὐσίας (the spirit of
their sphere) must be moved in
a direction contrary to that of
the fixed star heaven, but, at
the same time, must be carried
round by it—a double motion
which was necessary, because
otherwise there could not
be in the world beneath the
moon a regular alternation of
generation and passing away
(Qu. Nat. i. 25). Alexander
also (herein differing from
Aristotle) attributes a soul to
the πρῶτος οὐρανὸς, in which the
longing, which Aristotle had
ascribed to matter itself (PAzz.
a.G. ΤΊ, 11. 8718 sg.) must have its
seat; his contradiction to Her-
minus (vide supra, p. 313, 1) con-
sists only in this that Herminus
derives from the soul what
according to Alexander, is the
effect of the first moving prin-
ciple.

329

CHAP.
ΧΊ.

Relation

from the influence which diffuses itself % Θοώ

and the
world.

880

CHAP.
NI.

‘vidence.

ECLECTICISM.

of this force—the sky; and it is likewise divided
among the bodies compounded of these elements in
greater or lesser measure ; they have a more or less
perfect soul, according as they consist of purer or
impurer substances and, particularly, according as
more or less of the noblest element, fire, is mixed
up in them.! In this divine power the essence of
nature consists;? but Providence or destiny coin-
cides with nature. Therefore, though Alexander
does not admit destiny in the Stoical sense, he is as
little inclined to favour the ordinary belief in Pro-
This belief seems to him not only irrecon-
cileable with the freedom of the human will—for
free actions, as he points out, the Deity Himself
cannot foreknow, since His power does not extend to
the impossible ‘—but is also opposed to right con-
ceptions of God and the world. For it cannot pos-
sibly be supposed that the mortal and meaner is the
end, and the activity of the higher—of God—
is merely a means existing for the sake of the
former;° nor can we say of the world that it

1 Qu. Nat. ii. 8.

2 Yu. Natt. 6. Ὁ. 90; DedAn.
159, ὃ: τῆς θείας δυνάμεως τῆς
ἐν τῷ γεννητῷ σώματι ἐγγινυμένης
ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον [sc. σῶμα]
γειτγιάσεως, ἣν καὶ φύσιν καλοῦ-
μεν. According to Simpl. De
Coelo, 54, ὦ, 23, Karsten, Alexan-

theory (vide supra, Ὁ. 327, δὲ
329, 1). Brandis, SeAod. 475, a,
15: ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου ὕ. τ΄. 0:
‘so far as the deity is combined
with the wher?

3 De Bato, o 6: λείπεται δὴ
λοιπὸν τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἐν τοῖς
φύσει γινομένοις εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς

der even identified the Deity
with the wther, for it is here said
(ap. Arist. De Colo, i.3 5 2700, 8)
he referred the ἀθάνατον to the
θεῖον σῶμα, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ
θεοῦ, But only the reading of
Brandis is compatible with the
context, and with Alexander's

εἶναι ταὐτὸν εἱμαρμένην τε καὶ
φύσιν, which is then further
discussed. Je stn. 162, a:
λείπεται ἄρα τὴν εἱμαρμένην μηδὲν
ἄλλο ἢ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν εἶναι
ἑκάστου, (κο.

4 De Fato, α. 80.

5 gu. Nat, ii, 21, p. 128 sg.

OPINIONS ON PROVIDENCE.

requires a providence for its constitution and main-
tenance; on the contrary, its existence and con-
dition is a consequence of its nature.! If, therefore,
Alexander does not wholly deny Providence, he
confines it to the world beneath the moon, because
for this world alone care is taken by something out-
side itself which is destined to maintain it in its
existence and order, through the world of planets ;3
and if he also opposes the notion that Providence
is only an accidental operation of the Deity, he
considers it just as little an activity working with
design, but only as a consequence of Nature, fore-
known and fore-ordained by it.2 We cannot call
these opinions on Providence entirely un-Aristo-
telian ; but as they follow the Aristotelian doctrine
only on the physical side, they give proof of the
naturalism of the philosopher, whose explanation
of the life of the soul approximates to the Stoic
Materialism, and his whole theory of the universe
to the standpoint of Strabo the physicist.
Alexander of Aphrodisias is the last important
teacher of the Peripatetic school with whom we are

a more remote sense to the

Οὐ, the quotations from Adras-
tus, supra, Ὁ. 310, with whom,
however, Alexander does not
wholly agree; for he supposes
the planets to have their double
motion for the sake of the
earthly sphere, vide supra, Ὁ.
329, 1.

1 Loe. ett. 1.19.

* foe. cit. and i. 25, Ὁ. 79 sq.
According to the second passage
the conception of Providence
can Only have been applied in

whole material world.

8 Qu. Nut. il. 21, Ὁ. 124 sy,
131 sq. Alexander here ob-
serves that the question whether
Providence procecds καθ᾽ αὑτὸ
or κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς has never
been more closely investigated.
by any of his predecessors; he
himself gives the above decision
only hypothetically, but it
manifestly expresses his own
opinion.

331

CHAP.
XI.

Alexander
the last
important
Peripate-
tie.

332

CHAP.
XI.

From the
second
half of the
third cen-
tury the
Peripate-
tie School
a8 gra-
dually
merged in
that of the
Neo-Pla-
tonists.

ECLECTICISM.

acquainted. Of the few who are mentioned after
him in the first half of the third century,! all without
exception were insignificant.2 From the second
half of the third century the Peripatetic school
seems gradually to have lost itself in the school of
the Neo-Platonists, in which the knowledge of
Aristotle’s writings was also zealously maintained ;
we still hear of Peripatetics ;3 and there were not
wanting men who commented on the Aristotelian
writings and followed their doctrines in particular
branches, such as logic, physics, and psychology ; 4

1 Longinus ap. Porph. V. Plot.
20, among the philosophers of
his time whom he there enu-
merates, mentions three Peri-
patetics: Heliodorus of Alex-
andria, Ammonius (according to
Philostr. V. Soph. ii. 27, 6, he
was probably in Athens), and
Ptolemzus. Of these only the
first left philosophical writings ;
of the other two, Longinus
remarks that they were indeed
full of knowledge, especially
Ammonius (of whom Philostr.
i. ὃ. confirms this testimony),
but only wrote poems and de-
clamatory orations, to which
they themselves would hardly
have attributed so much value
as to wich to be known to pos-
terity by these productions.
Porphyry, ap. Eus. Pr. Hy. x. ὃ,
I, also mentions as his con-
temporary in Athens, Prosenes
the Peripatetic, perhaps head
of the school there.

* Even Anatolius of Alexan-
dria, who became bishop of
Laodicea, about 270 .a.D., and,
according to Eus. Hist. Zecl.
vii. 82, 6, so distinguished him-

self in the Peripatctie philo-
sophy that his native city
wished to make him head of
the school in that place, seems
to have displayed his chief
strength in mathematics. A
fragment from his κακόνες περὶ
τοῦ πάσχα is quoted by Eusebius,
l.¢., 14 sqy.; a fragment like-
wise, ap. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. ii.
462 sq., may, perhaps, belong to
him; but the fragments ap.
IJambl. Zheot. Arithnet. (vide
index) are from an earlicr Ana-
tolins, the teacher of Jambli-
chus.

3 Pide supra, Ὁ. 802, 2.

4 Thus, following Plotinus,
came Porphyry, Jamblichus,
Themistius, Dexippus, Syrianus,
Ammonius, Simplicius, the two
named Olympiodorus, and other
Neo-Platonists, to whom we
must add Philoponus; in the
Hast, Boéthus, and the philoso-
phers quoted by him, Victorinus
and Vegetius Pretextatus. Of
these men, so far as they come
within the scope of the present
exposition, we shall have to
speak later on.

EXTINCTION OF THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL. 333

but with regard to any philosophers who adopted nap.
the Peripatetic doctrine in their whole theory of ὅν
the world, there are only incidental allusions.!

1 We meet with sucha Peri- Vers. Το, 131, was converted
patetic even at the end of the by Isidorus from the Aristo-
fifth century in Dorus the telian to the Platonic—i.e. the
Arabian, who, according to Neo-Platonic—system.
Damasc. ap. Suid. sub voee, cf.

334

CHAP.
AIL.

D.
Platonists
of the first
centuries
A.D.

ECLECTICISM,

CHAPTER XII.

THE PLATONIC SCHOOL IN THE FIRST CENTURIES

AFTER

THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

Our knowledge of the Academic school! at the
point where we last left it becomes so fragmentary,
that for half a century not even the name of any of

its teachers is known to us.?

Only in the last

decades of the first century does some light break
in upon this darkness, and from that time onward we
can follow the school through a continuous series of
Platonic philosophers to the times of Neo-Platonism.®

1 Cf. Fabric. Bibl. 111.159 sqq.;
Zumpt, Ὁ. 59 sgq., in the trea-
tise quoted supra, p. 112, 1.

2 Seneca, whose testimony
must be valid. at any rate for
Rome, goes so far as to say:
Nat. Qu. vii. 32,2: deademicr
et veteres et minores niudlum
antistitem reliquerunt.

8 After the Platonists, men-
tioned Ὁ. 100 sqq., the next that
we know of is Ammonius of
Egypt, the teacher of Plutarch,
who taught in Athens, probably
as head of the Platonic school,
and died there, after having
repeatedly filled the office of
Strategus (Plut. Qu. Sym. iii.
1; vill. 3; ix. 1, 2,5,1,5; De
Hi. ὁ. 1 sg. Ὁ. 885, where a sup-
posed conversation with him

during Nero's visit to Greece
63 A.D. is narrated, Def. Ora.
c. 4; 9; 20; 38; 38; 46; De
eldulat. 31, Ὁ. 70; Themistokl.
c. 32, end; Eunap. J Soph.
Procem. 5; 8). With him Plu-
tarch is connected, of whom
we shall speak more at length
later on. Aristodemus, of
Aigium, was a friend and co-
disciple of VPlutarch, whom
Plutarch calls, Adv. Col. 2,
ἄνδρα τῶν ἐξ ᾿Ακαδημίας οὐ vap-
θηκοφόρον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμμανέστατον
ὀργιαστὴν Ἰλάτωνος, and τὸ
whom in this place, and in the
treatise against Epicurus (δὲ
P. Suev. v.) he has given a part
in the conversation. Under
Hadrian seem to have lived
the Syrian Apollonius, men-

LATER PLATONISTS.

In its mode of thought it remained true, on the whole,
tothe eclectic tendency which it had struck out since

tioned as a Platonist by Spar-
tian. Hadr. 2, and Gaius,
whose pupil Galen heard in
Pergamum about 145 B.c.(Galen.
Cogn. An. Morb. ὃ, vol. 5, 41;
vide infra, Ὁ. 337, 3). In the
eighth year of Antoninus Pius
(145 a.p.) Jerome (Chron. Hus.)
places Calvisius Taurus, of
Berytus (Hus. ὦ, e.; Suid. Tadp.).
or Tyrus (Philostr. V. Soph. ii,
1, 34); but as, according to
Gellius, WV. A. i. 26, 4, he had
Plutarch for his teacher, and,
according to Philostr. 2. «a,
Herodes Atticus, who was con-
sulin 143 A.D., he must have
come forward some time pre-
viously (Zumpt, p. 70). Gel-
lius, also his pupil, often men-
tions him. We see from W. A.
26; il. 2, 1; vii. 10, 1; 13, 1
sq.; xvii. 8, 1, that he was at
the head of the school. Con-
cerning his writings vide infra.
To the same period belong
Nigrinus, who is known to
us through Lucian (Nigrin.)
as a Platonist residing in Rome
(as such he describes himself
in c. 18). Sextus, of Cha-
ronea, a nephew of Plutarch’s,
teacher of Marcus Aurelius and
Verus (Capitol. Antonin. ;
Philos. 8; Verws. 3; Suid.
Mdpx. and 3ér.; by whom,
however, through his own mis-
take or his transcriber’s, Sextus
of Cheronea and Sextus Em-
piricus are confused; M. Aurel.
i. 9; Philostr. Vi Soph. ii. 9;
Dio Cass. lxxi, 1; Eutrop. viii.
12; Porph. Qu. Homer, 26, cf,
p. 276, 2); Alexander of Se-
leucia, in Cicilia, who was called

Peloplaton, and who taught
in Antioch, Rome, Tarsus, and
other places, and also stood in
favour with Marcus Aurelius
(Philostr. V. Soph. ii. 5; M.
Aurel. 1. 12); Albinus, the
pupil of Gaius (the title of a
treatise spoken of énf. Ὁ. 337, 8,
describes him as such) whose in-
structions Galen attended in
Smyrna 151, 2 Α.Ὁ. (Gal. De
Libr. Propr. 2 vol. xix. 16; for
further details concerning Al-
binus, de inf. Ὁ. 338 s7.); De-
metrius (M. Aurel. viii, 25);
Apuleius of Madaura, and
Maximus of Tyre. Under
Hadrian lived Theo of Smyrna
(cf. Martin, Zheon. Astron. 5
sgq.), as we know from the fact
that astronomical observations
of the 12th, 18th, 14th, and
16th years of Hadrian are
quoted from him (cf. Rossbach
and Westphal, Metrik. der Gr.
2nd ed. 1, 76). He is described
as a Platonist by Procl. in Zim.
26, A,and in the title borne by his
principal work in several manu-
scripts, τὰ κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν
χρήσιμα eis τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος
ἀνάγνωσιν" the first book of this
work is the ‘Arithmetic, which
Bullialdus first edited; the se-
cond, the ‘Astronomy,’ edited
by Martin; the three remaining
books are lost. Procl. (2. δ.
seems to refer to a commentary
on a Platonic work, perhaps the
Republic (cf. Theo, Astron. c.
16, p. 203, and Martin, p. 22 8.
79). Under the reign of Mar-
cus Aurelius, besides Atticus
(Jerome, Chron Hus.of the 16th
year of Marcus; 176, a.p.

335

CHAP.
SII.

General
character
of the
school at
this
period.

886

CHAP.
XII.

ECLECTICISM,

Philo and Antiochus.

But, in the first place, this

did not prevent individuals from protesting against
such overclouding of pure Platonism; and, in the
second place, after the commencement of the first
century, there was united with this medley of
philosophic doctrines in increasing measure that
religious mysticism, through the stronger growth of
which the eclectic Platonism of an Antiochus and

Porph. V. Plot.14; further de-
tails infra), must be placed
Daphnus (a physician of
Fiphesus, Athen. i. 1, ¢); Har-
pocration of Argos, a scholar
of Atticus (Procl. in Zim. 93,
B sq. Suid. sub voce), according
to Suidas, συμβιωτὴς Καίσαρος,
perhaps the grammarian, name-
sake and teacher of Verus, so
described by Capitol. Ver. 2.
Suidas mentions as written by
him a ὑπόμνημα eis Πλάτωνα in
twenty-four books, and λέξεις
πλάτωνος in two books. In the
first was contained no doubt,
what Olympiodorus tn Phadon.
p. 159, Schol. 388; F.in Alcid. Ὁ.
48 Or. quotes from him. In
the time of Marcus Aurelius,
also seem to have lived Nume-
nius, Cronius, and Celsus,
to be spoken of later on; at
the end of the second century
Censorinus, attacked by his
contemporary Alex. (Aplr. Qu.
Nat. i. 13) for a statement con-
cerning Epicurus’ theory of
colour; perhaps also Apollo-
phanes, mentioned by Por-
phyry (ap. Eus, Hist. Heel. vi.
19, 8) as a philosophical writer,
with the Platonists Numenius,
Cronius, and Longinus. In the
first half and middle of the

third century there lived in
Athens, Theodotus and Eu-
bulus, two διάδοχοι of the Pla-
tonic school, of whom the latter
was still alive after 263 a.n.
(Longinus ap. Porph. V. Plot.
20; Porph. himself, Z. 6. 15,
where the few and unimportant
writings of Hubulus are also
mentioned). To them Longinus
adds as Platonists (i. ¢.) who
had written much, Euclides
(cf. inf. 337, 3), Democritus,
and Proclinus, in Troas; of
Democritus, also mentioned by
Syrian in Metaph. Schol.in Ar.
892, ὁ, 31, we hear that he
wrote commentaries on the A/-
cthiades (Olympiodorus tn Al
cib. Ὁ. 105, Cr.) and the Phede
(Ibid. in Phed, Ὁ. 159, end,
38, F). Of Ammonius, Sak.
kas, Origen, and Longinus
we shall have to speak further
on. When ᾿Ακύλλας lived (quo-
ted by Procl. in Tim. 319, F. in
connection with a theory on
Tim. 41, D), and whether he
was earlier or later than Plo-
tinus, cannot be ascertained ;
nor are the datesof Maximus
of Nicwa (ride inf. Ὁ. 387, 8)
and of Severus (inf. Ὁ. 8895.)
exactly known.

COMMENTATORS.

his successors was developed into Neo-Platonism.
The opposition to the intermingling of other points
of view with the Platonic doctrine, was chiefly called
forth and nourished by the more accurate knowledge
of its most ancient records. As the Peripatetics of this
period turned their attention more and more to the
Aristotelian writings, so do we see the Academics now
applying themselves to the writings of Plato; and if
the scientific activity of the school did not throw itself
with the same zeal and exclusiveness into the works of
its founder as the Peripatetics did, the study of those
works nevertheless prevailed to an important and
considerable extent. Among later writers Plutarch
stands in the closest connection with the earlier
expositors of Platonic writings ;' inasmuch as he not
merely in numerous passages refers to sayings of Plato
in a general manner, but has also thoroughly discussed
certain points of his doctrine and certain sections of his
works.2, As commentators of Plato, Gaius, Albinus,
Taurus, and Maximus are likewise mentioned * among

Εὐκλείδης, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Πορφύριος.

1 Deroyllides, Thrasyllus, Hu-
A Scholium, ap. Fabric. 111. 158,

dorus (vide sup. p. 610 sq.).

2 Hspecially in the Πλατωνικὰ
ζητήματα and the treatise περὶ
τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας.

8 Τῇ the fragment of the
commentary on the Republic
ap. A. Mai, Class. Ant. I. xiv.
Proclus names as expounclers of
the mythus in Rep. x. 614 sg.
τῶν Ἰλατωνικῶν of κορυφαῖοι,
Νουμήνιος, ᾿Αλβῖνος (as, accord-
ing to Freudenthal, Hellenist.
Stud. 3 H. Ὁ. 300, the MSS. give;
Mai substitutes ’AAxivos), Γάϊος,

Μάξιμος ὁ Νικαεὺς, “Aproxpariwy,

says: τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα ὑπομνη-
ματίζουσι πλεῖστοι. Χρησιμώ-
τεροι δὲ Τάϊος, AdBivos, Πρισκιανὸς
(contemporaries of Simplicius),
Ταῦρος, Πρόκλος, &c. Gaius also
names Porphyry / Plot. 14
among those whose commen-
taries Plotinus had read; an
exposition of the Timeus is no
doubt referred to in Procl. in
Tim. 104. A; from Taurus,
Gellius (δὴ A. vii. 14, 5) quotes
the first book of a commentary
on the Gorgias and also (xvil.

CHAP.
XTI.

eet ee corre Ener

Comment-
aries on
the writ
ings of
Pilato and
study

of then.

ECLECTICISM.

others.

Of Albinus we possess, in a later revision,

an introduction to the Platonic dialogues,! and an
epitome of the Platonic doctrines 5 hitherto falsely

20) his oral exposition of the
Symposium; and from the first
book of an exposition of the
Timeeus, extracts are given in
the Bekker Scholia on Plato, p.
436 eg.and by Philop. De Atern.
Mundi, vi. 21. From the same
source comes, no doubt what is
quoted by Iambl. ap. Stob.
Eel. 1, 906.

1 This treatise, included by
Hermann in the sixth, and by
Diibner in the third volume of
his edition of Plato, has now
been subjected to a thorough
investigation, and newly edited
on the basis of more perfect
manuscripts by Freudenthal
(the Platonic Albinus and the
false Alcinous, Hellen. Stud.3 FH.
pp. 241-327). Its title runs thus
in the best MSS.: eisaywy)
eis τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος βίβλον,"
᾿Αλβίνου πρόλογος. Its text,
however, in its present form,
as Frendenthal has shown, p.
247 sqqg. is only a badly exe-
cuted and mutilated extract.
The same writer proves, p. 257
sq., that c. 1-4 of the prologue,
and Diog. Laert. lii. 48-62 have
emanated from one source,
which was earlier than Thrasyl-
lus (concerning whom vide sup.
p.102,2). As to its contentsride
Alberti, Rhein. Mus. NF. xiii.
76sq¢q. Some further details will
be found Phil. d Ge. TT. i. 427, 3.

2 This work is called in the
MSS., almost without exception,
᾿Αλκινόον διδασκαλικὸς (Cor λόγος
διδασκ.) τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων,
in the transcripts of some of
them also eisaywy) εἰς τὴν φιλο-
σοφίαν TIA., or ἐπιτομὴ τῶν Πλάτ.

δογμάτων (by the moderns for
the most part) elsaywy). It
has now been placed beyond
question by Freucdenthal’s tho-
rough examination (2. 6. 275
844.) that its author is no other
than Albinus, with whose ‘in-
troduction’ it entirely corre-
sponds both in form and con-
tent, and to whom many of the
doctrines brought forward by
the supposed Alcinous, and
among them some that are very
remarkable, are expressly attri-
buted. The alteration of Al-
binus into Alcinous was (as ir.
p. 800, 820 shows) so much the
more possible as all our mann-
scripts are derived from the
same ancient copy; and in this
an ᾿Αλκίνου may have been
found, or an ᾿Αλβίνου read
᾿Αλκίνου, and may have been
changed, when the book was
transcribed, into ’AAkivoov. But
even this treatise of Albinus we
possess according to all the evi-
dence only in a later revision,
which considerably shortened
the original work and repro-
duced it not without some cor-
rections ; a Paris Codex (J. ὁ.
p. 244, now imperfect), names
in its index Albinus’ third book
περὶ τῶν Πλάτωνι ἀρεσκόντων.
But that Albinus in his treatise
made plentiful use of more
ancient works we see from the
agreement—for the most part
word for word—of his twelfth
chapter with the passage from
Arius Didymus (ap. Hus. Pr.
ii. xi. 23; Stob. Hel. i. 830),
which Diels has now proved
more minutely (Dozogm. 76,447).

ALBINUS—SEVER US,

put forth under the name of Alcinous. He also com-
posed commentaries, but we know nothing of them.!
The commentary of Severus on the Timcews we know

through Proclus.?

The writings of Theo and Har-

pocration in explanation of Plato have been already
mentioned ; 8 commentaries on the Tumeus and
Phedrus are also quoted from Atticus;* from

1 Among the more celebrated
commentators of the Platonic
writings, Albinus is reckoned
in the passages quoted sup. p.
337, 3. What writings he ex-
pounded, and how his commen-
tarles were made, tradition does
not tell us; perhaps he merely
explained a number of Platonic
passages in one dogmatic work,
probably that mentioned in the
index of the Paris Codex
named in the previous note
(Freudenthal, Ὁ. 244), nine or
ten books of a summary of the
Platonic doctrines according to
the discourses of Gaius (AA-
Bivou [add. ἐκ] τῶν Talov σχολῶν
ὑποτυπώσεων πλατωνικῶν Soyud-
twy—this same work is alluded
to by Priscian, Solat. Ὁ. 553, ὃ),
32, as Lawini ex Gati scholis
exemplaribus Platonicorum dog-
matun, for the translator read
instead of AABINOY, “ΔΑΒ.
Freud. 246. According to its
contents, that which Procl. in
Tim. 104, A; 67, C; 311 A,
quotes may have been part of
a commentary on the Timeeus;
the passage we find ap. Tertull.
De An, 28 sq. may have been
taken from an exposition on
the Phedo ; and that in Iambl.
ap. Stob. Hol. i. 896, may have
come from an exposition of the
Republic. Meantime most of

these citations have amply suf-
ficient parallels in the supposed
Alcinous, and less exact paral-
lels in Procl. én Tim. 104 A and
Tertull. De An. 28 (cf. Freu-
denthal, 299 sq.), and though
it dees not follow uncondi-
tionally from this that they
refer to that particular treatise,
itis not unlikely that Albinus
may have repeated and copied
what he wrote there, as other
writers in those later centuries
are accustomed to do, and as
he himself transcribes from his
predecessors. Moreover, though
the circumstance that three of
the utterances of Albinus relate
to passages of the Zimeus and
are quoted in a commentary on
that dialogue, might serve to
corroborate the theory that
they originally stood in a similar
commentary, yet I must con-
cede to Freudenthal (p. 243 sy.)
that thisis not thereby rendered
more probable.

2In Zim. 68, A; 70, A: 78,
B; 88, D; 168, D; 186, H;
187, B; 192, Β Ὁ ; 198, BE sq;
804, B. I shall recur to this
philosopher later on.

8 Vide supra, pp. 337, 3; 335,
336.

4 Concerning the first, cf. the
Index to Procl. #2 Tim.: the
other is mentioned ὁ. ¢. 15, A.

z 2

339

CHAP.
XII.

940

CHAP.
XII.

Opposi-
tion to the
antroduc-
tion of
alien doc-
trines in
the nvit-

ECLECTICISM.

Numenius and Longinus, besides other treatises
devoted to the Platonic writings, commentaries on
the Timeus ;' and from Longinus’ contemporaries,
Democritus and Eubulus, explanations and dis-
cussions of several dialogues.? The oral instruction
also in the Platonic school consisted, doubtless, to a
considerable extent, in the reading and interpreta-
tion of the Platonic works.? Through this thorough
examination of the sources of the Academic doctrine
the conviction must certainly have arisen that much
which had in later times claimed to be Platonic was
far removed from the real opinions of Plato, and
thus we hear of several individuals who protested
against the prevailing confusion of the various
systems. Taurus wrote upon the difference of the
Platonic .and Aristotelian philosophy, and against
the Stoics;* but as to his own conception of the
Platonic system, little has been handed down to us,
and no noticeable peculiarities or characteristics® are

Syrian (Schol. in Av. 892, ὃ, 31)
seems to refer to the commen-
tary on the Time@us, and indeed
to the passage discussed by
Procl. in Zim. 87 B.

1 Vide the Index to Procl. ix
Tim. He seems to have taken
his quotations from Numenius,
out of a commentary, and not
from the other writings of this
Platonist. Whether Cronius
had written commentaries can-
not be decided from Porph. Τὰ
Plot. 14.

2. Concerning Democritus,
vide sup. Ὁ. 336, 2.3 concerning
Eubulus, wide Longinus, ap.
Porph. V. Plot. 20.

8. This we infer from the

multitude of commentaries and
expository writings, and also
from statements like those
quoted supra, p. 337, 3; 339, 1,
on the lectures of Taurus and
Gaius, and Porph. V. Plot. 14.
Taurus also read Aristotelian
writings with his scholars (ap.
Gell. xix. 6,2; xx. 4, the Pro-
blems).

4 The former, according to
Suid. ταῦρ, the latter according
to Gellius, V.A.xii.5,5. Healso,
according to Suidas, composed a
treatise περὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀσω-
μάτων and many other works.

5 We learn from his disciple,
Gellius, who frequently men-
tions him, that he required a

TAURUS—ATTICUS.

exhibited in it. Atticus also, like Taurus, set himself
against the tendency to amalgamate the Platonic
and Peripatetic theories. In the fragments of a
treatise which he devoted to this purpose! he
appears as an enthusiastic admirer of Plato, who is
anxious about the purity of the Academic doctrines ;
attacks the Peripatetic system with passionate pre-
judice, and especially reproaches it with the lowness
of its moral standpoint, and its denial of Providence
and immortality. Of the remaining doctrines of
Aristotle, it is the theory of a fifth element and the
eternity of the world which particularly move him
to opposition, the latter so much the more, as

thorough training for philoso-
phy, and could not endure a
merely rhetorical treatment of
it (MW af. i. 9, 8; x. 19: xvii.
20, 4 sq.); that he did not de-
spise subtle dialectic discus-
sions, and special physical in-
vestigations (vii. 13; xvi. 8;
xix. 6); that he did not wish
to eradicate the emotions, but to
moderate them, and therefore
condemned passionate disturb-
ances of the feelings, such as
anger (i. 26, 10) ; that he abhor-
red Epicurus’ cloctrine of plea-
sure and denial of Proviclence
(ix. 5, 8), to pass over points of
less importance (il. 2; vil. 10,
14,5; viii. 6; xii. 5; xviii. 10;
xx. 4). It further appears from
the fragment ap. Philop. De
Bern. M. vi. 21 that he, with
the majority of contemporary
Vlatonists, denied a beginning
of the world in time; and from
the fragments in Bekker’s Seho-
lia ad Plat. Ὁ. 436 sg. and ap.
Philop. 2. δ. xiii. 15, that he

apportioned the five senses to
the four elements, putting that
of smell midway between water
and air: and that in opposition
to Aristotle’s ether, he made
the heavens to consist of earth
and fire. From Iambl. ap.
Stob. #el. 1. 906, we learn that
his scholars were not agreed
as to whether souls were sent
upon the earth for the comple-
tion of the universe or for the
manifestation of the divine
life.

1 Bus. Pr. He. xi. 1, 23 xv.
4-9, ον 13, and probably also in
c. 12. In the first of these
passages the subject of the
treatise is indicated in the
words: πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τῶν ’Apic-
τοτέλους τὰ ΤΙλάτωνος ὑπισχνου-
μένους. What we find in the
superscription of many chap-
ters and in xv. 5, 1; 6, 1, as to
Plato and Moses belongs, of
course to Euscbins anc his
transcribers.

* xv. 4, 5, 9.

34]

CHAP.
XII.

ings of
Tass,

and
Atticus.

ECLECTICISM,

he has here to contend with a portion of his own
school.! Together with the Aristotelian doctrines
on immortality he also contests the statement that
the soul as such is unmoved, in order to uphold in
its stead the Platonic conception of the Self-
moving ;? but he herein limits existence after death
to the rational part of the soul, and represents this
as uniting itself at each entrance into earthly life
with the irrational soul dwelling in the body, which
is now first brought into order,* so that he conceived
the origin of the individual in a similar manner to
that of the universe. He, no doubt, also opposed
the Aristotelian conception of God, but of this
tradition tells us nothing ; as to his own theory, we
are told that he made the Creator of the world
identical with the Good, but. discriminated the other
ideas as creators of particular things from Him.+
Some other quotations from his commentary on the
Timeus® are of no importance; from his objec-
tions to the Aristotelian definitions concerning

' Against the other of Aris-
totle and the views connected
therewith concerning the stars,
he appeals to Hus. xv. 7, ὃ;
against the eternity of the
world, to ὦ ¢ ὁ. 6. But he
nevertheless would not acmit
any end to the world, as we
shall presently find. He hac
brought forward the same
views in his commentary on
the Zimeus. The unordered
matter (he here says, follow-
ing Plutarch) and the im-
perfect soul that moves it
are certainly indeed uncreated,
but the world as an ordered

whole, and its soul, were formed
at a detinite epoch (Procl. én
Zim. 84 3 87, A; 116, BF;
119, B; cf. 99, C3 170, A; 250,
B; lambl. ap Stob. Hel. i. 894);
but they may nevertheless be
imperishable (ef, Zim. 41, A)
through the will of the Creator
(Procl. ὦ. @. 804, 8).

* Hus. xv. 0, 4 sag.

3 Procl. 311, A; Jambl. 1. 6. 910.

1 Procl. ὦ. @. 98, ΟΣ 111, C;
119 B; ef. 181,6,

δ Ap. Procl. 87, B; 815, A;
7, C: 30, D; 88, C, D; 129, D;
187, B; 284, D; Syrian Sehol.
in dr. 892, ᾧ, 81.

ATTICUS.

Homonyms! we see that he extended his polemic to
logic also. But no important results are to be
expected from this, because he himself stood nearer
to the eclecticism which he combated than he was
aware. He is angryat the admixture of the Platonic
doctrines with the Peripatetic, but he himself inter-
mingles them with those of the Stoics when he
opposes to the Aristotelian doctrine of goods an
ἀυτάρκεια of virtue, which only differs in words from
that of the Stoics.2 Still more clearly, however,
does he betray the standpoint of the later popular
philosophy in the proposition that the happiness of
man is unanimously recognised by the philosophers
as the ultimate end of philosophy? It was precisely
this onesided practical standpoint which, together
with the indifference to a stricter scientific method,
had called forth the eclectic amalgamation of contra-
dictory doctrines. Atticus, however, does not seem
to have proceeded very scientifically. His objections
to Aristotle chiefly consist, as we have seen, in com-
plaints about the moral and religious corruption of his
doctrines ; to Aristotle’s deepest and most thoughtful
discussions he opposes arguments like that by which
he tries to reconcile the temporal origin of the world
with its eternal existence; namely, that God by
reason of his Omnipotence could preserve even
what has come into existence from destruction,‘

1 Simpl. Categ. 7, δ. 8, a, and on the Categories.
Porph. ἐξήγ. 9, ὦ, Sehol. 42, b, 9 * Bus. xv. 4, 1; 7 sgq.
(Prantl, Geseh. ἃ. Log. i. 618, 2 8 Loe. cit. xv. 4,1; cf. 5, 1.
sg. These scem to have been 4 Toe. cit. 6, 5 sgg.; of. Procl.
taken from a separate treatise in Tim. 304 B.

343

CHAP.
XII.

914

CHAP.
NII.

Eclecti~
cig exveme=
plified in

Thea,

ECLECTICISM.

The philosopher who treated argument so lightly
and derived his ultimate decision so recklessly
from practical necessity, had indeed no right to raise
objections to the fusion of the several systems, of
which that very necessity had been the determining
cause.

This eclecticism, then, constantly maintained its
ascendency with the majority of the Academics.
Men like Plutarch, Maximus, Apuleius, Numenius,
are, indeed, Platonists, but their Platonism has
absorbed so many foreign elements that they appear
merely as the promoters of the tendency introduced
by Antiochus. As these philosophers, however, will
again engage our attention among the forerunners
of Neo-Platonism, other details respecting them may
be omitted for the present. In respect to Theo of
Smyrna also it will suffice to remember that, as we
have already noticed,’ he found the free use of a Peri-
patetic treatise not incompatible with his Platonism,
while, at the same time, in the first book of his
work, he prefers to follow the tradition of the old and
new Pythagoreans.* Concerning Nigrinus, there is,
in spite of the Nigrinus of Lucian, little to say; the
description of him shows us a man of excellent dispo-
sition, who took refuge in philosophy from the luxury

1 Sup. Ὁ. 309, 4. Adrastus is μητικῆς and περὶ μουσικῆς is no
also made use of in De Mus. doubt chiefly Pythagorean, as
c.6;¢. 18, p. 94,97; ὦ, 19, ὁ. he indicates in De δι. c. 1, ὁ.
22,p. 117; ο. 40, Ὁ. 169. 12, et passim. In regard to his

? What Theo says in his first philosophy, the Neo-Pythago-
book, on numbers and the rela- rean clement is especially pro-
tions of tones, generally quoted minent in De Arith. o 4; De
under the two titles, περὶ ἀριθ- 28. c. 88 57.

NIGRIN US—SEVERUS.

and immorality of his time, and found in it inner
satisfaction and freedom ; but the discourses which
Lucian assigns to him might just as well have been
put into the mouths of Musonius or Epictetus. We
have still to speak of Severus and Albinus. Severus,
whom, indeed, we can only place conjecturally in
the second half of the second century,! is described
as having explained Plato in the sense of the Aris-
totelian doctrines.? From a treatise of his on the
soul Eusebius 8 has preserved a fragment in which
the Platonic doctrine that the human soul is com-
pounded of two substances, one capable of suffering,
and the other incapable,‘ is attacked with the obser-
vation that this theory would annul the imperish-
ableness of the soul, because two such different
constituents must necessarily again dissolve their
unnatural combination. According to this, he does
not seem to have recognised this doctrine as Plato’s
real opinion. Severus himself described the soul,

1 The first to mention him
are Iamblichus and Eusebius.
But there are as yet no traces
of the Neo-Platonic period in
the quotations from him. Pro-
clus, Zim. 304 B., observes in
respect to the opinion quoted
inf. p. 846,38, of Severus, Atticus,
and Plutarch, that many ob-
jections to it were raised by
the Peripatetics; which also
points to the fact that Severus
was older than Alexander of
Aphrodisias, the last author
known to us of the Peripatetic
school.

2 Syrian (Schol. in «12.. 880, 0,

38 ; Aristotle, Aletaph. xiii. 2)
opposes the doctrine that the
mathematical element accord-
ing to Plato, was in material
bodies; but this is irrelevant,
since such was not Plato’s
Opinion : εἰ δὲ BeBFjpos ἢ ἄλλος
τις τῶν ὕστερον ἐξηγησαμένων τὰ
Πλάτωνος ἐκ τῆς παρ᾽ αὐτῷ τῷ
᾿Αριστοτέλει κατηχήσεως τοῖς
μαθήμασι καταχρῶνται πρὸς τὰς
ἀποδείξεις τῶν φυσικῶν αἰτίων,
οὐδὲν τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους.

8. Prep. He. xiii. 11.

4 Tian. 41 sqq.; 69, C sq. 3 of.
Phil. a. Gr. IL i. 690 sq.

345

CHAP.
XIT.

Nigrinus,
Severus,

ECLECTICISM.,

and primarily the world-soul, as an incorporeal
mathematical figure, the constituents of which he
represented to be the point and the line, while of the
two elements from which Plato compounds the world-
soul,’ he connected the indivisible with the point,
and the divisible with the line.?. A beginning of the
world in its proper sense he did not admit, even if
the present world had been begun; he thought with
the Stoics that the world, eternal in itself, changed
its condition in certain periods, and he appeals for
this doctrine to the mythus in the Platonic dialogue
of the Statesman? There is a reminiscence of the
Stoics also in this, that he declared the Something
(ri) to be the highest generic-conception, below which
stand Being and Becoming.* However isolated
these statements may be, they nevertheless prove
that Severus departed in many respects from strict
Platonism. But we have much more numerous and
striking proofs, especially in his abstract of the
Platonic doctrines,® of the eclecticism of Albinus.
Quite at the beginning of this treatise we find the
Stoic definition of wisdom as the science of things
human and divine (6. 1), and the Peripatetic division
of philosophy into the theoretical and the practical
(c. 2), preceded by Dialectic as a third division

1 Tim. 35, A; vide Part il. a,
646, ὃ.

* Tambl. ap. Stob. Hel, i, 862;
Procl, ὧν Zim. 186, ἘΣ; 187, A
Sq.
Procl. 2. ὁ. 88, D sy.3 168,
D. That the world notwith-
standing might be imperishable

throuzh the will of God (2. ὁ.
304 B) was doubtless only a
concession to the expressions
of Plato.

1 Procl. 70, A; cf. PAil ἃ.
Gr. III. i. Ὁ. 92, 2.

5 Wide sup. Ὁ». 888, 2.

ALBINTE.

(c. 3). Albinus then, like Aristotle, divides theo-
retic philosophy into Theology, Physics, and Mathe-
matics, without, however, himself keeping to this
arrangement (6. 3,7); ! and practical philosophy also,
like the Peripatetics, into Ethics, Economics, and
Politics (c. 3).? Under Dialectic he first gives a theory
of knowledge which combines Stoic and Aristotelian
definitions with Platonic, and unites the φυσικ}
ἔννοια of the Stoics with the reminiscence of ideas.
In regard to the faculty of knowledge, he distin-
guishes in man (corresponding with the Aristotelian
doctrine of the active and the passive νοῦς) a double
reason, that which is directed to the sensible, and
that which is directed to the super-senyible.? Sub-
sequently the whole Aristotelian logic with the
syllogisms and the ten categories with various later
additions of the Peripatetics and Stoics, is foisted
upon Plato;* and the Aristotelian and Stoic ter-
minology is unscrupulously employed. In the
section on theoretical philosophy three primary causes
are enumerated : Matter, the primary forms, and the

' Iustead of an exposition of
the mathematics we tind at ὁ.
7 only an extract from the
utterances of Plato’s epublie
on mathematics and their di-
vision of mathematics.

* Similarly the ‘ Introduc-
tion,’ c. 6, spoken of sup. Ὁ. 338,
1]; concerning the Veripatetic
classification wide Phil. ὡς Gr. ΤΙ.
il. 176 sgq. Albinus makes use
of no Platonic divisions.

8. Ὁ, 4. I pass over some
further observations which are

not very clear, ccncerning vdn-
σις and αἴσθησις, Adyos ἐπιστη-
μονικὸς, and δοξαστικὸς.

Ἱ Ὁ, ὃ sqy.; wide Prantl, Gesch.
ὦ. Log. i. 610 sg.; Freudenthal,
280 sq.

§ Cf. Freudenthal, 2. ¢. 279,
281. So also inc. 25; cf. Ter-
tull. De ln. 29; a Platonic ar-
guiment for inumortality (Pheda,
71, C syg.) is defended with an
Aristotelian definition concern-
ing the ἐναντία (cf. Phil. d. Gu
IL. ii. 215, note).

347

CHAP.
XIT.

948

OCHAP.
NIT.

ECLECTICISM.

creative principle, or the Deity; the Deity is de-
scribed in the manner of Aristotle as active Reason
(c. 10), which, unmoved, thinks only itself. A three-
fold way is assumed to the knowledge of God: the
way of emancipation, analogy, and elevation ; ' ideas
are explained as eternal thoughts of God, but, at
the same time, as substances; their sphere, with
the exception of artificial things, or things contrary
to nature, is restricted to natural classes, and side
by side with the ideas, as their copies, the Aristo-
telian forms inherent in matter find a place.? In
regard to matter, Albinus says, making use of an
Aristotelian definition familiar to him, it is that
which is neither corporeal, nor incorporeal, but is in
the body potentially (c. 8, end). The eternity of
the world, he also thinks, he can maintain as a
Platonic doctrine, since, like some other philoso-
phers, he describes the world as having had a begin-
ning only because it is involved in constant Becoming,
and thereby proves itself the work of a higher
cause ; 3 and he rightly concludes from this that the
world-soul also has not been created by God, but is
similarly eternal. It does not, however, agree very
well with this, that the world-soul should be adorned
by God and awakened as it were from a deep sleep, in

1 Inthe second the author
has in view the passage from
Plato’s Republic, vi. 508 B; in
the third, another from the
Syinposium, 208, 3 sqq. |

* ©. 9, c 10, Albinus, like
some others (wide Phil..d. Gr II.
i. 552, 2), calls the ideas ἰδέαι; the

forms imitated from them εἴδη.
8. To this passage or a similar
one, of a commentary on the
Τρ or the SZypotyposeis
Proclus refers ὧν Zim. 67 ©.
Precursors of Albinus in the
theory mentioned above are
namedin Δ d. Gr. IT.1. 666, a.

ALBINUS.

order by turning to God, to receive the ideal forms
from him;! and that Albinus cannot altogether free
himself from the notion of a Divine formation of the
universe having once taken place.? That he assumes
the existence of inferior gods or demons, to whom
the guidance of the world beneath the moon is con-
fided, and that he regards these beings in the Stoic
manner, as elementary spirits, cannot surprise us in a
Platonist of that period (c.15). It is also in accord-
ance with the eclecticism of his age that he should
introduce into the Platonic ethics the Aristotelian
definition of virtue as μεσότης (c. 30); that he should
place among the four fundameatal virtues the Stoic-
Peripatetic prudence in place of the Platonic
wisdom,’ and appropriate the Stoic doctrine that
virtue is capable of no increase or diminution,’ and
with certain modifications also the Stoic theory of

the passions.’

1 CG. 14, Albinus here follows
Plutarch, who, however, was
more logical in disputing the
eternity of the world (cf. Pri.
d.@r. IIL. i. 168 sq.) ; for before
the world-soul had awaked out
of sleep, the world as such
could not possibly have existed.

2 Besides what has already
been stated, we find these words
in ὦ, ὁ. Ὁ. 170, 3, Herm.: τῆς
δὲ ψυχῆς ταθείσης ἐκ τοῦ μέσον
αὐτὴν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου...
περικαλύψαι and: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ-
τὸς ἄσχιστος ἔμεινεν, 7 δὲ ἐντὸς
εἰς ἑπτὰ κύκλους ἐτμήθη.

8 ΤῺ ὦ. 29 the φρόνησις is
called the τελειότης τοῦ λογισ-
τικοῦ (for which subsequently
the Stoic ἡγεμονικὸν is substi-

Some other instances might be

tuted) and defined quite in the
Stoicmanner as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν
καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων 3 ins. 80
the relation of φρόνησις to the
virtues of the lower parts of the
soul is spoken of in a way that
reminds us altogether of Aris-
totle’s Hth. WM. vi. (vide Phil, ἃ.
Gv, ΤΙ. τὶ, 502 sgq.).

4 Of. c. 80, and concerning
the corresponding Stoic doce-
trine, 7bid, ITI. i. 246, 2.

5 ©, 32, where Albinus re-
peats Zeno’s definition of πάθος
(Tbid. TIT. i. 225, 2), while he
opposes the reduction of the
emotions to κρίσεις (evide l. 6.
226 sq.) but enumerates the
same four chief emotions as
the Stoics held (ὦ, 6. 230).

350

CHAP.
AIT.

ECLECTICISM.

adduced,! but the previous quotations will suffice to
show how inclined Albinus was to combine alien
elements with the old Academic doctrine, which,
however, he followed in the main, and how deficient
he was in a clear consciousness of the peculiar
character of the Platonic system. We are told that
Albinus was one of the most important representa-
tives of his school,? and if we may infer anything
in respect to him from what we know of his master
Gaius, with whom he agrees? in one of his exposi-
tions of the Platonic philosophy, it becomes the
more evident that the mode of thought he exhibits
was still very prevalent in the Platonic school about
the middle of the second century of our era.
1 Cf. Freudenthal, 278 sqq. 3. Sup. Ὁ. 339, 1.

2 Cf. sup. Ὁ. 337, 8; and
Freudenthal, p. 243.

961

CHAPTER XIII.

ECLECTICS WHO BELONG TO NO DEFINITE SCHOOL—
DIO, LUCIAN, GALEN.

ALL the philosophers we have hitherto discussed
reckoned themselves under one of the existing
schools, though they allowed themselves many de-
partures from their original doctrines. The number
is much smaller of those who belong to no particular
. School, but, assuming a more independent attitude,
borrowed from each and all that which seemed to
them true. For though the internal unity of the
schools and the logical consistency of the systems
were greatly relaxed, yet the necessity for some
standard of authority was much too strong in that
period of scientific exhaustion to allow many to ven-
ture on freeing themselves from the custom which
required every teacher of philosophy to be con-
nected with some one of the ancient schools and its
tradition. The philosophers even sought to shield
themselves with the authority of antiquity, where
they were conscious of divergence from all contem-
morary schools, as we see in the case of the Neo-
Pythagoreans, when they claimed to be a continua-
tion of the ancient Pythagoreans, and in that of
the Sceptics when they professed to continue the

CHAP.
XITT.

Ff.
Eclecties
of no
particular
school.

CHAP.
XIII.

ECLECTICISM.

school of Pyrrho. There are, therefore, but few
among the philosophers of that time who stand out-
side the traditional pale of the schools, and these are
invariably men who had not made philosophy the sole
task of their life, but had occupied themselves with
it merely in connection with some other art or science.

An opportunity for such incidental occupation
with philosophy was afforded at that period partly
by the natural sciences, partly and especially by
rhetoric! which was constantly and zealously culti-
vated, and was included in the public education.
When a man had learned from the rhetoricians the
ornate form of exposition and discourse, he could
only find an adequate content for it, as the different
branches of instruction were then divided, with
the philosophers. It was, therefore, hardly possible
to advance beyond the merest outworks of rhetoric
without in some way taking a glance at philosophy,
and though this, no doubt, was done in most cases
hastily and superficially enough,? yet it could not
but happen that some individuals should occupy
themselves more seriously and permanently with

1 How numerous the schools
of rhetoric and teachers of rhe-
toric were in the times of the
Emperors; how lively the in-
terest in the achievements and
rivalry of celebrated rhetori-
cians (now called σοφισταὶ) and
how pupils streamed to them
from all sides, we sce from
Philostratus’ Vite Sophistarwn.
The appointment of public
teachers of rhetoric has been al-
ready noticed (sup. Ὁ. 190, gq).

Further details are to be found
in the writings quoted sup. p.
189, 1.

2 To students of rhetoric who
only stuclied something of phi-
losophy by the way, the cen-
sures of Calvisius Taurus, for
example, refer (ap. Gell. V. A.
1. 9, 10; xvii. 20,4; x. 19, 1;
the last passage, compared with
i. 9, 8, proves how common this
was.

DIO CHRYSOSTOM.

the claims of philosophy. In this way, towards the
end of the first century, Dio, and, about the middle
of the second, Lucian, went over from rhetoric to
philosophy. But neither of these men is important
enough as a philosopher to detain very long. Dio,
surnamed Chrysostom,! after his banishment, de-
sired indeed to be no longer merely a rhetorician,
but before all things a philosopher;? he also
assumed the Cynic garb ;3 but his philosophy is very
simple, and confines itself exclusively to such moral
considerations as were at that time not only to be

1 The sources for our know-
ledge of Dio’s life are, besides
his own writings, Philostr. Τὴ
Soph. i. 7 (the statements are
quite untrustworthy in his V.
Apol. v.27 sq.;V. Soph.i. 7,4, also
seems not to be historical);
Synes. Dio; Phot. Cod. 209;
Suid. sub voce; Plin. Hp. x. 81
89. (85 sqg.); Lucian. Peregs. 18;
Paras. 2; Schol.in Lue. Ὁ. 117;
248 Jac.; Eunap. V. Soph.
Proem. Ὁ. 2, and some later
biographical notices in Kay-
ser’s Philostr. V. Soph. Ὁ. 168
sgq. and in Dindorf’s edition of
Dio, ii. 361 sqq. The results
have been summed up after
Fabric. Bibl. V. 122 sqgg. by
Kayser (2. ¢.). In this place it
will suffice to say that he was
born at Prusa in Bithynia,
and under Domitian (according
to Emper. De Hail. Dion.
Braunschw. 1840, Ὁ. 5 sqg.—
in Dindorf’s edition, 2220, I.
XxxViii. sgqg.—the date is 82
A.D.) was banished or escaped
from Rome where he had
taught rhetoric, wandered for
many years through distant

countries, as far as the Geta,
returned after the murder of
Domitian to Rome and (accord-
ing to Themist. Or. v. 63) stood
high in the favour of Trajan.

? Dio often repeats that his
hearers are not to seek rheto-
rical graces from him; like
every true philosopher he de-
sires to aim at their moral im-
provement—to be a physician
of souls (Or. 33; Ov. 34, Ὁ. 34,
R.; Or. 35): he comes forward,
generally speaking, as a man
to whom God has given the
vocation of declaring to all,
the doctrines of philosophy
(Or. 18, p. 481; Or. 32, 657
sqq. δὲ passim). He himself
dates this vocation from his
exile (Or. 18, 422 sq.) ; likewise
Synesius (Dio, 18 825.) shows
how his destiny led him from
Sophisticism (i.e. Rhetoric) to
philosophy, which he had pre-
viously attacked in a vigorous
manner in some of his dis-

courses (κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων᾽

and πρὸς Μουσώνιον).
9 ὃν», 72; Or. 84, Ὁ. 88; cf.
Or. 1, p. 60.

AA

353

CHAP,
XITI.

Dio
Chr yso-
stom,

354

CHAP.
XIII.

His notion
of phitloso-
phy, the
endeavour
to be a
righteous
Man.

ECLECTICISM.

found alike in all the philosophical schools, but even
outside them. With theoretical enquiries he did
not concern himself; his whole endeavour is rather
to impress upon the hearts of his hearers and readers
the principles long acknowledged by the best, and
to apply them to given cases.’ Philosophy has, he
says,? the task of curing men of their moral in-
firmities; it consists in the endeavour to be a
righteous man. His philosophic ideal is Socrates, as
conceived by the later popular philosophy—namely,
as an excellent teacher of morals, but with whom
specifically scientific thoughts and purposes are not
in question ;* after him Diogenes, whose emancipa-
tion from needs he admires so unconditionally that he
pays no attention to what was unsound and distorted
in his character, and finds even the most revolting
things that are told of him praiseworthy. He
demonstrates that with virtue and wisdom happiness
is also given;* he describes the virtuous man in his

1 Synes., Ὁ. 14 sq., says very
truly: ὁ δ᾽ οὖν Δίων ἔοικε θεω-
ρήμασι μὲν τεχνικοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ
μὴ προσταλαιπωρῆσαι μηδὲ προσ-
ανασχεὶν φυσικοῖς δόγμασιν, ἅτε
ὀψὲ τοῦ καιροῦ μετατεθειμένος
(sc. ἀπὸ σοφιστικῆς πρὸς φιλοσο-
φίανν' ὄνασθαι δὲ τῆς στοᾶς ὅσα
εἰς ἦθος τείνει καὶ ἠρρενῶσθαι
παρ᾽ ὅὄντινοῦν τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ,
ἐπιθέσθαι δὲ τῷ νουθετεῖν ἀνθρώ-
πους. -. εἰς ὃ χρήσασθαι προαπο-
κειμένῃ παρασκευῇ τῆς γλώττης.

2 ον». 18, Ὁ. 431; cf. Ov. 70,
ΤΊ, and sup. 353, 2. The same
definition of the problem of
philosophy has already come
under our notice in connection

withthe Cynics, Phil. d. Gr. IT. i.
285, 3; Philo, sup. Ὁ. 77 s8qq.;
Musonius and Epictetus, sup. Ὁ.
250-272.

8. Of. Or. 13, 423 sqq.3 Or. 12
874 sqqg.: Or. 54, 55, 60, p. 312
and elsewhere.

4 Cf. Om. 6, 8, 9, 10, and the
coarse description of his sup-
posed conversation with Alex-
ander, Or. 4. In Ov. 6, p. 203,
Diogenes is admired even for
the excesses mentioned in Phil.
ὦ Gr II. i, 274, 3.

5 Or, 23, especially Ὁ. 515 sq.;
Or. 69, 868 s7. where the ¢pé-
νιμοι and the ἄφρονες are dis-
cussed in the Stoical sense.

DIO CHRYSOSTOM.

moral greatness and his working for others;' he
points out, with the Stoics, that true freedom coin-
cides with reasonableness, and slavery with un-
reason ;? in regard to the appetites, passions, and
vices of men, luxury, avarice, love of glory, and of
. pleasure, anxiety, faithlessness, &c., he makes reflec-
tions such as were usual in the schools ;? he recalls his
readers from the mode of life prevailing in society,
with its follies, its moral corruption, its artificial
wants, to the simplicity of the state of nature;* he
discourses in earnest and rational words against the
immorality of his time,’ occasionally also, with the
punctilious zeal of the Stoics, against things so
indifferent as the cutting of the beard; ® he exalts
the advantages ® of civil institutions,’ gives useful
advice to states,® discusses in the Aristotelian manner
the distinctions and relative forms of government ;?
in short, he expatiates on all possible questions of
morality and practical life. But in these well-
intentioned, verbose, and for the most part very
sensible discussions, there is little real and indepen-

1 Or. 78, 428 sq.

2 Or. 14, 15, 80.

8 E.g. Ov. 5, 1923; Or. 16, 17,
32, 66-68, 74, 79.

4 Cf. on this point, besides
the passages already quoted
concerning Socrates and Dio-
genes, the happy description
of an innocent natural life in
the Εὐβοϊκὸς (Or. 7) that ‘Greek
village history,’ as Jahn calls
it; the purpose of which Synes.
correctly estimates (Div, p 15
sqg.). In the same respect Dio

had commended the Jewish
Essenes (Synes. p. 16).

5 So in Or. 7, 268 sgq., where
the degradation and danger
of the public immorality so
universally tolerated, is very
well exposed.

86. Or. 36, 81 sq. 33.

7 On, 36, 83 40.

8. On. 88 sg. 38, 40, et passim.

® Or. 3, 115 sq. On the
monarchy as distinguished from
the tyranny (cf. Ow, 1-4, 62).

AA 2

800

CHAP.
XIII.

ECLECTICISM.

dent philosophy to be found; as soon as Dio goes
beyond actual and particular cases he falls into com-
monplaces which are treated in the spirit of a modi-
fied Stoicism or of the ethics of Xenophon.' Plato
was indeed, next to Demosthenes, his pattern of
style ; 5 and in Dio’s moral disquisitions the influence
of his philosophy and writings are unmistakable ;
but of the speculative determinations of Plato’s
system we find only a few scattered echoes,’ and in
regard to the Platonic Republic, Dio 1s of opinion
that it contains too much that is irrelevant to iis
proper theme—the question of justice. We more
commonly meet with Stoic doctrines in his writings :
what he says about the kinship of God to the
human spirit, on the knowledge of God that is
innate in us, on the natural interdependence of all
men, next to the Socrates of Xenophon reminds us
most of the Stoics; this is still more definitely the
case with the proposition that the world is a com-
mon house for gods and men, a divine state, a nature
governed by one 508], and with the tracing of the
demon to man’s own internal nature.’ Even the
Stoic doctrine of the conflagration and formation
of the world is at least tentatively brought forward.®
But for Dio it is manifest that nothing is of real

1 He expresses his admira- 5 Or. 12; cf. especially p.
tion for Xenophon in Or. 18, 384 8g.; 891 8ῳ.; 397; Or. 7, 270.

481. 5 Or. 80, 557; Or. 36, Ὁ. 88,
2 Of. Philostr. Vite Soph.i. 88; cf. Or. 74, Ὁ. 405; 12,
7, 3. 390, &c.
8 Such as ὦ». 30, 550; cf. 7 On. 4, 166: cf. Or. 28, 25.

Phedo, 62 B, and elsewhere. 8 Or. 36, 97 sq.
4 Or, T, 267.

LUCIAN.

value except that Universal, which he claims for all
men as their inborn conviction, and with the denial
of which he so severely reproaches the Epicureans '—
the belief in the gods and their care for mankind.
His standpoint is throughout that of the popular
philosopher, which turns to account in a practical
manner scientific results which have become common
property, without enriching them by new and
original enquiries.

A similar attitude to philosophy is assumed by
Lucian,? though for the rest his literary character
is widely different from that of Dio, and in mind and
taste he is far above him. Moreover, it was only

1 Or, 12, 390 sq.

2 All that we know of Lu-
cian’s life and personality we
owe almost entirely to his own
writings. From them (confin-
ing myself here to what is of
most importance) we find that
he was bornin Samosata (/ist.
Serib. 24; Piseat. 19), and was
tirst destined for a sculptor, but
subsequently devoted himself
to learned studies (Soman. 1 sqq.
14) and had traversed part of
the Roman dominions with
glory and profit as a rhetorician,
when at about forty years of
age, and by his own account,
through Nigrinus (sv. Ὁ. 334, 3),
was won over to philosophy,
and began to write philosophic
dialogues (Bis Accus. 27 80.
30 sqq.; Apol. 15; Nigrin. 4 sq.
35 sgq.; Hermot. 13). The time
of his birth cannot be correctly
stated, nor that of his death.
From Alew. 48, we see that he
composed this work after Mar-
cus Aurelius’ death. As an

older man he filled the impor-
tant and lucrative office of
secretary at the court of the
deputy (Apod. 12.; cf. c. 1, 15).
We afterwards find him resum-
ing his long interrupted dis-
courses (Here. 7). Nothing
further is known concerning
his life. Suidas’ story that he,
in well merited punishment for
his abuse of Christianity, was
torn to pieces by mad dogs,
is doubtless no more trust-
worthy than most of the similar
accounts of the mortes persecu-
torum. It is possible that this
story (as Bernays conjectures,
Lucian und die Kyniker, p. 52)
may have directly arisen from
his conflict with the philosophic
Kuves, of whom he says himself
(Peregr. 2): ὀλίγον δεῖν ὑπὸ
τῶν Κυνικῶν ἐγώ σοι διεσπάσθην
ὥσπερ ὁ ᾿Ακταίων ὑπὸ τῶν κυνῶν.
Among Lucian’s writings there
are several which are spurious,
or at any rate doubtful.

957

CHAP.
XIII.

Lucian.

Philosophy
in his opt-
NON CON
sists of
practical
wisdom,
and ts tied
TO RO 8YS8-
tem.

ECLECTICISM.

in his more mature years that he went over from
rhetoric to philosophy, and he appropriated from
philosophy only so much as might prove advan-
tageous to him either for his personal conduct or for
the new form of his writings which chiefly har-
monised with his individual character. True philo-
sophy consists, according to his theory, in practical
wisdom, in a temper of mind and bent of will which
is attached to no philosophical system ; on the other
hand, the distinctive doctrines and other peculiari-
ties of the schools appeared to him unimportant,
and, so far as men pride themselves upon them and
quarrel about them, ridiculous. Thus he assures us
that it is philosophy that has made him disloyal to
rhetoric, that he has always admired and praised
philosophy and nourished himself upon the writings
of its teachers, that he has fled from the noise of
the courts of justice to the Academy and the
Lyceum ;' yet he has exempted no school and no
philosopher from his mockery,’ and chooses espe-
cially for the target of his wit those that through
their remarkable customs and obtrusive character
excite the most attention and offer the most tempt-
ing material for satire. But as he confines himself
almost entirely to the satirical exposition of the
errors of others and very seldom brings forward his
own views, his standpoint may indeed be generally

1 Piscat. δ sq.29; Bis Aceus. the δραπέται, the συμπόσιον, the
32, and elsewhere; cf. the pre- Ἑρμότιμος, ᾿Ικαρομένιππος, Ev-
vious note. νοῦχος, “AAteds, and several

2 References are superfluous. funeral orations.

Among his chief writings of δ Above all the Cynics, δὲ.
this kind are the βίων πρᾶσις, Ὁ. 290, 1; 844.

LUCIAN.

determined, but cannot be explained by any more
precise account of his convictions. If the treatise on
Nigrinus be authentic,! he was at first much impressed
with the independence of the external, and insight
into the hollowness of the ordinary life of the world,
which characterised the discourses of this Stoicising
Platonist, but we cannot suppose the impression to
have been very lasting, since in his description the
rhetorical phraseology is patent enough. Even the
Cynics, whom in the sequel he opposed with such
passionate bitterness, he treats for a time not with-
out kindliness, and puts his satires and especially
his attacks upon the gods of the popular belief into
their mouths.? In his later years he bestows high
praise upon Epicurus for his freedom from religious
prejudice and his relentless war against superstition.’
But he gives utterance to his own opinion doubtless
only where he maintains that he honours philosophy
indeed as the true art of life, but that among the
multitude of philosophical schools philosophy itself
cannot possibly be found, since there is no token of
it which does not require to be proved by a further

1} [ see no sufficient reason in
its contents for denying this;
even such a superficial man as
Lucian may have had transient
fits of disgust with the world.
2 So in many of the funeral
discourses (No. 1-8, 10, 11, 17,
18, 2022, 24~—28), in the Menip-
pus, Ζεὺς ἐλεγχόμ.; Catapl. c.
7; cf. Bernays, Lucian und die
Kyniher. 46 sq. On the other
hand, the discourse on Demo-
nax is not to be considered

genuine, as has been already
mentioned sup. p. 297, 1.

8 Alew.c.17,¢. 25: Ἐπικούρῳ,
ἀνδρὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων
καθεωρακότι καὶ μόνῳ τὴν ἐν
αὐτοῖς ἀλήθειαν εἰδότι. CO. 61;
᾿Ἐπικούρῳ ἀνδρὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἱερῷ
καὶ θεσπεσίῳ τὴν φύσιν καὶ μόνῳ
μετ᾽ ἀληθείας τὰ καλὰ ἐγνωκότι
καὶ παραδεδωκότι καὶ ἐλευθερωτῇ
τῶν ὁμιλησάντων αὐτῷ γενο-
μένῳ.

969

CHAP,
XTII.

860

CHAP.
XIIL.

Galen.

ECLECTICISM.

token; that they all strive for visionary treasures,
and waste their time with useless things; the best
philosopher is he who, conscious of his ignorance,
abandons any claim to a specific wisdom, and, in-
stead of speculative cogitations, keeps to the moral
advantages of philosophy.}

The limitation of philosophy to a system of
ethics, in which there is no question of any deeper
scientific foundation, is here based upon a sceptical
view of the human faculty of knowledge. We shall find
this sceptical element still more strongly developed
in Favorinus, who must, therefore, be discussed
among the adherents of the sceptic school. The
semi-philosophers from the rhetorical schools were
none of them distinguished by any independent
investigations, but the tendencies of the period
are nevertheless shown in them—namely, the re-
duction of philosophy to the useful and generally
comprehensible, and the connection of this popular
philosophy with the mistrust of all philosophic
systems which was spread abroad by scepticism.

Far greater is the scientific importance of Clau-
dius Galenus,? and though it is primarily the art of

1 Piscat. 11,29, and the whole
of the Hemmotiomus; especially
c. 15, 25 8724. 52 sq. 70 sgq. 84;
cf. Bis Accus. 24. Of. also the
characteristics of Lucian as
given by Bernays, 2. ¢. 42 sqq.

2 All the information that
can be gathered concerning
Galen’s life, almost entirely
from his own writings, is to be
found in Ackermann’s Hist.

Literaria Galeni, which first
appeared in Fabric. Bidl. Gr.
Vv. 877 δ. Harl., revised in the
first volume of Kiihn’s edition
of Galen, 8, xvii-cclxv. To
this history I will also refer,
even in respect of Galen’s
writings, passing over the rest
of the voluminous literature
concérning him. Born at Per-
gamum in the year 131 «.p.,

GALEN.

healing to which he owes his extraordinary fame
and influence, yet he also knows how to acknow-
ledge to the full the worth of philosophy,’ and
occupied himself with it deeply enough,? to take his

place among the philosophers of his century.®

He

himself indeed stands nearest to the Peripatetic

Galen, whose father was him-
self a great architect and ma-
thematician, had received a
careful education, and had
already been introduced to phi-
losophy; when in his seven-
teenth year he began the study
of medicine. After his father’s
death, he pursued both studies
in Smyrna, and medicine in
several other places, especially
in Alexandria (151 sqqg.) and
returned from thence in the
year 158 to practise his art in
his native city. In the year
164 he betook himself to Rome,
where he won great fame by
his success as a physician, and
in 168 again returned to Per-
gamum, but was soon after re-
called afresh to Italy by Marcus
Aurelius and Verus. When he
left Italy for the second time
is not known; and from this
point there is no connected
record of his life whatever.
A discourse delivered in the
reign of Pertinax is mentioned
by him (De Libr. Propr. c. 13 ;
vol. xix. 46 K); he wrote De
Antidotis (Δ. 13; vol. xiv. 16)
in the reign of Severus (Zheriac.
ad Pis.c. 2, vol. xiv. 217, proves
nothing against the genuine-
ness of this treatise), Accord-
ing to one account (that of the
anonymous person mentioned
by Ackermann, ὦ. ὁ. xl. sq.) he

lived to the age of 87; Suidas,
however, says 70 years; so that
he probably died in 200 or 201
A.D.

1 In Protrept. I. vol. i. 3, he
calls philosophy τὸ μέγιστον
τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν, and in another
treatise (vol. i. 53 sq.) he de-
sires his fellow physicians to
remember ὅτι ἄριστος ἰατρὸς καὶ
φιλόσοφος.

2 Galen had learned in his
home, while still very young,
the chief forms of philosophy
as it then existed; from pupils
of Philopator the Stoic, of
Gaius the Platonist, and of As-
pasius the Peripatetic, and
from an Epicurean philosopher
(Cogn. an. Morb. vol. v. 41 sq.),
At a later period he heard
Albinus in Smyrna (cide supra,
337): of Eudemus the Peri-
patetic, who perhaps was also
his teacher (διδάσκαλε, however,
may be a mere title of respect,
De Prenot. ad Hpig.c. 4, vol.
xiv. 624), he says that he had
gained more from him in regard
to philosophy than to medicine
(1. δ. ὁ. 2, p. 608). Galen’s
philosophical writings were
very numerous ; but the greater
part of them is lost.

§ Concerning Galen’s philo-
sophic opinions cf. K. Sprengel,
Beitr. 2. Gesch. ad. Medicin, i.
117~195.

361

CHAP.
XIII.

His fame
a8 ὦ
physician.

362

CHAP.
ΧΠΤ,

Character
of his phi-
losophy,
“electi-
Cism On ὦ
Peripate-
tie basis.

Eis theory
of know-
ledge.

ECLECTICISM.

school, but he has also taken so much from others
that we can only designate his standpoint on the
whole as that of eclecticism on a Peripatetic
foundation. Galen is at once placed among the
eclectics by the fact that he compiled an entire
series of continuous expositions and excerpts from
Platonic and Aristotelian writings,’ and also from
those of Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Chrysippus,
while at the same time he declares that none of
all these schools satisfy him.? To Epicurus alone he
is thoroughly antipathetic (as were the eclectics of
that time almost without exception), and expressly
opposes him.? The scepticism also of the New
Academy appears to him an error, which he combats
with great decision. He for his part finds man, in
spite of the limitation of his knowledge, sufficiently
endowed with means for the attainment of truth;
sensible phenomena we discern through the senses,

seldom, and almost always in
connection with subordinate
points; on the other hand, he
names (De Libr. Propr. α. 17,

1 Galen, De Libr. Propr. c.
11; 14-16; vol. xix. 41 sq. 46
sg.. Where a great number of
such works are named.

* Loe. eit. c. 11, p. 89 87.
with immediate reference to
the doctrine of proof. He
sought counsel on the subject
from the philosophers, but
found here as in other divisions
of logic so much strife among
them and even within the
several schools, that he would
have fallen back upon Pyrrhon-
ism if the certainty of the
mathematical sciences had not
kept him from it.

8 Galen, in those of his
writings which have been pre-
served, mentions Epicurus but

vol. xix. 48) no fewer than six
works against Epicurus and his
doctrine of pleasure.

* In the treatise περὶ ἀρίστης
διδασκαλίας (vol. i. 40 524.)
against Favorinus, Cogn. an.
Peee. c. ὃ, vol. v. 98 sgq. He
also wrote upon Clitomachus,
De Libr. Propr. ὦ. 12, Ὁ. 44.
His chief éomplaint against the
sceptics is that they could not
establish their standpoint with-
out appealing to the judgment
of others, and presupposing in
them the capability of deciding
between true and false.

GALEN.

the deceptions of which may well be avoided with
the necessary circumspection ; the super-sensible is
discerned by the understanding; and as the sensible
perception carries with it an immediate power of
conviction (ἐνάργεια), so also the understanding is
in possession of certain truths which are established
immediately and prior to all proof; of certain
natural principles which verify themselves by univer-
sal agreement; through all this, which is self-evi-
dent, the hidden’ is known by logical inference.
The criterion of truth, therefore, for all that is clear
through itself, is the immediate certainty, partly
that of the senses, partly that of the understanding ;
and the criterion of truth for what is hidden, is
agreement with the immediate certainty, which is
clear! This appeal to the directly certain, to the
senses and the unanimous opinion of men, this
empiricism of the inner and outer sense, corresponds
entirely with the standpoint of Cicero and of the
later eclectic popular philosophy.

Among the three principal divisions of philo-
sophy, Galen ascribes a high value to logic,? as
the indispensable instrument? of all philosophical

1 De Opt. Dise. c. 4, vol. i.

either assent to, or deny every-
48 sq.3; De Opt. Secta, 2; 1.

thing, &c.

108 sq.; Cogn. an. Peee. 1. 6. ;
De Hippoer. et Plat.ix.7; vol.
v. 717 sq. As principles that
are immediately certain, Galen
(Therap. Meth. i. 43 vol. x. 36)
names the ἀρχαὶ λογικαΐ, that
magnitudes equal to a third
magnitude are equal to one
another, that nothing happens
without a cause, that we must

2 Concerning Galen’s logic
eide Prantl, Gesch. der Logik. i.
559 sqq.

3 De Hlem. ex Hippoer. i. 6,
vol. i. 460, Quod Opt. Med. Sit
Qu. Philos. ἃ: 59 sq.; Constit.
Art. Med. c. 8; end, i. 253 s¢. ;
Efippocr, et Plat. ix. 7; end,
1; vol. v. 782. ᾿

High
opinion of
logia.

364

CHAP.
XTII.

ECLECTICISM,

enquiry. He himself has composed a great number
of logical treatises,! but what remains of them ? does
not cause us to deplore very deeply the loss of the
remainder. In the doctrine of the categories, which
he with others declares to be the beginning and
foundation of all logic,’ he appears to have attempted
a reconciliation between Aristotle and the Stoics ;4
otherwise the categories have for him only a logical
and not a real importance.’ In the syllogistic and
apodeictic part of logic, which are to him of most
importance, he tries to attain the certainty of the
geometric method ;° in regard to matter, he places

* For the catalogue of these
cf. Gal. De Libr. Propr. c. 11
89.; 15 sq.5 xix. 41 87.; 47
sg.; cf. Prantl, Ὁ. 559 sq.

2 The short treatise πὶ τῶν
κατὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφισμάτων (vol.
xiv. 582 sqq.), which is quoted
by Alex. Sophist. #7. 8, b, 45, a
(Scehol. 298, ὃ, 14; 312, ὃ, 29).
But nowhere else are Galen’s
logical writings and commen-
taries mentioned by the Greek
commentators (with the excep-
tion of the passage quoted injra,
365, 1).

8 Therap. Meth. ii. 7; x.
145; 148; Puls. Diff. ii. 9;
Vill. 622, 624. Whether Galen
had himself written on the
Categories is not quite clear
from his own expressions (Libs.
Propr. 11, Ὁ. 42). The meaning
seems to me to be that he did
not actually write commen-
taries on them, but only some
observations on the difficult
questions they contained. This
would explain the ὑπομνήματα
on the Categories mentioned ὁ.

15. Prantl (560, 79) is of a
diferent opinion.

* David (Sehol. in Ar. 49, a,
29) ascribes to him five Cate-
geries: οὐσία, ποσὸν, ποιὸν, πρός
Tt, πρός τί πως ἔχον, which does
not indeed altogether agree
with the division mentioned
elsewhere (Therap. Meth. ii. 7;
129 sq.; 146; 156) of the οὐσίαι
and the συμβεβηκότα ; and of
the latter division into ἐνέργειαι,
πάθη, and διαθέσεις ; but it can
hardly be a mere invention; cf.
Puls. Diff. 11.10; viii. 632.

δ He discriminates very de-
cidedly between the yévos and
the category; that which
falls under the same category
may belong to separate genera
(Puls. Dif. i. 9 84.; 622 sq.;
632. What Prantl, Ὁ. 565 e,
quotes concerning the differen-
tiating of genera into species
belongs to the older Peripa-
tetics. »

6 Libr. Propr. 11, Ὁ. 89 89. -
of. Fat. Form. ο. 6; ἦν. 655:
702.

GALEN.

himself on the side of Aristotle and Theophrastus!
and against Chrysippus; but that he himself out
of the five syllogistic forms which Theophrastus had
added to the Aristotelian first figure,? formed a
fourth figure of his own,* is very doubtful. What has
otherwise been imparted to us from the logic of
Galen, or is to be found in his writings, is in part
so unimportant, and in part so fragmentary, that it
may suffice to refer the reader for further details to
Prantl’s careful digest.

Also in his physics and metaphysics Galen even
asa physician and naturalist chiefly follows Aristotle
without however being entirely fettered by him.
He repeats the Aristotelian doctrine of the four
causes, but increases their number to five by the
addition of the middle cause (the δι’ οὗ). Like
Plato and Aristotle, he regards the final cause as the
most important:° the knowledge of them forms, he
says, the groundwork of true theology, that science
which far surpasses the art of healing.’ In follow-
ing the traces of the creative wisdom, which has
formed all things, he prefers to dwell on the con-
sideration of living creatures;”’ but he is at the
same time convinced that if here in the meanest

1 Hippoor. et. Plat. ii. 2; B.
v. 213.

2 Vide Phil. ἃ. Gr. ΤΙ. ii.

Concerning this fourth
figure of Galen’s, which was
formerly only known on the
authority of Averroés, but is
now confirmed and explained
by a Greek fragment of Minas
in his edition of the Εἰσαγωγὴ

διαλεκτικὴ Ὁ, νέ 8ῳ., vide the
exhaustive investigation of
Prantl, Ὁ. 570 sqq.

* De usu Part. Corp. Hum.
vi. 13; vol. ili. 465.

5 Loe. cit.

§ Loc. cit. xvii. 1; vol. iv.
360.

7 Loe. cit. Ὁ. 358 sgq. et
passim.

His
physics
and meta-
physies
based on
those af
Aristotle,
but not en-
tively
similar,

CHAP.
XIU.

ECLECTICISM.

portion of the universe, and in these base and un-
clean substances, so wonderful a reason is at work,
this must also be in overflowing measure in the
heaven and its stars, which are so much more
glorious and admirable.! In what manner it is
inherent in the world he does not enquire more
closely; but his expressions indicate a tendency to
the Stoic conception, according to which the sub-
stance of the world is permeated by the divine
mind.? He is opposed, however, to the Stoic mate-
rialism ; for he shows that the qualities of things
are not bodies;* he likewise contradicts the Stoic
views on the original constitution of matter when
he defends the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle, of
the four elements, against the Atomists and the
ancient physiologists, and among these, especially,
against the Stoic-Heracleitean theory of one primi-
tive matter. What we are told of his objections
against the Aristotelian discussions concerning space,
time, and motion, is unimportant.2 Galen’s devia-

1 Loe. cit.

2 P. 358: τίς δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εὐθὺς
ἐνεθυμήθη νοῦν τινα δύναμιν
ἔχοντα θαυμαστὴν ἐπιβάντα τῆς
γῆς ἐκτετάσθαι κατὰ πάντα τὰ
μόρια; this νοῦς comes to the
earth from the heavenly bodies:
ἐν οἷς εἰκὸς, ὅσῳ πέρ ἐστι καὶ ἡ
τοῦ σώματος οὐσία καθαρωτέρα,
τοσούτῳ καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἐνοικεῖν
πολὺ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ γήϊνα σώματα
βελτίω τε καὶ ἀκριβέστερον. And
even here, before all things,
in the human body, ἐν βορβόρῳ
τοσούτῳ, there is a νοῦς περιττὸς ;
how much more, then, in the
stars 1 through the air οὐκ ὀλίγος

τις ἐκτετάσθαι δοκεῖ νοῦς, for how
could it otherwise be heated
and illuminated by the sun ?

ὃ Quod Quatitates Sint In-~
corporea:. B, xix. 468 sqq.

‘ De Constit. Artis Med. c. 7
sg.; B. i. 245 sqq.3 De Hle-
mentis, ἢ, ὁ. 413 σφ. Though
the views of the Stoics are not
named among those combated
here, the Heracleitean doctrine
of primitive matter which Galen
opposes is also theirs (De L. i.
4, p. 444); cf. also Hippoen. et
Plat. viii, 2 sq. v. 655 gq.

* In respect to space, he de-~
fends (ap. Simpl. Phys. 183, Ὁ;

GALEN.

tion from Aristotle in respect to the soul and its
activity seems of more consequence, but even here
his utterances sound so hesitating that we clearly
see how completely he has failed to attain a fixed
standpoint in the strife of opinions. As to what
the soul is in its essence, whether corporeal or in-
corporeal, transitory or imperishable, he not only
ventures to propound no definite statement, but
not even a conjecture which lays claim to probability ;
and he omits every sound argument on the subject.!
The theory of Plato, that the soul is an immaterial
essence, and can live without the body, seems to
him questionable ; ‘for how,’ he asks, ‘could in-
corporeal substances be distinguished from each
other? how can an incorporeal nature be spread
over the body? how can such a nature be affected
by the body, as is the case with the soul in madness,
drunkenness, and similar circumstances.’2 So far

367

CHAP.
XIII.

Themist. Phys. 38, ὃ) the defi-
nition controverted by Aristotle
that it is the interval between
the limits of bodies; a miscon-
ception of Aristotle’s observa-
tion that time is not without mo-
tion; and the objection that Aris-
totle’s definition of time con-
tains a circle, are mentioned by
Simplicius, Phys. 167 a; 169 ὃ;
Themist. Phys. 45, a; 46, ὦ
(Sehol. 388, δ, 20; 26); and an
objection against Arist. Phys.
vii. 1; 242, a,5; in Simpl. Phys.
242, b. Simplicius here (p. 167,
a) refers to the eighth book of
Galen's Apodeictic, and it is
probable, therefore, that all
these remarks were to be found
in this work.

1 De Fat. Form. ὁ. 6; iv.
701 sg.; De Hipp. et. Plat. vii.
7; v. 653: the soul, accord-
ing to its οὐσία, 15 either τὸ οἷον
αὐγοειδές τε Kal αἰθερῶδεςσῶμα
Or, αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν
οὐσίαν, ὄχημα τε [δὲ] τὸ πρῶτον
αὐτῆς εἶναι τουτί τὸ σῶμα, δι᾽ οὗ
μέσου τὴν πρὸς τἄλλα σώματα
κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει. On the other
hand, the Pneuma is neither its
substance nor its seat, but only
its πρῶτον ὄργανον (1. 6. c. 3; Ὁ.
606 sq.).

2 Quod Animi Mores Corp.
Temp. Seg. ¢.3; 5; iv. 775
sq.; 785 84.} De Loc. AF. 1λ.5 ;
vill, 127 sq.

368

CHAP.
XIII.

ECLECTICISM.

we might be inclined to endorse the Peripatetic
doctrine, according to which the soul is the form of
the body ; but this would certainly lead to the view
maintained by the Stoics and shared by many of
the Peripatetics, that the soul is nothing else than
the mixture of corporeal substances, and as to its
immortality there could then be no question.!
Galen does not venture to decide on this point, and
as little does he purpose to affirm or to deny im-
mortality. It is the same with the question as to
the origin of living creatures. He candidly ac-
knowledges that he has not made up his mind upon
this subject. On the one hand he finds in the
formation of the human body a wisdom and a
power which he cannot attribute to the irrational
vegetable soul of the embryo; on the other hand
the likeness of children to their parents obliges him
to derive the children from that soul; if we further
assume that the rational soul builds up its own
body, we are confronted with the fact that we are
most imperfectly acquainted with its natural con-
stitution ; the only remaining alternative, to assume
with many Platonists, that the world-soul forms the
bodies of living creatures, seems to him almost im-
pious, since we ought not to involve that divine
soul in such base occupations. Galen declares
himself more decidedly for the Platonic doctrine of

' Qu. An. Mores, &e. 0. 8; 4; τὸ λογιστικὸν] οὔθ᾽ ds οὐκ ἔστιν
p. 773 sq.; 780. ἔχω διατείνασθαι.

* Vide supra andl. cc. 8: * De Fat. Form. co. 6, iv.
ἐγὼ δὲ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἔστιν [ἀθάνατον 683 82.

GALEN.

the parts of the soul and their abodes,! which he
also no doubt combines with the corresponding
doctrine of Aristotle ;? his uncertainty in regard to
the nature of the soul necessarily, however, casts
doubt also upon this theory. Nor will our philo-
sopher decide, he says, whether plants have souls,?
but in other places he declares himself decidedly
for the Stoic distinction between the ψυχὴ and the
φύσις."

We shall be all the less surprised at the vacilla-
tion and fragmentariness of these definitions when
we hear what value Galen attributes to theoretical
enquiries in general. The question concerning the
unity of the world, whether or not it had a begin-
ning, and the like, he thinks are worthless for the
practical philosophers ; of the existence of the Gods
and the guidance of a Providence we must indeed
try to convince ourselves, but the nature of the
Gods we do not require to know: whether they have
a body or not can have no influence on our conduct;
in a moral and political pomt of view it is also in-
different whether the world was formed by a deity
or by a blindly working cause, if only it be acknow-

ledged that it is disposed

1 Cf. besides the treatise De
Hippocratis et Platonis Placitis,
which discusses this subject in
no fewer than nine books with
wearisome diffusiveness, Qu.
Animi Mores, &c., c. 8. That
the three divisions of the soul
are not merely three faculties
of one substance, but three
distinct substances, is asserted

according to purpose and

by Galen, De Hipp. et Plat. vi.
2, and Z. σ.

2 In Hippoer. de <Alim. iii.
10; xv. 293; Zn ippocr. de
Humor. i. ὃ; xvi. 98.

$ De Substant. Facult. Nat. c.
1; B.iv. 757 sq¢.; cf. in Hippo-
cratis de ριον. Libr. vi.;
Sect. v. 5; xviii. b, 250.

* De Natur. Facult. i. 1; Δ. 1.

BB

369

CHAP.
SITI.

His con-
tempt for
merely
theoretical
enquiries
as useless
and out of
our sphere.

870

CHAP.
XIII.

His ethical
mritings
are all lost
but two
which wre
not very
amportant,
but prove
himto have
been an
eclectic
also in
this
sphere.

ECLECTICISM.

design. Even the question which he has so fully
discussed, concerning the seat of the soul, is only of
interest to the physician, and not to the philogo-
pher ;' while conversely a definite opinion regarding
the nature of the soul is only necessary to theoretic
philosophy, and neither to medicine nor ethics.?
We certainly require no further evidence that a
philosopher who measures the value of scientific
enquiries so entirely according to their direct and
demonstrated utility, could not advance beyond an
uncertain eclecticism. But we shall greatly deceive
ourselves if we therefore expect from him indepen-
dent ethical enquiries. Galen’s numerous writings
on this subject? are all lost, with the exception of
two ;* but what we learn from occasional utterances
in one place or another, concerning his ethical
opinions, contains merely echoes of older doctrines.
Thus we sometimes find the Peripatetic division of
goods into spiritual, bodily, and external;> and in
another connection the Platonic doctrine of the four
fundamental virtues,® and again the Aristotelian
proposition that all virtue consists in the mean.’
The question whether virtue is a science or some-

1 De Hippoer. et Plat. ix. 6; 7 In Hippoer. de Humor. 1.

B. v. 779 sq. 11, end; xvi. 104: ὥσπερ γὰρ
* De Subst. Facult. Nat. B. πὸ μέσον ἐστὶν αἱρετὸν ἐν πᾶσιν,
iv. 764. οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἢ ἐλλειπὲς

8 De Propr. Libr. 13; 17. φευκτόν, ἀρεταὶ δὲ πᾶσαι ἐν

* De cognoscendis curandisque μέσῳ συνίστανται αἱ δὲ κακίαι
animt morbis. De animi pecca- ἔξω τοῦ μέσου. These words
torum dignatione atque medela, refer indeed directly to cor-

5 Protrept. 11; i. 26 sq. poreal conditions, but they have

® De Hinpocr. οὐ Plat. vii.1 a universal application. .
sq.3 v. 594.

GALEN. of

thing else, Galen decides thus: in the rational parts Cap.
of the soul it is a science, in the irrational merely AI.
a faculty and a quality or disposition.! The eclectic
tendency of the man thus shows itself in this portion

also of his doctrine.

1 De Hippocr. e Plat. v. 5; vii. 1; v. 468; 595.

BB 2

INDEX.

.-.-----....ὃ

ACA

CADEMICS of the first cen-
tury B.c., 75 sqq.
— of the first centuries A.D., 344

Ssqq-

Academy, the New and the Old,
80; Philo, and the New, 81

-- in Imperial times increasingly
tends to belief inrevelation, 194;
eclecticism of the, 34, 355 sq.

Achaicus, his commentary on the
categories, 3138

Adrastus of Aphrodisias, a Peri-
patetic, 805, .; his commen-
taries on Aristotle, 308 82.;
views on the universe, 310

@£lius Stilo, L., Roman disciple of
Panszetius, 11

Aimilius Paulus, gave his sons
Greek instructors, 8

Ainesidemus, 22

/fschines, a disciple of Carneades, 5

AGther, theories concerning the,
124; 188: 341, 5; 342, 1

Agathobulus, a Cynic, 294, 2.

Albinus, a Platonist, 335; his ec-
clecticism, 346; his commenta-
ries on Plato, 337; his division
of philosophy, 347; his doc-
trines, 347; concerning Matter,
the Deity, the world, the world-
soul, demons, the virtues, 347-
849; his importance among the
later Platonists, 350

Alexander, a Peripatetic of the
first century B.C., 124, 1

Alexander of /Egse, a Peripatetic,
instructor of Nero, 304, 2

ANT

Alexander of Aphrodisias, a Peri-
patetic, 306, 2., 318; called the
Commentator and Second Ari-
stotle, 319; commentaries of,
321; various theories and doc-
trines of, 323; Aristotle’s doc-
trine of the Universal and
Particular, how treated by, 324;
his doctrine of the soul and
body, 326; the soul and vous,
327; relation of God and the
world, 329; Providence, 331

— the last important Peripatetic,
331

Alexander of Damascus, a Peri-
patetic, 306, 7.

Alexander of Seleucia, a Platonist,
called Peloplaton, 335, 2.

Ammonius, of the New Academy,
teacher of Plutarch, 102, 2;
334, 3; 586, 2.

Anatolius of Alexandria, Bishop
of Laodicea about 270, A.D., dis-
tinguished himself in the Peri-
patetic philosophy, 332, 2

Andronicus of Rhodes, head of
the Peripatetic school in Athens,
113; Aristotle’s work edited by,
115; diverged from Aristotle,
116; but was on the whole a
genuine Peripatetic, 117

Animal food, to be avoided, ac-
cording to Musonius, 225; ar-
gument of Sextius against, 186

Annzeus Serenus, a Stoic, 196, 2.

Anthropology, Cicero’s, 169; Se-
neca’s, 219

374.

ANT

Antibius, 200, 2.

Antidotus, instructor of Antipater
of Sidon, 54, 2.

Antiochus of Ascalon, disciple of
Philo, called the founder of the
fifth Academy, 87 ; his doctrines :
virtue and knowledge, 87; cri-
terion of truth, 88; dicta of the
senses not to be discarded, 89;
scepticism self-contradictory,
90; maintains that all the
schools of philosophy are vir-
tually in agreement, 91; called
by Cicero a pure Stoic, 92;
divides philosophy into three
parts, 92; his theory of know-
ledge, 93; his ethics, 95; doc-
trines of life according to
nature, 96; the highest good,
96 ; virtue and happiness, 97; his
position in regard to the Stoics
and Peripatetics, 98; school
of, 99; other disciples of, 100

Antiochus the Cilician, a Cynic,
294, ῃ.

Antipater of Sidon,
philosopher, 54, 22.

Antipater of Tyre, 71, 2,

Apollas of Sardis, of the school of
Antiochus, 100, 2.

Apollodorus of Athens, leader of
the Stoic school in the first
century B.C., 53, 2.

Apollodorus 6 κηποτύραννος, com-
pared with Epicurus, 27, 28

Apollonides, friend of Cato, 72, n.

Apollonius, a freedman of Cassius,
72, 2.

Apollonius, a Peripatetic, 304, 2

Apollonius, a Platonist, 334, 3

Apollonius of Mysa, a Stoic, 53, 2.

Apollonius of Ptolemais, 72, 1.

Apollonius of Tyre, 71, 2.

Apollonius, Stoic instructor of
Marcus Aurelius, 198, 2.

Apuleius, on the Cosmos, 129; not
the author of the treatise περὶ
κόσμου, 131

poet and

INDEX.

ATH

Archaicus, a Peripatetic, 807, 2.

Aristo, a disciple of Antiochus, who
went over from the Academy to
the Peripatetics, 105, 2; 121

Aristocles of Messene, a Peripa-
tetic, 314; fragments of his
great historical work preserved
by Eusebius, 315; his admiration
for Plato, 315; his conception
of Reason, human and divine,
317; was a precursor of Neo-
Platonism, 318

Aristocles of Pergamus, a Peripa-
tetic, 305, 2.

Aristodemus, a Platonist, 334, 8

Aristodemus, teacher of Strabo,
75, ἢ. ;

Aristotle, commentaries on, 112,
304 sgq.; assertion of his agree-
ment with Plato, by Antiochus,
91; by Cicero, 163; by Severus
and Albinus, 346, 347

Aristus, brother and successor of
Antiochus in the New Academy
at Athens, 100, 1

Arius Didymus of Alexandria, the
Academic, 106

Arrian, author of a Meteorology,
258, 1

Arrian, the Stoic, 258

Artemon, a Peripatetic, 307, 2.

Asclepiades of Bithynia, relation
to Epicureanism, 29; atomistic
theory of, 81

Asclepiades, two Cynics of that
name, 294, ”.; 801, 3

Asclepiodotus, a Stoic, 71, 2.

Asclepiodotus of Nicewa, a disci-
ple of Panectius, 53, 2.

Aspasius, a Peripatetic, 805, ἡ. ;
his commentaries on Aristotle,
308

Athenodorus, son of Saudon, 72, 2.

Athenodorus, surnamed Cordylio,
71, 2.

Athenodorus the Rhodian, 124, 1

Athens visited by Romans, 18 ;
proposal by Gellius to the philo-

INDEX.

ATH

sophers in, 16; public teachers
of the four principal schools of
philosophy established in, by
Mareus Aurelius, 193

Attalus, teacher of Seneca, 195

Atticus, his zeal for the purity of
the Academic doctrines, 341;
opposition to Aristotle’s defi-
nition concerning Homonyms,
342, 343

Atomistic theory of Asclepiades, 31

ALBUS, bl. Lucilius, 55, 2.
Balbus, Ὁ. Lucilius, 55,.; 74,2.

Basilides, 54, 2.

Basilides of Scythopolis, 198, x.

Boéthus, Flavius, 306, 2.

Boéthus of Sidon, the Peripatetic,
disciple of Andronicus, 117 ; his
commentaries on Aristotle, and
divergences from him, 119; on
the immortality of the soul, 120

Boéthus, the Stoic, 35; hisdeviation
from pure Stoicism, 35; attitude
to the Stoic theology, 36; tothe
doctrine of the conflagration of
the world, 37, and prophecy, 38

Brutus, M.,a disciple of Antiochus,
100, %.

ALLICLES, 75, 4
Carneades, his predilection
for ethics, 5; his influence at
Rome, 9
Carneades, the Cynic, 291, 2 end
Cato, Seneca’s opinion of, 230
Cato the Elder, 15, 1
Cato the Younger, 74, 2.
Celsus, a Platonist in the time of
Marcus Aurelius, 336, 2.
Censorinus, 336, 2.
Chesremon, teacher of Nero, 195, 1
Chairs, institution of public, by
Hadrian, 189
Chrysippus, on the treatise περὶ
κόσμου, 127
Chytron, a Cynic, 301, 3

375

CRA

Cicero, his writings on Greek phi-
losophy, 1£; on the Epicureans,
25; his philosophic studies, 147 ;
his philosophical works, 148;
his scepticism, 149, 151; Cicero
and Carneades, 152, 157; his
objection to dialectic, 153; his
theological opinions, 154 sg. 167 ;
his view of philosophy, 156 ; his
theory of knowledge, 158; doc-
trine of innate knowledge, 159 ;
moral disposition innate, 160;
his doctrine of a moral sense,
160; his criterion of truth, 161;
on the immortality of the soul,
161, 170; dialectics and physics,
162; his criticism of Epicurean-
ism, 162; his ethics, 163; criti-
cism of the Stoics, 164; his
uncertainty and want of origin-
ality, 166; nature of God ac-
cording to, 167; human nature
in, 162; belief in Providence,
168; anthropology, 169; on
freewill, 171; Cicero a repre-
sentative of eclecticism, 157, 171

Cinna, Catulus, a Stoic, instructor
of Marcus Aurelius, 198, 7.

Claranus, a Stoic, 196, 7.

Claudius Agathinus, of Sparta,
disciple of Cornutus, 196, 2.
Claudius Maximus, Stoic, instrac-
tor of Marcus Aurelius, 198, 2.
Claudius Severus, teacher of Mar-

cus Aurelius, 306, 2.

Clitomachus, 5.

Commentators of Aristotle—Cri-
tolaus, Diodorus, Andronicus of
Rhodes, 113, 306

-— of Plato, 337 sq.

Cornutus, L. Annus, a Stoic,
banished by Nero, 196, 2. ; 198 sq.

Cotta, C., consul in 76 Β.0., dis-
ciple and adherent of Philo,
100, ἢ.

Crassitius, Lucius, of Tarentum,
member of the school of the
Sextil, 181

CRA

Crassus, Cornelius, a prolific writer
of the school of the Sextii, 181
Cratippus, a Peripatetic of the
first century Β.0., 122

Crescens,a Cynic, accuser of Justin
the Martyr, 294, 2.

Crispus Passienus, a Stoic, 196, ».

Critolaus, the most important re-
presentative of the Peripatetic
School in the second century
B.C., 118

Cronius, a Platonist, 336, 2.

Cynicism, revival of, soon after
the beginning of the Christian
era, 289

Cynics, the, of the Imperial era,
288, 290

—, mentioned by Julian, 301, 3;
last traces of the, 302

ALMON, the divine in man,
266 (Epictetus); 278 (Marcus
Aurelius)

Damocles of Messene, 53, ».

Daphnus, a Platonist, 336, 22.

Dardanus, disciple and successor
of Panzetius, 53, 2.

Demetrius, a Cynic, friend of
Seneca, 291; his moral prin-
ciples, 293; his contempt for
knowledge, 293

Demetrius, an Epicurean, 28

Demetrius, a Platonist, 335, 9.

Demetrius Chytras, a Cynic,
301, 8

Demetrius of Byzantium, a Peri-
patetic, 307, 2.

Demetrius the Bithynian, a Stoic,
58, 2.

Democritus, a Platonist, 336, 2.

Demonax, a Cynic, 294, ».; his
eclecticism, 297; his efforts to
liberate men from things oxter-
nal, 297; abstained from mar-
riage, sacrifices, and the mys-
teries, 298; his ready wit and
practical influence, 299

Demons, Posidonius in regard to,

INDEX.

ECL

61; in the treatise ep) κόσμου,
132; all things are full of gods
and (Epictetus), 265; Albinus
on, 349

Dercyllides, the grammarian mem-
ber of the New Academy, 102, 2

Destiny, submission to, man’s duty,
271 (Epictetus); 284 (Marcus
Aurelius)

Dio, 100, 2.; 121, 2

Dio Chrysostom, 353; his notion
of philosophy the endeavour to
be a rightcous man, 354; ap-
proximation of Stoicism, 355;
Plato next to Demosthenes his
pattern of style, 356 ; his general
standpoint, 357

Diodorus, a Peripatetic commen-
tator, 113

Diodotus, instructor and friend of
Cicero, 22.

Diogenes, a Cynic, in the reign of
Vespasian, 294, 2.

Diogenes of Seleucia, his opinion
as to the conflagration of the
world, 36

Diogenes of Tarsus, an Epicurean,
28, 2

Diogenianus, a Peripatetic, 307, 2.

Diognetus, 198, 2.

Dionysius of Cyrene, a geometri-
cian, 53, 2.

Dionysius, Stoic of the first cen-
tury A.D., 196, 2.

Dionysius, Stoic philosopher of the
first century B.c., 71,2.

Diotimus, of the school of Panz-
tins, 54, 2.

Diphilus, a Stoic, 53, 2.

Divine assistance to man, how
understood by Seneca, 243

CLECTICISM, originand growth

of, in Greck philosophy ; cha-
racter of, 17; presupposes an
individual criterion of truth,
18; eclecticism and the philo-
sophy of revelation, 20; scep-

INDEX.

ECL

ticism, 21; contained germs of
Neo-Platonism, 23; eclecticism
among the Epicureans, 24 sq.;
the Stoics, 81 sq, 246 s¢,,
189; the Academics, 76 sq., 335
sq.; the Peripatetics, 112 s¢.,
304; In Cicero, 146; in Seneca,
224, 225; of Galen, 362; Hclec-
tics belonging to no particular
school, 351

Eclectic School, the, 111

Egnatius, Celer P., a Stoic, 197

Ennius, his acquaintance with
Greek philosophy, 7

Epictetus, 197, ».; date and per-
sonal history of, 257; his con-
ception of philosophy, 258 ; doc-
trines, 259 sqy.; men are to be
made philosophers in behaviour
rather than opinions, 260; his
opinion of logic and dialectic,
261; natural philosophy, 262;
religious view of the world, 263 ;
belief in the perfection of the
world, 263; opinion of the popu-
lar religion, 264; soothsaying,
265; demons, 266 ; immortality
of the soul, 266; freewill, 267;
innate moral conceptions and
principles, 268 ; man’s indepen-
dence of things external, 269 ;
duty of absolute submission to
destiny, 271; inclination of
Epictetus to cynicism, 272; his
cynicism modified by his mild
disposition, 274; his love of
mankind, 275

Epicureanism, the later, at Rome,
12

Hpicureans, in the first two cen-
turies B.c., relation of the later
to Hpicurus, 26; Cicero on the,
25, 162

.-- the, averse to science, 194

Equality of men (Seneca), 242

Ethics of Panzetius, 47; of Posi-
donius, 67 ; of Antiochus, 95 ; of
Eudorus, 104; of Arius Didymus,

377

GAL
108 ; of Cicero, 163; of Varro,
173; of the Sextii, 185; of

Seneca, 226; of Musonius, 251;
of Epictetus, 268 sg.; of Marcus
Aurelius, 286; of Galen, 370

Eubulus, a Platonist, 336, 2.

Huclides, a Platonist, 336, 7.

Hudemus, a Peripatetic, 306, 2.

Hudorus of Alexandria, his Pla-
tonism, 103; his digest of the
Categories, 104; his Encyclo-
pedia, 104

Euphrates, teacher of the younger
Pliny, 197, Ὁ.

Evil external, Seneca’s view of,
229; Epictetus on, 270; Demo-
nax on, 297; Marcus Aurelius
on, 284.

ABIANUS PAPIRIUS, 181
Faith, attitude of Panzetius to
the popular, 50; of Cicero, 169; of
Seneca, 244; of Hpictetus, 264,
265 ; of Marcus Aurelius, 282

Fannius, C., a Roman disciple of
Pansetius, 55, ἢ.

Fatalism of the Stoics opposed by
Diogenianus, 307 ; by Alexander
of Aphrodisias, 322

Forgiveness of injuries, Seneca,
241; Epictetus, 274; Marcus
Aurelius, 286

Freewill, Cicero’s treatise on, 1713.
Seneca on, 231; Epictetus on,
267

Friendship, Seneca on, 240; opinion
of some Hpicureans on, quoted
by Cicero, 25

AIUS, a Platonist, 335, .; his
commentaries on Plato, 337
Galen of Smyrna; his personal
history, 360, 2; his fame as a.
physician, 368; his philosophy
is eclecticism on a Peripatetic
basis, 362; theory of knowledge,
363; high opinion of logic, 363
sq.; his physicsand metaphysics,.

-378

GAL

365 sqg.; doctrine of matter, 366;
soul and body, 367; contempt
for theoretical enquiries, 369 ;
eclecticism of his ethics, 370;
his ethical writings, most of
them lost, 370

'Gellius the proconsul, his proposal
to the philosophers in Athens, 16

‘Georgius of Lacedasmon, 53, 2).

God, nature of, according to Boé-
thus, 36; Cicero, 160, 167;
Seneca, 213 s7., Hpictetus, 268 ;
Marcus Aurelius, 280-282 ; Alex-
ander of Aphrodisias, 330, 342 ;
Galen, 369

Gods, see Faith

‘Good, the highest, according to
Antiochus, 96; Cicero, 164 sq.;
Varro, 172

‘Greek philosophy, decline of origi-
nality in, 3; effect of scepticism
on, 4; among the Romans, 610;
Roman students of, 11; effect
of Roman character on, 14; last
epoch of, 23

APPINESS, to be sought in
ourselves (Seneca), 236;
(Epictetus) 270; (Marcus Au-
relius) 282, 284
Harpocration of Argos, a Platonist,
336, n.; his commentaries on
Plato, 339
Hecato, of Rhodes, member of the
school of Panzetius, 58, »., 55
Hegesianax, a Cynic, 295, ἢ.
Heliodorus, a Peripatetic, 322, 1
Heliodorus of Prusa, 115, 5
Helvidius Priscus, a Stoic, put to
death by Vespasian, 197, ἢ.
Heraclides, the Stoic, 52; con-
temporary of Paneetius, 52
Heraclitus, a Stoic, 195, 1
Heraclitus, of Tyre, member of the
New Academy, 99, 2.
Heraclius, a Cynic, 301, 3
Heras, a Cynic in the reign of
Vespasian, 294, »

INDEX.

LAM

Herminus, a Peripatetic, 306, ».;
his commentaries on Aristotle,
312

Herminus, a Stoic, 200, 2.

Hermodorus the Ephesian, 6, 2

Herophilus, a Cynic, 294, 2.

Homonyms, Aristotle’s definition
concerning, objected to by Atti-
cus, 842, 343

Honoratus, a Cynic, 29+, 2.

Human nature, how treated by
Cicero, 169; by Seneca, 239 ; by
Epictetus, 260; by Marcus Au-
relius, 286

DEAS, doctrine of, according to
Albinus, 348
Images, worship of (Varro), 178
Immediate certainty, its nature
according to the Eclectics, 19
Immortality, Cicero on, 161, 170;
Seneca’s view of, 223; Epictetus
on, 266; Marcus Aurelius on, 288
Iphicles, of Epirus, a Cynic, 301, 3

ASON, a Stoic, 71, 2.
Julianus, of Tralles, 307, 2.

INSHIP of mankind, Seneca,
239

— of man to God (Epictetus), 266 ;
(Mareus Aurelius) 283; (Dio
Chrysostom) 356

Knowledge of God, innate in man
(Cicero), 160, 161 ; (Dio Chryso-
stom), 356

Knowledge, theory of, 311; Philo’s,
79, 88; Cicero’s, 158; Cicero’s
doctrine of innate, 159; Anti-
ochus’ theory of, 97; proper
object of, the universal, Alex-
ander of Aphrodisias, 324; Al-
binus on the theory and faculty
of, 847; Galen’s theory of, 362

AMPRIAS, a Peripatetic, bro-
ther of Plutarch, 305, ».

INDEX.

LEO

Leonides, a Stoic of Rhodes, 71, 2.

Logic, how treated by Seneca, 208;
by Epictetus, 261 ; by Alexander
of Aphrodisias, 321; by Galen,
323

Longinus, 336, ἢ.

Love of mankind (Seneca), 239,
240; (Epictetus) 275; Marcus
Aurelius), 286

Lucanus M. Annzeus, nephew of
Seneca, a Stoic, 197, 2.

Lucian, his personal history, 357 ;
considers philosophy as tied to
no system, but satirises each in
turn, 358, 359; conception of
true philosophy as the true art
of life, 360

Lucilius, 12, 3; 196, 2.

Lucretius, Hpicureanism of, 26

Lyco, a Bithynian, 53, 2.

ARCUS AURELIUS, settled
public teachers of the four
chief schools of philosophy in
Athens, 193; references to him
and his instructors, 199, .;
his personal history, 276; re-
semblances to Epictetus, 278 ;
conception of human life and of
the problem of philosophy, 279 ;
his doctrines, 279 sg.; belief in
the Divine order of the universe,
281; in dreams and auguries,
282; future existence, 283; his
ethics, 284; resignation to the
will of God, 285; love to man,
286; nobility and purity of his
life, 287
Marriage, Seneca’s view of, 240;
Musonius on, 256 ; Epictetus on,
273
Maximus of Nicea, a Platonist,
336, n
Maximus of Tyre, a Platonist, 335,
2.5 337
Menecrates of Methyma, of the
school of Antiochus, 100, 2.

379

NER

Menephylus, a Peripatetic, 304, 2

Menesarchus, disciple and succes-
sor of Panzetius, 53

Menippus, a Cynic of the third
century B.c., 291, 1

—, the Lycian, mentioned by
Philostratus, 291, 7.

Meteorology, Seneca’s, 211

Metrodorus, philosopher and
painter, 8,1 ; accompanied Aimi-
lius Paulus on his warlike ex-
peditions, 8

Metronax, a Stoic, 196

Mnasagoras, disciple of Panzetius,
53, 2.

Mnaseas of Tyre, of the school of
Antiochus, 100, 2.

Mnesarchus, the Stoic, 86

Monachism adopted by the Chris-
tian Church from Cynicism, 303

Mucius Sceevola, disciple of Panz-
tius, 49

Mummius, Sp., Roman, disciple of
Panetius, 55, 2.

Museum, the Alexandrian, 191

Musonius, a Cynic, 766, 2 end

Musonius, a Stoic of the third cen-
tury A.D., 200, 2.

Musonius Rufus, instructor of
Epictetus, 197, ».; personal his-
tory, 246, 3; devoted to prac-
tical ethics, 248; asserted
philosophy to be the only way
to virtue, 251; his personal in-
fluence, 253; Stoicism exag-
gerated by Musonius, 253 ; inner
freedom of man his leading
thought, 254 ; reasons for avoid-
ing animal food, 255 ; views on
marriage and the exposure of
children, 256; disapproval of
public prosecutions, 256

Musonius the Tyrian, 199, 2.

EO-PLATONISM, forerunners

of, among the Platonists, 344

Nero, influence of the time of, on
philosophy, 236

980

NES

Nestor of Tarsus, the Academic,
54, 2.3; distinct from Nestor the
Stoic, 102, 2

Nicander the Bithynian, 53, x.

— a Peripatetic, 307, 2.

Nicolaus of Damascus, 122

Nigrinus, a Platonist, 335, »; his
eclecticism, 344.

Numa, the books of, 7

Numenius, 336, 2.

NOMAUS of Gadara, a Cynic
of the ‘reign of Hadrian,
295; his treatise against the
‘ Jugglers,’ 295
Origen, 336, 2.
Originality, decline of, in Greek
philosophy, 8
Orion, 282

ANZETIUS of Rhodes, 39; at
Rome, 9; friend of Scipio and
Lelius, 40; head of the Stoic
school in Athens, 40; learning
and reputation, 41; character
of his Stoicism, £2 ; denial of the
soul’s existence after death, 48;
ethics, 47; work on duty, 48;
theology, 49: his allegorical in-

. terpretation of myths, 50; rejec-
tion of soothsaying, 58; relation
to the Stoics, 51; contemporaries
and disciples of, 52; school of,
53 sq.; and Seneca, 245

Pancratius, a Cynic, 294, ».

Papirius, Fabianus, member of the
school of the Sextii, 181

Paramonus of Tarsus, disciple of
Panzetius, 53, 2

Paulus, the Prefect, a Peripatetic,
306, 2.

Pausanias of Pontus, disciple of
Panzetius, 53, 2.

Peregrinus, a Cynic, 294, 2. ;
Lucian’s description of him,
299, 3; his voluntary death by
fire, 299; praised by Gellius, 300

INDEX.

PHI

Περὶ Κόσμου, the treatise, its origin,
125; Chrysippus on, 127; Posi-
donius not the author of, 128;
nature of the treatise, 132;
affinity with Stoicism, 135;
Peripatetic and Stoic ideas com-
bined in it, 137; its probable
date of composition, 138; later
than Posidonius, 141; about the
first century B.¢., 143

Peripatetics, the later, 112; ex-
clusively clevoted to commen-
taries on Aristotle, 194

— of the first centuries after Christ,
304 sq.

Peripatetic School from the second
half of the third century A.D.
eradually merged in that of the
Neo-Platonists, 332

Persius, Flaccus A,
197, 2.

Petronius, Aristocrates, of Mag-
nesia, a Stoic, 196, 2.

Phanias, a Stoic, 71, 2.

Philo, of Larissa, at Rome, 88 B.c.,
12; personal history, 75; in-
structor of Cicero, 76; practical
basis, 77; his revival of Platon-
ism, 82; theory of knowledge,
83; was the founder of the
‘Fourth Academy,’ 84; pupils
of, 100, 2.

Philopator, a Stoic under Fladrian,
198, 2.

Philosophers banished from. Rome,
7

a Stoic,

- Sects of, onumerated by Varro,
17

Philosophy, schools of, tend to
amalgamation, 1; Roman esti-
mates of, 15

— of revelation, allied with eclec-
ticism, 20; schools of, are all in
agreement, according to Antio-
chus, 91; general character of,
in Imperial times, 189

~- regarded with political mis-
trust in the first century B.C.,

INDEX.

PHI

190; chairs of, established by
Hadrian, 191; theoretical and
practical, 205; relation of, to
rhetoric, 352

Physics, Seneca’s high estimation
of, 210

Φύσις distinguished from ψυχὴ by
Pansetius, 47; by Galen, 369

Piso, 55, 2.

Piso, M.,a disciple of Antiochus,
101, 2.

Plato, commentators of, 337

Plato of Rhodes, 58, 2.

Platonism, revival by Philo, 82

Platonists of the first centuries
A.D., 334

Plutarch, his commentary on Plato, |

337

Polyzelus, a Cynic, 295, ἢ.

Polyzelus, a Peripatetic, 295 2.

Posidonius at Rome at the begin-
ning of the first century B.c., 12

-— a Syrian of Apamea, clisciple of
Paneetius, 56; his doctrines and
relation to Stoicism, 59 84.;
love of rhetoric and erudition,
62; natural science, 62; anthro-
pology, 64 ; doctrine of the soul,
64 sq.; ethics, 65; psychology,
68; not the author of περὶ
κόσμον, 128

Potamo of Alexandria, his eclec-
ticism, 109 sq.; criterion of
truth, 11]

Premigenes of Mytilene, a Peripa-
tetic, 306, 2.

Proclinus, a Platonist, 336, 2.

Protagoras, a Stoic, 74, 2.

Providence, Cicero’s belief in, 168;
Marcus Aurelius on, 285

Ptolemy, a Peripatetic, 317, 2.

Ptolemy, two Epicureans of that
name, 28, 2

Publius, a disciple of Philo, 100, 2.

ELIGION, Seneca’s conception
of, 244

381

SEL

Rhetoric, an important part of
publicinstruction in the Imperial
period, 352; numerous schools
of, 352; appointment of public
teachers of, 352

Roman character, effect of, on
Greek philosophy, 14

Roman disciples of Panztius,
55, 2.

Roman estimate of philosophy, 15

Roman students of Greek philo-
sophy, 11

Rome, Greek philosophy at, 6;
philosophers banished from, 7;
Carneades at, 9; Greek philo-
sophy at, 10; Epicureanism at,
12; Panetins at, 9; Stoicism
at, 9; Philodemus and Syro, the
Epicureans at, in the first cen-
tury B.c., 13; Philo the Platonist
at, in 88 B.c., 12

Rubellius Plautus, a Stoic put to
death by Nero, 197, .

Rusticus Junius, Stoic instructor
of Marcus Aurelius, 198, 2.

Rutilius Rufus, Q., Roman disciple
of Panzetius, 55, 2.

AKEKAS, a Platonist, 336, ἢ.
Sallustius, a Cynic ascetic of

Athens in the sixth century A.D.,
302, 3

Sandon, 72, 2.

Screvola, Q. Mucius, Roman dis-
ciple of Panzetius, δῦ, 2.

Scepticism, its effect on Greek
philosophy, 4; relation of, to
eclecticism, 12; self-contradic-
tory accorcling to Antiochus, 90;
of Seneca, 225

Schools of Philosophy, the, tend
to approximate, 193

Scylax of Halicarnassus, friend of
Paneatius, 54, ».

Self - examination,
(Seneca), 238

Selius, Caius, disciple of Philo,
100, ἢ.

necessity of

382

SEN

Seneca, 196, 2.; his reputation and
influence, 208; practical nature
of his ethics, 204; his concep-
tion of philosophy, theoretical
and practical 205 sq¢.; contempt
for merely theoretical inquiries,
his view of logic, 208; his high
estimation of physics, 210; his
meteorology, 211; physical and
theological doctrines, 212 ;nature
of God, according to, 213; Stoic-
ism in, 215; theories of the
world, 217; his anthropology,
219; nature of the soul, accord-
ing to, 219; theory of passions
and affections, 221; frailty of
human nature, 221; contempt
for the body, 222; body and
spirit opposed, 222; his view of
immortality, 223 ; Seneca’s psy-
chology compared with that of
Chrysippus, 224; scepticism of,
225; Stoicism of, 226, 242

—on external evil, 229; ethics
of, 226; Peripateticism of, 229 ;
his opinion about Cato, 230

— on the wise man, 231; his
deviation from Stoicism, 231;
vacillation in his character, 232 ;
rhetoric of, 984

— influence of his time, 235

—— bids us find happiness in onr-
selves, 236; necessity of self-
examination, 238 ; natural kin-
ship of mankind, 239; view of
political life, 239; love of man-
kind, 239, 240; view of marriage,
240

— on the forgiveness of inju-
ries, 241; view of suicide, 245 ;
of the assistance given by the
Deity to man, 243; on the
equality of men, 242; his con-
ception of religion, 244; com-
pared with Panzetius, 245

Senses, the, their dicta not to be
discarded; doctrine of Antio-
chus, 89; of Cicero, 158

INDEX.

STO

Serapio, a Stoic, 196 x.

Serenianus, a Cynic, 301, 8

Severus, a Platonist, 336, 2.; his
commentary on the Timeus, 339;
his eclecticism, 345 ; treatise on
the soul, 345 sqg.; deviations
from Platonism, 348

Sextii, school of the, advocated
daily self-examination, re-
nounced animal food, 186; its
character and doctrines, 183 sq.;
was a branch of Stoicism, 187

Sextius, Q., his school, 180; ques-
tion as to his authorship of the
book of Sentences, 182, 2; rela-
tion to the Stoics, 186; succeeded
as head of the school by his son,
181

Sextus of Cheeronea, a Platonist,
335, 2.

Sextus, the supposed Pythagorean,

“15 wal

Socrates, a Peripatetic, 307, n.

Sosigenes, the Peripatetic, 306, .;
313

Sosigenes, the Stoic, contemporary
of Panzetius, 52

Soson of Ascalon, 53, 7.

Sotas of Paphos, a Stoic, 54, 2.

Sotion, a Peripatetic, 305, 2.

Sotion of Alexandria, member of
the school of the Sextii, 181;
instructor of Seneca, 181

Soul, nature of the, according to
Asclepiades, 30; Antiochus, 95;
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 326;
Cicero, 170; Posidonius, 64;
Seneca, 219; Marcus Aurelius,
283 ; the, an emanation from the
Deity, 176; the, immortality of,
defended by Cicero, 170; is air
(Varro), 176; opinions of Atticus,
342; Galen, 367

Sphodrias, a Cynic, 295, 2.

Staseas, of Naples, called by Cicero
nobilis Peripatetious, 122, ἢ

Stoicism at Rome, 9

Stoics, the later, 34; of the first

INDEX.

STO

century 3B.C., 71 sg.; the, and
Sextius, 186; the, in the first
centuries A.D., 189; criticism of
the, by Cicero, 164; their re-
striction to ethics, 194; under
Domitian, Trajan, and Hadrian,
198, ».; inclination of the later
to Platonism, 42 sq., 62 sq.

Strabo the geographer, a Stoic,
73, Ἢ.

Stratocles of Rhocles,
54, 2.

Strato, the Alexandrian Peripa-
tetic, 807, 2.

Suicide, Seneca’s view of, 243; de-
fended by the Cynics, 298, 300
Sulpicius Gallus, astronomer and

philosopher, 8

a Stoic,

AURUS CALVISIUS BERY-
TUS, a Platonist, 335, ».;
commentaries on Plato, 340

Tetrilius Rogus, 100, 2.

Theagenes, a Cynic, 294, 2; dis-
ciple of Peregrinus, 301

Theodotus, a Platonist, 336, 2.

Theomnestus, a Cynic, 295, n.

Theomnestus, of the New Aca-
demy, 102, 2

Theo of Alexandria, 73, 2.

Theo of Smyrna, a Platonist, 335,
m.; his commentaries on Plato,
339

Theopompus, of the school of An-
tiochus, 100, x.

‘Thrasea Petus, a Stoic, 197, ἡ;
friend of Seneca, 291, 2

Thrasyllus, the grammarian, mem-
ber of the New Academy,
102, 2

Timocles of Cnidus, 54, ἢ.

Truth, criterion of, according to
Antiochus, 88; according to
Potamo, 111; Cicero, 153, 156,
161; according to Galen, 363

588.

ZEN

Tubero, Q. Ailius, Roman disciple
of Panetius, 55, 2.

ARRO, a disciple of Antiochus,
100, ». ;a Roman eclectic and
friend of Cicero, 171; his view
of philosophy, 172; and the.
sects of philosophers, 173; his
ethics and doctrine of the
highest good, 174; virtue a con-
dition of happiness, 174; his:
psychology and theology, 176;
his opinion of image worship,.
178; of State religion and theo-
logy, 178

Vespasian, his measures against
philosophers, 190, 1; payments.
to rhetoricians, 191, 3

Vigellius, M., Roman disciple of’
Pansetius, 55, n.

Virginius Rufus, a Peripatetic,.
307, 2.

Virtue and knowledge, according
to Antiochus the Academic, 88,
96

Virtue, a condition of happiness,.
174 (Varro) ; 238 (Seneca); rela--

‘ tion of, to philosophy, according
to Musonius Rufus, 251

ISE MAN, the, of the Stoics,.
and Seneca, 231
World, theories of the (Treatise
περὶ κόσμου), 1384; (Seneca), 217 ;
(Marcus Aurelius), 281; (Atti-
cus), 342; final conflagration of
the, 34, 35, 44

ATES, a Cynic, 295
Xenarchus, controverted Aris-
totle’s Physics, 124

ENO of Sidon, 27

Zeno of Tarsus, successor of
Chrysippus, 34; opinion as to
the destruction of the world, 34

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